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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The questions
This thesis attempts to answer the following questions:
1. What is the text of the Apohasiddhi (AS)?
2. What does that text say?
3. Why does it say what it says?
These questions I try to answer in a critical edition of the AS, in its annotated trans-
lation, and in a study of some of its main arguments. The text edition (chapter 2 on
page 13), and the translation (chapter 3 on page 39) jointly try to answer questions 1
and 2. The translation, along with some comments (section 4.1 on page 65) and an
analysis of the argumentative structure (section 4.3 on page 98), as well as a study of
the AS (chapter 5 on page 111) try to answer question 3.
1.2 Ratnakīrti
Ratnakīrti, a Buddhist monk and teacher in the monastery of Vikramaśīla, is listed as
the 32nd of 41 authors belonging to the tradition of the Buddhist epistemological-logical
school of thought in Steinkellner and Much 1995: 99 ff., and his dates are given there
as 990–1050 CE.
Ratnakīrti was a pupil of Jñānaśrīmitra. This is shown by the phrase “yad āhur gura-
vaḥ” used to introduce quotations from his teacher in various passages.1 Jñānaśrīmitra
is unanimously recognized as a highly important Buddhist thinker.2 Since Ratnakīrti’s
existant texts are closely based on those of his teacher, this importance is imparted to
these texts too. But whether there are any differences between the position’s of these
1Cf. the comments in Thakur 1975a: 11 ff. The following list of these passages is based on the
viśiṣṭanāmasūcī (index of specified names) in RNĀ2 151 f.: SJS2 27.5 (most probably referring to a
verse in the lost Sarvajñasiddhi of Jñānaśrīmitra, see Steinkellner 1977: 384, also cf. frag. 8 on p. 388),
KBhSA2 72.5, KBhSV 88.3, SSD2 118.23, SSD2 119.9, SSD2 118.31, CAPV 132.6, CAPV 133.16,
CAPV 136.23, CAPV 138.28, CAPV 141.9, CAPV 142.28. The references to RNĀ2 32, 96, 135, given
under the entry guruḥ, do not actually contain the word guruḥ.
2Cf. the reconstruction of his importance by Frauwallner (1931), and the assessments, after his works
had become known, by Thakur (1987a: 29), Jong (1962: 75), and McCrea and Patil (2006: 304 ff.).
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two authors is a question that can not be answered with certainty until both their works
have been properly studied.3
Ratnakīrti’s texts were amongst the earliest to become the subject of modern stud-
ies. The editio princeps of the Apohasiddhi is found in Shāstri 1910.4 Mookerjee
(2006: 125 ff.) made an early (1935) attempt to place Ratnakīrti’s AS in its historical
and argumentative context, and was also responsible for a long running debate about
the development of the apoha-theory.5 In 1932, Stcherbatsky noted about the AS that it
“...was written in one night and, probably for this reason, [is—PMA] lacking in clear-
ness....” (Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 404)6
The next important event was the 1934 discovery of amanuscript of Ratnakīrti’s col-
lected works by Sāṅkṛtyāyana in Źa lu ri phug.7 On the the 3rd of June 1938 pictures of
that manuscript were taken.8 On the basis of these pictures, the Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī
(RNĀ1) was published by Anantalal Thakur, with a second revised edition appearing in
1975 (RNĀ2).
The most noteworthy books on Ratnakīrti, in order of publication, are as follows:9
3Cf. the considerations at the beginning of Mc Allister Forthcoming. I have nothing to add to the
scholarly presentations of Ratnakīrti’s life, works, and intellectual surroundings in Thakur 1975a, Thakur
1987a: 29 ff., Kajiyama 1998: 7 ff., Mimaki 1976: 3 ff., and Mimaki 1992.
4This bookwas reprinted in 1989 and, for want of a better word, re-edited in 1996. This latter publica-
tion is not very useful, because it introduced quite a few misprints, omitted some footnotes, and changed
the layout.
5Cf. Kataoka 2009: 498–496 for a concise summary of this discussion.
6This misinterpretation of the colophon was corrected by Thakur (1957a: 13, fn. 1).
7I follow the spelling found in Kellner and Sferra 2008: 426, fn. 16.
8The discovery of the RNĀ is described in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 25 f., and the manuscript was first
catalogued as item 22 (=VIII.2, sect. III) in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 29, i.e., on Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s 2nd
expedition to Tibet, April 4th–November 10th, 1934 (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 21 f.). Pictures of it might
also have been taken between the 5th and 15th of August 1936, according to the account in Sāṅkṛtyāyana
1937: 14 f. Unfortunately, as Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1938: 138) reports, “[l]ast time [i.e., in 1936—PMA]we took
Photographs of some of theseMSS., but we had failed to get good results.” But manuscript P is signed and
dated on the empty folio 60a by “FanyMockerjee” (the photographer as spelt in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938: 137).
The signature in fact looks more like “Fany Mookj”, but the date “3/6/38” is clear.
9Two other published studies about the Apohasiddhi should be mentioned: Sharma 1969 and Chat-
topadhyay 2002. For an appreciation of Sharma 1969, see Oberhammer 1975. Sharma 1969 provides a
text based on AS1 with corrections according to AS2, a translation, and a study. The translation I found
very hard to understand in some passages, and it seems to have missed a few of the more important
points. The study, although it is very interesting since it aims at a philosophically relevant restatement of
Ratnakīrti’s apoha-theory, is, for that very reason, not very informative about Ratnakīrti’s theories them-
selves. One example might suffice to prove the point concerning the translation: the phrase “tatra na
buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ saṃvṛttyā vā vidhiniṣedhau, svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatvād ...” (from
§ 49) is translated as follows by Sharma (1969: 91):
In this context, affirmation and negation are applicable to the configuration (which is a
passive cognition) neither in reality, nor in internal feeling (for it is neither to be desired
nor to be not desired), for the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-
perception.
Apart from the terminological disagreements I have with this translation, I think that the understanding
of saṃvṛttyā as “in internal feeling” and the analysis of svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatva as “the self-
feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception” are not merely confusing but misleading
(cf. § 49 on page 60 for my understanding of this phrase). The proof cited for (as far as I understand) the
interpretation of saṃvṛttyā as “in internal feeling” by Sharma (1969: 90, fn. 238) is not very convincing:
“samvṛtyā samvṛtti = svasamvedanā. See PVST.[=PVSVṬ, PMA], p. 121; PVP. [=PVA, PMA], p. 573:
2
1.2. Ratnakīrti
Mimaki 1976 contains an edition, based on SSD1 and the manuscript used for that
edition (= ms P), a translation and careful study of the SSD, the “Réfutation de la per-
manence des choses” (Mimaki 1976: 2).
Bühnemann 1980 translated and studied the SJS, the “Proof of an Omniscient One”,
basing herself on SJS1, SJS2, and the manuscript used by Thakur for that edition (again,
this is manuscript P).
Lasic 2000b provides a true critical edition of the VyN based on the pictures taken
by Sāṅkṛtyāyana, a translation, and an analysis of the argument structure.
Patil 2009 follows a different aim than the books mentioned. He intends to provide
a more “systematic” account of Ratnakīrti’s ĪSD. It should be called systematic since
Parimal Patil shows how the various positions that Ratnakīrti holds on subjects such as
inference, perception, awareness, and language influence the very specific arguments
of the ĪSD. To this end, he relies mainly on the AS, and in a lesser degree on the VyN,
the KBhSA, the KBhSV, and the CAPV. None of these texts is translated in its entirety,
but certainly the main passages of the ĪSD and the AS are translated and interpreted
very thoroughly. Especially for the AS it should be noted that Parimal Patil has had
access to (and used) the manuscripts from Nepal that were used also for the edition in
the present work (mss. N1, N2, N3).
Apart from these publications, I was also able to avail myself of a few studies that
are not easily available, or had kindly been provided to me as drafts by their respective
authors. Akamatsu 1983, a doctoral thesis providing an annotated translation of Jñāna-
śrīmitra’s AP, was invaluable to me. This is a pioneering work of the highest quality,
and it is a great mystery to me why it was never published. Even though a few of the
more poetic parts of Jñānaśrīmitra’s treatise were not perfectly understood, the main
philosophical points and historical influences of the AP were clearly outlined.
Parimal Patil kindly made available to me a draft of his translations of both the
AS (Patil 2008b) and the AP (Patil 2008a, which he worked on jointly with Lawrence
McCrea). The latter has just been published asMcCrea and Patil 2010, but it was too late
to systematically incorporate that publication (and its highly informative introduction)
into this dissertation.
Furthermore, I was able to profit greatly fromWoo 1999, a dissertation on the KBh-
SA, from a draft of M. T. Much’s German translation of the apoha-section in PV 110
(Much 2008), as well as from a draft of Hisataka Ishida’s critical edition of TS2 866–871
and Pañjikā thereon (Ishida 2008).
samvṛttisadeva dharmi-dharmalakṣaṇam.” For the rest of the footnote he cites (and paraphrases) material
from Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 385 f., fn. 6 (whose note only concerns svasaṃvedana, but not saṃvṛtti). I
couldn’t find either svasaṃvedana or saṃvṛttimentioned in PVSVṬ 121. Although I haven’t studied the
context of the phrase “samvṛttisad eva dharmidharmalakṣaṇaṃ” (PVA 573.24) as closely as it deserves,
it doesn’t seem to say more than that what has the characteristic of property and property bearer exists
only conventionally.
The text edition in Chattopadhyay 2002, which draws on AS1 and AS3, is generally reliable. The
English translation, which is rather free, suffers a bit from terminological problems that seem to stem
from not having studied more recent translations of similar works in much detail, but is usually close to
the mark. The Bengali translation I am unfortunately not able to read.
McDermott 1969, a study of the KBhSV, did not receive much critical acclaim, cf. Seyfort Ruegg
1971 (replied to in McDermott 1972) and Steinkellner 1972.
10The chapters of the Pramāṇavārttika are counted as follows: Svārthānumāna, Pramāṇasiddhi,
Pratyakṣa, and Parārthānumāna. For the discussion about the sequence of these chapters, cf. Kellner
2004a, Gnoli 1960a: xv ff., and Frauwallner 1954: 142–147.
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1.3 The Apohasiddhi
Title of the Apohasiddhi
According to the colophon of manuscript P, the title of the text is Apohaprakaraṇa,
the same as Jñānaśrīmitra’s work on the same subject (AP). All the other manuscripts
support the name Apohasiddhi. Since Ratnakīrti himself refers to the AS as “...iti
apohasiddhau prasādhitam” (...so it is well established in the Apohasiddhi.) in the
CAPV 122.18–19, preference is given to the title Apohasiddhi.
Purpose of the Apohasiddhi
Ratnakīrti does not say what kind of text the Apohasiddhi is supposed to be. The first
impression certainly is that it is little more than a condensed version of Jñānaśrīmitra’s
AP, or even only a rearrangement of passages from that work.11 But a closer examina-
tion reveals at least two interesting points of difference between the AS and the AP. On
the one hand, Ratnakīrti, at least in the AS, does not follow Jñānaśrīmitra’s interpre-
tatorial technique of “a conditionally adopted position (vyavasthā)” (Patil 2007: 598),
whereby certain theories can be provisionally accepted “for only specific and philosoph-
ically legitimate purposes” (Patil 2007: 603), just in order to be abandoned or at least
substantially altered when those purposes change.12 The central term used by Jñānaśrī-
mitra in this context is vyavasthā. In the AS, this connotation of the term can not be
found, and it simply means definiton or classification.13 A second noticeable difference
lies in the arrangement of the texts. The AP is organized according to the introductory
verse, as has been shown by Akamatsu (1983: 35–38) and Katsura (1986: 179, n. 15).
The AS is arranged according to more ‘logical’14 principles, in particular15 according
to the requirements of the inference found at its end (§ 54 to § 58 on page 37).
As pointed out by Thakur (1975a: 12), Ratnakīrti states his intention in writing texts
comparable to the AS at the end of the SJS and at the beginning of the ĪSD:
durvāraprativādivikramam anādṛtya pramāprauḍhitaḥ sarvajño jagade-
kacakṣur udagād eṣa prabhāvo ’tra ca |
sambuddhasthitimedinīkulagirer asmadguroḥ kin tv ayaṃ saṃkṣepo ma-
ma ratnakīrtikṛtinas tadvistaratrāsinaḥ || SJS2 31.24 ff.
Disregarding the strength of irrepressible opponents, through the full de-
velopment (prauḍhi) of true knowledge (pramā), the omniscient one, the
single eye of the world, arose. And the majesty with regard to this [subject,
omniscience,] is [that] of my revered teacher, the chief mountain in the land
of residence of the allenlightened one. But this compendium [is] mine, the
obeying Ratnakīrti’s, who fears this [master’s] extensive treatise.16
11Cf. the remarks in Lasic 2000b for examples of differences between Jñānaśrīmitra’s VC and Ratna-
kīrti’s VyN, and cf. Thakur 1975a: 12 for a general assessment, as well as the beginning of Mc Allister
Forthcoming.
12Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006 and Patil 2007 for two excellent studies on this technique.
13Cf., e.g., the arguments in § 5 and § 16.
14First observed by Thakur (1957a: 13, fn. 1, and pp. 14 f.) as a general stylistic mark of Ratnakīrti’s
works.
15I have tried to argue this point in the study of the AS, cf. section 5.1 on page 112.
16Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 90.
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sūktaratnāśrayatvena jitaratnākarād idam | guror vāgambudheḥ sma-
rtuṃ kiñcid ākṛṣya likhyate ||
rītiḥ sudhānidhir iyaṃ sattame madhyavartini | vidveṣiṇi viṣajvālā kiñcij
jñe tu na kiñcana || ĪSD 32.5 f.
Having17 retrieved some [jewels] to remember from that ocean of words,
the revered teacher, who has conquered ratnākara18 based on beautifully
expressed jewels, this [treatise] is written.
This stream [of words] is a reservoir of nectar for a venerable one occupy-
ing the center, [it is] a poisonous torch for a hostile one, but [it is] nothing
at all for someone knowing a little.
To these should be added the verses introducing the SSD and the CAPV:
yadyogād andhavad viśvaṃ saṃsāre bhramad iṣyate |
sā kṛpāvaśagaiḥ pāpā sthirasiddhir apāsyate || SSD2 112.4–5
That wicked proof of permanence, in consequence (yogāt) of which the
whole world, as if blind, is assumed to be wandering in the course of exis-
tence, is driven away by those under the power of compassion.19
dig eṣā svaparāśeṣaprativādiprasādhanī |
citrādvaitamatābodhadhvāntastomakadarthinī || CAPV 129.5–6
This is a line [of reasoning] (diś) which overpowers (prasādhanin) all op-
ponents, whether internal or external,20 [and] repells (kadarthin) the mass
of ignorance [that is due] to not knowing the doctrine of non-duality in
plurality (citrādvaita).21
From these verses, even though the above translations are far from secure, the fol-
lowing intentions can be attributed to Ratnakīrti’s texts: they intend to restate the main
points of Jñānaśrīmitra’s much longer treatises, they should abolish wrong opinions,
held by internal, Buddhist, and external, Non-Buddhist, opponents, they should streng-
then correct opinions, and, through this, they should aid in the deliverance from the
cycle of existence.
17Cf. also the translation of this difficult verse in Patil 2001: 307:
Having taken something from the ocean of (my) teacher’s words through which he, in virtue
of being a locus of well-spoken jewels, conquered the ocean (of samsāra) this was written,
in rememberance.
Among those who follow the middle path and are the best of men this course is an ocean of
ambrosia, among those who are enemies it is a poisonous flame, and for those who know a
little it is nothing.
18ratnākara can refer to a mine of jewels (the literal meaning) or the ocean. Acc. to McCrea and
Patil 2010: 3, the phrase jitaratnākarādmeans “the one who has defeated Ratnākara”, or Ratnākaraśānti,
a Buddhist contemporary of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. In that case, the follwing phrase “based on ...”
might be a reference to the verse work SāSaSū.
19Cf. Mimaki 1976: 83: “Il est admis que quiconque est d’accord avec cette [preuve] erre dans la
transmigration (saṃsāra) comme un aveugle. Aussi, cette fausse preuve de permanence [des choses]
est-elle rejetée par ceux qui sont sous l’empire de la compassion (kṛpā).”
20I.e., whether they are Buddhists or Non-Buddhists.
21Dr. Abhijit Ghosh, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, gave me his very helpful opinion on this verse in
May 2009.
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Persons and texts mentioned in the Apohasiddhi
The following texts or persons (or groups of persons) are mentioned by name in the
Apohasiddhi and its colophon:
The persons mentioned are:
• Dharmottara: § 51 on page 35 (referring to the DhAP)
• Followers of Kumārila (i.e., Sucaritamiśra): § 25 on page 24
• Ratnakīrti: § 60 on page 38
• Trailokyadatta (scribe): § 60 on page 38
• Trilocana: § 38 on page 30
• Vācaspati: § 10 on page 17, § 22 on page 22, § 24 on page 23, § 30 on page 26
(all references to NVTṬ)
• Vidhivādin: § 9 on page 15
• Pratiṣedhavādin: § 9 on page 1622
The texts mentioned are:
• Nyāyabhuṣana: § 31 on page 27 and § 43 on page 32.
• Śāstra: § 28 on page 26.
1.4 Manuscripts
Five of six23 known manuscripts of the AS have been used for this edition:
1. Manuscript K:24
• This is manuscript number G 4711 in the collection of the Asiatic Society
in Kolkata (cf. the description in Shāstri 2005: 32 f.).
• Its script is characterized by Shāstri (2005: 32) as Bengali of the 12th cen-
tury.
2. Manuscript P:
• I was able to use copies of the prints catalogued as “Xc 14/26” in the Samm-
lung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen (Col-
lection of the Seminar for Indology and Buddhist studies in Göttingen).25
This manuscript is reported by Bandurski (1994: 60) to be in Beijing, un-
der the signature “Pek.-L., Nr. 52–58.”, and is described in Bandurski
1994: 58 ff. The text of the Apohasiddhi is to be found on folios 32b–36b.
22Unnamed persons are referred to in the following paragraphs: § 4 on page 14, § 31 on page 27
(Bhāsarvajña), § 37 on page 30, § 40 on page 31 (probably Trilocana), § 41 on page 31 (probably Trilo-
cana), § 54 on page 37. References to the Siddhāntin are found in these paragraphs: § 8 on page 15, § 37
on page 30
23Two manuscripts were used in Shāstri 1910 for the edition of AS1: The first is manuscript G 4711
in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. Shāstri 2005: 32 f.). This is manuscript K in the
present edition. The other (S2) was in Shāstri’s private possession, and I was not able to find it during a
visit to Kolkata in 2009.
24These keys to the entries are used to reference the source in the critical apparatus.
25For details on this collection, cf. Bandurski 1994: 15 ff., and see Kellner 2007: 19 for how copies
of the prints came to Vienna.
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The ms was discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in Źa lu ri phug during
his second expedition to Tibet.26 In his note to the manuscript he called the
script Purāṇamaithilī, which he seems to have used synonymously with
Nevārī and Vartula.27 Thakur 1975a: 11 states that the manuscript convo-
lute that the Apohasiddhi is a part of “...consists of eighty-six folia in clear
Maithil script of circa 1200 A.D.”28
• This manuscript is the basis of the editions AS2 and AS3.
3. Manuscripts N1, N2 and N3 were microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript
Preservation Project (NGMPP). Their numeric identifiers in the NGMCP are
3890, 3889, and 3891 respectively, and their microfilm numbers are A109/12,
D35/1, and A117/7. The descriptions given on their scanned catalogue cards are
as follows (my additions are in square brackets, the values are written in Devanā-
garī on the cards of mss. N1 and N3):
• Manuscript N1, whose script is identified as Newari in the Nepalese-Ger-
man Manuscript Cataloguing Project (NGMCP: entry 3890):
– [Number, probably of the microfilm]: e 109/12
– Subject: bauddhadarśana
– Manuscript-Name: apohasiddhiḥ
– C. No. [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu]
3–717
– S. No. 2
– Folio No. 13
– Size: 34,5 × 10 [cm]
• Manuscript N2, whose script is identified as Newari in Nepalese-German
Manuscript Cataloguing Project (NGMCP: entry 3889) (this manuscript is
not in the National Archives of Kathmandu, and the scanned catalogue card
is written in English):
– Short Title: Apohasiddhi
– Running No. 764D
– Subject: Baudd. Nyāya
– Title (acc. to Colophon) Apohasiddhi
– Author: Ratnakīrti (c. 10th cent. AD)
– No. of leaves: 14 complete
– Size in cm: 32,5 × 8,4
– Reel No.: D 34,1
– Remarks: paper [note to the effect that manuscript is undamaged]
– Script: Newari
• Manuscript N3, whose script is identified as Devanāgarī in Nepalese-Ger-
man Manuscript Cataloguing Project (NGMCP: entry 3891):
26Cf. the comments in fn. 8 on page 2.
27For a discussion of this script see Bandurski 1994: 20; 58 f., Dimitrov 2002: 29 ff., as well as Ishida
2011a: xxvi–xxxiii.
28Kellner (2007: 21) gives a succinct overview of the various classifications of the very similar script
in JNĀms.
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– [Number on front:] E 117/7
– Subject: bauddhadarśana
– Manuscript-Name: apohasiddhiḥ
– C. No. [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu]
5–256
– S. No. 2 (kha)
– Folio No. 11
– Size: 32,5 × 11 [cm]
Considering Anantalal Thakur’s expertise in editing these kinds of texts, I have
noted those differences to any of Thakur’s observations and footnotes in either AS2 or
AS3 which could not be easily resolved as misprints or similar circumstantial errors.
Relation of the manuscripts
The following points must be noted in order to establish the relation between the avail-
able manuscripts:
1. In the opening line, K, N1, N2, N3 pay hommage to Śrīlokanātha, P to Tāra.
2. K, N1, N2, N3 share a practically identical colophon.
3. N3 appears to be dependant on N2: they have many errors in common, and the
same repetition of ll. 41 to 49. Some of the other factors that point to this depen-
dency are:
• N3 might have misread some of the unclearer passages in N2: cf., e.g.,
the evidence for °śabdāt (l. 160);29 the evidence for śabdāntarāvagatena
(l. 118), first emended from śabdāntarāvābhābhāvaṃgatena to śabdānta-
rābhāvābhāvaṃgatena, by placing the numbers 2 and 1 over the syllables
vā and bhā, and then finally to śabdāntarāvaṃgatena in N2 7b1, deleting
vābhābhā (and forgetting to delete the remaining anusvāra) by placing a
kākapāda on vā and the last bhā, is found in N3 6a6 as śabdāntarābhāvā-
bhāvagatena. The simplest explanation is that the scribe of N3 correctly
understood the first correction in N2, but missed the deletion marks.30
• In the case of °sāṃkarya° (l. 238), N3 apparently mistook a ṅka for kā. N2
has a prefixed ṅ that looks like a sign for a long ā in its script.31
But there are also a few readings which do not fit in with this: cf., e.g., the variants
for kiṃ sāmānya (l. 187), or for vipakṣato (l. 256).
4. N1 and N2 in turn depend on K: c.f., e.g., the variants for °pari° in l. 13, ca in 22,
°sphuritam in l. 24, eṣa in l. 66, or apoha° in l. 69.
From this, the following sketch can be constructed, the top node “α” standing for
the archetype, and a line meaning “descended from”, without claiming directness:32
29If N3 and N2 are linked, it could be that N3 misread the hook for ā occurring at the end of line 1 in
N2 9b, which resulted in the erroneous reading “śa«b»dat” in N3.
30The other important possibility is that N2 and N3 had a common ancestor reading śabdāntarābhā-
vābhāvagatena, which N2 initally reproduced, and then, having corrected a slight mistake made during
copying, changed to something more meaningful.
31Cf. figs. 1.12 to 1.15 on page 12.
32This means that a line connecting A to B should not be understood as indicating that B directly
descended from A, a fact that could hardly be verified. But it does mean that a dependency on A is
visible in B.
8
1.5. Notes on the critical edition
.α
K P
N1 N2
N3
1.5 Notes on the critical edition
Conventions and abbreviations used in the critical apparatus
The following conventions are used in the critical edition:33
1. Names are signified by underlining, like vācaspatiḥ.
2. {ka} means that “ka” was deleted or marked as erroneous in the ms.
3. «ka» means that “ka” was added into the original textflow. There is no implicit
specification as to where this addition is placed (i.e., above, below, in the margin,
etc.)
4. A “ v ” indicates that there is an insertion mark at this point.
5. (ka) means that “ka” was not read with certainty.
6. Some34 scribal corrections are marked as anyāpoḍhovadhārya/t{e}→ta/, mean-
ing that the scribe wrote te and then deleted the vowel sign for e, so that the result
was ta.
7. tadanupra
⇃N12b
veśo signifies the beginning of a folio, in this case it would be the
beginning of the reverse of leaf 2 in manuscript N1 after the akṣara pra.
8. tatpratītivyava
╷K2
sthā signifies the end of line 2 in K (for example if the manuscript
is torn at that point). It is put after the last whole akṣara in the line.
9. athaivaṃ
˯K3
matiḥ signifies the start of a new line (start of line 3 in K). If this coin-
cides with the end of the previous line, so that nothing is missing, only this sign
will be recorded.35
10. anaikāntika×mbhā° indicates that there is a space of one akṣara between ka and
mbhā.
11. A “··” indicates an illegible sign with the width of one akṣara.
12. °bāhya⁓ ⁓ ⁓ viṣayatvena indicates that there are three filling signs between ya
and vi (cf. section 1.5 on page 11).
13. A “•” indicates that there is a dot in the ms, often marking a word boundary.
14. Punctuation used in the edition does not reflect the punctuation of the mss. Some
special signs are:
a) Maṅgala sign:36 ¤
33The following is based on Steinkellner 2007: xlvi f.
34I.e., those where a simple note of the correction would not provide useful or clear information. In
the example given, a simple report of the correction as “t{e}” could be misunderstood as a correction to
“t” instead of “ta”.
35Cf. item 1f on the following page for the use of marking the end of line and start of line in K.
36Cf. G. Roth 1986 for a discussion of these signs, and see section 1.5 on page 11 for examples of the
signs used in the manuscripts of the AS.
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b) Siddham sign: ⊕
c) Ornamental sign at the end of ms: ⁕
In the notes to the edition, I have tried to follow these rules:
1. An entry in the critical apparatus is typically as follows:
a) The line number or range of lines that this entry is indexed to is given.
b) The lemma is printed. This is a quotation of a text string as found in the
edition, and its purpose is to index the entry to the text. If it is not unique
within the line, a raised number following the lemma indexes it to the rele-
vant occurrence in the referenced line.
c) Next come the sigla of the manuscripts supporting the reading accepted in
the edition (i.e., of the manuscripts reading as the lemma does save for the
neglected errors mentioned section 1.5 on the next page). If no manuscript
supports the reading, it is an emendation and is marked as “em.”.
d) Next, the variants found in the other manuscripts are given. These readings
(in contrast to the lemma) do reflect the text as it is found in the manuscripts.
They are separated from each other (and the lemma) either by
i. a colon, which indicates that the reading following it is different from
the one accepted, or
ii. a comma, which indicates that the following reading partially or indi-
rectly supports the accepted reading, or
iii. a semicolon, indicating that the following variant (usually an omission)
does not provide decisive evidence.
These signs always express the relation that the variant has to the accepted
reading, and not the relation between two subsequent variants.
e) Separated by an opening square bracket, an explanation may be given.
f) On most folios of K, a few akṣaras at the end of the line are missing. When
the remaining material supports a reading or a variant only partially, I have
added it as a witness nevertheless. The reader will easily be able to see
which part of the reading is actually supported or not supported by looking
at the end-of-line and start-of-line marks (cf. items 8 and 9 on the preceding
page). When the remaining material does not have any value for deciding
the reading, I have entered “ no ev. K” (meaning “no evidence in K”).37
2. A missing virāma is not noted, except when there are other variants or it is rele-
vant for the meaning of the passage. In these cases it is rendered as word  (e.g.,
saty  for satya in the manuscript).
37An example is the reading cānyāpoḍhānyāpohayorvirodho at the beginning of § 14: K reads °ḍhā-
nyāpohayorvirodho, starting on line 6, and cānyāpo° was, presumably, at the end of the previous line
that is damaged. This I have taken as evidence in K for the reading adopted in the edition, because the
relevant information, °ḍhānyāpoha° vs. °hānyapoḍha° is found in K. And that cānyāpo° is not found in
K can easily be gathered from the end-of-line and start-of-line marks in the edition. I believe this is the
most useful way of presenting the information without cluttering the apparatus with irrelevant informa-
tion. Another example is the reading aprāpter bhrāntir against aprāpte bhrāntir (cf. l. 164). There K
reads prā, then the folio is torn, and the next folio starts with °rbhrānti°. This I have taken as support in
K for aprāpter bhrāntir.
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Textual references in the critical edition
To show textual relations (as opposed to content relations) of the AS to other texts, I
have made use of two symbols:
1. A “=” is used to show that the passage has a close parallel.
2. A “” indicates a loose parallel.
Differences not reported in critical edition
Discrepancies between the manuscripts that result from any of the following factors
have not been noted as variant readings:
1. K, P, N1, N2 do not usually degeminate tt following ṛ. N3 does.
2. P, N1, N2, N3 degeminate tt before a semi-vowel, K does not.
3. All manuscripts irregularly geminate m, t, and y after r.
4. avagraha-s are not always written.
5. Substition of a nasal with an anusvāra.
6. Additional anusvāra before nasals.
7. N1, N3 and N2 use dots to separate words as well as parts of compounds without
any recognizable pattern, and sometimes with an obvious misunderstanding.38
These dots do not usually influence saṃdhi. They are only reported (as “•”)
when they are useful for understanding a variant.
Particularities of the scripts
The most noteworthy peculiarities of the akṣara-s encountered in the manuscripts are
as follows:
1. Siddham signs (⊕) used: cf. figs. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.39
2. Ornamental signs (⁕) used: cf. figs. 1.6 and 1.7.
3. Spacing (⁓ ) in K 8b1: cf. fig. 1.4.
4. P sometimes (e.g., l. 40, p. 16) uses a stylized ma with virāma as shown in, cf.
fig. 1.5.40
5. Deletion markers: K sometimes “brackets” wrong text, e.g., in l. 121 (p. 24): cf.
fig. 1.11.
6. N1 and N2 sometimes use a special correction mark, a sort of tilde above an
akṣara, to transform that akṣara within its class. Cf. the following corrections:
/śa→sa/ in l. 175 (p. 30, cf. fig. 1.10), /śa→ṣa/ in l. 182 (p. 30), /ma→ṇa/ in
l. 132 (p. 25, cf. fig. 1.9), /na→ṇa/ in l. 209 (p. 32), /ṣye→sye/ in l. 218 (p. 33).
38Cf. 1.8 on the next page.
39All references in this list are to p. 12.
40For a discussion of this letter cf. MacDonald 2005: xxii, and the references given there. See also
Kouda 2004: 110, “Characters with ṃ\”.
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Figure 1.1: Siddham sym-
bol, K 1b1
Figure 1.2: Siddham sym-
bol, K 8b3
Figure 1.3: Siddham sym-
bol, N1 1b1
Figure 1.4: Spacing Sym-
bols, K 8b1
Figure 1.5: anusvāra
(ryaṃ), P 33a3
Figure 1.6: Ornamental
symbol, N1 13b2
Figure 1.7: Ornamental
symbol, N2 14b4
Figure 1.8: bāhya•meva,
N1 1b2
Figure 1.9: Correction of
ma to ṇa, N1 7a5
Figure 1.10: Correction of śa to sa,
N2 10a5
Figure 1.11: Deletion, N2 4b6
Figure 1.12: “śabdā” in
N2 9b1 before end of line.
Figure 1.13: “śa«b»dat.”
in N3 7b6.
Figure 1.14: “sāṅkaryya”
N2 13b1.
Figure 1.15:
“sākāryya” in
N3 10b5.
Figure 1.16: Usual bha in
N2.
Figure 1.17: Second ver-
sion of bha in N2 11a4.
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Chapter 2
Text of the Apohasiddhi
oṃ namaḥ śrīlokanāthāya.
[§ 1] apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate.
[§ 2] nanu ko ’yam apoho nāma. kim idam anyasmād apohyate, asmād vānyad apo-
hyate, asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā vijāti
╷K1
vyāvṛttaṃ bāhya
˯K2
m eva vivakṣitaṃ
5 buddhyākāro vā yadi vāpohanam apoha ity anyavyāvṛttimātram iti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ.
[§ 3] na tāvad ādimau pakṣau, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt. antimo ’py
asa
╷K2
ṅgataḥ, pratī
˯K3
tibādhitatvāt. tathā hi parvatoddeśe vahnir astīti śābdī pratītir vidhirū-
pam evollikhantī lakṣyate, nānagnir na bhavatīti nivṛttimātram āmukhayantī. yac ca
1 oṃ ] N2 N3 ; ¤ K N1 ; n. e. P — Cf.
punctuation schema, 14 on page 9. Symbols in
K and N1 closely resemble symbols number 1
and 12, respectively, in G. Roth 1986: plate
“Signs used in the article of Dr. Gustav Roth”.
1 śrīlokanāthāya ] K N1 , śrīlokanāthāya{ḥ}
N3 : śrīlokanāthāyaḥ N2 ; tārāyai P — Scribal
additon.
2 apohaḥ ] K P N2 N3 : apoha N1
2 śabdārtho ] K P N2 N3 : śabdārtha N1
3 apoho ] K P N1 N2 : apoha N3
3 idam ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
3 apohyate ] K P N1 N2 : ayohyateḥ N3
3–4 apohyate ] K P : apohyateḥ N1 N2 :
ayohyateḥ N3
4 apohyata ] K P N1 N2 : ayohyata N3
4 iti ] K P N1 N2 : n. e. N3
5 apoha ] K P N2 N3 , aha«2» | po«1» N1
5 trayaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : traya N3
7 parvatoddeśe ] K P N1 N2 : parvatodeśe N3
7 astīti ] K P N1 N2 : asmīti N3
8 evollikhantī ] K P : evolikhayantī N1:
evolikhaṃti N3: evolikhanti N2
8 lakṣyate ] K P N2 : lakṣyateḥ N1 : lakṣate
N3
8 āmukhayantī ] K P N1 N2 : āmukhayaṃti
N3
1 oṃ ] Mss K N1 N2 N3 begin on folio 1b, P on folio 33b.
3–5 nanu ko ...pakṣāḥ ] Cf. TBh2 52.7–12
3–5 anyasmād ...buddhyākāro vā ] AP 202.12–13
3 vānyad ] Acc. to AS3 58, fn. 3: “anyad omitted T.” (“T” is P).
6 apohanāmnā ...vivakṣitatvāt ] =AP 202.13–14
7–9 pratītibādhitatvāt ...atiprasiddham ] AP 201.9–12
7–8 parvatoddeśe ...āmukhayantī ] Cf. ĀTV2 112.9–10 (ĀTV1 278.6–8)
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pratyakṣabādhita
╷K3
m, na tatra sā
˯K4
dhanāntarāvakāśa ity atiprasiddham.
10 [§ 4] atha yady api nivṛttim ahaṃ pratyemīti na vikalpaḥ, tathāpi ni-
vṛttapadārthollekha eva nivṛttyullekhaḥ.
⇃N22a
na hy anantarbhāvitaviśeṣa
╷K4, N12a
ṇapratī
˯K5
tir viśi-
ṣṭapratītiḥ. tato yathā sāmānyam ahaṃ pratyemīti vikalpābhāve ’pi sādhāraṇākā-
raparisphuraṇād vikalpabuddhiḥ sāmānyabuddhiḥ pareṣām, tathā nivṛttapra
╷K5
tyayā
˯K6
kṣiptā
nivṛttibuddhir a
⇃N32a
pohapratītivyavahāram ātanotīti cet.
15 [§ 5] nanu sādhāraṇākāraparisphuraṇe vidhirūpatayā yadi sāmānyabodhavyavasthā,
tat kim āyā
╷K6
tam asphu
˯K7
radabhāvākāre cetasi nivṛttipratītivyavasthāyāḥ. tato nivṛttim
ahaṃ pratyemīty evamākārābhāve ’pi nivṛttyākārasphuraṇaṃ yadi syāt, ko nāma ni-
vṛttipratītisthitim a
╷K7
palape
⇃K2a
t. anyathāsati pratibhāse tatpratītivyavahṛtir iti gavākāre ’pi
cetasi turagabodha ity astu.
20 [§ 6] atha viśeṣaṇatayāntarbhūtā nivṛttipratītir ity uktam, tathāpi yady agavāpo
╷K1
ḍha
itīdṛśā
˯K2
kāro vikalpaḥ, tadā viśeṣaṇatayā tadanupra
⇃N12b
veśo bhavatu, kiṃ tu gaur iti
pratītiḥ. tadā ca sato ’pi nivṛttilakṣaṇasya viśeṣaṇasya tatrānutkalanāt kathaṃ
10 pratyemīti ] K P N1 N2 : pratyemiti N3
10 vikalpaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : vikalpa N3
10–11 nivṛtta° ] K P N1 N2 : nivṛti N3
11 °padārtho° ] K N1 N2 N3 : pa{thā}rtho P
11 nivṛttyullekhaḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
nivṛtyalekhaḥ N3
11 anantarbhāvita° ] K P N2 N3 :
anantabhāvita N1
11 °pratītir ] K P : pratīti N1 N2 N3
13 °pari° ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
13 °sphuraṇād ] K P N1 N2 : sphuraraṇāt. N3
13 nivṛtta° ] K P N1 N2 N3 —Acc. to AS1 1,
fn.2, S2 reads nimitta here.
15 sāmānya° ] K P N1 N2 : sānya N3
15 °vyavasthā ] K P N2 N3 : vyavasthāḥ N1
16 °vyavasthāyāḥ ] K P N1 N2 : vyavasthāyā
N3
17 pratyemīty ] K P N1 N2 : pratyemity N3
17–18 nivṛttipratīti° ] K P N1 : nivṛti N3 :
nivṛttiīti N2 — In N2, both i and ī are attached
as vowel signs to the same base letter, tt.
18 apalapet ] N1 N2 N3 : apalepet P ;
no ev. K
20 °tayāntarbhūtā ] K P N1 : tayā aṃtabhūtā
N3 : tayā antabhūtā N2
20 agavāpoḍha ] P N2 N3 : agadāpoḍha N1 ;
no ev. K
21 vikalpaḥ, tadā ] K P N1 N2 : vikalpes
tadā N3
22 pratītiḥ ] K P N1 N2 : pratīti N3
22 ca ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
10–23 atha ...pratītivyavasthā ] =AP 201.17–202.4
10–16 yady api ...°vyavasthāyāḥ ] ĀTV2 112.11–113.7 (ĀTV1 279.17–280.6)
16–19 tato ...astu ] ĀTV2 113.8–12 (ĀTV1 282.2–5)
20–22 agavāpo ...pratītiḥ ] ĀTV2 113.7–8 (ĀTV1 282.1)
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tatpratītivyava
╷K2
sthā.
[§ 7] athaivaṃ
˯K3
matiḥ — yad vidhirūpaṃ sphuritam, tasya parāpoho ’py astīti tat-
25 pratītir ucyate, tathāpi sambandhamātram apohasya. vidhir eva sākṣānnirbhāsī. api
caivam a
╷K3
dhyakṣasyāpy a
˯K4
pohaviṣayatvam anivāryam, viśeṣato vikalpād ekavyāvṛttol-
lekhino ’khilānyavyāvṛttam īkṣamāṇasya.
⇃N32b
tasmād vidhyākārāvagrahād adhyakṣa
╷K4
vad vi-
kalpasyā
˯K5
pi vidhiviṣayatvam eva, nānyāpohaviṣayatvam iti katham a
⇃P33a
pohaḥ śabdārtho
ghuṣyate.
30 [§ 8] atrābhidhīyate — nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva keva
╷K5
lo ’bhipretaḥ,
˯K6
nāpy anyavyāvṛttimātram, kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ. tataś ca
⇃N23a
na
pratyekapakṣopanipātidoṣāvakāśaḥ.
[§ 9] yat tu goḥ pratītau na tadātmā parātmeti
╷K6, N13a
sāmarthyād apo
˯K7
haḥ paścān niścīya-
ta iti vidhivādināṃ matam, anyāpohapratītau vā sāmarthyād anyāpoḍho ’vadhāryata iti
24 matiḥ ] K P N1 N2 : mati N3
24 yad vidhirūpaṃ ] P N1 N2 N3 : yadi
«vi»dhirūpaṃ K
24 sphuritam ] K N1 N2 N3 : sphurati P
24 parāpoho ] K P N1 N3 : parāṃproho N2
24 astīti ] P N1 N2 N3 , astī{i}ti K
25 tathāpi ] K N1 N2 N3 : tadāpi P
25 vidhir ] K N1 N2 N3 : vidher P
25 sākṣānnirbhāsī ] K P N1 N2 :
sākṣānirbhāsi N3
26 °syāpy apo° ] N1 N2 N3 : syāpo P ;
no ev. K
26 apoha° ] K P N1 N2 : ahoha N3
26 °viṣayatvam anivāryam ] K P N2 N3 :
viṣayanirvāyam N1
26–27 °vyāvṛttollekhino ] P N2 ,
vyā{··}vṛttollekhino K : vyāvṛ(tto)lleṣino N1 :
vyāvṛtolekhino N3
27 ’khilānyavyāvṛttam ] P N1 N2 ,
’khilānya(vyāvṛ)ttam K ( Worm damage.) :
likhānyavṛtam N3
28 vidhiviṣayatvam eva,
nānyāpohaviṣayatvam iti ] K P N1 N2,
vidhiviṣayatvav«m eva nānyāpohatva»(m)m
iti N3 — The akṣara “mi”, which the scribe of
N3 had difficulties with, is not written as usual
in N2 (the prefixed line being only half the
usual height in this case).
28 katham apohaḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
kathapomaheḥ N3
28 śabdārtho ] K N1 N2 N3 : śabdārtha uda P
30 kevalo ’bhipretaḥ ] N1 P : kevalo ’pretaḥ
N2 : kevalopretaḥ N3 ; no ev. K
32 °pakṣopanipāti° ] K P N1 N2 :
pakṣopanīpāti N3
33 yat tu ] K P N2 : yatu N1 : yata N3
33 parātmeti ] K P N2 N3 : parātme N1
33 sāmarthyād ] P N2 N3 : sāmarthyad N1
34 sāmarthyād ] P : sāmarthyāt N1 N2 N3
34 anyāpoḍho ’vadhāryata ] P N1 :
anyāpoḍhovadhārya/t{e}→ta/ K :
anyāpoḍhovadharyate N2 :
anyāpodhovadhāryate N3
24–28 yad vidhirūpaṃ ...nānyāpohaviṣayatvam ] AP 202.7–202.11
31 anyāpohaviśiṣṭo ...arthaḥ ] Cf. TBh2 52.14
33–34 yat tu ...matam ] AP 206.15–16
33–44 yat tu goḥ ...abhidhīyate ] TBh2 52.14–53.12
33 na tadātmā parātmeti ] Cf. TSP2 1013a.
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2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
35 pratiṣedhavādināṃ matam, tad asundaram, prāthamikasyā
╷K7
pi pratipattikra
⇃K2b
mādarśanāt.
na hi vidhiṃ pratipadya kaścid arthāpattitaḥ paścād apoham avagacchati, apohaṃ vā
pratipadyānyāpoḍham. tasmād goḥ pratipattir ity anyāpoḍhapratipattir ucyate. yady
api cānyāpo
╷K1
ḍhaśabdānulle
˯K2
kha uktaḥ, tathāpi nāpratipattir eva viśeṣaṇabhūtasyānyāpo-
hasya, agavāpoḍha eva gośabdasya niveśitatvāt. yathā nīlotpale niveśitād indīvara-
40 śabdān nīlotpa
╷K2
lapratītau tatkā
˯K3
la eva nīlimasphuraṇam anivāryam, tathā go
⇃N33a
śabdād apy
agavāpoḍhe niveśitād
⇃N23b
gopratītau tulyakālam eva viśeṣaṇatvād ago’pohasphuraṇam
35 pratiṣedhavādināṃ ] K P N1 N2 :
pratiṣedhavādinā N3
35 °kasyāpi ] K P N1 N2 : kasyāmi N3
35 pratipattikramā° ] N1 N2 : pratītikramā P:
pratipatikramā N3 ; no ev. K
36 vidhiṃ ] K P N2 N3 : vidhi N1
36 pratipadya ] P N1 N2 N3 ,
prati/p{ā}→pa/dya K
36 kaścid ] K P N1 N2 : kaścīyad N3
36 arthāpattitaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : (arthāpa)titaḥ
N3 —N3 is smudged here.
36 paścād ] P N1 N2 N3 , «paścād» K
36 apoham avagacchati, apohaṃ vā ] K P N1
N2 : apoha«m avagacchati apoha» vā N3
37 goḥ ] K P : agoḥ N1 N2 : ago N3
37 ity ] P : iti • K N1 N2 : iti N3
37 anyāpoḍha° ] K P N2 N3 : anyāpoḍho N1
37 °pratipattir ] K P N1 N2 : pratipatir N3
38 °ānullekha ] P N1 N2 : ānulekha N3 ;
no ev. K
38 nāpratipattir ] K N1 N2 : nāpratītir P :
nāpipratipatir N3
38 °bhūtasyā° ] P N1 N2 : bhutasyā N3
38 °anya° ] P N1 N2 N3 : {anya} K
40 °śabdān nīlotpala° ] K P N2 :
śabdānīlotpala N1 : śabdānīlopala N3
40 eva ] K P N1 N2 : evaṃ N3
40 nīlima° ] K P N2 : nīlama N1 : nīlīma N3
40 °sphuraṇam anivāryam ] K P N1 N2 :
sphuram aṇicāryam N3
41 agavāpoḍhe ] K P N1 N2 : agavāpoḍheḥ
N3
41 eva ] K P N1 N2 N2’ N3’ : evaḥ N3
41 ago’poha° ] K N1 N2 N3 N2’ N3’ : apoha
P
41–42 °sphuraṇam anivāryam ] K P N1 N2
N3 , sphuraṇani«2»ma«1»vāryyam N2’ :
sphura(ṇa)nimavāryyam N3’ ( smudged)
35 tad asundaram ...°ādarśanāt ] AP 206.16
36 apoham ] AS3 59, fn. 2 states that AS1 reads artham, which is not true. Also all the mss support
apoham.
37 tasmād ...ucyate ] AP 206.19–20
37–39 yady api ...niveśitatvāt ] AP 203.16–17
39–42 yathā nīlotpale ...anivāryam ] AP 203.20–22
41 niveśitād ] K P N1 N2 N3 : niveśitatvād P acc. AS3
41 gopratītau ] N3 and N2 repeat the passage from l. 41 “gopratītau” to “jāter adhikāyāḥ” (starting
l. 49) : N2 3b1–6 equals N2 4a1–6, and N3 3a1–7 equals N3 3a7–3b5. It might be significant for the
relation of the two mss to note that “gopratītau” is the first word both on folio N2 3b and N2 4a, because
this makes it seemmore likely that the repetition originated in N2 rather than in N3, where “gopratītau” is
found in positions less prone to error. In this section of the edition, variants found in the first occurrence
of this passage will be referenced by the usual N2 or N3, while variants found in the second occurrence
will be referenced by N2’ and N3’ respectively.
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anivāryam. yathā praty
╷K3
akṣasya prasajyarū
˯K4
pābhāvagrahaṇa
⇃N13b
m abhāvavikalpotpādana-
śaktir eva, tathā vidhivikalpānām api tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśaktir evābhāvagrahaṇam
abhidhīyate. paryudāsarūpābhāva
╷K4
grahaṇaṃ tu niyata
˯K5
svarūpasaṃvedanam ubhayor avi-
45 śiṣṭam. anyathā yadi śabdād arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohaḥ, katham anya-
parihāreṇa pravṛttiḥ. tato gāṃ badhāneti codi
╷K5
to ’śvādīn api
˯K6
badhnīyāt.
[§ 10] yad apy avocad vācaspatiḥ — jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānāṃ śabdānāṃ
ca gocaraḥ. tāsāṃ ca tadvatīnāṃ rūpam atajjātīyaparāvṛttam ity arthatas tadavagater
42 pratyakṣasya ] P N1 N2 N2’ N3’ :
pratyakṣa«(··)» N3 ; no ev. K
42 prasajyarūpā° ] P N3 N3’ : prasahyarūpā
N1 N2 N2’ ; no ev. K
42 °grahaṇam ] K P N1 N2 N3 N2’ :
yahaṇam N3’
42–43 abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir
...grahaṇam ] K P N2 N3 N2’ N3’ : n. e. N1
42 °lpotpādana° ] K P N2 N3 N2’ :
lpotpādena N3’
43 vidhivikalpānām ] K P N2 N3 :
vidhikalpānām N2’ N3’
43 °ānuṣṭhāna° ] K P N2 N2’ N3’ ,
ānuṣṭhā{danurūpānuṣṭhā}na N3
43 °dāna° ] K N2 N3 N2’ N3’ : n. e. P
44 abhidhīyate ] K P N1 N2 N2’ N3’ :
abhidhiyate N3
44 niyata° ] P N1 N2’ : niyanta N2 N3 :
niyeta N3’ ; no ev. K
44 °svarūpasaṃvedanam ] K P N1 N2 N3
N3’ : svarūpamamvedanam N2’
45 anyathā ] K P N2 N3 N2’ N3’ : anyathā
yathā N1
45 śabdād artha° ] P N2’ N3’ : śabdārtha K :
śabdād arthā N1 N2 N3
45 °pratipatti° ] K P N1 N2 N2’ N3’ :
pratipadya N3
45 °kāle kalito ] K N1 N2 N3 : kālakalito P
45 katham ] P N2 N3 N2’ N3’ , ka(tha)m K
( Worm damage.) : kanyam N1
46 °parihāreṇa ] K P N2’ N3’ : parihareṇa
N1 N2 : pariharaṇa N3
46 tato gāṃ ] K P N1 N2’ N3’ : tato (’)gaṃ
N2 N3
46 codito ] K P N1 N2 N2’ : coditā N3 :
cādito N3’
46 ’śvādīn ] P : ’ścodīn N1 N2 N2’ : ścodin
N3 : ścodīn N3’ ; no ev. K
47 avocad ] K P N1 N2 N2’ N3’ : avācad N3
47 vācaspatiḥ ] K P N2’ N3’ : vācaspati N1
N2 N3
47–48 vikalpānāṃ ...gocaraḥ ] K P N1 N2’ :
vikalpānāṃ śabdānāṃ cāgocaraḥ N2 :
vikalpānāṃ śabdānāṃ cāṅgocaraḥ N3 :
vikalpānāśabdānāśca goraca N3’
48 tāsāṃ ca ] K N1 N2 N3 N2’ N3’ : tāsāṃ P
48 atajjātīya° ] K P N2’ : atajjātiya N1 N2 :
atajātiya N3 N3’
48 °parāvṛttam ] P N2 N3 ,
pa{rihāre}rāvṛttam K : parāvṛtyam N1
48 arthatas ] K N1 N2 N3 N2’ N3’ : arthas P
— Read as atas in AS3.
48 tadavagater ] K P N1 : tavagater N2 N3 :
tadavagate N2’ N3’
42–44 yathā pratyakṣasya ...aviśiṣṭam ] AP 205.12–16
45–46 anyathā ...badhnīyāt ] TBh2 53.12–15
45–46 yadi śabdād ...badhnīyāt ] AP 206.13–14; cf. also AP 206, fn. 2
47–53 yad apy ...uktaprāyam ] =AP 206.25–207.4
47–49 jātimatyo ...badhnāti ] NVTṬ 443.23–444.2
17
2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
na gā
╷K6
ṃ badhāneti co
˯K7
dito ’śvādīn badhnāti, tad apy anenaiva nirastam. yato jāter adhi-
50 kāyāḥ
⇃N24a ,N33b
prakṣepe ’pi vyaktīnāṃ rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam eva cet, tadā tenaiva rūpe
╷K7
ṇa
śa
⇃N24b
bdavikalpa
⇃K3a
yor viṣayībhavantīnāṃ katham atadvyāvṛttiparihāraḥ.
[§ 11] atha na vijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ vyaktirūpaṃ tathāpratītaṃ vā, tadā jātiprasāda eṣa
iti katham arthato ’pi tadavagatir ity uktaprāyam.
[§ 12] atha jātiba
⇃N14a
lā
╷K1
d evānyato
˯K2
vyāvṛttam, bhavatu jātibalāt svahetu
⇃N34a
paraṃparābalād
55 vānyavyāvṛttam, ubhayathāpi vyāvṛttapratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir asty eva.
[§ 13] na cāgo’poḍhe gośabdasaṃketavidhāv anyonyā
⇃P33b
śraya
╷K2
doṣaḥ,
˯K3
sāmānye
tadvati vā saṃkete ’pi taddoṣāvakāśāt. na hi sāmānyaṃ nāma sāmānyamātram
abhipretam, turage ’pi gośabdasaṃketaprasaṅgāt, kiṃ tu gotvam. tāvatā ca sa
49 codito ] P N1 N2 N2’ N3’ : ścodito N3 ;
no ev. K
49 ’śvādīn ] K P : ’ścādīn N1 N2 N2’ :
ścodīna N3 N3’
49 badhnāti ] P N1 N2 N3 , ba{×××}dhnāti K
49 anenaiva nirastam ] P N1 N2 N2’ N3’ :
anenenaiva nirastam K : ateneva nirasta N3
49 jāter ] K P N1 N2 N2’ N3’ : jātecar N3
50 vyaktīnāṃ ] K P N1 N2 : vyaktināṃ N3
50 atajjātīya° ] K P N1 : atajjātiya N2 :
atajātiya N3
50 °vyāvṛttam eva ] N1 N3 , vyā{(··)}vṛttam
e{tyarthabha}va K : parāvṛttam eva P :
vyāvṛttem eva N2 —AS3 59, fn. 9 claims
“vyāvṛtta” for P. The reference should
probably be to AS1.
50 tenaiva ] K P N2 N3 : tainaiva N1
51 °vikalpayor ] K P : vikalpayo N1 :
vikalpāyo N2 N3
51 viṣayībhavantīnāṃ ] K P N2 :
viṣaryobhavantīnāṃ N1 : viṣayibhava(p)īnā
N3
51 °parihāraḥ ] K P N1 N2 : parihyaraḥ N3
52 atha ] K N1 N2 N3 , atha{ḥ} P
52 na vijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ ] K N1 N2 : na
vijātivyāvṛttaṃ P : na vinavijātiyavyāvṛkta N3
53 arthato ’pi ] K P N1 : athatopi N2 N3
53 tadavagatir ] K P N1 N2 : tadevagatir N3
54 jātibalād ] K P N2 : jātibad N1 : jātibasād
N3
54 bhavatu ] P N1 N2 : bhavatu {kodo} K :
evabhu N3
54 °paraṃparābalād ] K P : parāsparābalād
N1 N2 N3
55 vānyavyāvṛttam ] K P N1 N2 :
vānyathāvṛtama N3
55 ubhayathāpi ] K P N1 N3 :
ubhayayathāpi N2
55 °pratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir ] K N2 :
pratipattau vyāvṛttipratītir P : pratīpattau
vyāvṛttipratiprattir N1 : pratipatir N3
56 cāgo’poḍhe ] K N1 N2 : cāgavāpoḍha P :
rāgopāte N3 —AS3 reads cāgavāpoḍhe.
57 saṃkete ] K P N1 N2 : śaṅkate N3
57 taddoṣāvakāśāt ] K P N1 N2 :
doṣāvakāśāt N3
57 sāmānyaṃ nāma ] K P N1 N2 :
sāmānyanāma N3
57 sāmānyamātram ] K P N1 N2 :
sānyamātram N3
58 turage ’pi ] K P N1 N2 : bhurage ’pi N3
58 gośabdasaṃketa° ] K P N1 N2 :
gośabdasaṅkaṭa N3
49–50 adhikāyāḥ ] Repetition in N2 and N3 ends here, cf. note to line 41.
54 atha ...vyāvṛttam ] AP 207.5
56–60 na cā°...°vācyāparijñānāt ] AP 203.23–204.2
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eva
╷K3
doṣaḥ, ga
˯K4
vāparijñāne gotvasāmānyāparijñānāt, gotvasāmānyāparijñāne gośabda-
60 vācyāparijñānāt. tasmād ekapiṇḍadarśanapūrvako yaḥ sarvavya
⇃N25a
ktisādhāraṇa i
╷K4
va bahir
adhya
˯K5
sto vikalpabuddhyākāraḥ, tatrāyaṃ gaur iti saṃketakaraṇe netaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ.
abhimate ca gośabdapravṛttāv agośabdena śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam ucitam.
╷K5
[§ 14] na cānyāpo
˯K6
ḍhānyāpohayor virodho viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvakṣatir vā, paraspa-
ravyavacche
⇃N14b
dābhāvāt, sāmānādhikaraṇyasadbhāvāt bhūtalaghaṭābhāvavat. svābhāvena
65 hi virodho na parābhāvenety ā
╷K6
bālaprasiddham.
[§ 15]
˯K7
eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhata ity atrāpy apoho gamyata eva, apra-
kṛtapathāntarāpekṣayā eṣa eva, śru
⇃N34b
ghnapratyanīkāniṣṭasthānāpekṣayā śrughnam eva,
araṇyamārgavad vicchedābhāvā
╷K7
d upatiṣṭhata
⇃K3b
eva, sārthadūtādivyavacchedena panthā
59 gavāparijñāne ] K P N1 N2 :
gavāparijñāna N3 —AS3 reads
gavādiparijñāne.
59 °sāmānyāparijñānāt ] K P N1 N2 :
sāmānyaparijñānāt N3
59 °parijñāne ] K P N2 : jñāne N1 :
«parī»jñānaṃ N3
60 tasmād ] K P N2 N3 : tasmā N1
60 °piṇḍada° ] P N1 N2 N3 ,
p(i)ṇḍa/d{e}→da/ K
61 adhyasto ] K P N1 N2 : adhyastā N3
61 saṃketakaraṇe ] K P N1 N2 :
maketakaraṇe N3
62 °pravṛttāv ] K P N1 N2 : ravṛtāv N3
62 śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam ] K P N2 :
śesyāpy avidhānam N1 : śeṣasyāpy
abhidhānem N3
63 °āpoḍhānyāpohayor ] K :
āpohānyāpoḍhayor P : āpoḍhānyāpohayo N1
N2 : āpotānyāpohayo N3 —AS1 5.14 reads
as accepted here, implying that S2 also
supports this reading.
63 °viśeṣaṇabhāva° ] P : viśeṣaṇa K N1 N2
N3 —The accepted reading is also found in S2
acc. to AS1 5, fn. 1.
63 °kṣatir ] K P N1 N2 : kṣatīr N3
64 °ābhāvāt ] K P N1 N2 : ābhāvāta N3
64 sāmānādhi° ] K P N1 : sāmānyādhi N2 :
sāmāṃnyādhi N3
64 °karaṇya° ] K P N1 : kararṇya N2 :
karaṃnyaṃ N3
64 °sadbhāvāt ] K P N1 :
sadbhāvā{samānādhi} N2 :
sadbhāvasamānādhi N3
65 hi ] K P N2 N3 : n. e. N1
65 parābhāvenety ] K P N1 N2 :
parābhāvenaty N3
66 eṣa ] K N1 N2 N3 : ayaṃ P
66 panthāḥ ] K N1 N2 N3 : panthā P
66 śrughnam ] K P N1 N2 : śraghnam N3
66 upatiṣṭhata ity ] K P N1 N2 : upatiṣṭhata
itity N3
66 apoho ] K P N1 N2 : apaho N3
66–67 aprakṛta° ] K N1 N2 N3 : prakṛta P,
S2 acc. AS1
67 °pathā° ] K P N2 : panthā N1 : paṭā N3
67 °pratyanīkāniṣṭa° ] K P N1 :
pratyayanīkāniṣṭa N2 : pratyayanīkābhaṣṭa N3
67 °āpekṣayā ] K P N1 N2 : āpekṣayāḥ N3
67 śrughnam ] K P N2 N3 : śrūghnam N1
68 °dūtādivyavacchedena ] K N1 N2 :
dūtādivyavacchena P : dutādivyavacchedana
N3
60–61 tasmād ...°doṣaḥ ] Cf. AP 204.2–12
62 abhimate ...abhidhānam ] AP 204.13–14
63–65 na cā ...°prasiddham ] Cf. AP 206.1
66–69 eṣa panthāḥ ...sulabhatvāt ] AP 206.6–9
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2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
eveti pratipadaṃ vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt. tasmād apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śa-
70 bdād avagatiḥ, puṇḍarīkaśabdād iva śvetimaviśiṣṭasya
⇃N25b
padmasya.
╷K1
[§ 16] yady evaṃ vidhi
˯K2
r eva śabdārtho vaktum ucitaḥ, katham apoho gīyata iti
cet, uktam atra — apohaśabdenānyāpohaviṣiṣṭo vidhir ucyate. tatra vidhau pratīya-
māne viśeṣaṇatayā tulyakālam anyā
╷K2
pohapratītir i
˯K3
ti. na caivaṃ pratyakṣasyāpy apoha-
viṣayatvavyavasthā kartum ucitā, tasya śābdapratyayasyeva vastuviṣa
⇃N15a
yatve vivādābhā-
75 vāt. vidhiśabdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atadrūpa
╷K3
parāvṛtto
˯K4
bāhyo ’rtho ’bhimataḥ, ya-
thāpratibhāsaṃ buddhyākāraś ca. tatra bāhyo ’rtho ’dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācyo vya-
vasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyata
╷K4
pravyakta
˯K5
-
svalakṣaṇāsphura
⇃N35a
ṇāt.
yac chāstram —
69 vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt ] K P N2 :
avacchedasya sulabhatvāt N1 :
vyavacchedasubhalatvāt N3
69 apoha° ] K N1 N2 : anyāpoha P : amoha
N3
70 °śabdād iva ] K P N1 N2 : śabdādi N3
70 śvetima° ] P N1 N2 N3 , śvetima{śa} K
71 yady evaṃ ] P N1 N2 : yadyavaṃ N3 ;
no ev. K
71 apoho ] K P N1 N2 : apaho N3
72 °śabdenā° ] K P N1 N2 : śabdanā N3
72 ucyate ] K P N1 N2 : ucyateḥ N3
72–73 pratīyamāne ] K P N1 N2 :
pratīyamāna N3
73 °pratītir iti ] K N2 N3 : pratītiḥ P : pratīr
iti N1
73–74 pratyakṣasyāpy apoha° ] K P ,
pratyakṣasyāpy aho«2»po«1» N2 :
pratyakṣasvāpy aho N1 : pratyakṣasyāpy
ahopo N3
74 °viṣayatva° ] P N1 N2 N3 ,
{vyavasthā}viṣayav«tva3» K
74 kartum ucitā ] K P N1 N2 , kartuv«m
u»citā N3
74 śābda° ] K : śabda P N1 : śabdā N2 N3
75 ca ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
75–76 atadrūpa ...’dhyavasāyād ] Repetition
in N3: 4b5–6 = 4b6–7. One explanation is an
eye-skip from ’dhyavasāyād to
yathādhyavasāyam, further corroborated by
N3’s ’dhyavasāyām at the end of this
passage’s first occurrence. Variants found in
repetiton are noted as N3’ (cf. note to l. 41).
75 atadrūpa° ] K P N1 : antadrūpa N2 N3
N3’
75 °parāvṛtto ] P N1 N2 : parāvṛtau N3 N3’ ;
no ev. K
75 bāhyo ’rtho ’bhimataḥ ] K P N2 :
bāhyorthorvibhimataḥ N1 : bāhyārthobhimata
N3 : bāhyārthobhimataḥ N3’
76 °pratibhāsaṃ ] K P N1 N3’ : pratibhāṣaṃ
N2 N3
76 bāhyo ’rtho ’dhyavasāyād ] K P N1 N2 :
bāhyarthodhyavaṣāyām N3 :
bāhyārthodhyavasāryyād N3’
77–78 °pravyaktasva° ] K P N2 N3 :
pravyaktaḥ sva N1
69–70 tasmād ...avagatiḥ ]  AP 204.19–20
70 puṇḍarīka°...padmasya ] Cf. AP 204.16–18
72 uktam atra ] Cf. line 31 on page 15 and line 69 on page 20.
73–75 na caivaṃ ...vivādābhāvāt ]  AP 205.9–10
76–78 tatra ...svalakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā ] AP 208.11–14
76–82 bāhyo ...iti ] TBh2 53.15–54.2
78–83 yac chāstram ...iti cet ] AP 208.16–19
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80 [§ 17] śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt |
arthasya dṛṣṭāv iva
iti.
[§ 18] indriyaśabdasvabhāvopāyabhedād ekasyaivārthasya pratibhāsa
╷K5
bheda iti
˯K6
cet.
⇃N26a
atrāpy uktam —
85 [§ 19] jāto nāmāśrayo ’nyānyaś cetasāṃ tasya vastunaḥ |
ekasyaiva kuto rūpaṃ bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat ||
[§ 20] na hi spaṣṭāspaṣṭe dve rūpe parasparavi
╷K6
ruddhe e
˯K7
kasya vastunaḥ staḥ, yata
ekenendriyabuddhau pratibhāsetānyena vikalpe, tathā
⇃P34a
sati vastuna eva bhedaprāpteḥ.
na hi svarūpabhedād aparo vastubhedaḥ. na ca pratibhāsabhedād apa
╷K7
raḥ svarū
⇃K4a
pabhedaḥ.
90 anya
⇃N15b
thā trailokyam ekam eva vastu syāt.
[§ 21] dūrāsannadeśavartinoḥ purūṣayor ekatra śākhini spaṣṭāspaṣṭapratibhāsabhede
’pi na śākhibheda iti cet. na brūmaḥ — pratibhāsabhe
╷K1
do bhinnavastu
˯K2
niyataḥ, kiṃ tv
80 śabdenā° ] K P N1 N2 : śabdānā N3
80 °āvyāpṛtākṣasya ] K P :
āvyāvṛttākhyasya N1 N2 : āvyāvṛtākhyasyā
N3
83 °bhedād ] K P N1 N2 : bhedāta N3
83 °syaivārthasya ] P : syaiva K N1 N2 N3—
syaivārthasya also in S2, acc. to AS1 6, fn. 1
83 pratibhāsa° ] K P : pratibhāva N1 N2 N3
84 atrāpy ] K N1 N3 , av«trā»py N2 : tatrāpy
P
85 °āśrayo ’nyānyaś ] K P N1 N2 :
āśramonyānyaḥ N3
85 cetasāṃ tasya ] K P N1 , ce/t→ta/sāntasya
N2 : cetsāṃtasya N3 —N2 deleted virāma,
resulting in ta
86 °āvabhāsi tat ] K N1 : āvabhāsi yat P :
āvabhāsit N2 : āvabhāsita N3
87 spaṣṭāspaṣṭe dve ] [K]P N1 N2 :
spaṣṭāspaṣṭadve N3
87 vastunaḥ ] K N1 N2 : vastuna P :
v(e)stunaḥ N3
87 staḥ ] K P N1 N2 : sta N3
87 yata ] K N1 N2 : yad P : yetaḥ N3
88 ekenendriya° ] K P N1 : ekenandriya N2
N3
88 buddhau ] K P N1 N2 : buddhauḥ N3
88 pratibhāsetānyena ] K P N2 :
pratibhāvatānyena N1 : pratibhāsatānyena N3
88 vikalpe ] K P N1 N2 : vikalpa N3
88 bheda° ] P N1 N2 N3 : bhada K
88 °prāpteḥ ] K P N1 : prāpte N2 N3
89 aparo ] K P N1 N2 : aparā N3
89 vastubhedaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : vastubheda N3
89 pratibhāsa° ] K P N1 N3 : pratibhāṣa N2
89 aparaḥ ] P : apara N1 N2 N3 ; no ev. K
90 trailokyam ] K P N1 : trelokyam N2 N3
90 ekam eva vastu ] K P N2 : ekam evastu
N1 : evastu N3
90 syāt ] K P : na syāt N1 N2 N3
91 °deśa° ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
91 °vartinoḥ ] K P N1 N2 : vartināḥ N3
91 purūṣayor ] K P N1 N2 : purūṣayo N3
92 cet ] K P N1 N2 : ceta N3
92 °bhedo ] P N1 N2 : bhe(ḍ)ā N3 ; no ev. K
80–81 śabdenā°...dṛṣtāv iva ] = PVin 1 15a-c
84–90 atrāpy ...vastu syāt ] =AP 208.20–209.1
85–86 jāto ...bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat ] =PV 3 235
91–92 dūrasannadeśa ...na śākhibedha ] AP 209.2
92–93 na brūmaḥ ...niyata iti ] =AP 209.5–6
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2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
ekaviṣayatvābhāvaniyata iti. tato yatrārthakriyābhedādisacivaḥ pratibhāsabhedaḥ, tatra
vastubhedaḥ, ghaṭavat. anyatra punar niyamenaikaviṣayatāṃ pariharatīty e
╷K2
kapratibhā
˯K3
so
95 bhrāntaḥ.
[§ 22] etena ya
⇃N35b
d āha
⇃N26b
vācaspatiḥ — na ca śabdapratyakṣayor vastugocara-
tve pratyayābhedaḥ, kāraṇabhedena pārokṣyāpārokṣyabhedopapatter iti, ta
╷K3
n nopayo-
gi,
˯K4
parokṣapratyayasya vastugocaratvāsamarthanāt. parokṣatāśrayas tu kāraṇabheda
indriyagocaragrahaṇaviraheṇaiva kṛtārthaḥ. tan na śābde pratyaye svalakṣaṇaṃ
╷K4
pari-
100 sphurati.
[§ 23]
˯K5
kiṃ ca svalakṣaṇātmani vastuni vācye sarvātmanā pratipatter vidhi-
niṣedhayor ayogaḥ. tasya hi sadbhāve ’stīti vyartham, nāstīty asamartham. asadbhā-
ve tu nāstīti
╷K5
vyartha
⇃N16a
m, astī
˯K6
ty asamartham. asti cāstyādipadaprayogaḥ. tasmāc chā-
93 ekaviṣayatvā° ] K P N2 N3 : viṣayatvā N1
93 °niyata ] K P N1 N2 : nīyata N3
93 °sacivaḥ ] K P N3 : saciva N1 : sacirvaḥ
N2
93–94 pratibhāsabhedaḥ ...°viṣayatāṃ ] K P
N2 N3 : pratibhāṣayataṃ N1
94 vastubhedaḥ ] K P N2 , «vastu»bhedaḥ N3
94 ghaṭavat ] K N2 : ghaṭavata N3 : n. e. P
94 niyamenaika° ] K P N2 : niyamanaika N3
94 °viṣayatāṃ ] K P : viṣatā N3 : viṣatāṃ N2
94 eka° ] P : n. e. N1 : eva N2 N3 ;
no ev. K
95 bhrāntaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : bhrānta N3
96 vācaspatiḥ ] K P N1 N2 : vācaspati N3
96 śabdapratyakṣayor ] K N1 N3 N2 :
śābdapratyakṣayor P — JNĀms 11b6 supports
śābdapratyakṣayor.
97 pārokṣyāpārokṣya° ] K P :
parākṣyāpārokṣya N1 : parātmāparokta N3 :
parokṣyāpārokṣya N2
99 viraheṇaiva ] K P N1 : viharaṇeva N3 :
viraheṇeva N2
99 pratyaye svalakṣaṇaṃ ] K P N1 N3 :
pratyayasvalaṇam N2
101 vastuni vācye ] K P N1 N2 : vastu vācye
N3
101 sarvātmanā ] K P N1 : savātmanā N2 N3
101 pratipatter vidhi° ] K N2 N3 : pratipatte
vidhi N1 : pratipatte vidhe P
102 vyartham, nāstīty ] K P : vyarthanāstīty
N1 N2 N3
103 tu ] P : n. e. K N1 N2 N3 — tu also
supported in S2 acc. to AS1 8, fn. 1.
103 asamartham ] K P : asamārtha N1 :
asamatham N2 : asamartham astīty
asamartham N3
103 cāstyādi° ] K N1 N2 N3 : cātyādi P
103 °prayogaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : prayoga N3
103–104 tasmāc chābda° ] P : tasmāc
chabda K N1 N3 : tasmātaśabda N2
93–95 tato ...bhrāntaḥ ] AP 209.12–14
96–99 etena ...kṛtārthaḥ ] AP 210.3–5
96–97 na ca śabda°...bhedopapatter ] NVTṬ 115.8–10
99–100 tan na ...parisphurati ] Cf. AP 210.1–2
101–103 kiṃ ca ...prayogaḥ ] TBh2 54.3–6
101–104 kiṃ ...kṣamate ] Cf. AP 211.1–6
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bdapratibhāsasya bāhyārthabhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyaṃ na tadviṣayatāṃ kṣamate.
105 [§ 24] yac ca vācaspatinā jātimadvyaktivācyatāṃ sva
╷K6
vācaiva prastu
˯K7
tyānantaram
eva — na ca śabdārthasya jāter bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyaṃ nopapadyate.
⇃N27a
sā hi svarū-
pato nityāpi deśakālaviprakīrṇānekavyaktyāśrayatayā bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇī
╷K7
bhavanty
astinā
⇃K4b
stisambandhayogyā. vartamānavyakti
⇃N36a
sambandhitā hi jāter astitā, atītānāgata-
vyaktisambandhitā ca nāstiteti sandigdhavyatirekitvād anaikāntikaṃ bhāvābhāva-
110 sādhāraṇyam, anyathāsiddhaṃ veti
╷K1
vilapitam, tad aprastutam. tāvatā
˯K2
tāvan na
prakṛtakṣatiḥ, jātau bharaṃ nyasyatā svalakṣaṇāvācyatvasya svayaṃ svīkārāt.
kiṃ ca sarvatra padārthasya svalakṣaṇasvarūpeṇaivāstitvādikaṃ cintyate. jātes tu
varta
╷K2
mānādivyaktisa
˯K3
mbandho ’stitvādikam iti tu bālapratāraṇam. evaṃ jā
⇃N16b
timad-
105 svavācaiva ] N1 N2 N3 :
svabhāvatayaiva P ; no ev. K
105 prastutyānantaram ] K P :
prastutyānanantaram N1 N2 N3
106 jāter ] K P : jate N1 N2 N3
107 °viprakīrṇā° ] K P N1 : viprakīṇā N2 :
vikirṇā N3 — Since viprakīrṇa, contrary to
the claim in AS1 8, fn. 2, is not found in K, it
must either be misassigned, and therefore the
reading of S2, or a mistaken reading of K by
the editor of AS1.
107 °bhavanty ] P : bhavann N1 N2 :
bhavan N3 ; no ev. K. — S2 probably read
bhavann, as this appears in AS1 8.9 and K
gives no evidence here.
108 astināstisambandhayogyā ] K N2:
astyādisambandhayogyā P :
astīnāstisambandhayogyāḥ. N1 :
āstīsambandhayogyā N3
108 astitā ] K P N2 N3 : astitāḥ N1
109 °vyatirekitvād ] K P N1 N2 :
vyatirekītvād N3
109 anaikāntikaṃ bhā° ] P N1 :
anaikāntika×mbhā K : anaikāntikabhā N2 N3
110 vilapitam ] P N1 N2 : v«2yi»lapite N3 ;
no ev. K — In K, 5 akṣaras are missing in
average on this folio, so it is unlikely that the
phrase “vilapitam, tad aprastutam. tāvatā”
(approx. 12 akṣaras) could have been written
in K. Since AS1 reads vilapitam, missing in K,
it can be assumed to have its basis in S2. AS3
obviously emends to vikalpitaṃ, noting the
reading of P in AS3 61, fn. 7.
110 tad aprastutam ] P : n. e. N1 N2 N3 ;
no ev. K— Apparently not entered in S2
either, as AS1 does not read it.
110 tāvatā ] P : n. e. N1 N2 N3 ; no ev. K—
Acc. to AS1 8, fn. 3, S2 reads tāvatā tāvat.
111 prakṛtakṣatiḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
prakṛtakṣanti N3
111 bharaṃ nyasyatā ] K N1 , bharaṃ
sya«2»nya«1»tā N2 : bharaṃ nyasyatāpi P :
bharasyanyetā N3
111 svalakṣaṇāvācyatvasya ] K P N1 N2 N3 :
svalakṣaṇavācyatvasya AS3
112 kiṃ ca sarvatra ] K P N2 N3 : kiñ ca
savatra N1
112 svalakṣaṇa° ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
112 °svarūpeṇaivā° ] K P N1 N2 :
svarūpaivā N3 — If I understand AS1 8, fn. 4
correctly, S2 reads rūpeṇaiva.
113 °sambandho ’stitvādikam ] K P N1 :
sambandhāstitvādikam N2 N3 — saṃbadhī
’stitvādikam in AS3
113 evaṃ ] K P N1 : eva N2 N3
113 jātimad° ] K P N2 N3 : jāmad N1
105–111 yac ca vācaspatinā ...svīkārāt ] AP 211.7–13
105 svavācaiva prastutyānantaram ] Cf. line 47 on p. 17
106–110 na ca ...anyathāsiddham ve° ] NVTṬ 444.2–6
113–115 evaṃ ...muktiḥ ] AP 212.18–19
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2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
vyaktivacane ’pi doṣaḥ. vyakteś cet pratītisiddhiḥ, jātir adhikā pratīyatāṃ mā vā,
115 na tu vyaktipratītidoṣā
╷K3
n muktiḥ.
[§ 25] ete
˯K4
na yad ucyate kaumārilaiḥ — sabhāgatvād eva vastuno na sādhāraṇya-
doṣaḥ.
⇃N27b
vṛkṣatvaṃ hy anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ śabdād avagamyate. tayor anyatareṇa
śabdāntarā
╷K4
vagatena sa
˯K5
mbadhyata iti, tad apy asaṅga
⇃P34b
tam, sāmānyasya nityasya pratipa-
ttāv anirdhāritabhāvābhāvatvāyogāt.
120 [§ 26] yac cedam — na ca pratyakṣasyeva śabdānām arthapratyāyanaprakāraḥ
╷K5
,
yena taddṛṣṭa i
˯K6
vāstyādiśabdāpekṣā na syāt, vicitraśaktitvāt pra
⇃N36b
māṇānām iti, tad apy
aindriyakaśābdapratibhāsayor ekasvarūpagrāhitve bhinnāvabhāsadūṣaṇena dū
╷K6
ṣitam.
vi
˯K7
citraśaktitvaṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ sākṣātkārādhyavasāyābhyām api caritārtham. tato
yadi pratyakṣārthapratipādanaṃ śābdena, tadvad evāvabhāsaḥ syāt. abhavaṃś ca
⇃N17a
na
114 doṣaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : doṣa N3
114 vyakteś cet ] K P N1 : vyaktaś cete N3 :
vyakteś ceta N2
114–115 mā vā, na tu ] K P N1 N2 : mā
cāratu N3
116 ucyate ] K P N1 : ucya N2 N3
116 kaumārilaiḥ ] K P N1 : komārilaiḥ N2
N3
117 hy anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ ] K : hi
anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ P : hy
anidhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ N1 : hy
aṃnirdvāribhāvaṃ N2 : hy anirdvāribhāvaṃ
N3
117 anyatareṇa ] K P N1 N2 : aṇyatareṇa N3
118 śabdāntarāvagatena ] P N1 :
śabdāntarā{vā«2»bhā«1»bhā}vaṃ gatena N2 :
śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena N3 : ; no ev. K
118 sambadhyata iti ] K P N1 N2 :
sambandhyate iti N3
120 na ca ] K P N1 N2 , v«1na ca» N3
120 pratyakṣasyeva ] K P N1 N3 ,
prakṣa«2»tya«1»syeva N2
121 taddṛṣṭa ] P : tadadṛṣṭa N1 N2 N3 ;
no ev. K
121 ivāsty° ] K N1 N2 N3 : ivāty P
121 tad ] P N1 N2 N3 , {tato yadi pratyakṣa.}
tad K
122 aindriyaka° ] K P N2 N3 : endriyaka N1
122 °āvabhāsa° ] P N1 N2 N3 :
āvabhā{va}ṣa K
122 °dūṣaṇena ] K P N1 N2 : n. e. N3
123 sākṣāt° ] K P N2 N3 : sākṣā N1
124 yadi ] K P N1 : yadbhi N3 : yahi N2
124 pratyakṣārtha° ] K P N1 N2 :
pratyakṣārthaṃ N3
124 °pratipādanaṃ ] K P N1 : pratipādānāṃ
N3 : pratipādanāṃ N2
124 abhavaṃś ca ] K P : abhavaśca N1 N2 :
abhaveś ca N3
124 na ] K P N1 N2 : n. e. N3
116–118 etena ...sambadhyata iti ] AP 212.20–21
116–118 sabhāgatvād ...sambadhyata ] Cited from Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā ad ŚV Av 1, acc. to Kata-
oka 2010.
120–122 yac cedam ...dūṣitam ] AP 213.3–5
120–121 na ca ...pramāṇānām ] Also a quotation from Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā ad ŚV Av 1, acc. to
Kataoka 2010.
121 vicitra ...pramāṇānām ] =ĀTV2 135.6–136.1 (ĀTV1 327.12–13)
123 vicitraśaktitvaṃ ...caritārtham ] Cf. AP 213.7
123–125 tato yadi ...kṣamate ] AP 213.5–6
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125 tadviṣaya
╷K7
khyāpanaṃ kṣama
⇃K5a
te.
[§ 27] nanu vṛkṣaśabdena vṛkṣatvāṃśe codite sattvādyaṃśaniścayanārtham
astyādipadaprayoga iti cet, niraṃśatvena pratyakṣasama
⇃N28a
dhigatasya svalakṣaṇasya
ko ’vakāśaḥ padāntareṇa dharmāntaravidhiniṣedha
╷K1
yoḥ pramāṇā
˯K2
ntareṇa vā. pratya-
kṣe ’pi pramāṇāntarāpekṣā dṛṣṭeti cet, bhavatu, tasyāniścayātmakatvād anabhyasta-
130 svarūpaviṣaye. vikalpas tu svayaṃ niścayātmako yatra grāhī, tatra kim apareṇa. asti ca
śabdaliṅgāntarāpe
╷K2
kṣā.
˯K3
tato na vastusvarūpagrahaḥ.
[§ 28] nanu bhinnā jātyādayo dharmāḥ parasparaṃ dharmiṇaś ceti jātilakṣaṇaika-
dharmadvāreṇa pratīte ’pi śākhini dharmāntaravattayā na pratītir iti kiṃ na bhi-
nnābhi
╷K3
dhānādhī
˯K4
no dharmāntarasya nīlacalo
⇃N37a
ccaistaratvāder avabodhaḥ. tad etad asa-
135 ṅgatam, akhaṇḍātmanaḥ svalakṣaṇasya pratyakṣe pratibhāsād dṛśyasya dharmadharmi-
125 tadviṣayakhyāpanaṃ ] P N1 N2 :
tadviṣayakhyāpana N3 ; no ev. K
125 kṣamate ] P N2 N3 : kṣamaḥ te N1 ;
no ev. K
126 vṛkṣatvāṃśe ] K P N2 : vṛkṣatvāśe N1
N3
126 °niścayanārtham ] K N1 N2 N3 :
niścayārtham P
127 °pada° ] K N1 N2 N3 : śabda P
127 °gatasya ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
128 °vidhi° ] P N1 N2 N3 , v«vidhi» K
129 dṛṣṭeti ] K P N1 : dṛśeti N2 N3
129 °ātmakatvād ] P : ātmatvād K :
ātmatvāt N1 N2 : ātmatvā N3
129–130 anabhyastasvarūpa° ] K P N1 :
anabhyasvarūpa N2 : anityasvarūpa N3
130 vikalpas ] K P N2 N3 : vikapas N1
130 svayaṃ ni° ] K P N2 , ya«2»sva«1»nni
N1 : svaya ni N3
130 grāhī ] K P N2 : grāhiī N1 : grāhi N3 —
N1 did not delete the prefix for the short i.
132 dharmiṇaś ceti ] K P N2 :
dharmmi/ma→ṇa/(··)ti N1 : dharmmaṇaśceti
N3 —N1 is smudged here.
133 śākhini ] K P N1 N2 : śākhinī N3
134 °ābhidhānādhīno ] K P N1 :
ābhidhānādhīnī N2 : ābhidhānādhīni N3
134 dharmāntarasya ] K P N1 N3 :
dhammāntarasya N2
134 nīlacaloccaistaratvāder ] K P N1 :
nīlacalāccaistaratvāt der N2 :
nīlacalāccaistaratvāt. der N3
134–135 asaṅgatam ] K P N1 N2 :
asargjatam N3
135 akhaṇḍātmanaḥ ] K P N1 : akhādātmana
N3 : akhadātmanaḥ N2
135 pratyakṣe pratibhāsād ] K : pratyakṣe
’pi pratibhāsanāt | P : pratyakṣe pratibhāṣāt |
N1 : prakṣa«2»tya«1»pratisāt || N2 :
pratyekṣapratisāt || N3 —AS3 opts for
pratyakṣe ’pi pratibhāsāt.
135 dharmadharmi° ] K N1 N2 N3 :
dharmmidharmma P
126–127 vṛkṣaśabdena ...iti cet ] TBh2 54.9–11. Cf. AP 212.25–26
127 niraṃśatvena ...svalakṣaṇasya ] Cf. AP 213.10
128–131 ko ’vakāśaḥ ...vastusvarūpagrahaḥ ] AP 213.11–14
129–130 tasyā°...apareṇa ] TBh2 54.11–14
132–134 bhinnā ...°occaistaratvāder ] AP 213.15–17
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2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
⇃N17b
bhedasya pratyakṣaprati
╷K4
kṣiptatvā
˯K5
t. anyathā sarvaṃ sarvatra syād ity atiprasaṅgaḥ. kā-
lpanikabhedāśrayas tu dharmadharmivyavahāra iti prasādhi
⇃N28b
taṃ śāstre.
[§ 29] bhavatu vā pāramārthiko ’pi dharmadharmibhedaḥ, tathāpy anayo
╷K5
ḥ
samavā
˯K6
yāder dūṣitatvād upakāralakṣaṇaiva pratyāsattir eṣitavyā. evaṃ ca
140 yathendriyapratyāsattyā pratyakṣeṇa dharmipratipattau sakalataddharmapratipattiḥ,
tathā śabdaliṅgābhyām api vācya
╷K6
vācakādi
˯K7
sambandhapratibaddhābhyāṃ dha-
rmipratipattau niravaśeṣataddharmapratipattir bhavet, pratyāsattimātrasyāviśeṣāt.
[§ 30] yac ca vācaspatiḥ — na caikopādhinā sattvena viśiṣṭe tasmin gṛhīta
╷K7
upādhyantara
˯K8
viśiṣṭatadgrahaḥ. svabhāvo hi dravyasyopādhibhir viśiṣyate, na tūpā-
145 dhayo vā viśeṣyatvaṃ vā tasya svabhāva iti, tad api plavata eva. na hy abhedād
136 pratyakṣa° ] K P N2 N3 : pratyakṣaḥ N1
136 ity atiprasaṅgaḥ ] K P N2 : ity ati ||
prasaṅgaḥ N1 : ity a•pratisargjaḥ N3
136–137 kālpanika° ] K P N1 N2 : kālpani
N3
137 dharmadharmi° ] K N1 N2 N3 :
dharmmidharmma P
137 iti ] K P N2 : i N1 : iti || iti N3 —N1
has a linebreak after i.
138 °ārthiko ] K P N1 N3 : ārthīko N2
138 ’pi ] P : n. e. K N1 N2 N3
138 dharma° ] P N1 N2 N3 , dharmm/o→a/
K
139 upakāra° ] K P N1 N2 : ukāra N3
139 pratyāsattir ] K P : pratyāsantir N1 N2
N3
139 evaṃ ca ] K N1 N2 N3 : evaṃ P
140 pratyakṣeṇa dharmi° ] K P N1 N2 :
pratyakṣeṇa dharmma N3
140 °taddharma° ] K P N2 : tadharmma N1 :
saddharmma N3
141–142 °pratibaddhābhyāṃ dharmi° ] P
N1 N2 : pratibaddhā×bhyāṃ dharmmi K :
pratibaddhyātyādharmi N3
142 °pratipattau ] K P N1 N2 :
pratipatt/i→au/ N3. The scribe of N3 did not
delete the vertical bar of the prefixed short i.
142 °pratipattir bhavet ] K P N1 :
pratipattibhavet N2 N3
142 pratyāsattimātrasyāviśeṣāt ] K P N1 :
pratyāsattimātrasyāpi viśeṣāt N2 :
pratyāsattimātrasyāpi viṣesyāt N3
143 vācaspatiḥ — na ] K P N1 N2 :
vācaspatina N3
143 sattvena ] P : satve K N1 N2 : satva N3
—Acc. to AS1 10, fn. 1, S2 reads sattvena.
143 viśiṣṭe ] K P N1 N2 : viśiṣṭa N3
143 gṛhīta ] K : gṛhīte { | } P : gṛhīte N1 N2
N3
144 °viśiṣṭatad° ] K N1 N2 N3 : viśiṣṭas tad
P
144 °grahaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : graha N3
144 dravyasyopādhibhir ] P :
dravyasya{vi}upādhibhir K : dravyasya
upādhibhi N1 N3 : dravyasya upādhibhir N2
144 viśiṣyate ] P N1 N2 N3 : viśeṣyate K —
Acc. to AS1 10, fn. 2, S2 reads viśeṣyate.
144–145 tūpādhayo ] K P N1 N2 :
tupādhayo N3
145 viśeṣyatvaṃ ] K N1 N2 : viśeṣatvaṃ P :
viśeṣyatva N3
136–137 kālpanikabhedā ...vyavahāra ] Cf. PVSV 2.22–3.1, and see translation of § 28 on page 51 for
more material.
143–147 yac ca ...°prasañjanāt ] AP 215.3–6
143–145 na caikopādhinā ...svabhāva ] NVTṬ 115.10–13
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upādhyantaragraha
⇃N18a
ṇa
╷K8
m āsañji
⇃K5b
tam, bhedaṃ puraskṛtyaivo
⇃N37b
pakārakagrahaṇa upakārya-
grahaṇaprasañjanāt. na cāgnidhūmayoḥ kāryakāra
⇃N29a
ṇabhāva iva svabhāvata eva dha-
rmadharmiṇoḥ pra
⇃P35a
tipattiniyamakalpanam ucitam, tayor api pra
╷K1
māṇāsiddha
˯K2
tvāt. pramā-
ṇasiddhe ca svabhāvopavarṇanam iti nyāyaḥ.
150 [§ 31] yac cātra nyāyabhūṣaṇena — sūryādigrahaṇe tadupakāryāśeṣavasturāśi-
grahaṇaprasañjanam uktam, tad abhiprāyānavagāhanaphala
╷K2
m. tathā
˯K3
hi tvanmate yadā
dharmadharmiṇor bheda upakāralakṣaṇaiva ca pratyāsattiḥ, tadopakārakagrahaṇe
samānadeśasyaiva dharmarūpasyaiva copakāryasya grahaṇam āsañjitam. tat
katha
╷K3
ṃ sūryo
˯K4
pakāryasya bhinnadeśasya dravyāntarasya vā dṛṣṭavyabhicārasya gra-
146 upādhyantara° ] K P N1 N2 ,
upādhya(nta)ra N3
146 °grahaṇam āsañjitam ] P : grahaṇañ ca
māsañjitam N1 N2 : grahaṇaṃ ca māsañjitam
N3 ; no ev. K — Since there is no evidence in
K, S2 apparently read grahaṇaṃ ca
māsañjitam.
146 bhedaṃ ] K P N1 N2 : bheda N3
146 °grahaṇa ] em. : grahaṇe K P N1 N3 :
graha/ṇa→ṇ«e»/ N2
147 °prasañjanāt ] K P N1 :
prasa{ṅga}ñjanāt N2 : prasaṅgañjanāt N3
147–148 svabhāvata eva dharma° ] K P N1
N2 : svabhāto dharma N3
148 pratipatti° ] P : prati K N1 N2 N3
148 tayor api ] K N1 N2 N3 : tayoradyāpi P
148 pramāṇāsiddhatvāt ] P N1 N2 :
pramāṇasiddhatvāt N3 ; no ev. K
149 °opavarṇanam ] K P N1 N2: opavarṇam
N3
149 nyāyaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : nyāyāt N3
150 °upakāryāśeṣavastu° ] K P N1 N2 :
upakāryyāvaśeṣavastu N3
151 °grahaṇa° ] K P N1 N2 : grahaṇaṃ N3
151 °prasañjanam ] P N1 ,
prasa{ṅgaḥ}ñjanam K : pramañjanam N2 N3
151 tvanmate ] K P N3 : tvatmate N1 N2
151 yadā ] P : n. e. K N1 N2 N3
152 dharmadharmiṇor bheda ] K P :
dharmmadharmmiṇo bhedaḥ N1 N2 :
dharmmadharmmiṇor bheda(ḥ) N3
152 °lakṣaṇaiva ] K P N1 N2 : lakṣaṇeva N3
152 °pratyāsattiḥ ] K P N1 : pratyāsanti N3 :
pratyāsaṃtiḥ N2
152–154 tadopakāraka ...°opakāryasya ] K
P N1 N2 In N3, this passage has been added in
the bottom margin.
152 °opakāraka° ] K P N1 : opakaraka N2
N3
152 °grahaṇe ] K P N2 N3 : graṇor bhedaḥ
{upakāra} N1
153 samānadeśasyaiva ] K P N1 : samāṇe
deśasyaiva N2 N3
153 āsañjitam ] K P N1 N2 : āsakṣitam N3
154 kathaṃ ] P N1 N2 : katha N3 ; no ev. K
154 °āntarasya vā ] K P N1 N2 :
āntarasvabhāvā N3
150–151 yac cātra ...°phalam. ] AP 215.8–9
151 sūryādigrahaṇe ...prasañjanam ] NBhūṣ 247, 2
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2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
155 haṇaprasaṅgaḥ saṅgataḥ.
[§ 32] tasmād ekadharmadvāreṇāpi vastusvarūpapratipattau sarvātmapratīteḥ kva
śa
⇃N18b
bdā
╷K4
ntareṇa
˯K5
vidhiniṣedhāvakāśaḥ. asti ca. tasmān na svalakṣaṇasya śabdavikalpa-
liṅgapra
⇃N29b
tibhāsitvam iti sthitam.
[§ 33] nāpi sāmānyaṃ śābdapratyayapratibhāsi. saritaḥ pāre gāvaś ca
╷K5
rantīti
˯K6
gavādi-
160 śabdāt sāsnāśṛṅgalāṅgūlādayo ’kṣarākāraparikaritāḥ sajātīyabhedāparāmarśanāt sam-
piṇḍitaprāyāḥ pratibhāsante. na ca tad eva sāmānyam.
[§ 34] va
╷K6
rṇākṛ
˯K7
tyakṣarākāraśūnyaṃ gotvaṃ hi
⇃N38a
kathyate.
[§ 35] tad eva ca sāsnāśṛṅgādimātram akhilavyaktāv atyantavilakṣaṇam api sva-
lakṣaṇenaikīkriyamāṇaṃ sāmānyam ity ucyate. tādṛśasya bāhyasyāprā
╷K7
pte
⇃K6a
r bhrāntir
165 evāsau keśapratibhāsavat. tasmād vāsanāvaśād buddher eva tadātmanā vivarto ’yam
155 °prasaṅgaḥ saṅgataḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
prasaṅgasaṅgataḥ N3
156 °pratīteḥ ] K N1 N2 : pratipattiḥ P :
pratīte N3 —Acc. to AS3 63, fn. 3, P reads
pratipatteḥ.
157 °āntareṇa ] P N1 N2 : āntare N3 ;
no ev. K
157–158 °vikalpaliṅga° ] K P N1 N2 :
vikalpabhiliṅga N3
159 śābda° ] K P N1 N2 : śabda N3
159 °pratibhāsi ] P N1 N2 N3 : «prati»bhāsi
K
159 carantīti ] P N1 N2 : carantī N3 ;
no ev. K
160 °śabdāt ] K P N1 N2 : śa«b»dat N3.
160 °lāṅgūlādayo ’kṣarā° ] K : lāṅgulādayo
’kṣarā P N1 : lāṅgūlādayokṣarā N2 :
lāv«2gulā»dayokṣarā N3
160 °āparāmarśanāt ] K N1 N2 N3 :
āparāmarśāt P — The reading vamarśāt,
found in P acc. to AS3 63, fn. 4, can not be
found there.
160–161 sampiṇḍita° ] K : saṃpihi«ṇḍi3»ta
P : sapiṇḍita N1 N2 : sapaṇḍita N3 — In P,
the point where the akṣara in the bottom
margin is to be inserted is not clearly marked,
but this is the most sensible place.
161 pratibhāsante ] K P N2 N3 :
pratibhāṣante N1
162 gotvaṃ ] K P N1 N2 : gatva N3
162 kathyate ] K N1 : vakṣyate P : (hi)
ka(thyaṃ)te N3 : kathyaṃte N2 —N3 is
smudged here.
163 ca ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
163 atyanta° ] K P N1 : antyanta N2 N3
163–164 svalakṣaṇenaikīkriyamāṇaṃ ] K P
N1 N2 : svalakṣaṇaivikrīyamāṇaṃ N3
164 tādṛśasya ] K P N1 N2 : tādṛśyasya N3
164 °āprāpter bhrāntir ] K : āprāpte bhrāntir
P N1 N2 N3
165 evāsau ] P N1 N2 N3 , e{ṣai}vāsau K
165 keśa° ] K P N2 N3 : veśa N1
165 buddher ] K P N1 N2 : buddhar N3
156–157 tasmād ...°āvakāśaḥ ] AP 218.22–23
157–158 tasmān na ...sthitam ] AP 219.23–24
159–162 nāpi ...kathyate ] AP 220.2–5
162 varṇā ...kathyate ] PV 3 147cd (varṇyate instead of kathyate)
163–164 tad eva ca ...ucyate ] AP 220.8–9
164–165 tādṛśasya ...bhāsavat ]  AP 220.15–16
165–168 tasmād ...sāmānyavārtā ] AP 220.23–221.1
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astu, asad eva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu, vyaktaya eva vā sajātīyabhedatiraskāreṇānyathā
bhāsa
╷K1
ntā
˯K2
m anubhavavyavadhānāt, smṛ
⇃N19a
tipramoṣo vābhidhīyatām. sarvathā nirviṣayaḥ
khalv ayaṃ
⇃N210a
sāmānyapratyayaḥ. kva sāmānyavārtā.
[§ 36] yat punaḥ sāmānyābhāve sāmānyapratyayasyākasmi
╷K2
ka
˯K3
tvam uktam, tad ayu-
170 ktam, yataḥ pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasmaraṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānā viśeṣapratyayajanikā sā-
magrī nirviṣayaṃ sāmānyavikalpam utpādayati.
╷K3
ta
˯K4
d evaṃ na śābde pratyaye jātiḥ pra-
tibhāti, nāpi pratyakṣe. na cānumānato ’pi siddhiḥ, adṛśyatve pratibaddhaliṅgādarśa-
nāt. nāpīndriyavad asyāḥ siddhiḥ, jñānakā
╷K4
ryataḥ
˯K5
kādācitkasyaiva nimittāntarasya si-
ddheḥ. yadā hi piṇḍāntare ’ntarāle vā gobuddher abhāvaṃ darśayet, tadā śābaleyā-
166 asad ] K P N1 N2 : prasad N3
166 eva vā tad° ] P N1 N2 : evātad K : eva
tad N3 — eva vā tad also supported by S2
acc. to AS1 12, fn. 1.
166 vā2 ] P N1 N2 N3 : n. e. K — vā also
supported in S2 acc. to AS1 12, fn. 2.
166 sajātīya° ] K P N1 : sajāya N3 : sajāya
N2 —AS2 reads svajātīya, misprinted in AS3
as svajātoya.
166 °bhedatiraskāreṇā° ] K P N1 N2 :
bhedatireskāreṇā N3
167 bhāsantām ] K P : bhāṣantām N1 N2 N3
167 anubhava° ] K N1 N2 N3 :
anubhava«sya4» P — The addition is written
in the topmargin, directly above this passage
(which is in l. 4 of P 35a). There is no mark
indicating that the addition should go here, but
I see no other reasonable possiblity.
167 smṛtipramoṣo ] K N1 N2 N3 :
smṛtivipramoṣo P
167 vābhidhīyatām ] K N1 N2 N3 : vā
’bhidhīyatāṃ. P
167 sarvathā ] K P N2 N3 : sarvarthā N1
167 nirviṣayaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : nirviṣaya N3
168 khalv ayaṃ ] K P N2 N3 : svalpayaṃ N1
168–169 sāmānyavārtā. yat ] K P N1 N2 :
sānyavārttayet || N3
169 °ākasmika° ] P N1 N2 : ākasminka N3 ;
no ev. K
169–170 tad ayuktam ] K N1 N2 N3 , «tad
ayuktam (5)» P — That this addition was
made “...by a separate hand” (AS3 63, fn. 8) is
not evident from my copy.
170 °darśana° ] P : daṇḍadarśana K :
daṇḍadaśana N1 : daṇḍana N2 N3 — S2 reads
like P acc. to AS1 12, fn. 3.
170 °smaraṇa° ] K P N2 N3 : maraṇa N1
170 °sahakāriṇātiricya° ] K P N1 N2 :
sahakārināriṃcya N3
170 °pratyayajanikā ] K P N1 N2 ,
pratyaya{ || }janikā N3
170–171 sāmagrī ] K P : sāmāgrī N1 N2 N3
171 nirviṣayaṃ ] K P N2 N3 : nīrviṣayaṃ N1
171 °śābde pratyaye° ] P : śābdapratyaye K
N1 N2 N3
172 pratyakṣe. na ] K P N1 N2 :
pratyakṣaṇena N3
172 cānumānato ] K P N1 N2 : cānamānato
N3
172 ’pi siddhiḥ ] K P N1 N2 : ’siddhiḥ N3
172 adṛśyatve ] K P N1 N2 : adṛśyetve N3
173 asyāḥ siddhiḥ ] K P N1 N2 : asyāsiddhi
N3
173 °kāryataḥ ] P N1 N2 : kāryata N3 ;
no ev. K
173 kādācitkasyaiva ] K P N1 N2 :
kadācitkasyeva N3
173 nimittāntarasya ] K P N1 N2 :
nimittāntara N3
174 yadā hi ] N1 N2 N3 : yadā P : yadāpi K
174 °buddher ] K P N1 N2 : buddhar N3
169–170 yat punaḥ ...tad ayuktam ] AP 221.11
170–171 yataḥ ...utpādayati ]  AP 221.13–14
172–173 na cā°...siddheḥ ] Cf. AP 221.17–20
174–178 yadā ...bhavatu mā vā ] AP 221.20–25
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175 disakalagopiṇḍānām
⇃N38b
evābhāvād abhā
╷K5
vo go
˯K6
buddher upapadyamānaḥ katham arthānta-
ram ākṣipet. atha gotvād eva gopiṇḍaḥ, anyathā turago ’pi gopiṇḍaḥ syāt. yady evam,
gopiṇḍād eva go
⇃N19b
tvam, anyathā
⇃P35b
turagatvam api
╷K6
go
⇃N210b
tvaṃ
˯K7
syāt. tasmāt kāraṇaparamparāta
eva gopiṇḍaḥ, gotvaṃ tu bhavatu mā vā.
[§ 37] nanu sāmānyapratyayajananasāmarthyaṃ yady ekasmāt piṇḍād abhinnam, ta-
180 dā vijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ piṇḍānta
╷K7
ram asa
⇃K6b
martham. atha bhinnam, tadā tad eva sāmānyam,
nāmni paraṃ vivāda iti cet, abhinnaiva sā śaktiḥ prativastu. yathā tv ekaḥ śaktasvabhāvo
bhāvaḥ, tathānyo ’pi bhavan kīdṛśaṃ doṣam āvahati. yathā
╷K1
bhavatāṃ
˯K2
jātir ekāpi samā-
nadhvaniprasavahetuḥ, anyāpi svarūpeṇaiva jātyantaranirapekṣā, tathāsmākaṃ vyaktir
api jātinirapekṣā svarūpeṇaiva bhinnā hetuḥ.
185 [§ 38] yat tu trilocanaḥ—aśvatva
╷K2
gotvā
˯K3
dīnāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ svāśraye samavā-
yaḥ sāmānyaṃ sāmānyam ity abhidhānapratyayayor nimittam iti. yady evaṃ vyakti
⇃N211a
ṣv
175 °sakala° ] K P N1 : śakala N3 :
/śa→sa/kala N2
175 evābhāvād ] K P N1 N2 : savābhāvāvād
N3
175–176 arthāntaram ] K P N1 :
aryāntaram N2 : aryyāntaram N3
176 atha ] P : n. e. K N1 N2 N3
176 gopiṇḍaḥ1 ] K P N1 : gopiṇḍa N2 N3
176 turago ’pi gopiṇḍaḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
turagopiṇḍa N3
177 eva gotvam ] K P N2 N3 : eve gotvam
N1
177 turagatvam ] K N1 N2 N3 :
tura«(ga)»tvam P
177 °paramparāta ] K P : parasparāta N1
N3 : parasparāt N2
178 gotvaṃ ] K P N1 N2 : gotva N3
178 tu ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
179 °sāmarthyaṃ ] K P N1 N3 : sāmārthyaṃ
N2
179 ekasmāt ] K P N1 N2 : ekasmāta N3
179 piṇḍād abhinnam ] K P N1 N2 :
piṇḍābhinna N3
180 vijātīya° ] K P N2 N3 : vījātiya N1
180 asamartham ] K P N1 : asamartha N2
N3
180 bhinnam ] K P N1 N2 : bhinna N3
181 paraṃ ] K P N1 N2 : para N3
181 sā śaktiḥ ] K P N1 N2 : sa (śa)ktiḥ N3
182 doṣam ] K P N1 , do/śa→ṣa/m N2 :
doṣan N3
182–183 samāna° ] K P N1 N2 : samā N3
184 °aiva bhinnā ] K P N2 N3 : aivaṃ
bhinnā N1
184 hetuḥ ] K P N1 N2 : hetu N3
185 aśvatva° ] P N1 N2 N3 : aśvatvaṃ K
185 °gotvādīnāṃ ] K P N1 N2 : gotvādinā
N3
185 svāśraye ] K N1 : svaviṣayeṣu P :
śvāśraye N2 N3 —AS1 13, fn. 1 attests
svāśrayeṣu in S2.
186 sāmānyaṃ ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P — K
puts a daṇḍa after this sāmānyam.
186 abhidhāna° ] K P N1 : abhitvābhidhāna
N2 N3
186 °pratyayayor nimittam ] K P N2 :
pratyayor nimittam N1 : pratyayor nirmittam
N3
186 vyaktiṣv ] K P N1 N2 : vyaktisv N3
179–184 nanu ...hetuḥ ] AP 222.3–8
185–186 yat tu ...nimittam iti ] AP 222.10–11
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apy ayam eva tathābhidhānapratyaya
⇃N110a
hetur astu, kiṃ sāmānya
╷K3
svīkāra
˯K4
pramādena.
⇃N39a
na ca
samavāyaḥ sambhavī —
[§ 39] iheti buddheḥ samavāyasiddhir iheti dhīś ca dvayadarśane syāt |
190 na ca kvacit tadviṣaye dvayekṣā svakalpanāmātram ato ’bhyupāyaḥ ||
[§ 40] e
╷K4
tena se
˯K5
yaṃ pratyayānuvṛttir anuvṛttavastvanuyāyinī katham atya-
ntabhedinīṣu vyaktiṣu vyāvṛttaviṣayapratyayabhāvānupātinīṣu bhavitum arhatīty
ūhāpravartanam asya pratyākhyātam, jātiṣv e
╷K5
va pa
˯K6
rasparavyāvṛttatayā vyaktīyamā-
nāsv anuvṛttapratyayena vyabhicārāt.
195 [§ 41] yat punar anena viparyaye bādhakam uktam — abhidhānapratyayānuvṛttiḥ
kutaścin nivṛtya kvacid eva bhavantī nimittava
╷K6
tī,
˯K7
na cānyan nimittam ityādi, tan na
samyak, anuvṛttam antareṇāpy abhidhānapratyayānuvṛ
⇃N211b
tter atadrūpaparāvṛttasvarūpa-
viśeṣād avaśyaṃ svīkārasya sādhitatvāt. tasmāt
⇃N110b
—
187 kiṃ sāmānya° ] K P N1 N3 : kisāmānya
N2
187 °svīkāra° ] P N2 N3 : svīkāraḥ N1 ;
no ev. K
187 °pramādena ] K N1 N2 : vacanena P :
prasādena N3
188 sambhavī ] K P N2 N3 :
sambha/vi→viī/ N1 — The scribe of N1
apparently wrote vi, and then emended to vī
without deleting the short i.
189 iheti ] K P N1 N2 : iti he/tu→tui/ N3 —
N3 here probably corrected tu to ti without
deleting the u.
189 dhīś ] K P N1 N2 : dhiś N3
189 °darśane syāt ] K N1 N2 : darśanena P :
darśana syāt N3
190 tad° ] K P N1 N2 : n. e. N3
190 dvayekṣā ] K : tv apekṣā P N1 N2 N3
190 svakalpanāmātram ] K P N2 N3 :
svakalpanāmāmātram N1
190 ato ’bhyupāyaḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
atotyupāyaḥ N3
191 seyaṃ ] P : yeyaṃ N1 N2 N3 ; no ev. K
— As this is missing in K, S2 probably also
supported yeyaṃ, found in AS1 14.8.
191 anuvṛtta° ] K P N1 : anuvṛti N3 :
anuvṛ/tt{i}→tta/ N2
191–192 atyanta° ] K P N1 , atya{ya}nta
N2 : atyayanta N3
192 °pratyayabhāvā° ] K P N1 : pratyabhāvā
N2 N3
192 bhavitum ] K P N3 : bhavītum N1 ,
(bha)vitum N2 — bha in N2 is not written as is
usual for this ms (cf. figs. 1.16 and 1.17).
192 arhatīty ] K P N1 : arha/ti→tiī/ty N2 :
arhatity N3
193 °pravartanam ] K P N1 N2 :
pravartenam N3
193 asya ] K P N1 N2 : atya N3
193 jātiṣv eva ] K P N1 : jātiṣṭeva N2 N3
193–194 vyaktīyamānāsv ] K P N1 :
vyaktiyamānāsv N2 N3
194 anuvṛtta° ] K P N1 N2 : anuvṛti N3
195 anena ] K N1 N2 N3 : anana P
196 kutaścin ] K P N1 : kataścin N2 :
kataścīn N3
196 nivṛtya kvacid eva ] K P N1 N2 :
navṛtyakvaniveda N3
196 bhavantī ] K P N1 : bhavantīti N2 N3
196 °ānyan nimittam ] K P : ānyanimittam
N1 N2 N3
197 antareṇāpy abhidhāna° ] K P N1 N2 :
antaraṇāpi abhidhāna N3
198 svīkārasya ] K P N1 N2 : svikārasya N3
189–190 iheti ...’bhyupāyaḥ ] =KBhV 70.13–14
191–194 etena ...vyabhicārāt ] AP 222.23–25
195–198 yat punar ...tasmāt ]  AP 223.15–18
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[§ 42] tulye bhede yayā
╷K7
jā
⇃K7a
tiḥ pratyāsattyā prasarpati |
200 kvacin nānyatra saivāstu śabdajñānanibandhanam ||
[§ 43] yat punar atra nyāyabhūṣaṇenoktam — na hy evaṃ bhavati — yayā pratyā-
sattyā daṇḍasūtrādikaṃ prasarpati kvacit, nānya
⇃N39b
tra, saiva pra
˯K2
tyāsattiḥ puruṣasphaṭikā-
diṣu daṇḍisūtritvādivyavahāranibandhanam astu. kiṃ daṇḍasūtrādineti, tad asaṅgatam
— daṇḍasūtrayor hi puruṣasphaṭikapratyāsannayor dṛṣṭayor daṇḍisūtritvapratyayahetu-
205 tvaṃ
˯K3
nāpalapyate. sāmānyaṃ tu svapne ’pi na dṛṣṭam. tad yadīdaṃ parikalpanīyam,
tadā varaṃ pratyāsattir eva sāmānyapratyayahetuḥ parikalpyatām. kiṃ gurvyā parika-
lpanayety abhiprāyā
˯K4
parijñānāt.
[§ 44] athedaṃ jātiprasādhakam anumā
⇃N212a
nam abhidhīyate — yad viśiṣṭajñānam, tad
viśeṣaṇagraha
⇃P36a
ṇanāntarīyakam, yathā daṇḍijñānam. viśiṣṭajñānaṃ cedaṃ gaur ayam ity
199 tulye ] K P : tulya N1 N2 N3—AS1
reads tulya.
199 bhede yayā ] K P N2 N3 : bhedena
yathā N1
199 pratyāsattyā ] K P N2 N3 :
pratyayāsattyā N1
199 prasarpati ] K P N1 : prasarṣati N2 N3
201 bhavati ] K P N1 N2 : bhavatī N3
201–202 pratyāsattyā ] K P N2 N3 :
pratyayāsattyā N1
202 °sūtrādikaṃ ] K N1 N2 N3 : sūtrādi P —
In the pictures of P, the position of the label
identifying the batch of folios (“5B”) in the
top margin of P 35b covers the place where an
additon would be expected.
202 pratyāsattiḥ ] K P N2 N3 :
pratyayāsattiḥ N1
203 °sūtritvā° ] K P N1 N2 : sūtratvā N3
203 °ādineti ] K P N1 N2 : āneti N3 —
tvādinā in S2 acc. to AS1 15, fn. 1.
204 daṇḍasūtrayor ] K P : daṇḍasūtrayo N1
N2 N3
204 °pratyāsannayor ] K : pratyāsannayoḥ P
N2 N3 : pratyayāsannayoḥ N1
204 dṛṣṭayor ] K : dṛṣṭatvād P : dṛṣṭayoḥ N1
N2 : dṛṣṭayo N3
204 °sūtritvapratyaya° ] P : sūtripratyaya K
N2 : sūtrīpratyaya N1 : sūtrapratyayo N3
204–205 °hetutvaṃ nāpalapyate ] K P N1 :
hetum«2»tva«1» nāppalapyate N2 : hetum
utpanām upala(pya)te N3 —N3 is smudged
here.
205 yadīdaṃ ] K P N1 N2 : yad idaṃ N3
205 °kalpanīyam ] K P N1 N2 : kalpanīṃ N3
206 tadā varaṃ pratyāsattir ] K P N2 , tadā
varaṃ pratya{yā}sattir N1 :
(··················)āsatir N3 —N3 is smudged here.
206 parikalpyatām ] K P N1 N2 :
parikalpatām N3
206–207 parikalpanayety ] K P N1 N2 :
parikalpenayety N3
208 jātiprasādhakam ] P N1 N2 N3 ,
jāti{bha}prasādhakam K
208 anumānam ] K P N1 N2 : anutānam N3
209 viśeṣaṇa° ] K P N2 : viśeṣa/na→ṇa/ N1 :
viśeṣeṇa N3
209 °jñānaṃ cedaṃ ] K N1 N2 : grahaṇaṃ
«jñānaṃ1» cedaṃ P : jñāna(ñce)daṃ N3
199–200 tulye bhede ...°nibandhanam ] =PV 1 162 =AP 224.6–7
201–203 yat punar ...daṇḍasūtrādineti ] AP 224.10–12
201–203 na hy evaṃ ...kiṃ daṇḍasūtrādineti ] =NBhūṣ 261.5–7
208–210 athedaṃ ...°hetuḥ ] TBh2 55.17–56.1
208–219 athedaṃ ...vyavahārasya ] AP 225.1–9
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210 arthataḥ kārya
˯K5
hetuḥ. viśeṣaṇānubhavakāryaṃ hi dṛṣṭānte viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ siddheti.
[§ 45] atrānuyogaḥ—viśiṣṭabuddher bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇanāntarīyakatvaṃ vā sā-
dhyaṃ viśeṣaṇa
˯K6
mātrānubhavanāntarīyakatvaṃ vā.
[§ 46] prathamapakṣe pakṣasya pratyakṣabādhā sādhanāvadhānam anavakāśayati,
vastugrāhiṇaḥ pratyakṣasyobhayapratibhāsābhāvāt. viśiṣṭabuddhitvaṃ ca sāmānyahe-
215 tur a
˯K7
naikāntikaḥ, bhinnaviśeṣaṇa
⇃N310a
grahaṇam antareṇāpi darśanāt, yathā svarūpavān gha-
ṭaḥ, gotvaṃ sāmānyam iti vā.
[§ 47] dvitīyapakṣe tu siddhasādhanam, svarūpavān ghaṭa ityādivad gotvajātimā
⇃K7b
n
piṇḍa iti pari
⇃N212b
kalpitaṃ bhedam upādāya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasyeṣṭatvād agovyāvṛttānu-
210 arthataḥ ] K P N1 : arthaṃ N2 N3
210 °hetuḥ ] K P N1 N2 : hetu N3
211 atrānuyogaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : atrānuyoga
N3
211 °viśeṣaṇa° ] K P N1 N2 : viśeṣa N3
211 °grahaṇanāntarīya° ] K P N2 ,
graha/{ṇā}→ṇa/nāntarīya N1 : grahaṇāṃtariya
N3
211 vā ] P N1 N2 N3 , vā {prathamapakṣe} K
212 viśeṣaṇa° ] P N1 N2 N3 : viśeṣa(ṇa) K
212 °ānubhavanā° ] K P N1 : ānubhavatā
N2 N3
212 °katvam ] P N1 N2 N3 : ka{tva}m K
214 °grāhiṇaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : grāhiṇa N3
214 pratyakṣasyo° ] P N1 N3 : prakṣasyo K ,
pra{tha}tyakṣasyo N2
214–215 sāmānyahetur ] P : sāmānyam.
hetur K N1 N2 : sāmāṃnyaṃ hetur N3 —K
N1 N2 support a clear syntactical break,
having either | or || .
215 anaikāntikaḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
anekāṃntikaḥ N3
215–216 ghaṭaḥ ] K P N2 : ghaṭa N1 N3
216 gotvaṃ ] K N2 N3 : gotva P : n. e. N1
217 dvitīya° ] K N1 N2 N3 : dvitīye P
217 °sādhanam, sva° ] K P N1 N2 :
sādhanasva N3
217 ghaṭa ] K P N2 N3 : ghaṭaḥ N1
217 gotva° ] P N1 : gov«tva7» K : gītva N2
N3
217 °jātimān ] K P N1 N2 : mānṃ N3
218 parikalpitaṃ ] K P N1 N2 : kalpitaṃ N3
218 upādāya ] K P N1 N2 : upāya N3
218 °bhāvasyeṣṭatvād ] K P N2 ,
bhāva/ṣye→sye/ṣṭatvād N1 : bhāvasveṣṭatvād
N3
218 ago° ] K P N2 N3 : davyo go N1
218–219 °ānubhavabhāvitvād ] K N1 N2
N3 , ānu«bha(3)»vabhāvitvād P
211–219 atrānuyogaḥ ...vyavahārasya ] TBh2 56.2–10
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bhavabhāvitvād gaur ayam iti vyavahārasya.
220 [§ 48] tad evaṃ na sāmānyasiddhiḥ. bādhakaṃ ca sāmānyaguṇa
⇃N111b
karmādyupā
˯K2
dhi-
cakrasya kevalavyaktigrāhakaṃ paṭupratyakṣaṃ dṛśyānupalambho vā prasiddhaḥ.
[§ 49] tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. sa ca bāhyo ’rtho buddhyākāraś ca viva-
kṣitaḥ. tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ saṃvṛttyā vā vidhini
˯K3
ṣedhau, svasaṃvedana-
pratyakṣagamyatvād anadhyavasāyāc ca. nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhiniṣedhau, ta-
225 sya śābde pratyaye ’pratibhāsanāt. ata eva sarvadharmāṇāṃ tattvato ’nabhilāpyatvam,
˯K4
pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt. tasmād bāhyasyaiva sāṃvṛttau vidhiniṣedhau, anyathā
saṃvyavahārahāniprasaṅgāt
⇃N213a
.
[§ 50] tad evaṃ
nākārasya na bāhyasya tattvato vidhisādhanam |
219 gaur ] K P N1 N2 : gor N3
220 evaṃ ] P : eva K N1 N2 N3 — evaṃ
also in S2, acc. to AS1 16, fn. 1.
220 °siddhiḥ ] P : buddhiḥ K N1 N2 :
buddhi N3 — S2 also supports siddhiḥ acc. to
AS1 16, fn. 1.
220 bādhakaṃ ] K P N2 N3 : bādhaka N1
220 ca ] K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P
220 °guṇa° ] K P N1 N2 : gurṇa N3
220 °karmādy° ] P N1 N2 N3 ,
karmmā{dika}dy K
220–221 °upādhicakrasya ] K P ,
upādhikra«2»ca«1»sya N1 :
upādhikacakrasya N2 N3
221 vā ] P N1 N2 N3 : n. e. K — vā also
attested in S2 acc. to AS1 16, fn. 2.
221 prasiddhaḥ ] K N1 N2 : siddhaḥ P :
praddha N3
222 sa ] K N1 N2 N3 : (sa) P
222 bāhyo ’rtho ] K P N1 N2 : bāhyārtho N3
222 buddhyākāraś ] K P N1 : buddhyāraś N2
N3
222–223 vivakṣitaḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
vi/vīkṣa→vakṣi/taḥ N3 —N3 wrote vīkṣa, and
then emended to vakṣi using the vertical line
of the long ī for the vertical line of the short i
in kṣi.
223 tattvataḥ ] K P N1 N2 : tatvata N3
223 °niṣedhau ] K P N1 N2 : niṣe ’dho N3
224 °pratyakṣa° ] K P N1 , pratya{ya}kṣa
N2 : pratyayaṃ kṣa N3
224 °gamyatvād ] K P N1 N3 : gamyatvāta ||
N2
224 anadhyavasāyāc ] K P N1 :
anadhyavaśāyāc N2 N3
224 tattvato ] K : tatvato P N1 N2 N3
225 śābde ] K N2 N3 : śābda P : śabde N1
225 ’pratibhāsanāt ] K N2 : ’pratibhāsāt P :
pratibhāṣanāt N1 : pratibhāsanāt N3
225 tattvato ] K : tatvato P N1 N2 N3
225 ’nabhilāpyatvam ] K N2 :
’nabhilapyatvaṃ P : ’nabhilāpyatva N1 N3
226 bāhyasyaiva ] K P N1 N2 : bāhyasaiva
N3
226 sāṃvṛttau ] K P N1 : sāvṛtto N3 :
sāvṛttau N2
227 saṃvyavahāra° ] K N1 N2 N3 :
vyavahāra P
227 °prasaṅgāt ] K P N1 : praśaṅgāt N2 N3
229 nākārasya ] K P N1 N2 : nākālasya N3
229 tattvato ] K : tatvato P N1 N2 N3
229 °sādhanam ] N2 N3 : sādhanama K :
bādhanaṃ P : sādhanaṃm N1 — bādhanaṃ
also supported in S2 acc. to AS1 16, fn. 3.
223–224 tad evaṃ ...vidhiniṣedhau ] Cf. AP 229.6–15
226–227 anyathā ...°prasaṅgāt ] =AP 229.15
229–230 nākārasya ...nākṛteḥ ] =AP 229.3–4, SāSiŚā 443.13–14
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230 bahir eva
˯K5
hi saṃvṛttyā saṃvṛttyāpi tu nākṛteḥ ||
[§ 51] etena
⇃N310b
yad dharmottaraḥ— āropitasya bāhyatvasya vidhiniṣedhāv ity alauki-
kam anāgamam atārkikīyaṃ kathayati, tad apy apaha
⇃N112a
stitam.
[§ 52] nanv adhyavasāye
˯K6
yady adhyavaseyaṃ vastu na sphurati, tadā tad adhyava-
sitam iti ko ’rthaḥ. apratibhāse ’pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam iti yo ’rthaḥ. apratibhāsāviśeṣe
235 viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa kathaṃ niyataviṣayā pravṛttir iti cet,
˯K7
ucyate — yady api viśvam
agṛhītam, tathāpi vikalpasya niyatasāmagrīprasūtatvena niyatākāratayā niyataśaktitvāt
230 °āpi ] K P N1 N2 : n. e. N3
230 nākṛteḥ ] K P N1 N2 : nākṛte N3
231 etena ] P N1 N2 N3 , ete/{nāropita}→na/
K
231 dharmottaraḥ ] K P N1 : dharmmottara
N3 : dharmmonttaraḥ N2
231 bāhyatvasya vidhi° ] N1 N2 N3 ,
bāhyatvav«sya5» vidhi K : bāhyatvavidhi P
— bāhyatvavidhi also found in S2 acc. to
AS1 16, fn. 4.
231–232 alaukikam ] P N1 N2 :
alaukika{ḥ}m K : alokikam N3
232 atārkikīyaṃ ] K P N1 : atākirkīyaṃ
N2 : atākīrttiyaṃ N3
232 tad apy apa° ] P : tad apa K N1 N2 N3
233 yady ] K P N1 N2 : yay N3
233 tadā tad ] K P N1 N2 : tadāt N3
234 yo ’rthaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : yo ’rtha N3
234 °viśeṣe ] K N1 N2 : viśeṣe («pi») P :
viṣaye N3 — It is not certain that the addition
in the bottom margin of P really belongs here.
235 kathaṃ niyataviṣayā ] K P N2 :
kathaniyataviṣayā N1 : kathaṃnniyatāviṣayā
N3
231–232 etena ...apahastitam ] AP 229.16–17
231 āropitasya ...niṣedhāv ] Cf. DhAP 244.3–4: “sgrub pa daṅ dgag pa dag ni sgro btags gaṅ źig phyi
rol ñid du ṅes par byas pa de daṅ ‘brel pa yin te.” Identified in Frauwallner 1937: 266, fn. 1.
234 apratibhāse ...°kṛtam ] AP 211.23. Cf. KBhSA2 73.11
235–237 yady api ...pravṛttiḥ ] AP 226.2–3
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niyataiva jalādau pravṛttiḥ, dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavat.
[§ 53] niyataśaktayo hi bhāvāḥ
⇃K8a
pramāṇapari
⇃N213b
niṣṭhitasvabhāvā na śaktisāṃkaryapary-
anuyogabhājaḥ. tasmāt tadadhyavasāyi
⇃P36b
tvam ākāraviśeṣayogāt tatpravṛttijanakatvam.
240 na ca sādṛśyād āropeṇa pravṛttiṃ brūmaḥ, yenākāre bāhyasya bāhye vā
˯K2
kārasyāropa-
dvāreṇa dūṣaṇāvakāśaḥ, kiṃ tarhi svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva
⇃N112b
buddhir apa-
śyanty api bāhyaṃ bāhye pravṛttim
⇃N311a
ātanotīti viplutaiva. tad evam anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo
vijātivyāvṛtto
╷K2
’rtho
˯K3
vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpohaśabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ pra-
237 niyataiva ] em. : niyatav«eva7» K :
niyata eva P : niyatā eva N1 N3 : niyatā evaṃ
N2
237 dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavat ]
N1 N2 N3 : v«(······)pattivat7» yady api
vahnau dhūmasya trailokyasyābhāvas tathāpi
tato dhūma«syaivotpādo nānyasya» K : yathā
vahnau dhūmaghaṭādyor asatvepi dhūma
evotpadyate na ghaṭādiḥ P — S2 supports the
reading accepted here, cf. AS1 17.9–10, and
fn. 1. Concerning K: The whole passage is
obviously an emendation. The writing is much
more condensed than in the rest of the ms,
suggesting that the reading now found in K is
significantly longer than the previous one.
AS1 17, fn. 1 reads “asadāpattivat.” Since this
addition in the bottom margin of K 7b is
smeared, I am not able to verify this from the
manuscript. But it is clear there is no daṇḍa
after the addition, but only a “7”, indexing the
addition to the line where it should be entered.
238 niyataśaktayo ] em. : niyataviṣayā K P
N1 N2 N3. Cf. CAPV 138.5–6: “niyataśaktayo
bhāvā hi pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvāḥ, na
śaktisāṅkaryaparyanuyogabhājaḥ ...” ;
AP 226.3–4: “niyataśaktayo hi bhāvāḥ
pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvā na
śaktisāṅkaryaparyanuyogabhājaḥ ....” In both
cases, the context in which the sentence
appears is the same as in this passage.
238 °sāṃkarya° ] K P N1 N2 : sākāryya N3
238–239 °paryanuyoga° ] K P N2 N3 :
nuyoga N1
239 tasmāt tad° ] K P N2 : tasmātad N1 N3
— S2 reads tasmāt acc. to AS1 17, fn. 2.
239 °adhyavasāyitvam ] P N1 N3 ,
adhya«vasā»yitvam K : adhyavasayitvam
N2
239 °viśeṣayo° ] P N1 N2 N3 ,
viśe{ṣayo}ṣayo K
240 āropeṇa ] K P N1 : āroṣeṇa N2 N3
240 pravṛttiṃ brūmaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : pravṛtti
drūmaḥ N3
240 yenākāre ] K P N1 N2 : enokāre N3
240 vākārasyā° ] P : vā ākārasyā K N1 N2
N3
241 svavāsanā° ] K N2 : vāsanā P : svavāsa
N1 : svavānā N3
241 °vipāka° ] K N1 N2 N3 : paripāka P
241 upajāyamānaiva ] K P N1 :
upajāyamāṇaiva N2 N3
241–242 apaśyanty ] K P : apasyanty N1
N2 N3
242 pravṛttim ] P : vṛttim K N1 N2 N3 — P
actually reads : v«pra»vṛttim
242 anyābhāva° ] K P N1 N2 : anyabhāva
N3 — anyonyābhāva in AS1 acc. to AS3 66,
fn. 1, but that is apparently a mistake.
243 °vyāvṛtto ’rtho ] K P N1 : vyāvṛttārtho
N2 N3
243 eva cāpoha° ] K N2 N3 : evāpoha P :
ecāpo N1
243 °vācyaḥ ] K P N1 N2 : vācya N3
243–244 arthaḥ pravṛtti° ] P N1 N2 :
a/rtho→rthe pra/vṛtti N3 —N3 wrote rtho,
then made vertical bar of the attached o into
the left part of pa, and let the topstroke for o in
rtho become the topstroke for e.
238–239 niyataśaktayo ...°bhājaḥ ] =AP 226.3–4
240–242 na ca ...viplutaiva. ] AP 226.9–12
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vṛttinivṛttiviṣayaś ceti sthitam.
245 [§ 54] atra prayogaḥ— yad vācakam, tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastu-
mātragocaram, yatheha kū
╷K3
pe
˯K4
jalam iti vacanam. vācakaṃ cedaṃ gavādiśabdarūpam
iti svabhāvahetuḥ. nāyam asiddhaḥ, pūrvoktena nyāyena pāramārthikavā
⇃N214a
cyavācaka-
bhāvasyābhāve ’py adhyavasāyakṛtasyaiva sarvavyava
˯K5
hāribhir avaśyaṃ svīkarta-
vyatvāt, anyathā sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgāt. nāpi viruddhaḥ, sapakṣe bhāvāt. na
250 cānaikāntikaḥ. tathā hi śabdānām adhyavasitavijātivyāvṛttava
˯K6
stumātraviṣayatvam ani-
cchadbhiḥ paraiḥ— paramārthato
[§ 55] vācyaṃ svalakṣaṇa
⇃N113a
m upādhir upādhiyogaḥ sopādhir astu yadi vākṛtir
astu buddheḥ |
[§ 56] gatyantarābhāvād aviṣayatve ca vācakatvā
╷K6
yo
˯K7
gāt. tatra —
[§ 57] ādyantayor na samayaḥ phalaśaktihāner madhye ’py upādhivirahāt
tritaye na yuktaḥ ||
255 [§ 58] tad evaṃ vā
⇃N311b
cyāntarasyābhāvād viṣayavattvalakṣaṇasya vyāpakasya nivṛttau
vipakṣato
╷K7
niva
⇃K8b
rtamānam vācakatvam adhyavasitabāhyaviṣayatvena vyāpyata iti vyā-
ptisiddhiḥ.
244 °viṣayaś ceti ] K N1 N2 N3 : viṣayaḥ
ceti P
245 vācakam ] K P : vācakraṃ N1 N2 N3
245 adhyavasitā° ] K N1 N2 : adhyavasitāt
P : adhyavasthitaḥ N3
245 °rūpa° ] K P N1 N2 : rupa N3
246 vācakaṃ ce° ] K P N1 : vācakaś ce N2
N3
246–247 °śabdarūpam iti ] K P N1 N2 :
śabdam iti N3
247 svabhāvahetuḥ. nāyam ] K P N1 N2 ,
svabhāvahetu({····})nāyam N3
247 pāramārthika° ] K P : pāramārthaka N1
N2 N3
247–248 °vācakabhāvasyā° ] P N1 N2 N3 :
vācakasyā K
248 °ābhāve ’py ] K N1 N2 , ābhāvepy P :
ābhāvepi N3 — S2 also supports the accepted
reading acc. to AS1 18, fn. 2.
248 °kṛtasyaiva ] P : kṛtasya K N2 N3 :
kṛtatasya N1
248 sarva° ] K P N1 N2 N3 —Acc. to
AS1 18, fn. 2, S2 reads sarvasya here.
248 °vyavahāribhir ] K P N1 : vyavaharibhir
N2 N3
248 avaśyaṃ ] P : avaśya K N1 N2 N3
249 viruddhaḥ, sapakṣe ] K P N1 :
viruddhaḥ mapakṣe N2 : viruddham apekṣa N3
250–251 anicchadbhiḥ ] K P N1 N2 :
anicchadbhi N3
252 vācyaṃ ] K P N1 N2 : vācya N3
252 upādhir ] K P N1 N2 : n. e. N3
252 sopādhir astu ] P N2 N3 : sopādhivastu
K : sopādhirustu N1
252 vākṛtir ] P N1 N2 , vā v«ā6»kṛtir K :
kṛtivār N3 — The additional ā in K is
metrically not correct.
253 aviṣayatve ] P N1 N2 ,
aviṣa/y{e}→ya/tve K : aviṣayetve N3
254 °hāner madhye ’py ] K P : hāne
mardhyepy N1 : hāner madhyapy N2 N3
254 °virahāt tritaye na ] K P : virahāṃ
tritaye na N1 N3 : virahāṃ tritye na N2
255 °lakṣaṇasya vyāpakasya ] N1 N2 N3 :
lakṣaṇasya vyākasya K : lakṣaṇavyāpakasya P
256 vipakṣato ] K P N1 N3 : vipekṣato N2
256 °bāhyaviṣayatvena ] P N1 N2 N3 ,
bāhya⁓ ⁓ ⁓ viṣayatvena K
257 °siddhiḥ ] K P N1 N2 : siddhi N3
247 pūrvoktena nyāyena ] Cf. ll. 136–137.
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2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
[§ 59] śabdais tāvan mukhyam ākhyāyate ’rtha
⇃N214b
s tatrāpohas tadguṇatvena
gamyaḥ |
arthaś caiko ’dhyāsato bhāsato ’nyaḥ sthāpyo vācyas tattvato naiva kaścit ||
260 [§ 60] apohasiddhiḥ samāptā. kṛtir iyaṃ mahāpaṇḍitaratnakīrtipādānām.
[§ 61] bhavatv apohe kṛtināṃ prapañco
╷K1
va
˯K2
stusvarūpāsphuraṇaṃ tu marma |
tatrādṛḍhe sarvam ayatnaśīrṇaṃ dṛḍhe tu sausthyaṃ na
⇃N113b
nu tāvataiva ||
[§ 62] saṃpūrṇarātripraharadvayena kīrter apoho likhitaḥ sukhena |
trailokyadattena parātmahe
╷K2
tor ya
˯K3
tnād ato ’yaṃ parirakṣaṇīyaḥ ||
265 [§ 63] ⁕śubham.
258–259 śabdais ...kaścit ] N1 N2 N3:
v«śabdais ...kaścit» K : n. e. P — Acc. to
AS1 19, fn. 1, this verse is also not found in
S2. In K this verse is written after the
colophon, i.e., after parirakṣaṇīyaḥ in l. 264,
and marked as an insertion that should follow
siddhiḥ, l. 257.
258 śabdais ] K N1 : śabdes N2 N3
258 tāvan mukhyam ] K N2 N3 : tāvat
mukhyam N1
258 ’rthas ] K N2 N3: rthe N1
258 gamyaḥ ] K N1 N2 : gamya N3
259 arthaś cai° ] K N1 N2 : arthacai N3
259 bhāsato ] K : bhāṣato N1 N2 N3
259 ’nyaḥ ] K N2 , {naiva kaścit} ’nyaḥ N1 :
n. e. N3
259 sthāpyo ] K N1 N2 : ’sthāpyā N3
259 tattvato ] K N1 : tattato N2 N3
259 kaścit ] K N1 : kaścita N2 , ka(«ś»)cit
N3
260 apohasiddhiḥ ...°ratnakīrtipādānām ] K
N1 N2 N3: mahāpaṇḍitaratnakīrtipādaviratam
apohaprakaraṇaṃ samāptaṃ P — Emend
viratam in P to viracitam, as in AS3 66.22.
260 apohasiddhiḥ samāptā ] K N1 N2 : {( ||
apohasiddhiḥ samāptā || )} N3
260 °paṇḍita° ] P N1 N2 N3 : paṇḍ(i)ta K
261–264 bhavatv apohe ...parirakṣaṇīyaḥ ]
K N1 N2 N3 : n. e. P — This passage is not
found in S2 acc. to AS1 19, fn. 2.
261 apohe ] K N1 N2 : amoha N3
261 kṛtināṃ ] K N1 N2 : kṛtinā N3
262 °śīrṇaṃ ] K N1 N2 : śīrṇa N3
262 sausthyaṃ ] K N1 N2 : sausth«(··)»ān
N3
263 kīrter ] K P N1 N2 : kīrttir N3
263 likhitaḥ ] K N1 N2 : likhita N3
264 parātmahetor ] K N1 N2 : pavātmaheto
N3
264 parirakṣaṇīyaḥ ] K N1 N2 :
parirakṣaṇīya N3
265 ⁕śubham ] N2 : || • || ⊕ K : n. e. P :
śubham ⁕ N1 : {(śubham)} N3
258–259 śabdais ...kaścit ] =AP 203.1–4 =SR 712.4–6
261–262 bhavatv apohe ...tāvataiva ] =AP 232.12–15
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Chapter 3
Translation
Oṃ. Hommage to Śrīlokanātha!41
§ 1 | Exclusion (apoha) is declared (nir-√vac) as the referent of words.42 A.up #
§ 2 Objection:43 | What is this so-called exclusion (apoha)— [Is it that,] through an B.1.pp #
etymological derivation such as “this is excluded from another, or another is excluded
from this, or another is excluded in this,” either only [something] external, differentiated
(vyavṛtta) from that of another genus (vijāti) [is] what is meant, or [is it that by such an
etymological derivation] the form of awareness (buddhyākāra)44 [is meant],45 or else [is
it that], if “exclusion [is] [the act of] excluding” [is understood], the mere differentiation
from something else [is meant]? [These are the] three positions.46
§ 3 To begin with, the first two positions are not [correct], because by the name B.1.2.
“exclusion” only a positive element47 is meant (vivakṣitatva). The last [position] is
41Tārā in P. Numbers in the margins are those used in the analysis of the argument structure, sec-
tion 4.3 on page 98.
42What is at stake in this definition is the kind of object that every conceptual state of cognition has. Cf.
the explanations in section 5.3 on page 121. The Sanskrit compound śabdārtha is expanded as śabdānām
arthaḥ in l. 31, p. 15. The most common translations are: meaning, object, or referent of words, cf.,
e.g., “meaning of words” for “śabdasya svārtha” Ishida 2011b: 204 f., “objects ...of expressions” for
śabdārthasya Dunne 2004: 359, “referent of the word” for “śabdārthaḥ” Pind 2009: 84. As pointed out
by Patil (2003: 245, n. 6), artha covers all of these semantic possibilities, and more. I shall generally
translate artha as referent in the Apohasiddhi, since I think that in this way both object and, should it
be necessary, meaning can be understood. For some material on the Tibetan discussion of this term, cf.
Dreyfus 1997: 220 ff.
43Acc. to Patil 2003: 245, fn. 7 this objection continues to § 8. This is feasible not only because of
the content, but also stylistically: all Buddhist viewpoints are introduced by atha (cf. § 4, § 6, § 7), and
are embedded in a discussion led from the opponent’s point of view. For an example of this technique in
another text, cf. also the notes on the VyN, section 4.1. Another example is found in the opening section
of the SSD (cf. the overview in Mimaki 1976: 11).
44Generally I translate buddhyākāra as “form of awareness.” But in situations where this would be
misleading or sound strange, e.g., the form of awareness of blue, I use “cognitive form.”
45This position is mentioned PVV 169.13 ad PV 3 169 (cf. trl. on page 168, and section A.4 on
page 173). It is one of the theories about the word referent discussed in the TSP, cf. the detailed discussion
in section B.5.
46Cf. section 4.1 on page 65 for the background of this paragraph.
47For the scope of the term vidhi, cf. section 5.3.
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inconsistent as well, because it is invalidated by cognition (pratītibādhitatva). For [it
is] so: The verbal (śābdin) cognition “There is a fire on the upper part of the hill.” is
observed as representing (ullikhant) [something] having a positive nature, but not as
making a mere non-occurrence (nivṛtti)48 “Non-fire does not exist.” apparent. And it is
widely known49 that there is no opportunity for a further proof (sādhanāntarāvakāśa)
for that invalidated by perception.50
§ 4 If [a Buddhist replies:] | Even though there is no conceptual cognition (vika-B.2.1. up #
lpa) as (iti) “I cognize a non-occurrence (nivṛtti).”, still, the very representation of a
non-occurring (nivṛtta) word referent is a representation (ullekha) of non-occurrence
(nivṛtti).51 For there certainly is no cognition of [something] that is qualified that does
not contain the cognition of a qualifier.52 Therefore, in the same way as an awareness
of a concept is an awareness of a universal for others53 because it appears (parisphur)
as a common (sādhāraṇa) form (ākāra) even though there is no concept “I cognize a
universal.”, in that way the awareness of non-occurrence, that is implied (ākṣipta) by
the apprehension (pratyaya) of what does not occur, causes (ā-√tan) the common talk
(vyavahāra)54 of “cogniton of exclusion”.
48nivṛtti is here translated like this rather than as negation or exclusion, because cognates of ni-√vṛt
seem not to be used as synonyms of apa-√uh derivatives (as apoha is one) in the AS. For one thing,
Ratnakīrti does not use them in the passages that he outlines his own theory in, in contrast to derivatives
from vy-ā-√vṛt. Perhaps the reason is that the connotation of ni-√vṛt was too negative (or “negation-
ist”). A similar consideration might also have influenced the formulation nivṛttyapohavādināṃ matam
TBh2 52.17 instead of Ratnakīrti’s pratiṣedhavādīnāṃ matam (§ 9).
49This argument might be based on the idea that perception precedes, and hence is more authoritative
than, inference. This opinion was important to Kumārila, cf. Mimaki 1976: 16 and notes, and Taber
2005: 84–92. Acc. to Taber 2005: 198, fn. 101, also NSū 1.1.5 maintains that “...inference, at least, is
dependent on perception ....” (Taber 2005: 198, fn. 101) Cf. also Angot 2009: 280 f.
50This objection, that exclusion is refuted as the word referent by the mere experience of a verbal
cognition, has been traced back to Kumārila by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), based on ŚV Av 38–39,
TS2 909–910 (which he convincingly argues are verses from Kumārila’s Bṛhaṭṭīkā, being quoted as of
Kumārila in PVSVṬ 114.7–11), TS2 1012–1013a (cf. section B.10 on page 188), and PVSVṬ 114.7–17
(trl. section A.2 on page 166). Cf. also Akamatsu 1981: 54 f.
51Cf. DhAP 246.26 ff. for Dharmottara’s explanation of why this is not the way exclusion is cognized.
52That differentiation and that differentiated from others (i.e., that which is qualified by differen-
tiation) are the same is one of Dharmakīrti’s central arguments against Kumārila’s and Uddyotakāra’s
critiques of Dignāga, cf. Akamatsu 1986: 68–72 and Much 1997: 170 f. respectively. See also PV 1 59
(cf. trl. on page 155), and notes thereto, for more details on Dharmakīrti’s position. A similar point,
namely that—if there is a difference of a property and its bearer—they can not be known without each
other, is made by Ratnakīrti in § 29. This argument is also brought as an interjection against ŚV Av 88
after its quotation as TS2 947 (cf. section B.8 on page 186, and fn. 56 on the next page).
53Acc. to ĀTVK 280.16 (pareśāṃ naiyāyikānāṃ), the others in this passage are the Naiyāyikas.
Acc. to ĀTVP 283.10 (pareśāṃ naiyāyikādīnām), the Naiyāyikas et. al. are meant. Since this passage
is not very specific, and its exact source is not known (cf. Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., fn. 333), the latter
interpretation seems more likely to me. The others would thus be all those who think that a concept’s
object is a universal. This is the position of the Naiyāyika authors (cf., e.g., NSū 2.2.66, and Dravid
1972: chapter 2), as well as of the Mīmāṃsaka authors (cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3).
54Usually this term has the broader connotation of “everyday activity.” Acc. to Schmithausen
(1965: 268, fn. 215) and Steinkellner (1967b: 156, n. 3, section 1) a threefold and fourfold classification
of “everyday activity” can be made: that into a cognitive, linguistic, and physical dealing with something,
and that which adds causal efficacy to these three types. According to Steinkellner (1967b: 156, note 3,
section 1, subnote 3) this 4th sense of the term is already present in Dharmakīrti’s writings. See Dreyfus
1997: 269 ff. and Dunne 2004: 258, fn. 58 for vyavahāra as “convention.”
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§ 5 | [Then we opponents say]: Now, if [there is] a classification (vyavasthā) as B.2.2.pp #
knowledge (bodha) of a universal when a common form appears as being of a positive
form,55 what is it that is achieved by a classification as cognition of non-occurrence in
the case of a thought having the form of an absence that does not appear?56 Therefore,
if there should be an appearance of a form of non-occurrence, even though there is no
form such as “I cognize a non-occurrence.”, who indeed (nāma) would deny (apa-√lap)
the existence (sthiti) of a cognition of non-occurrence?57 Otherwise,58 there would be
common talk (vyavahṛti) of a cognition of something (tat) when there is no manifes-
tation [of it], so that (iti) [the following] would have to be [the case]: even though a
thought has the form “cow”, there is knowledge of a horse.
§ 6 If (atha) it is said [by the Buddhists] that | a cognition of non-occurrence is B.2.3.up #
contained (antarbhūta) in the form of the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) [in the cognition of
something qualified], | [then] nevertheless, if [there were] a concept (vikalpa) having app #
form such as (idṛś) “excluded by non-cow”, then there may be an involvement (anupra-
veśa) of this [non-occcurrence] as being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā); but still (kiṃ tu) the
cognition [is] “cow.” And then, how [can there be] a classification (vyavasthā) as a cog-
nition of this [non-occurrence] because a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), characterised (lakṣaṇa)
as non-occurrence, does not appear (anutkalana) here, even though it [may] exist?59
§ 7 If this thought (mati) [is entertained]: | “For that, which appears in a positive form B.2.5.up #
(vidhirūpa), there is also exclusion from [that which is] different (parāpoha). There-
55The role of vidhirūpatayā in this sentence is ambiguous in my opinion. It could be either a modal
or an instrumental qualifier of either °parisphuraṇe or °vyavasthā, resulting in the following four possi-
bilities:
1. If there is a classification as knowledge of a universal when a common form appears as being of
a positive form, ...;
2. ...appears due to being of a positive form, ...;
3. If there is a classification of the knowledge of a universal as being of a positive form when a
common form appears, ...;
4. ...of a universal due to being of a positive form when ...;
It seems to me that the causal interpretation is not suitable. The sentence recapitulates what a Buddhist
had argued in § 4, that non-occurrence is cognized by cognizing a non-occurring object (i.e., the absence
of non-fire on a hill), and at no point was it admitted that it was due to the positive nature of anything
that an object is conceptually understood. But the argument was introduced by a concession made about
what appears in a conceptual cognition: “Even though there is no conceptual cognition as “I cognize a
non-occurrence.” ....” I think that it is this phrase that is being echoed here by vidhirūpatayā. If so,
it should be taken as a modal qualifier of an appearance in a conceptual cognition (°parisphuraṇe) as
before, rather than as a modal qualifier of °vyavasthā. Cf. also the phrase “yad vidhirūpaṃ sphuritam,
...” at the beginning of § 6.
56Akamatsu 1983: 168,n. 9 refers to ŚV Av 88, cited TS2 947 for this position. Cf. section B.8 on
page 186.
57Cf. ŚV Av 164, also discussed in PVSVṬ 114 f. (cf. section A.2 on page 166).
58That is, if one were to deny this.
59Acc. to Akamatsu 1983: 169, n. 13, this objection corresponds to ŚV Av 41. Again, this is found in
TS2 923, cf. section B.6 on page 185.
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fore [it] is called cognition of this [exclusion].”,60 | nevertheless [there is only] a mere pp #
connection to exclusion. Only (eva) a positive thing actually (sākṣāt) appears. And ad-
ditionally, in this way it is unavoidable (anivārya) that exclusion [would be] the object
also for perception, specifically (viśeṣatas) because [there would be] a concept for [a
perceptual cognition] that, seeing what is different from all (akhila) others, represents a
single excluded thing.61 Therefore, because of the apprehension (avagraha) of a posi-
tive form, only a positive element is, as in perceptual cognition, the object of a concept
also; exclusion of others is not the object. So, how [is it that] exclusion [is] announced
as the referent of words?62
§ 8 | [Answer:] To this [the following] is replied (abhi-√dhā): By us through the wordC. up #
“exclusion” an indeed (eva) positive element alone (kevala) is not meant (abhipreta),
nor mere differentiation from others, but rather that a positive element qualified by
exclusion from others63 [is] the referent of words. And therefore, there is no possibility
(avakāśa) for the errors afflicting each individual position.64
§ 9 But the idea (mata) of the affirmationists (vidhivādin) that, where there is the cog-C.1.
nition of cow, exclusion is ascertained subsequently because of the implication (sāma-
rthya) that “That not of this nature (na tadātman) [is] of another nature.” (parātman),
or the idea of the negationists (pratiṣedhavādin) that, where there is the cognition of
other-exclusion, that excluded from others is understood because of implication,65 are
incorrect (asundara), because not even for a first time [learner of a word] (prāthamika)
is there an observation of a sequence (krama) in cognition. For neither does anyone,
having cognized (pratipad) a positive element, understand (avagam) exclusion later
60Akamatsu 1983: 170, n. 16 takes this to be the opinion expressed in the TS, and refers, in Akamatsu
1983: n. 4, p. 162, to TS2 1012–1013a as the central passage that supports this interpretation (cf. trl. on
page 189). This seems to be the last, and weakest, option for someone endorsing exclusion as the word
referent. The argument of the defender of apoha thus goes through four variations: exclusion, in the
sense of mere differentiation from others, is the word referent (stated and attacked in § 2–§ 3); there is
no representation of non-occurrence in awareness, but the representation of a non-occurring object is the
representation of non-occurrence (discussed § 4–§ 5); a cognition of non-occurrence is contained as a
qualifier (§ 6); a positive representation possesses, or is connected to, an exclusion of others (§ 7).
61I was not able to find a precursor to this specific objection in either PV 1, TSP2 or DhAP. Kamalaśīla,
in commenting on TS2 1060–1062, explicitly states that exclusion, in the sense of the particular, is the
object of sense perception: tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva. (TSP2 407.15,
for a trl. cf. section B.11 on page 189). Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 340–56 for Jñānaśrīmitra’s position.
62The introductory objection (pūrvapakṣa) ends here, questioning the programmatic statement in § 1.
See fn. 43 on page 39.
63As discussed in § 2, various interpretations of “other-exclusion” (anyāpoha) are possible. Since it
is not altogether clear which analysis Ratnakīrti himself endorses, or even if he thinks they are all wrong
(cf. Kajiyama 1998: 123, n. 333: “...three kinds of wrong interpretation of apoha ...”; but see Akamatsu
1983: n. 22, p. 175 for an alternative opinion), I will usually render anyāpoha as “exclusion from others,”
or simply “other-exclusion,” unless the context suggests another interpretation. Cf. also the comments
in section 4.1 on page 65.
64Cf. the three positions in § 2: An external thing, a form of awareness, and exclusion as such.
65Acc. to Akamatsu 1986, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are the affirmationists (cf. especially the
evidence in TS2 1013a, trl. on page 189), and Dharmottara is a negativist. This analysis by Ratnakīrti
has been very important for modern scholarship on the development of the apoha theory. Cf. fn. 336 on
page 128 for more comments on this passage and secondary literature.
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by implication,66 nor [does anyone], having cognized exclusion[, understand] that ex-
cluded from others. Therefore the cognition (pratipatti) of that excluded from others
is called cognition of a cow.67 And even if the non-representation of the words “ex-
cluded from others” [in conceptual cognition] has been taught,68 nevertheless there is
no noncognition at all (eva) of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word
cow is founded only on that excluded from non-cow.69 As the appearance of blue is
unavoidable (anivārya) at that time when there is the cognition of a blue lotus because
of the word indīvara[, i.e., blue lotus,] which is founded on a blue lotus, so also the
appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the
same moment (tulyakāla) as there is the cognition of cow from the word “cow” which
is founded on that excluded from non-cow. As for perception the grasping of absence
in a purely negating form (prasajyarūpa) is only the capacity to generate the concept of
absence, so also for positive concepts only the capacity of granting activity (anuṣṭhāna)
in conformance to (anurūpa) this [absence] is considered the grasping of absence.70 But
the grasping of absence in an implicative form is the awareness (saṃveda) of something
with a limited own form (niyatasvarūpa) that is not different for either. Otherwise, if
the exclusion of others is not formed (kalita) at the time of the cognition of a referent
because of a word, how can [there be] activity71 that avoids other [things] (anyapari-
66“arthāpattitaḥ” is here synonymous to “sāmārthyad”. For a Buddhist critique of arthāpatti as used
in Mīmāṃsā philosophy, cf. Kajiyama 1998: § 4.4. In the SSD this term plays an important role, cf. the
comments in Mimaki 1976: 41.
67This is a synthesis of the two positions mentioned: goḥ pratipatti and anyāpoḍhapratipatti. So
there is no relation between positive and negative content as main and implied content in a cognition, but
both are simultaneous. For a further discussion, cf. section 5.3 on page 129.
68Apparently this is referring back to § 4.
69Immediately after this passage in AP, Jñānaśrīmitra cites PV 1 124 (cf. a trl. from the Tibetan in
Frauwallner 1933: 58 ). Akamatsu 1983: 184 ff., n. 34 translates PV 1 124–127, and then states that in
these verses and the commentary Dharmakīrti presents the four points constituting his theory of apoha.
Akamatsu (1983: 185, n. 34) says:
1) Le mot exprime l’affirmation et la négation à la fois. ...2) C’est pourquoi’ la désigna-
tion de l’objet affrmatif (A) et la différenciation-négation de non-A ne sont pas en relation
réelle du “détermine” et du “déterminant”. ...3) Par suite de la simultanéité de la désigna-
tion affirmative de A et de la négation de non-A, la critique de Bhāmaha contre Dignāga
ne sera plus valable. ...4) ...un tel caractère différentiel ...est irréel.
70The parallel passage in AP 205.12–16 is preceded by a quote attributed to a Śāstric source, i.e.,
Dharmakīrti. Akamatsu (1983: 195, n. 49) traces it to HB 26*23–24, as does Katsura 1986: 180, n. 20.
For the latter, it is an important factor in making the case that “...Jñānaśrīmitra’s idea of simultaneous
understanding of affirmation and negation is not necessarily unique to him, for a similar idea is already
found in the Hetubindu.” (Katsura 1986: 174) For a closer analysis of this comparison, see section 5.3
on page 125.
71Ratnakīrti distinguishes the usual (cf. fn. 54 on page 40) three classes of activity (vṛtti or pravṛtti):
verbal, bodily, and mental, cf. the beginning of Ratnakīrti’s answer to the objection that conceptual
cognition does not exist since it does not refer to an external thing in CAPV 139.17–19: atrābhidhīya-
te. ihāgnir atrety adhyavasāyo yathā kāyikīṃ vṛttiṃ prasūte tathāgnir mayā pratīyata iti vācikīm api
prasūte, etadākārānuvyavasāyarūpāṃ mānasīm api prasavati (To this it is said [by us]: Here, as the
determination “Here’s fire.” brings forth bodily activity, so [it] brings forth also the verbal [activity,
consisting in saying] “I cognize fire.”, [and] also brings forth this mental [activity] that has the nature of
a determination according to the form of awareness.)
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hāra)?72 Consequently someone instructed “Tether a cow!” could also tether a horse
etc.73
§ 10 Also what Vācaspati said: | “Particulars (vyakti) qualified by a genus (jātimat)74D.1. pp #
are the objects75 of concepts and words. And the form of these so qualified is distin-
guished (parā-√vṛt) from what is not of that genus. Thus, because of implicitly under-
standing this,76 someone instructed “Tether a cow!” does not tether a horse etc.”77 | , up #
that also has been refuted (nirasta) exactly by this.78 Because (yatas), if — even though
an additional (adhika) genus is thrown in— it is the form of the particulars that is really
(eva) differentiated from that of another genus, then how [should there be] an escape
from [the theory of] differentiation from what is not that for those [objects] that become
the object of both word and concept due to this form alone?79
§ 11 Or, if the form (rūpa) of the particulars [itself] is not differentiated from that of aD.3.
different genus or cognized in that way (tathāpratīta), then is this a gift of the genus?80
So how could there be a conception of this [form of the particulars] even implicitly?
[This (iti)] was generally said (uktaprāyam).81
72AP 206.3 quotes PV 1 96 in this context. Cf. Vetter 1964: 61 for an explanation of the context and
a translation. Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., nn. 60 and 62) links the discussion in the AP to the objection in
ŚV Av 143cd and the answers to it in PV 1 122–123a, as well as in TS2 1159–1161.
73Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 342 for a discussion of these last two sentences’ parallel in the AP.
74For more on this topic’s history, see Hattori 1996.
75More precisely, gocarameans field of activity. Since I was not able to see a difference between the
use of gocara and viṣaya, and since “object” makes for a much smoother reading than “field of activity”,
I have translated gocara as “object.”
76I.e., that the particulars are distinguished from others according to the genus that qualifies them.
77Note the differences (marked by emphasis) of the quote found here from the text as it appears in
NVTṬ 443.23–444.2: tasmāt jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānāṃ ca śabdānāṃ ca gocaraḥ, tāsāṃ tadvatī-
nāṃ rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam ity arthaḥ. atas tadavagater na gāṃ badhāneti codito ’śvādīn badhnāti.
Unfortunately, an assessment of the main difference, arthatas vs. “arthaḥ. atas”, must await further
research, since the passage in NVTṬ is quite difficult to understand without a very thoroughgoing study
of its context. In the meantime, see the translation (or paraphrase) and notes in Stcherbatsky 1994 2:
420–421.
78Probably by the general point made in § 9, according to which exclusion and the positive element
are cognized simultaneously, and not sequentially.
79AP 207.3 reads atadvyāvṛttipratītiparihāraḥ instead of atadvyāvṛttiparihāraḥ, i.e., “How should
there be an avoidance of the cognition of the differentiation from what is not that ....” Ratnakīrti here
reduces Vācaspati’s opinion to the point that exclusion from others is the only relevant factor in cognizing
a particular as belonging to a genus. For, so Ratnakīrti, the genus of a thing is irrelevant for the thing’s
classification, since it is the particular’s form alone that its classification (and hence the cognition of its
genus) depends on.
80I.e., the genus makes it possible that particulars are differentiated from others and that they are
cognized in such a way, thus facilitating correct activity. It is not very likely that eṣa refers to atadvyā-
vṛttiparihāraḥ (the escape from the theory of differentiation from others), and it would not make good
sense. In his translation of the corresponding passage in AP, Akamatsu 1983: 64 adds “connaissance de
la différenciation des autres hétérogenes” in brackets, thus taking eṣa as referring to atadvyāvṛttipratīti,
which is not found in AS3 (cf. fn. 79). Apart from the grammatical glitch (masculine pronoun referring
to feminine noun), this way of taking the argument is very good.
81Understanding uktaprāyam in this way, it is debatable who its subject is. If understood as referring
to Ratnakīrti (“this was generally said by me”), it is not clear to me which passages he is referring to
here, since the past participle, ukta, can hardly be taken as pointing to subsequent arguments. Since this
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§ 12 Or, if that differentiated from another [is so] only by virtue of the genus, [then] D.4.
let it be differentiated from others either by virtue of the genus or by virtue of its uninter-
rupted row (parampara) of causes, in both cases, given a cognition of the differentiated,
there certainly is a cognition of differentiation.
§ 13 And there is no error of mutual dependence82 (anyonyāśrayadoṣa) when the D.5.1.
positive element (vidhi) of the verbal convention (saṃketa)83 of the word cow [is] that
excluded from non-cow, because this error is possible (avakāśa) even in the case of the
conventional designation of a universal or that qualified by it. For the so-called universal
does not mean the mere universal, since there is the unwanted consequence (prasaṅga)
that even for a horse there is the conventional designation by the word cow;84 rather,
[the universal means] cowness. And to this extent there is this very error [of mutual
dependence], because in the case of the noncognition of a cow [there is] no cognition
(aparijñāna) of the universal cowness, [and] because in the case of the noncognition
of the universal cowness [there is] no cognition of what is to be denoted by the word
cow. Therefore there is no error of mutual dependence (itaretaradoṣa) when making
the conventional designation “This is a cow.” for (tatra) a form of conceptual aware-
ness (vikalpabuddhyākāra) that, preceded by (pūrvaka) the observation (darṣaṇa) of a
single material object (ekapiṇḍa), is spread out (adhyas) externally as if (iva) common
(sādhāraṇa) to all particulars. And if [this] application of the word cow is admitted
(abhimata), the denomination (abhidhāna) also of the rest (śeṣa) by the word non-cow
is accepted (ucita).
§ 14 And there is also no contradiction (virodha) between that excluded from others D.5.2.
and the exclusion from others, nor a damage (kṣati) to the relation (bhāva) of that qual-
ified and the qualifier, because of the absence of a mutual distinction (vyavaccheda)
passage is taken from AP, it could also be that uktaprāyam there had Jñānaśrīmitra as its subject, and
was reused by Ratnakīrti somewhat imprecisely. But also in the AP the preceding discussions do not
deal with this question in much depth (cf. the synopsis at Katsura 1986: 179, n. 15, acc. to which the
section against sāmānya (and jāti) as the word referent is found later in the text). So it seems most likely
that this should be taken as a statement referring to previous authors: “It was generally said” with no one
subject intended. Lasic (2000a: 127) translates this phrase (together with a preceding iti) as “Damit ist das
Wesentliche gesagt.” This would also make good sense here. Furthermore, cf. the gloss of uktaprāyam
at PVSVṬ 280,l. 23 to PVSV 71, l. 2: prāyaśabdo bāhulyavacanaḥ. prāyeṇoktam uktaprāyam. (The
word prāya expresses “abundance.” It was said for the most part[, thus,] generally said (uktaprāyam).)
Karṇakagomin then states that the word prāya is at the end of the compound because it is to be analysed
acc. to Pāṇ 2.2.31.
82That the cognition of “exclusion from non-cow” presupposes the cognition of “cow” was an objec-
tion to Dignāga by Kumārila (ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS2 942–943, and refuted in TS2 1063–1064,
cf. section B.12 on page 190) and Uddyotakara (NV 324.1–7). Dharmakīrti’s refutation is found
in PV 1 113cd–121 (cf. section A.1 on page 160). Other instances of this argument are found in
NMK1 187.5–186.5 (translated section D.1 on page 195). Cf. Akamatsu 1983: 187, fn. 37 for a trl.
of ŚV Av 83–84, and Much 1994: 361 for the context of Uddyotakara’s argument. See also section 5.5
on page 137 for some comments on this argument.
83saṃketa, verbal convention, is the act of establishing that a certain word refers to a certain object.
Acc. to Dharmakīrti, there is convention only for exclusion, cf. PV 1 72cd (trl. Dunne 2004: 343 f.),
as well as PV 1 110 (trl. section A.1 on page 160). Cf. Hugon 2011 for a discussion of saṃketa and
the problem of circularity as it appears in PV 1 (also discussed in Hugon 2009) and the TSP. See Arnold
2006 for some of the broader philosophical issues that are involved.
84Cf. the similar argument at the end of § 36 (trl. on p. 56).
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[between them],85 since for them there really is (sadbhāva) co-referentiality, as for ex-
ample a pot’s absence on the floor. For there is a contradiction with its own absence, but
not with the absence of another. This is established [for everyone] down to children.86
§ 15 Also here [in the sentence] “This road leads to Śrughna.”87 exclusion can indeedD.6.
be cognized, because a distinction can easily be understood for each word: the very
‘this’ with regard to other roads that are irrelevant,88 the very ‘Śrughna’ with regard to
the location (sthāna) of undesired (aniṣṭa) [places] opposed (pratyanīka) to Śrughna,
the very ‘leads to’ because of not being cut off (viccheda) like a forest track, the very
‘road’ as distinct from a caravan or a messenger (dūta). Therefore that having a positive
form [and] having the property of exclusion is understood from aword, as from the word
puṇḍarīka a lotus characterised by white is understood.89
§ 16 | Objection: If it is thus (evam) acceptable (ucita) to call the positive elementD.8. pp #
alone the referent of words, how is exclusion to be asserted (√gai)?
85I.e., it is not the case that that excluded from others, or the object that is qualified, and exclusion
from others, or the qualifier, preclude or contradict each other.
86 That the apoha theory is not compatible with a relation of qualifier and qualified, and that co-
reference is not possible in it, were objections of Kumārila (cf. the references in Hattori 2006: 62).
sāmānādhikaraṇya, the co-referentiality that two words may have, was a very important issue in earlier
texts on apoha, cf., e.g., Much 1997, and the passages referred to there in which Dharmakīrti discusses
co-referentiality: PVSV 34.25–35.4, 42.12–43.18, 65.19–66.1 (cf. the translation of the second passage
in Dunne 2004: 346 ff., as well as section A.1 on page 156 for a translation of the first of these passages).
This passage is the only time Ratnakīrti explicitly mentions this issue. But, as Much 1997: 170 notes,
already “Dharmakīrti does not repeat Dignāga’s treatment of sāmānādhikaraṇya, but concentrates on
discussing the preclusion (apoha, vyāvṛtti) and the precluded (apoḍha, vyāvṛtta).” So the problem of
co-referentiality can be subsumed under the more general debate of qualifier and qualified, as is also
suggested by such formulations as: PVSV 42.12–13: jñānapratibhāsiny arthe sāmānyasāmānādihka-
raṇyadharmadharmivyavahārāḥ, where Dharmakīrti says that universal, co-referentiality, as well as
property and property bearer are used for an object that appears in a cognition; or TS2 1100: viśeṣaṇavi-
śeṣyatvasāmānādhikaraṇyayoḥ | tasmād apohe śabdārthe vyavasthā na virudhyate || (cf. section B.13
on page 191 for a trl.).
87Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 57 f., fn. 132 for the background of this example in the theory of 3 kinds
of vyavaccheda. The problem of a sentence having exclusion as its object was already clearly seen by
Kumārila, cf., section B.9 on page 187.
88Herzberger claims that for Dignāga “...the apoha-operation is confined to names and does not ap-
ply to demonstratives.” (Herzberger 1986: 107 f.) If this is true, then this passage would show a very
clear break that occurred at some point between Dignāga and Ratnakīrti. Acc. to Hattori 1968: 25, and
p. , n. 1.27, Dignāga accepts proper names (yadṛcchā-), genus words (jāti-), quality words (guṇa-), ac-
tivity words (kriyā-), and substance words (dravyaśabda). This conclusion is also arrived at in R. P.
Hayes 1988: 203, and accepted in Pind 2009: 315, n. 600. For a discussion by Dignāga of demonstrative
pronouns’ denotation, cf. Pind 2009: § 65, and see notes thereto for additional material. Jinendrabud-
dhi’s explanation, as cited and translated in Pind 2009: 322, n. 627, could be understood as implying that
demonstrative pronouns refer to exclusion, since they are used in the same way as a general term, e.g.,
tree, might be used to refer to a single tree.
89As traced by Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., n. 62), it was Kumārila who objected that other-exclusion
can not be what a sentence expresses (cf. ŚV Av 143cd = TS2 977cd, trl. section B.9 on page 187).
For the difference between Dignāga and Śāntarakṣita concerning whether a sentence makes exclusion
known, cf. Hattori 1979. Patil 2009: 208 ff. argues that Ratnakīrti’s argument in this passage makes it
seem “...as if a compositional theory of semantics is assumed to explain how word-meanings are related
to sentence-meaning and vice versa.” (Patil 2009: 210)
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| Answer: In this regard it was said (uktam atra)90 that by the word exclusion aup #
positive element qualified by the exclusion of others is meant. Hereby, when a posi-
tive element is being understood (pratīyamāna), the cognition of other-exclusion in the
form of [its] qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) [occurs] simultaneously. And the definition (vyava-
sthā) that also for perception the object is exclusion can not (ucita) be made, because
for it there is no dispute (vivāda) that the real thing (vastu) is the object (viṣaya), like
[there is] for verbal apprehension (śābdapratyaya). And by the word “positive ele-
ment” (vidhi) an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature (rū-
pa)91 is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation (pratibhāsa)
a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that
to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular’s
appearance (parisphūrtyā), since there is no manifestation (asphuraṇa) of a manifest
(pravyakta) particular that is limited (niyata) as to space (deśa), time and condition
(avasthā) like [there is in the case of] perception. What [is also said] in the scripture
(śāstram):
§ 17 Because an object (artha) does not appear due to a word in the aware-
ness of [someone having] an inactive sense organ (avyāpṛta-akṣa) in the
same way as [it does] in perception (dṛṣṭi)[, ....]92
§ 18 Objection:| Because of the difference in the ways (upāya) [of apprehending D.11.2.pp #
an object] according to the nature (svabhāva) of a sense faculty and a word there is a
difference of appearance even for a single object.93
| With regard to this it is also said:up #
§ 19 The basis of thoughts (cetas) is truly different (jāto nāma) [in each
case. So] why does a completely unique real thing have a nature that ap-
pears with different forms of awareness?94
§ 20 For there aren’t two forms (rūpa), ‘clear’ and ‘unclear’, of one and the same D.11.3.1.
thing (vastu) that are contradictory to each other (parasparaviruddha), so that [that
single thing] would appear with one [form] to the cognition of the sense faculties, with
90Cf. § 8 on page 42. This paragraph repeats Ratnakīrti’s own theory of what the word referent is in
broader lines than above. Cf. section 5.2 on page 118, fn. 356 on page 135, and section 5.5 on page 138.
91Cf. PVin 2 8 for a very prominent occurrence of the phrase atadrūpaparāvṛtta.
92The full verse PVin 1 15 is:
śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt |
arthasya dṛṣṭāv iva tad anirdeśyasya vedakam ||
Ratnakīrti only quotes the ablative clause giving the reason for the main sentence, i.e., for the fact that
“this [perception] makes known [something] that can not be designated [by words].” Cf. PVin 1 16, notes
ad loc. for other texts where this verse is found, as well as Vetter 1966: 55 for a translation of this verse’s
context. For the fundamental difference between the objects of perception and conceptual awareness,
cf., e.g., the expositions in Dunne 2004: 79–84 or Taber 2005: 31 ff., and see Krasser 1995: 252 ff. and
McCrea and Patil 2006 for a study of the revisions that this strict distinction underwent with Dharmottara
and Jñānaśrīmitra respectively.
93This argument is also found in ĀTV2 237.8 ff. (ĀTV1 330.14 ff.). Concerning the parallel passage in
AP 208.16–19, Akamatsu 1983: 206, n. 86 notes that the same discussion is found in PV 3 233cd–234ab.
Cf. section A.3 on page 169 for a translation.
94This is PV 3 235, cf. section A.3 on page 169 for the context. PV 3 235a is also cited in Jñānaśrī-
mitra’s SāSiŚā 396.10.
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another in a concept, since, if it were so, even [that real] thing (vastu) would obtain [this]
difference.95 For the difference of a real thing (vastu) is no other than the difference of
[its] own form. And the difference of [its] own form is no other than the difference of
[its] appearance. Otherwise, the threefold world would be only one thing.96
§ 21 Objection: | There is no difference in a tree (śākhi), even if there is, in the caseD.11.4. pp #
of a tree in a single place, a difference in [its] appearance as ‘clear’ and ‘unclear’ to
two people [one] situated in a far away (dūra) [and the other in a] nearby (sanna) place
(deśa).97 | [Answer:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is limited (niyata) up #
to different things (vastu), but rather that it is limited to it not being [the case] that there
is a single object (viṣayatva) [for the two faculties of cognition]. Therefore there is also
a difference in the real thing (vastu) when there is a difference in appearance that is
accompanied (sacivaḥ) by a difference in causal effectiveness etc., there , as in the case
of a pot.98 In the other case again, [i.e., when there is a difference in appearance but
none in causal effectiveness,] one appearance is wrong (bhrānta) because it is certainly
(niyamena)99 refuted that there is the same object.100
§ 22 Due to this what Vācaspati said[, i.e.]: | “[Even though]101 the two [valid meansD.11.6. pp #
of cognition] word and perception have a real thing as [their] object (vastugocaratva),
the [two] apprehensions (pratyaya) are not without a difference, because the difference
between being imperceptible and being perceptible (pārokṣyāpārokṣya) arises due to
95This cannot be the case, because a real thing is a partless entity, the relation of property and property
bearer being only conceptually constructed. Cf. fn. 116 on page 51.
96A slightly clearer version of this consequence is found in SSD2 118.4–7 (and cf. Mimaki
1976: 122–123):
viruddhayor dharmayoḥ padmarāgād anyatve ’pi viruddhadharmayogāt padmarāga-
sya bhedaḥ katham apahnūyate, trailokaikatvaprasaṅgasya durvāratvāt. na hi dharma-
dharmiṇor anyatve ’pi brāhmaṇatvacaṇḍālatve ekādhāre bhavitum arhata iti padma-
rāgasya bhedo duratikramaḥ.
Even if two contradictory properties[, e.g., here and there, or earlier and later,] are dif-
ferent from the lotus, how can a difference of the lotus [itself] be excluded since it is
connected with contradictory properties? For[, if that could be done,] the unwanted con-
sequence of the threefold world being one would be difficult to avoid. For even though
property and property bearer are different, ‘being a Brahmin[, i.e., of the highest caste,]’
and ‘being a caṇḍāla[, i.e., of the lowest caste]’ can not exist in the same subject. So the
difference of the lotus is difficult to overcome.
The consequence in this passage seems to be that, if two contradictory properties can qualify the same
thing, all qualities can qualify the same thing. The same argument might work in the case of ‘clear’ and
‘unclear’ as the two forms of one and the same thing.
97Akamatsu 1983: 207, n. 89 refers to PV 3 407ab (cf. section A.3 on page 169), where a similar
statement is negated.
98In the corresponding passage of Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. section 4.1 on page 72) the example is: “...like
the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to a [perceptual] grasping of a pot.”
99Instead of reading niyamena adverbially, it could also be understood that there is a refutation through
the restriction (niyama) mentioned, i.e., due to the the fact that difference of appearance is restricted to
there not being the same object.
100For an explanation of this paragraph and Jñānaśrī’s version of this argument, cf. section 4.1 on
page 72.
101This concessive construction is much clearer in NVTṬ 115,8–10 : na ca śabdapratyakṣayor vastu-
gocaratve saty api pratyayābhedaḥ, kāraṇabhedena pārokṣyāpārokṣyabhedopapatteḥ.
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a difference in the cause.” | is not applicable, because of the impossibility that a cog-up #
nition of [something] imperceptible (parokṣa) has a real thing as [its] object. Rather,
the difference of the causes, which is[, according to Vācaspati,] the basis (āśraya) of
imperceptibility, achieves its end (kṛtārtha) [of causing a different cognition] simply
by lacking (viraha) the grasping of the object (gocara) of the sense faculties (indri-
ya). Thus, the particular does not appear (parisphur) in verbal apprehension (śābda
pratyaya).
§ 23 Moreover, if a thing (vastu) that has the nature of a particular [were] what D.11.7.3.
is to be denoted (vācya), both affirmation (vidhi)102 and negation (niṣedha) would be
impossible, because [the thing] is observed (pratipatti) with its whole nature.103 For if
this [thing] really exists, [the expression] “it exists” is meaningless (vyartha) and [the
expression] “it does not exist” is impossible (asamartha). But if [it] does not really
exist, [the expression] “it does not exist” is meaningless (vyartha) and [the expression]
“it does exist” is impossible (asamartha). But [there] is the usage (prayoga) of the
words “is” etc. Therefore, the commonness of the appearance in verbal [cognition] to
[both] the presence and absence of an external referent does not tolerate (√kṣam) that
this [particular should] be the object (viṣayatā) [of verbal cognitions].104
§ 24 And right after (anantaram) having pointed out (pra-√stu) the fact [that] that D.11.7.5.
which is to be denoted is a particular possessing a universal (jātimadvyakti)105 with his
very own words, Vācaspati uttered (vilapita) [this]:| “And the commonness of a univer-pp #
sal (jāti), [which is] a word’s referent, to the existence and non-existence [of an external
object] is not impossible, since this [universal], which, although permanent by its own
nature, becomes common to existence and non-existence by being based on many par-
ticulars scattered in space and time, is fit for a connection [to] “it is” and “it is not”. For
the connectedness to an existing (vartamāna) particular is the state “it is” for a univer-
sal, and the connectedness to past and future particulars is the state “it is not”. Thus,
because [the reason’s] negative concomittance is doubtful, [the reason] “commonness
to existence and non-existence” [of an external object] is [either] ambiguous (anaikā-
ntika) or established in a different way.”106| This is not to the point (aprastuta). To theup #
extent (tāvatā) [of what has been said there is] at any rate (tāvat) no damage (kṣati) to
what has been put forth [by us] (prakṛta), because by laying (nyasyat) the burden on the
universal [Vācaspati] has himself accepted (svīkāra) the fact that the particular is not
102In the dvandva compound vidhiniṣedha, vidhi is not used in the technical sense of “positive ele-
ment.” Cf. the argumentation in § 49, where vidhiniṣedha appears alongside vidhi in its technical sense.
103I.e., if a word would make a particular known (in the same way as perception), every statement
about a thing would be either impossible or superfluous: e.g. “A cow exists.” is a pointless statement
if the word “cow” made a particular, and therefore existing, cow known. Conversely, the statement “A
cow does not exist.” would be impossible (or at least nonsense), if “cow” here referred to a particular
cow.
104The obvious fact that words can refer to their objects irrespective of the objects’ existence was
always an important concern in Indian theories of language: cf. Houben 1995: 257 ff., and Ogawa
1999: 275 (esp. fn. 17) , where Bhartṛhari’s explanation of secondary or mental existence (upacārasattā)
is given. As noted by Frauwallner (1937: 262, fn. 2), the discussion here and in the following paragraph
is very similar to DhAP 241.11–242.6 (trl. Frauwallner 1937: 262 f.).
105Cf. § 10 on page 17.
106Cf. section 4.1 on page 75 for the inference that Vācaspati is discussing here.
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what is to be designated. Furthermore (kiṃ ca), in every case the state “it is” etc. of a
word’s referent (padārtha) is considered only according to the nature of the particular.
But [this idea]: “But the universal’s connection to present etc. particulars [is considered
as] the state “it is” etc.” [is] a trick for a child (bālapratāraṇa). Equally, there is an error
even in the declaration of a particular possessing a universal [as the word referent]. If
a cognition is established (siddhi) because of a particular (vyakti), [then] an additional
(adhika) universal107 may be cognized or not; but there is no liberation (mukti) from the
error [that there is] a cognition of a particular (vyakti).
§ 25 Due to this [explanation] what is said by the Kumārilites:108| “It is only becauseD.11.7.9. pp #
of a thing’s having parts (sabhāga) that there is no error in [a permanent universal] be-
ing common [to existent and non-existent things]. For treeness (vṛkṣatva), unspecified
(anirdhārita) as to presence or absence, is understood from a word. By understanding
another word treeness is connected with either of these.”109| is also false (asaṅgata), up #
because, when there is a cognition of a permanent universal, it is not possible that the
state of existence [or] non-existence is not specified.
§ 26 And also this [statement]:| “Also, the way (prakāra) of words to cause the ap-D.11.8. pp #
prehension of referents (arthapratyāyana) is not like [the way] of perception, so that
(yena) there would not be a requirement (apekṣā) of the words ‘is’ etc. as in the case of
observing (taddṛṣṭa) this [object], because the means of valid cognition have different
capacities (vicitraśaktitva).” | has been falsified (duṣita) by the falsification (dūṣa- up #
ṇa)110 of different appearances (avabhāsa) when one and the same nature is grasped
in two appearances, perceptual and verbal. And that there are diverse capacities of the
means of valid cognition is achieved (caritārtha) also by both direct perception and de-
termination (sākṣātkārādhyavasāya). Therefore, if the object of perception were made
known (pratipādana) through verbal [cognition], there would be an appearance in ex-
actly the same way [as for perception]. And something non-existing does not tolerate
(√kṣam) being made known as an object of this[, i.e., of perception] (tadviṣayakhyāpa-
na).
§ 27 [Objection:] | Now, if the part (aṃśa) “treeness” is indicated (codita) by theD.11.13. pp #
word “tree”, then the application of the words “is” etc. [has] the purpose of letting the
part of existence etc. be restrictively fixated (niścayana). | [Answer:] What possibility up #
(avakāśa) of affirmation or negation of another property (dharmāntara) is there through
another word or another means of valid cognition for a particular that is, due to [its]
partlessness, completely comprehended (samadhigata) by perception?111 [Objection:]
| Also in [the case of] perception the requirement of a different means of cogntion is pp #
107This repeats the point of § 10 on page 44.
108Acc. to Kataoka 2009: 496, Kaumārila refers to Sucaritamiśra. As mentioned in the critical edi-
tion, Kei Kataoka has informed me that this quote is indeed from Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā. Cf. Biardeau
1964: 164 ff. for a consideration of Śabara’s ideas concerning the relationship between a thing, its parts,
and the denotation of words.
109Cf. section 4.1 on page 76 for some material on this position.
110Cf. the discussion in § 21.
111As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 223 f., n. 119 this argument is found in PV 1 43, cf. trl. on pages 148–
149.
50
observed. | [Answer:] That may be because this [perception] does not have the natureup #
(ātmaka) of restrictive fixation (aniścaya) when a [thing’s] own form that has not been
repeatedly experienced (anabhyasta) is the object.112 But what [use] is another [means
of valid cognition] where a concept, itself (svayam) having the nature of restrictive
fixation (niścaya), [is] grasping? But (ca) there is a requirement for another word and
a logical mark. Therefore, a real thing’s own form is not grasped [by a concept].
§ 28 [Objection:] | Now then, properties like universal etc. [are] different from each D.12.1.pp #
other (paraspara) and from the property bearers.113 So in the case of a tree, although
cognized (pratīta) by means of a single property that has the character of a genus (jā-
tilakṣaṇaikadharmadvāra), there is no cognition [of it] as possessing other properties
(dharmāntaravattā). Therefore, why [is there] no cognition (avabodha)—dependent
on different expressions (abhidhānādhīna)—to another property [of a tree], like green-
ness, swaying (calatva), height (uccaistaratva) etc.? | [Answer:] Precisely this (tadup #
etad) is unsuitable (asaṅgata), because a perceivable difference of property and prop-
erty bearer has been refuted by perception, since in perception a particular with an in-
divisible nature (akhaṇḍātman) appears.114 Otherwise there is the overreaching conse-
quence (atiprasaṅga) that everything would be everywhere.115 “But the common talk
(vyavahāra) of property and property bearer has [its] basis (āśraya) in a conceptual
(kālpanika) difference.” This [fact] is well established in the authoritative scripture
(śāstra).116
112In the tradition following Dignāga, perception itself does not ‘ascertain’ its object (cf., e.g., the pro-
grammatic statements in Hattori 1968: 25–27, p. 36 (III.Bc-1), and see McCrea and Patil 2006: 318 ff.
for a concise review of research on this matter), insofar as ‘ascertainment’ (niścaya) is synonymous to
determination (adhyavasāya). Ratnakīrti is probably referring to habituated perceptions here, which are
discussed in PVSV 27.15 ff. and PVSV 32.5–12, passages closely analysed in Kellner 2004b: 11–29
(see especially Kellner 2004b: 26 for a note on Jñānaśrīmitra’s view of habituation and inference). So
Ratnakīrti’s statement should probably not be understood as implying that when an object is familiar
perception itself does ascertain it. It is only a conceptual awareness event that can ascertain something.
This also finds slight support in the phrase “svayaṃ niścayātmako” qualifying conceptual cognition in
the next sentence, because it suggests that it is opposed (tu) to perception in so far as it has the nature
of ascertaining something of its own accord (svayam), i.e., without an additional (ascertaining) means
of cognition. For the difference of this position to Kumārila’s, cf. Taber 1998a: 96–101. The Naiyāyi-
ka’s position is discussed in B. K. Matilal 1986: 330 ff. Vācaspatimiśra’s discussion of perception as
ascertaining its object is found in NVTṬ 107.8–117.6 (a passage translated, or at least paraphrased, in
the pioneering work, Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 257–298).
113As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 224, n. 121, cf. PVSV 29,7 ff. for a discussion of the same objection
(trl. on page 152). The opponents there are Naiyāyikas and/or Vaiśeṣikas (cf. fn. 413 on page 152). The
relation between the separated dharma and dharmin is called samavāya. Cf. Halbfass 1992: 147 ff. for
a short characterisation of this concept.
114Cf. PV 1 43 (and Frauwallner 1932: 249 f., as well as the trl. on page 148).
115This unwanted consequence is not clear to me. “Otherwise” can be taken as “if a particular separable
into parts such as treeness, height, swaying, etc., appeared in perception.” In this case, where an instance
of treeness appears as separated from an instance of height, etc., we could probably not say which partic-
ular tree these various properties belonged to, and so they might be said to occur everywhere. If, on the
other hand, “otherwise” means that the refutation of a difference between property and property bearer
by perception could be wrong, then it could be understood that anything that is cognized by perception
could be wrong, so that a tree appearing to me in some place might as well be somewhere else. (This last
explanation I owe to Parimal Patil.)
116Cf. PVSV 2.21–3.1: na. dharmabhedaparikalpanād iti vakṣyāmaḥ. tathā cāha. sarva evāyam
anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmibhedeneti. This passage is also found in
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§ 29 Or117 may it be that the difference of property and property bearer is even realD.12.4.
(pāramārthika), nevertheless [their] contact (pratyāsatti) is to be assumed (eṣitavya)
[by you] only as qualified by assistance (upakāralakṣana) because [contact such as]
inherence (samavāya) etc. between them (idam) has been falsified (dūṣitatva).118 And
so (evaṃ ca), in the same way as there is, when a property bearer is cognized through
perception, a complete cognition of its properties through contact to the sense faculties,
so there would be, when a property bearer is cognized through both word and logical
mark, which are connected (pratibaddha) [to their object] by a connection such as de-
noted and denoting etc.,119 a complete cognition of its properties, because there is no
difference in contact as such.
§ 30 Also what Vācaspati [said]: | “But if that [real thing] is grasped [which is] qual-D.12.4.3. pp #
ified by a single additional attribute (upādhi),120 [e.g.,] existence (sattva), then there
is no grasping of it as qualified by other additional attributes (upādhi). For the nature
of a substance (dravya) is characterized through additional attributes (upādhi), but nei-
ther the additional attributes nor the state of being qualified [by them is] its nature.”
| [Answer:] This also only (eva) flows away (√plu). For the grasping (grahaṇa) of the up #
other additional attributes does not follow (āsañjita) from a nondifference, since only
after a difference is presupposed (puraskṛtya) is there the consequence (prasañjana)
that [there is] a grasping of that which is assisted (upakārya) when that assisting [it]
(upakāraka) is grasped.121 And it is not appropriate to assume, as in the case of the
PVin 2 56.12–57.1 (corr. to PVin 2t 40,4–6). As noted in Steinkellner 2007: n. ad 56.13 f., Dharmakīrti
is invoking Dignāga as authority here: “tathā ca ...”. For a translation of this passage, see Steinkellner
1979: 45. Note also that acc. to Gnoli (1960b: 189, n. to p. 2, l. 22), iti vakṣyāmaḥ refers to the apoha
section. Cf. also PVSVṬ 143.15–16 (in fn. 432 on page 155).
117As observed for the corresponding passage in the AP by Akamatsu (1983: 229 f., fn. 129) the
arguments in this section, discussing the relation of particular and universal under the condition that they
really are separate, is quite clearly based on the discussion in PV 1 46 and PV 1 52–55 (cf. trl. on page 150
and section A.1 on page 152 respectively).
118Cf. the comments in section section 4.1 on page 77. In § 38, Ratnakīrti says that inherence is not
possible, and then quotes KBhV 70,13–14 (corresponds to § 39).
119In the case of the logical mark, the connection would be between logical mark (liṅga), such as
having smoke or being a śiṃśapā, and the pakṣa (or liṅgin), something qualified by the logical mark,
such as a mountain or a tree. Note that this amounts to an equation of the relation of both vācya-vācaka
and liṅga-liṅgin with the relation of dharma-dharmin in the following respect: knowledge of a denoter
(vācaka) or a logical mark (liṅga), like that of a dharma, can not be had without knowledge of the de-
noted (vācya) or that having the logical mark (liṅgin), which thus resemble the property bearer dharmin.
This equation is, of course, an unwanted consequence (prasaṅga), because it is formulated under the
unaccepted assumption that this relation is real, i.e., that the relata really exist as relata. It is only on the
theory that a word and a logical mark do not refer to or designate any real thing that this consequence
does not arise.
120See section 4.1 for some explanations of the term upādhi.
121I.e., the problem formulated by Vācaspati does not occur under the Buddhist premise of nondiffer-
ence between a property and its bearer. This passage is a little clearer in JNĀ 215.5–7:
...na hy abhedād upādhyantaragrahaṇam āsañjitam, ākare ’py upakāryopakāradvāreṇa
bhedaṃ puraskṛtyaiva sarvākāragrahaṇaprasañjanāt. śaktīnāṃ tu śaktimatoḥ abheda
uktaḥ. tad anenāpi na spṛṣṭam.
[The grasping of other additional attributes] does not follow from nondifference, because
even in the treasury[, i.e., PV 1,] grasping all forms of awareness follows only after pre-
supposing a difference by means of [the terms] assisted and assisting. [Objection:] But
[Dharmakīrti] stated that there was the non-difference of abilities and that possessing an
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cause-effect relation of fire and smoke, a limitation of a cognition to a property and
property bearer only due to [their] own nature, because these two are not established
by a means of valid cognition.122 And the rule (nyāya) [is] that when [something] is
established by a means of valid cognition (pramāṇasiddha) [there is] a description of
[a thing’s] nature (svabhāvopavarṇana).123
§ 31 And what the Nyāyabhūṣana says about this: | “If “sun etc.” is grasped there is D.12.4.6.pp #
the consequence (prasañjana) of grasping the multitude (rāśi) of all [other] things (āśe-
ṣavastu) [as] that assisted (upakārya) by this [sun etc.].”124 | is the result (phala) of notup #
fathoming the intent (abhiprāyānavagāhana) [of what was said by Dharmakīrti]. For
it is so: [If,] in your opinion, [there is] a difference of property and property bearer, and
[their] contact (pratyāsatti) [is] only characterized as assistance (upakāralakṣana),125
then, if the assisting is grasped, [there] follows (āsañjitam) the grasping of the assisted
only [when it has] the same place and only [when it has] the form of a property (dha-
rmarūpa). Therefore (tat), how does the unwanted consequence (prasaṅga) of grasping
that assisted by the sun (sūryopakārya), whose deviation was observed [in as far as that
assisted is] [either] at a place other [than the sun] or has a different substance, follow
(saṅgataḥ)?126
§ 32 Therefore, because of the complete (sarvātman) cognition (pratīti) where the D.13.
nature (°svarūpa°) of a thing (vastu°) is apprehended (°pratipatti) even by means of
one property (ekadharma), what possibility of affirmation or negation (vidhiniṣedha)
is [there] for another word? But [there] is [this possibility]. Therefore it is established
ability. [Answer:] This is also not touched on by him [i.e., Vācaspatimiśra].
As shown by Akamatsu (1983: 229 ff., n. 129), this passage (§ 28 to § 29 on pages 25–26) closely
follows the argument in PV 1 52cd–55. PV 1 52cd, where the unwanted consequence under discussion is
introduced, is stated under the hypothetical assumption that there really is a difference between properties
and their bearers, cf. the phrase that starts the auto-commentary on PV 1 52cd, PVSV 29.12 ff.: yady
apy upādhayo bhinnā eva .... (For a trl. of this passage, cf. section A.1 on page 152). The opponent in
Jñānaśrīmitra’s text argues that Dharmakīrti has stated that there is no difference between a capacity to
support an attribute and that having that capacity (probably PVSV 29.13–16, cf. section A.1 on page 152
for a trl.). I understand the opponent’s point to be that there would be a contradiction to the hypothetical
acceptance of a difference. But Jñānaśrīmitra says that this point is not touched by Vācaspatimiśra.
I thank Parimal Patil for telling me that ākara can also mean the “treasure of a tradition”, i.e., the most
important scriptures.
122I understand this argument as follows: In an inference from smoke to fire, which are in the effect-
cause relation to each other, two different entities are established, since the nature of the effect smoke,
which is established by valid cognition, restricts the inferential cognition to fire. But in a cognition that
determines a property and property bearer, these two entities are not established merely due to the fact
that a cognition represents them separately. The reason for this is given in the next sentence.
123Cf. section 4.1.
124In this unwanted consequence, the sun is what assists the cognition of all other objects, i.e., those
assisted by the sun, because a person sees things by the light, or assistance, of the sun. Cf. the translation
of the passage in section 4.1 on page 83.
125This was stated above, § 29.
126Dharmakīrti’s argument, according to this interpretation, was only valid for dharma and dharmin
relations, which have to fulfill two criteria: First, the relata must be in contact with each other. Second,
they must be properties of the same substance. So the relation between objects in daylight and the light
of the sun is not a proper relation of upakāraka and upakārya, since the sun illuminates things at a great
distance and these things are not properties of the sun.
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(sthita) that a particular (svalakṣaṇa) does not appear (pratibhāsitva) because of a word
(śabda), a concept (vikalpa) or a logical mark (liṅga).
§ 33 Neither does a universal (sāmānya) appear (pratibhāsin) in a verbal apprehen-E.1.
sion (śābdapratyaya). Because of a word such as “cow” etc. in [the sentence] “Cows
are grazing (√car) on the other side (pāra) of the river (sarit).” there appear dewlap,
horn, tail etc. [which are] accompanied by (parikarita) the forms of letters (akṣarā-
kāra), [and which are] so to speak (prāya) lumped together (sampiṇḍita) because of
the disregard (aparāmarśana) for the differences between that of the same genus. But
exactly this is not a universal.
§ 34 For [the universal] “cowness” is proclaimed to be devoid (śūnya) of
colour (varṇa), shape (ākṛti), and the forms of letters (akṣarākāra).127
§ 35 And precisely this mere128 dewlap, horn etc., which is identified (ekī-√kṛ) withE.1.3.
the particular (svalakṣaṇa) though (api) completely (atyanta°) different (°vilakṣaṇa)
in every (akhila°) particular (°vyakti), is called (√vac) a universal (sāmānyam). This
(adas) [is] only an error because such (tādrśa) an external [object] (bāhya) is not ob-
tained (aprāpta), like the appearance of hair (keśa).129 Therefore, [a universal] may
(astu) either be this unfolding (vivarta)130 only of the mind (buddhi) itself as having
the nature of this [universal] in virtue (vāśa) of the remaining impressions (vāsanā), or
that having its [a universal’s] form, which is simply inexistant, appears, or the things
(vyakti) themselves (eva) might appear (√bhās) in some other way with disregard of (ti-
raskāra) the differences to that of the same genus because [differences amongst things]
are hidden from experience (anubhava), or a deprivation of memory (smṛtipramoṣa)
may be considered [as the reason].131 In all ways (sarvathā), this cognition of a uni-
versal (sāmānyapratyaya) is truly (khalu) without an object (nirviṣaya). [So] where [is
there] news of a universal?
§ 36 What is said [as objection] again,132 | that if a universal is inexistent there is ac-E.3. pp #
cidentality (ākasmikatva) of the universal’s cognition,| is wrong (ayukta). For (yatas) a up #
causal complex (sāmagrī), which, enriched (ati-√ric) by the assisting cause (sahakārin)
of recollecting an observation of an earlier material object (pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasma-
127Cf. section 4.1 on page 84 for a discussion of this verse.
128For the import of “mere” (mātra) here, cf. fn. 177 on page 62.
129This is one of the standard symptoms of a person suffering from an eye-disorder called timira that
causes perceptual errors. Cf. Chu 2004: 131 ff. for further information on timira (and note the reference
to Anne MacDonald’s forthcoming work in Chu 2004: 131, fn. 67).
130Cf. the characterisation of this term in the context of the Vedāntin’s error theory, Schmithausen
1965: 102: “...d. h. der eine Geist nimmt die ihm fremde unwirkliche Gestalt einer Mannigfaltigkeit an,
ohne dabei sein Wesen zu verlieren ....”
131Cf. section 4.1 on page 85 for more details on these forms of error.
132Cf. section 4.1 on page 88 for who might have said this.
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raṇa),133 generates (janika) a particular (viśeṣa) apprehension (pratyaya),134 produces
(ut-√pad) the objectless concept of a universal. In this way (tad evam) a genus (jā-
ti) does not appear in a verbal apprehension, nor in perception.135 Nor is [a genus]
established (siddhi) through an inference (anumānatas), because a connected (pratiba-
ddha) logical mark (liṅga) is not observed in the case of invisibility (adṛśyatva) [of the
genus].136 Neither is this [genus] established like a sense faculty (indriyavat), because
an only occasional (kādācitka), other reason (nimitta) is established by the effect, [i.e.,]
133An observation of a material entity was stated to be a prerequisite for conventional agreement,
cf. l. 60, p. 19 (trl. § 13 on page 45). Here Ratnakīrti makes the point that it is on the basis of a complex of
causes, supported by a recollection of such an observation, that a conceptual cognition of a “universal” (or
non-difference, abheda, aviśeṣa) is produced. What exactly Ratnakīrti is referring to here with “complex
of causes” is not quite clear to me.
Generally, a sāmagrī is a set of factors that, taken together, causes a particular effect. The causal
complex of perceptual cognitions has been treated very thoroughly in the translation of and notes to
HB b.1221 in Steinkellner 1967b, as well as in Kellner 1999: 197 ff. The causal complex governing
conceptual cognitions is less clear. Perceptual judgement, a conceptual cognition following a perception,
is treated byDharmakīrti in PVSV31.26–32.12 (seeKellner 2004b: 19–32 for an excellent interpretation).
I do not know of a discussion explicitly about the “‘causal factors for ascertainment’ (niścayapratyaya)”
(Kellner 2004b: 24) that are at work in fully inferential cognitions.
Ratnakīrti’s argument at this point is supposed to prove that there is no appearance of a universal
in perception or verbal apprehension (śābdapratyaya), cf. l. 171, p. 29. If it is correct to classify this
verbal apprehension as a form of perceptual judgement, the causal complex referred to here could be
analysed as the appearances on hearing the sentence: “Cows are grazing on the far side of the river.”.
These, according to Ratnakīrti’s explanations in § 33, are “such things as dewlap, horn, etc., which are
accompanied by the forms of letters, and which are so to speak lumped together because of a disregard
for the differences between things of the same genus.”
This position is rather similar to Dharmakīrti’s explanations of the interplay of memory, convention,
and real things: cf., e.g., the discussion following PV 1 64 (trl. section A.1 on page 156), PVSV 54.12–14
(translated and referred to in Akamatsu 1983: 247, fn. 164 in this context), and see also PV 1 72 and
commentary (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 344 f. ), PVSV 42.13–22 (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 346 f.),
and PVSV 82.4–22 (trl. section A.1 on page 164).
134AS1 and AS2, as well as all the mss available to me, read °mānāviśeṣa°. I therefore take °mā-
naviśeṣa° in AS3 to be a misprint. There are three ways of analysing this: °mānā vi°, °mānā ’vi°, and
°māna-avi°. Respectively, one will understand either as translated above, or as “a causal complex, which,
enriched by the assisting cause ..., generates a non-specific apprehension,” or as “a causal complex, which
generates a non-specific apprehension that is enriched by the assisting cause.” The differences concern
two points: what is enriched by memory, the conceptual cognition or its set of causes, and what is en-
gendered by the mentioned causal complex—a viśeṣapratyaya or an aviśeṣapratyaya?
I think the first option yields the best sense. Concerning point one, memory—as an additional cause
(sahakārin)—is more likely one condition in the the set responsible for a conceptual cognition than a
part of conceptual cognition itself; and, concerning point two, viśeṣapratyaya (a certain/specific appre-
hension) seems to be the right option since it is what Ratnakīrti is trying to prove here: that the cognition
is not arbitrary, but specific.
135 Cf. the notes in section 4.1 on page 88.
136The inference considered here aims to prove a genus (sādhya). Neither the reason (hetu) nor the
locus (pakṣa) of the inference are specified. The counter argument is that if a genus is not observable,
it can not be proven that it is connected to the hetu in the first place. Given that an effect of the genus
is used as a reason, as supposed in the next sentence, this argument would appeal to the impossibilty of
establishing the cause-effect relation between a genus and a cognition (or all its other effects). Cf. Mimaki
1976: 292, fn. 321 for a concise summary of Ratnakīrti’s opinion in this matter. As Patil 2008b: 22,
fn. 100 notes, “...the inference of other minds (santānāntara) and of the functioning of our sense faculties
(indriya) ...” are instances where Ratnakīrti accepts that even though that which should be established is
invisible, a vyāpti can be established.
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cognition (jñānakāryatas).137 For when [someone] points out the absence of the cog-
nition “cow” in [the case of] another material object (piṇḍa) or an intermediate space
(antarāla), then how should the absence of the cognition “cow”, [which is] generated
(upapadyamāna) from the absence of all (sakala) material cow entities, like flecked
ones (śābaleya) etc., implicate (ā-√kṣip) another object[, i.e., a genus]?138 [Objection:]
| Now (atha), [it is] only because of cowness [that there is] a material entity (piṇḍa) cow, pp #
otherwise (anyathā) also a horse would be the material entity (piṇḍa) cow. | [Answer:] up #
If so, [then it is] only because of the material entity cow [that there is] cowness, oth-
erwise (anyathā) also horseness would be cowness. Therefore the material entity cow
[is] only because of a succession of causes (kāraṇaparamparā).139 But cowness may
either exist or not.
§ 37 [Objection:] | Now, if the capacity (sāmarthya) to generate a universal’s appre-E.8. pp #
hension (sāmānyapratyayajananasāmarthya) is not different (abhinna) from a singular
material entity (ekapiṇḍa), then another material entity, excluded from that of anoth-
er genus (vijātīyavyāvṛtta), [is] without [that] capacity (asamartha). But [if] different
[from a single material entity], then this is the universal, [and there is] at most (param)
a dispute (vivāda) concerning the name. | [Answer:] This capacity is indeed nondiffer- up #
ent for each thing (prativastu). But in the same way as one being has a capable nature
(śaktasvabhāva), so also another exists (bhavant): what sort of error does [this] bring
about (ā-√vah)? In the way that for you one genus (jāti) is the reason (hetu) for the
creation (prasava) of a common term (samānadhvani) as well as (api ...api) another
[genus] is by its very nature independent (nirapekṣa) of other genera, in that way also
a particular (vyakti), independent (nirapekṣa) of genera [and] differentiated (bhinna)
[from other particulars] through its very own form, [is] for us the reason [of a common
term].140
§ 38 But what141 Trilocana142 [said is this]: | “Inherence (samavāya) of specificE.10.
137Cf. section 4.1 on page 86 for some remarks on this argument.
138The problem whether a genus is omnipresent (sarvagata), so that it might occur both in the space
between its manifestations as also in other entities, is also discussed in NV 303.6–10 (cf. Potter 1977: 325
for a summary), and ŚVĀv 25. Both of these passages are quoted byKarṇakagomin, ad PVSV 76.25–77.4
(cf. the references in section 4.1 on page 88). See also Potter 1977: 139-140 for a short sketch of the
various positions held by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors in this matter.
139Cf. ll. 54 ff. in § 12, where a causal chain such as this is also mentioned as a reason for a thing’s
differentiation from other things.
140This paragraph, giving only a very general argument, draws on many of the central ideas of the
apoha theory as developed by Dharmakīrti:
• that a capacity is not different from the particular having that capacity is argued for in PV 1 54
(cf. the trl. on page 153);
• that many particulars have a non-different capacity śakti, one of which is to cause the same cog-
nition, for particulars is discussed in PV 1 73 ff. (cf. Dunne 2004: 343 ff.), PV 1 109 (referred to
and translated by Akamatsu (1983: 248, n. 170); cf. the trl. on page 159), and PV 3 163cd–164
(cf. the trl. on page 167);
• that particulars are essentially different from each other is introduced at the beginning of Dhar-
makīrti’s discussion of apoha in PV 1 40–42 and the auto-commentary thereon (cf. section A.1
on page 146).
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pp #
universals like horseness, cowness etc. in [their] own basis (svāśraya) [is] the cause
(nimitta) for both an appellation and apprehension (abhidhānapratyaya) as ‘A univer-
sal, a universal’.”143 | [Answer:] If [it is] so (yady evam), [then] this very reason forup #
such appellations and cognitions exists in the particulars (vyakti) too, [so] what [is the
use of] the obsession with claiming a universal (sāmānyasvīkārapramāda)? Moreover,
inherence is not possible (sambhavin) [either]:
§ 39 Inherence (samavāya) is established because of the cognition (bu-
ddhi) “[something is] in here.” And the thought (dhī) “in here” [exists]
through observation of two (dvayadarśana) [where one is in the other, i.e.
“in here”].
But in no object of that [cognition] is there a perception of both (dvayekṣā).
Therefore [there is] agreement (abhyupāya) [with regard to inherence] on-
ly as [your] own imagination (svakalpanāmatra).144
§ 40 Through this [verse] [this following] speculation145 of his146 (asya) is rejected: E.13.
| “How can this continuity of an apprehension (pratyayānuvrtti) accordingwith a contin-pp #
ued thing (anuvṛttavastvanuyāyin) exist where there are completely (atyanta) different
(bhedin) particulars (vyakti) that concur (anupātin) with the fact of an apprehension
of excluded objects (vyāvṛttaviṣayapratyayabhāva)?”, | for [there is] a deviation (vya-up #
bhicāra) through a continued apprehension (anuvṛttapratyaya) when the genera (jāti)
themselves are particularised (vyaktīyamāna) due to being mutually (paraspara) ex-
cluded (vyāvṛttatā).147
141yat tu is supported by K, P, N1, N2, N3. It is not clear to me why yac ca is reported for P in AS3 64,
fn. 1.
142Trilocana’s texts have been lost. For more information about this Naiyāyika author, who was a
teacher of Vācaspatimiśra, cf. Potter 1977: 396 ff.
143Oberhammer reads according to JNĀ and ms. P, translating: “Das Inhärieren der besonderen
Gemeinsamkeiten wie Pferdtum, Kuhtum etc. in dem jeweiligen Substrat ist die Ursache für das Be-
nennen und Erkennen der Gemeinsamkeit.” (Oberhammer 1964: 144, fn. 47) He makes no comment
about the reading “sāmānyaṃ sāmānyam iti”. I think that the repetition of “universal” can be made
sense of here: Cowness, horseness, etc. are causes for corresponding cognitions. These cognitions are,
according to Trilocana, repeated cognitions in the sense that they have the inherence of the same univer-
sal in (at least two) particular things as their cause. So for both things the same judgement arises: “The
universal cowness, the universal cowness.” Since this is at least possible, and it is difficult for me to see
how the mistake of a repeated sāmānya could have crept into the text (but easy to see how its repetition
might have been overlooked), I retain this reading for the meantime.
144This verse is in the upendravajrā metre (as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 4), and in all
likelihood originally from Jñānaśrī. For inherence as assumed by Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika authors, cf.
the explanations in Dravid 1972: 19 ff., and the notes in section 4.1 on page 77.
145Even though the masculine form ūha is found in the corresponding passage in AP, the feminine
form ūhā exists as well according to Böthlingk and R. Roth 1855: 1036. So a text emendation is not
necessary here.
146Since no new opponent has been introduced following § 38, this passage is most likely taken from
one of Trilocana’s texts.
147The logical error seems to be as follows: Trilocana thinks that a continuity of cognitions concerning
particulars (hetu) can not occur without a continued thing, e.g., a particular with a universal inhering in
it. Since the cognition is dependent on these continued particulars as its cause, it establishes them. In
other words, they are the sādhya of the inference in the background of this passage. But, as Ratnakīrti
suggests, even the genera themselves are differentiated from each other, since they are “particularized”
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§ 41 What is again formulated (ukta) as a [valid cognition] eliminating (bādhaka) [theE.15.
continuity of cognition] in the opposite case (viparyaya) by him,148 [i.e.,] | “A continuity pp #
of appelation and apprehension (abhidhānapratyayānuvṛtti) existing (bhavat) only in
some places while averted from some [others] has a cause (nimittavat), but there is
no other cause (nimitta) [except a continuous particular].” and so on | is not correct, up #
since, even without a continuing [thing], it has been established149 that the continuity
of appellations and cognitions is [to be] necessarily (avaśya) accepted because of the
specificity (viśeṣa) of [a thing’s] own nature, which is differentiated from that of another
form (atadrūpaparāvṛttasvarūpaviśeṣa). Therefore:
§ 42 By which contact a genus spreads out into something, when [there
is] the same difference of things, but not into another, that [contact] alone
should be the cause of both words and cognitions.150
§ 43 What is again said about this [verse] (atra)151 by the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: | “For itE.17. pp #
is not so: By which contact (pratyāsatti) [such things as] a stick, a string etc. extend
somewhere [but] not elsewhere, that very contact should be the cause of the common
talk of ‘having a stick’, ‘having a string’ etc. in cases of a man [carrying a stick], crystal
[on a string] etc. [So] what [then] is the use of stick, string etc.?” | is wrong (asaṅgata), up #
because the intention [of this verse, correctly given as follows,] was not understood
(abhiprāyaparijñāna) [in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa]:152 “For it is not denied that both a stick
and a string, connected (pratyāsanna) to a man and a crystal, [and] observed [as such],
are the reason (hetutva) for the apprehension of ‘having a stick’, ‘having a string’. But
a universal is not observed even in a dream (svapna). Therefore, if something is to
be imagined (parikalpanīya), then (tadā) preferably (varam) only contact (pratyāsatti)
should be imagined as the reason for the apprehension of a universal. [But] what is the
use of a complicated (guru) assumption (parikalpanā) [like this]?”
or, literally, have gone into the particulars. Therefore the logical reason that Trilocana professes, the
continuity of cognition, goes astray or deviates: there can be differentiated things causing a continuous
cognition.
148Presumably this is still Trilocana. The full formulation of the logical error Ratnakīrti is defending
against here is sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa. Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 116 f. for more information.
Acc. to Kajiyama 1998: 116 f., fn. 310, it is supposed to establish the pervasion of a separate inference
by disproving other possibilities. Trilocana, as mentioned above ( fn. 147 on the previous page), wishes
to prove that a cognition of sameness is caused by, and so can prove, the sameness of its objects. Here he
argues that, in the case opposite to the one he wants to prove, i.e., when there is no continuous thing, the
reason of his inference, the continuity of cognition, is not possible (or is eliminated). In this way, the fact
that there is a continuity of cognitions is a valid reason for inferring its only cause, a continuous thing.
149Ratnakīrti has argued that the inexistence of a universal does not mean that cognitions of a universal
are without cause (§ 36), and that particulars differentiated by their own nature are possible as a cause for
a cognition of sameness (§ 37). Together, these arguments might account for the present statement that
continuity of appelations and cognitions must be accepted on the basis of the specific characteristics of
particulars alone.
150This verse is PV 1 162 (cf. the trl. on page 165), where it also follows a discussion about the causes
of cognitions and designations.
151The following quote, NBhūṣ 261.5–7 is actually directly aimed at PV 1 162, which is quoted at
NBhūṣ 261.3–4.
152The structure of the argument is: what the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa says about PV 1 162, i.e. that the verse is
wrong in claiming that a stick (or universal) is not the cause of the cognition “someone having a stick”
(or something qualified by a universal), is wrong itself, because the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa does not correctly
understand Dharmakīrti’s intention, which is as follows.
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§ 44 [Objection:] | Now this inference (anumāna) demonstrating a universal (jātipra- E.19.pp #
sādhaka) is set forth (abhi-√dhā): What is a cognition of [something] that is qualified
(viśiṣṭajñāna), that [is] inseparable to the grasping of the qualifier (viśeṣaṇagrahaṇa-
nāntariyaka), like the cognition of ‘having a stick’ [in the case of someone carrying a
stick]. And this is a cognition of [something] that is qualified: “This is a cow”. In fact
(arthatas) [this is] an effect-reason (kāryahetu). For in the example (dṛṣṭānta) the cog-
nition of [something] qualified is proven as the effect of the experience of the qualifier
(viśeṣaṇānubhāvakārya).153
§ 45 | [Answer:] With regard to this [inference] [there is] a question (anuyoga): E.20.up #
[Is] the inseparableness of an awareness of what is qualified (viśiṣṭabuddhi) from a
grasping of a differentiated (bhinna) qualifier what is to be proven (sādhya), or [its]
inseparableness from the experience of a mere qualifier?
§ 46 In the first case, the elimination of the locus through perception (pratyakṣa- E.20.3.
bādhā) does not provide an opportunity154 for attention towards the proving [reason]
(sādhanāvadhāna), because there is no appearance of both [a qualified thing and that
qualifying it] in a perception grasping a real thing.155 Moreover, that there is an aware-
ness of [something] qualified (viśiṣṭabuddhitva) is an ambiguous (anaikāntika) reason
for a universal (sāmānyahetu), because [that cognition of something qualified is] ob-
served also without grasping a differentiated qualifier, as (yathā) “A pot (ghaṭa) has its
own form (svarūpavat).”, or “Cowness [is] a universal.”156
§ 47 But in the second case (dvitīyapakṣa) [there is an] establishing of what is [al- E.20.4.
153The elements used in this inference are as follows: The pakṣa, or locus of the inference, is cogni-
tion. The hetu, reason, is that the cognition is of something that is qualified, which simply means that
the object that is known in a cognition is specified in some way. The sādhya, which is what is to be
proven, is that this cognition of something qualified implies an apprehension of that which qualifies its
object—on a realist account, a universal. The example, dṛṣṭānta, is the cognition of a person carrying a
stick, which implies that there be the cognition of the stick. The reason used in this inference is a so-called
effect reason, kāryahetu, i.e., the reason (cognition of something qualified) is an effect of what is to be
established (grasping of a qualifier). This is one of three types of reasons that are admissable according
to Buddhist logicians in the tradition of Dharmakīrti (cf. the explanations in Kajiyama 1998: 72 ff.).
154anavakāśayati could be either the causative 3rd person singular active presence of ava+√kāś pre-
fixed by a-, or a denominative of an-avakāśa. The negation by the prefix a- is very uncommon in verbs,
although it is possible acc. to Whitney 2000: § 1121a. I don’t think that any difference in meaning would
result for this passage, but I think the derivation from the verb form is more likely, since Ratnakīrti is
certainly not averse to a truly nominal style and I cannot see a reason why he should use a denominative
in this passage instead of a normal participle.
155Meaning we do not apprehend the universal cowness in the perception of a specific cow. And
since there is no cognition of both a qualified thing and its qualifier, it is no use paying any attention
to the reason. For the exemplary inference from ‘smoke on a mountain’ to ‘fire on a mountain’, the
corresponding argument would be that the ‘mountain qualified by smoke’ is shown not to exist, so that
the inference becomes futile. For Ratnakīrti’s stance on the relation of qualifier and qualified, cf. the
argument in § 28 on page 25.
156These examples show that it is possible to have a cognition of something that is qualified without
grasping a qualifier that is different from the thing: a pot is not different from its own form, and cowness
is not different from the universal that it is. Since it is therefore possible that a qualified cognition (hetu)
can occur independently of a separate qualifier (sādhya), the reason is ambiguous, anaikāntika. Cf. the
notes on an anaikāntikahetu in section 4.2 on page 94.
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ready] established (siddhasādhana), because, in accepting a difference imagined as “A
material entity possesses the genus cowness.” in the same way as [one thinks] “A pot
has its own form.”, a relation of qualifier and qualified is postulated [even by us],157
since common talk [such as] “This is a cow.” comes about due to an experience of that
differentiated from non-cow.
§ 48 So in this way a universal is not established. And the [valid cognition] eliminat-E.21.
ing the circle of additional attributes like universal, property, action etc.,158 [is] a sharp-
ened perception (paṭupratyakṣa) grasping a complete particular (kevalavyaktigrāhaka),
or the well established non-perception of what is observable.159
§ 49 So in this way160 only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [pos-F.1.
itive element] is intended to be called the external object and the form of awareness.161
Amongst these, [there is] no affirmation [or] negation of the form of awareness in reality
or in a relative sense, because of the fact that [it] is understood through the perception
self-awareness,162 and because of non-determination (anadhyavasāya) [of the form of
awareness]. Neither is there in reality a negation or affirmation of the external, because
of its non-appearance in verbal apprehension. Precisely for this [reason] all properties
(dharma) [of an object] are inexpressible in reality, because there is no determination
[or] appearance [of them]. Therefore there is conventional affirmation and negation
of an external [object] only, because otherwise there is the unwanted consequence of
insufficiency for everyday interaction (saṃvyavahāra).163
§ 50 So in this wayF.1.2.
an affirmation [and negation] in reality establishes neither a form of aware-
ness nor an external [object].
For [affirmation and negation] conventionally [establish an object] only
externally. But even conventionally [there is] no [such establishment] of a
form (ākṛti).164
157Cf. § 28 (trl. on page 51) for this argument.
158I.e., all things that can be understood as qualifying a particular. Ratnakīrti here hints at the entities
that, according to the ontology of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors, can inhere in substances (dravya). Cf.
the summary in Halbfass 1992: 70 ff.
159Ratnakīrti here summarises his two main lines of attack on entities that exist separately from a
particular but nevertheless are capable of qualifying it: a particular is not observed as having a sepa-
rate qualifier, and there is no perceptual evidence for this qualifier. This corresponds to the two main
polemical sections, § 10 to § 32 on pages 17–28 and § 33 to § 47 on pages 28–33 respectively.
160This paragraph sums up Ratnakīrti’s own position. Cf. section 5.3 on page 121 for explanations of
the issues mentioned in this paragraph.
161Cf. the same statement in § 16 on page 47.
162For a discussion of Ratnakīrti’s ideas about self-awareness as relevant for conceptual cognition,
cf. section 5.4 on page 132.
163Cf. fn. 185 on page 63 and references given there for this unwanted consequence.
164Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 338 f. for more on this verse’s context in the AP. Their translation
of the verse is as follows: “There is no way of really affirming either the mental image or the external
object. Conventionally [there is affirmation] only of externals, whereas even conventionally there is no
[affirmation] of the mental image.” (McCrea and Patil 2006: 338)
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§ 51 Through this [verse] what Dharmottara says uncommonly (alaukika), against G.1.
scripture (anāgama), and illogically (atārkikīya): | “[There is] affirmation and negationpp #
of externalness that is superimposed.”165 | is also rejected (apahastita).up #
§ 52 If this (iti) [is objected:] | “If the thing to be determined does not appear in a G.2.pp #
determination (adhyavasāya),166then what is the meaning of [saying] “this [real thing]
is determined?”167 [You say] the meaning [is] “[something is] made an object of activ-
ity (pravṛttiviṣayīkṛta), even though it does not appear.”168 How [then] is there, when
there is an unspecific nonappearance,169 activity (pravṛtti) having a limited object (ni-
yataviṣaya) through an avoidance of other objects (viṣayāntaraparihāra)?” | [then] itup #
is said [in answer]: even though everything (viśva) is ungrasped (agṛhīta), still there
is activity (pravṛtti) that is indeed restricted to [its proper object,] such as water etc.,
because a concept, since [it] has a restricted form of awareness due to being produced
by a restricted complex of causes, has a restricted capacity,170 like smoke generates the
cognition of a hidden fire.171
165Cf. DhAP 244.3-4: “sgrub pa daṅ dgag pa dag ni sgro bdag gaṅ źig phyi rol ñid du ṅes par byas pa
de daṅ ’brel pa yin te.” (Translation acc. to Frauwallner 1937: 266: “Dagegen wird eine Bejahung oder
Verneinung mit dem Übertragenen verbunden, das als außen bestimmt wird.”) Note that in Ratnakīrti’s
quote a Sanskrit equivalent for ṅes par byas pa is missing. This position is illustrated by Dharmottara
with the example of a rope that is mistaken for a snake: it is with regard to the superimposed snake,
which is determined as external, that there is affirmation and negation. Cf. section 4.1 on page 89 for a
translation of that example.
166This criticism is expressed also in CAPV 133.23–24.
167If tadadhyavasitam is interpreted as a compound, one could understand “...[saying] ‘[it is] deter-
mined through this [determination]?”
168This opinion is expressed, e.g., KBhSA2 73.9–12 (cf. chapter C on page 193 for a translation of the
latter passage, as well as Woo 1999: 187). In CAPV 140.4–7, Ratnakīrti makes it clear that an object can
be determined regardless of its ontological status:
tasmād vastu vā ghaṭapaṭādi sandigdhavastu vā sādhakabādhakātikrāntam, avastu
vātmadikkālākṣaṇikādikam adhyavasitam iti, apratibhāse ’pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam ity
arthaḥ. ayam eva cāropaikīkaraṇādhyavasāyābhedagrahādīnām arthaḥ sarvatra śāstre
boddhavyaḥ.
Therefore, [the statement] that a real thing, like a pot, a cloth etc., or a doubtful thing,
which goes beyond an establishing or refuting [means of valid cognition], or an unreal
thing, like a soul, space time (dikkāla), an unmomentary thing, etc., is determined, means
that, even though there is no appearance [of any of these], [each of these things] is made
the object of activity.
And exactly this is the meaning of [terms] such as imposition, equation, determination,
grasping as non-different etc., which should be heeded everywhere in the Śāstra.
169I.e., the non-appearance of horse can not be distinguished from the non-appearance of cow.
170Cf. the notes to § 36 (especially fn. 133 on page 55) for Ratnakīrti’s idea about how a concept is
causally linked to things.
171The variants of this example in mss K and P are as follows:
K: ...like in the case of something that doesn’t exist. Even if [there is] absence of smoke, which is in
the three worlds, where there is fire, nevertheless from that[, fire,] only smoke arises, but nothing else.
(It is not obvious to me how dhūmasya trailokyasyābhāvas should be construed. Perhaps an emendation
to dhūmasya trailokyābhāvas (understood as “absence of smoke in the three worlds”) would be a good
idea.)
P: ...like, even though there is no [such thing as] smoke, pot, etc. when there is fire, smoke alone is
created [by fire, but] not a pot etc.
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§ 53 For existing [things], [which] have restricted capacities,172 have natures com-G.6.
pletely ascertained by a means of valid cognition, [and] are not liable to be questioned as
to a mixing of [their] capacities. Therefore, the state of determining this [object] (tada-
dhyavasāyitva) is, because of a relation to a specific form of awareness (ākāraviśeṣayo-
ga), the state of being generative of the activity towards this [object] (tatpravṛttijanaka-
tva). But we do not speak (√brū) of activity (pravṛtti) due to a superimposition (āropa)
because of similarity (sādrśya),173 so that there would be the possibility of falsification
(dūṣaṇāvakāśa) by means of superimposition (āropadvāra) [either] of an external ob-
ject on a form of awareness or of a form of awareness on an external object;174 rather[,
we say], an awareness (buddhi)—arising (upajan) only in virtue of (vaśa) the ripening
of one’s own remaining impressions (vāsanā)—even though not seeing (apaśayat) an
external object, brings forth (ā-√tan) activity towards an external object. Thus (iti),
[it] is completely mistaken (vipluta).175 So in this way a positive element (vidhi) is the
referent (artha), which, qualified by the absence of others (anyābhāvaviśiṣṭa), is dif-
ferentiated from that of another genus (vijātivyāvṛtta). And only this [positive element]
[which is] to be denoted by the word “exclusion” (apoha) is the referent of words, and
the object (viṣaya) of activity and inactivity (pravṛttinivṛtti). This is settled.
§ 54 Here [there is] the formulation of a proof (prayoga):176 All that, which is denot-H.1.
ing (vācaka), has as [its] object a mere thing177 that is determined [and] distinguished
(parāvṛtta) from that of another form, as the expression “Water (jala) [is] here in a well
(kūpa).”178 And this [expression] having the form of a word like cow etc. is denoting
(vācaka).179 [This is] the logical reason of essential property (svabhāvahetu).180 This
[reason] is not unestablished (asiddha), because, even though there is no real relation
172Apart from the similar passages quoted in the critical edition, an emendation of niyataviṣaya to
niyataśakti suggests itself also from context. For it is not clear to me how to construe niyataviṣaya, just
having been used by Ratnakīrti’s opponent as a bahuvrīhi compound in niyataviṣayā pravṛttiḥ (in line
235 of the critical edition), with bhāva in this sentence, because things don’t have objects. But they can
have capacities.
173This is also discussed in CAPV 138.12–16.
174Cf. the discussion of these possibilities, amongst others, in CAPV 133.23–135.4.
175Following the passage that Ratnakīrti based himself on for the current discussion, AP 226.14–15
quotes PV 3 13b-c. Ratnakīrti quotes that verse in CAPV 138.17–18.
176Cf. section 5.2 on page 114 for a discussion of this proof.
177Patil 2009: 239 translates vastumātra as “thing-in-general”, which he takes to be the same “as
‘similarity classes’ and ‘constructed universals’.” (Patil 2009: 240) vastumātra is an odd term. vastu has
been used by Ratnakīrti strictly in the sense of a real thing (cf., e.g., l. 74, or the argument in § 20). So here
the word mātra must have some special significance that alters the import of vastu so far that Ratnakīrti
is not claiming that a real thing is the object of words. In § 33,mātrawas used in a similar meaning: from
the word “cow” a mere dewlap, etc. is to be understood, i.e., a thing that is determined and differentiated
from something else. A similar usage of mātra is seen in the argument about the viśeṣanamātra in § 45
and in § 47. There Ratnakīrti accepts a “mere qualifier”, which means an abstracted property of a thing,
since that facilitates everyday activity.
178For this example, cf. Krasser 1991: 55 f., fn. 91.
179Patil (2009: 239) points out that even though the pakṣa of this inference is “something that “has
the form of a word such as ‘cow[...]’”” it should be understood as “the inferential/verbal awareness-
event produced in the mind of a competent speaker of a language upon hearing a token utterance of an
expression in that language.” Also see the arguments in section 5.3 on page 123 which show in what way
“expression” is equivalent to a conceptual state of awareness.
180The translation of svabhāva here follows the usage in Kellner 2010b.
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of a denotable and denoting (pāramārthikavācyavācakabhāva) [according to] the rule
stated earlier181, [this relation], made by determination (adhyavasāyakṛta), is necessar-
ily (avaśya) to be accepted (svīkartavyatva) by all [those] engaged in everyday activity
(sarvavyavahārin), for otherwise [there is] the unwanted consequence of the extermi-
nation of all usual activity (sarvavyavahāroccheda).182 Neither is that [reason] con-
tradictory (viruddha),183 because it exists in a similar instance (sapakṣa). Nor is [that
reason] ambiguous (anaikāntika).184 For [it is] like this: the others, averse (anicchat)
to [our theory that] the object of words is the mere thing which is determined [and] ex-
cluded from that of a different genus (adhyavasitavijātivyāvṛttavastumātraviṣayatva)
[say]: | In realitypp #
§ 55 that denoted (vācya) must be a particular (svalakṣana), an additional
attribute (upādhi), a connection to an additional attribute (upādhiyoga),
[something] possessing an additional attribute (sopādhi), or (yadi vā) must
be a form (ākṛti) of awareness (buddhi),
§ 56 because there is no other way [for a word to have an object], and because, if H.3.3.2.
there is no object [for a word], it is not possible that [a word] denotes. | [Answer:] Toup #
this [it is said]:
§ 57 There is no convention (samaya) for either the first [possibility, the
particular or] the last [possibility, the form of awareness] because of the
insufficiency (°hāni) of the capacity (°śakti°) for a result (phala°).185 Even
to the middle triad [of options convention is] not bound because of the lack
(°viraha) of an additional attribute (upādhi°).186
§ 58 In this way therefore, [the logical reason of] being denoting, which is excluded H.3.3.4.
from the counter instances given the negation of a pervading [property] characterised
by the state of having an object because there is no other [object] that is to be denoted, is
181This is probably referring back to l. 136–l. 137, p. 26 (cf. also the notes on Ratnakīrti’s usage of
nyāya in section 4.1 on page 83). Patil 2009: 241, fn. 111 carefully says that “[t]his seems to be referring
to what preceeds “iti sthitam,” RNĀ (AS 66.06-66.07)” which corresponds to l. 243, p. 36–l. 244. But I
think that iti sthitam ends the discussion about what appears in determination (§ 51 to § 53 on pages 35–
36), and, even if that is wrong, I don’t see how the unreality of a denoter-denoted relation should be a
consequence of the passage that says that the positive element can indeed be called exclusion, and is the
object of everyday activity.
182The same consequence resulted in § 49.
183Cf. section 4.2 on page 93 for a viruddhahetu.
184See fn. 156 on page 59, and section 4.2 on page 94 for what this means.
185Particular and the mental construct can not be made an object of everyday activity, because they are
incapable of a result in this respect: the particular is strictly unique, and the mental construct is private
as well as a particular. Obviously result, phala, can not well mean causal efficacy here, otherwise this
would be a rather controversial statement for a Buddhist thinker. Rather, the result mentioned here is a
usefulness for everyday activity, as was said above in § 49 (trl. on page 60), and § 54 (trl. on this page): if
there is no affirmation or negation of the conventional external object there would result an insufficiency
for common usage.
186Cf. section 4.1 on page 90 for some notes on this verse.
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pervaded by the fact of [having] an object that is determined [and] external[, the property
that is to be established].187 Thus pervasion is established (vyāptisiddhi).
§ 59 First of all (tāvat), a referent (artha) is principally (mukhya) expressed
(ā-√khyā) through words. In that [case], exclusion (apoha) [is] to be un-
derstood (gamya) due to being this [referent]’s quality (tadguṇatva).
Further (ca), one referent [is] set up due to [being] determined, the other
[referent] due to [being what] appears.188 [But] In reality, nothing at all
[is] to be expressed.189
§ 60 The Proof of Exclusion (apohasiddhi) is completed (samāpta). This [is the]J.
work of the honourableMahāpaṇḍita Ratnakīrti.
§ 61 May there be a long explanation (prapañca) for those who work
(kṛtin) on exclusion (apoha). But the nonappearance (asphuraṇa) of a
thing’s own nature [is] the vulnerable point (marman).
There, if [that problem is] not certain (adṛḍha), everything is shattered
without effort (ayatnaśīrna), but, if certain, [everything] is well grounded
indeed, at all events (nanu tāvatā).
§ 62 In a full (sampurna°) night (°rātri°) and two watches the [proof of]
exclusion of [Ratna]kīrti was written (likhita) joyfully by Trailokyadatta
from effort grounded in the highest being (parātman). Therefore (atas)
this [text] is to be protected.
§ 63 Good luck (śubha)!K.
187By this the ambiguity under discussion is shown not to apply to the reason: All instances of denoting
are instances where the object is one that is determined and excluded. For denoting can not occur without
this sort of object, since all the other possible objects, i.e., those that the opponent is trying to promote as
the word referent, have been shown to be unsuitable for denotation.
188I.e. the external object and the form of awareness, cf. § 16 (trl. on page 47).
189Cf. the argument in § 49 (trl. on page 60), and also the translation and interpretation in McCrea and
Patil 2006: 341 ff.
64
Chapter 4
Additional comments on the
Apohasiddhi
4.1 Notes on individual passages of the Apohasiddhi
Argument structure in other works of Ratnakīrti
Anantalal Thakur observed that in all works in the RNĀ “the discussion is started just
in the way of a formal debate, as if the opponent is present before the author.” (Thakur
1957a: 14) Even though this is probably not true for all these texts,190 the opening section
of the VyN does show this structure:
VyN
The structure of the opening passage up to VyN 5*.7 atrocyate is quite similar to that
of the Apohasiddhi. It consists of a presentation of other opinions (those of the fol-
lowers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, of Trilocana, and Vācaspati), interspersed with Buddhist
objections.191 The perspective in this whole section is that of the opponent, e.g., asmā-
kaṃ tu refers not to Buddhists in general, but to Trilocana and people commited to his
position. As an example, here is the structure of the presentation of Trilocana’s ideas
in VyN 2*.1–16:
• | trilocanas tv āha ...pp #
• | atha ...eveti,up #
• | nanu ...pp #
• | atha ...up #
• | evam api .... asmākaṃ tu ...pp #
Notes to § 2
It is not obvious how the explanations of anyāpoha are linked to the different meanings
of apoha.
190At least for the CAPV the same can not be said. It starts with the statement of Ratnakīrti’s own
claim and various other views (CAPV 129.7–21), presents the central inference (CAPV 129.22–24), and
then starts a discussion of this inference. The SJS does not conform with Thakur’s statement either, acc.
to the analysis in Bühnemann 1980: xxix ff.
191Cf. the analysis given in Lasic 2000b: 73–75.
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Ratnakīrti offers four interpretations for the term anyāpoha, the first three of which
he calls etymological derivations (vyutpatti):
1. idam anyasmād apohyate. (This is excluded from another.)
2. asmād anyad apohyate. (Another is excluded from this.)
3. asminn anyad apohyate. (In this another is excluded.) These are the three ety-
mological derivations (vyutpatti).
4. apohanam apohaḥ. (Exclusion is excluding.)
These four ways of understanding apoha are stated to be the reasons for calling
three things apoha:
1. vijātivyāvṛtta bāhya, the external object excluded from what is not of its kind.
2. buddhyākāra, the form of awareness.
3. anyavyāvṛttimātra, the mere differentiation from others.
The last element here, themere differentiation from others, is explained by the fourth
understanding of apoha, that as apohana, the act or process of excluding, and is not
related to the etymological explications.
The question is, therefore, how anyāpoha in the first and second sense should be
aligned with the three etymological explications. The options are as follows:
1. The three derivations all lead to apoha as meaning the external object (bāhyam
eva), and form of awareness (buddhyākāra) has no explanation.
2. The three derivations all explain both the external object and the form of aware-
ness.
3. Two of the three derivations explain the external object, the third the form of
awareness, or vice versa.
To judge which option is most suitable, it is helpful to survey the development of
this threefold distinction.192
The earliest known version of these three forms of anyāpoha is found in the PVṬ.
It is found, in various forms, also in the TSP, the PVSVṬ, the AP and the TBh.
As recently shown by Ishida (2011b: 206) “it has become clear that Śākyabuddhi and
Śāntarakṣita adopt almost the same structure to classify the anyāpoha, but Śāntarakṣita
has a more developed understanding concerning the meaning of words.”
The situation presented by Śākyabuddhi in his comment on PV 1 179 is rather
straight forward: The external particular, excluded from everything else, corresponds to
understanding anyāpoha as “anyo ’pohyate ’sminn iti” (PVṬFr 207.1–2). Simple other-
exclusion follows from understanding “anyāpohanam anyāpoha iti” (PVṬFr 207.5).
Lastly, an understanding of anyāpoha as “anyo ’pohyate ’neneti” (PVṬFr 207.7) corre-
sponds to exclusion as an appearance in awareness.
In the TSP, the situation is less clear. As noted in Ishida 2011b: 202, fn. 12, a
statement of an etymological analysis supporting one of the three forms of exclusion is
given TSP2 391.12–22 , where Kamalaśīla appends it to the explanation that the name
exclusion is applied to the object’s reflection in awareness because the reflection is
192Akamatsu 1983: 171, fn. 22 provides ample material for tracing this distinction back to Dharmakīrti,
as well as a sketch of its development. Other studies on this topic include Kajiyama 1998: 122, fn. 333
(but see Akamatsu 1983: 173 ff. for a criticism of some of these points), Dunne 2004: 131 f., and Ishida
2011b. Cf. table table 4.1 on the facing page for an overview of the various positions taken by Buddhist
authors.
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4. Additional comments on the Apohasiddhi
different from other reflections.193 The other two things that can be called exclusion,
an external thing and mere exclusion, are also upheld, but no etymological explanations
corresponding to those given by Śākyabuddhi are offered.194 It would thus appear that in
the TSP, whilst a form of threefold other-exclusion is maintained, it is not systematically
linked to an etymological analysis in such a way that it would help understand the intent
of Ratnakīrti’s introductory paragraph (§ 2).
Karṇakagomin also refers to three types of exclusion, but, unlike Śākyabuddhi, he
does so in his comment on PV 1 41 (cf. section A.2 on page 166).195 His classification
corresponds to that of Śākyabuddhi: The form of awareness is called exclusion because
“by it [another] is excluded”, mere negation is called exclusion because “[the act of]
excluding is exclusion”, and a particular is called exclusion because “for it [another] is
excluded”.196
Jñānaśrīmitra explains:
AP 202.12-14: yat punar anyasmād apohyate, apohyate ’nyad asmin veti
vijātivyāvṛttaṃ bāhyam eva buddhyākāro vānyāpoha197 iti gīyate. tena
na kaścid upayogaḥ, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt, na ca nāmā-
ntarakaraṇe vastunaḥ svarūpaparāvṛttiḥ.
Furthermore, because of [the expressions] “it is excluded from another,
another is excluded, or in this [another is excluded]”,198 either the exter-
nal [object] itself, differentiated from that of another kind, or the form of
awareness is called other-exclusion. This [explanation] is useless, since
through the designation “exclusion” only an affirmation is intended, and,
if a thing is called by another name, there is no change of [its] own na-
ture.199
193Cf. section B.10 on page 189.
194Cf. the assessments and translated passages in Ishida 2011b: 202–203.
195Śākyabuddhi cites PV 1 40cd in his explanation, though, cf. PVṬFr 207.3. For the gist of Karṇak-
agomin’s commentary on PV 1 179, cf. Ishida 2011b: 205, fn. 21: Karṇakagomin refers only to two
forms of exclusion, the particular and exclusion itself, and does not give any etymological explanations.
Therefore, this passage is of little relevance for the discussion here.
196PVSVṬ 114.19–21: kalpitaś cākāro ’pohāśritatvād apoha ucyate. apohyate ’neneti vā. anya-
nivṛttimātraṃ tv arthād ākṣiptam apohanam apoha ity ucyate(.) svalakṣaṇaṃ tv apohyate ’sminn ity
apoha ucyate. (Trl. section A.2.)
197JNĀms 8b6 reads buddhyākāro vā ’nyā° (i.e., supporting vānyā°) against buddhyākāro ’nyā°
AP 202.13.
198I thank Hisataka Ishida for discussing this passage with me. He had the good idea of putting a lot of
emphasis on the fact that vā is in a position that indicates three rather than two alternatives. If only two
alternatives had been intended by Jñānaśrīmitra here, the placement of vā would be expected to be after
the first word of the second alternative, perhaps resulting in something like this: ...anyasmād apohyate,
apohyate vānyad asminn iti. And if understood as expressing the same three alternatives, Ratnakīrti’s
corresponding passage can be understood as a clearer restatement of the same point, rather than as offering
a different kind of classification. The parallels would then be as follows (AP =AS3): anyasmād apohyate
= anyasmād apohyate, apohyate ’nyad = asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin = asmin vānyad apohyate.
199Cf. also Katsura 2011: 125, and the references given there: Dunne 2004, and to a Japanese article by
Toru Funayama (an English summary can be found in Funayama 2000). Also see Ishida 2011b, as well
as Patil 2008b: 6, fn. 14: “This grammatical analysis of exclusion (apoha) seems to have begun with
Śākyabuddhi, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, the Pramāṇavārttika-ṭīkā (See
PVṬ ad Pramāṇavārttika (PV 1), Svārthānumāna v. 169). Karṇakagomin, another commentator on
Dharmakīrti’s text, also mentions it in his Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti-ṭīkā (PVSVṬ), as do Śāntarakṣita
and his commentator Kamalaśīla in their independent works the Tattvasaṃgraha and Tattvasaṃgraha-
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Here, obviously, the three etymological explanations are not as clearly differentiat-
ed as in the interpretations of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin. Basically there is the
same problem as for the passage in Ratnakīrti: Both the external object and the form
of awareness are understood as derived from three ways of analyzing exclusion. The
fourth, purely negative interpretation of exclusion, is not mentioned in the AP, as far as
I can see.
In the TBh, the relevant passage runs:
[TBh2 52.7–14] nanu ko ’yam apoho nāma ? yathādhyāvasāyaṃ bāhya
eva ghaṭādir arthaḥ apoha ity abhidhīyate, apohyate ’smād anyad vijātī-
yam iti kṛtvā. yathāpratibhāsaṃ buddhyākāro200 ’pohaḥ, apohyate pṛthak
kriyate ’smin buddhyākāre vijātīyam iti kṛtvā. yathātattvaṃ nivṛttimā-
traṃ prasajyarūpo ’pohaḥ, apohanam apoha iti kṛtvā. nanu yathādhya-
vasāyaṃ vidhir eva, tarhi kevalo viṣaya ity āgatam. na[,] anyāpohaviśi-
ṣṭo201 vidhir abhipretaḥ.
| Now, what is this called exclusion? According to determination, a tru-pp #
ly external object like a pot etc. is designated as “exclusion”, by thinking
“Another, which is of another class, is excluded from it.” According to
appearance, a form of cognition is [designated as] exclusion, by thinking
“That of another class is excluded, [i.e.,] singled out in this form of aware-
ness.” According to reality, mere absence is exclusion having the nature of
absolute negation, by thinking “exclusion [is the act of] excluding.” Now,
if according to determination [exclusion is] only a positive element, then
an object alone is understood. | No[, none of these is correct]. A positiveup #
element qualified by other-exclusion is meant.202
What, then, is the conclusion that can be drawn from these passages for § 2? Ap-
parently Ratnakīrti clarified Jñānaśrīmitra’s analysis (“...asmād vānyad apohyate ...”,
pañjikā (TS and TSP). For a parallel passage in the work of Ratnakīrti’s teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, see JNA
(202.12-212.14).”
200TBh2 52.10 f. reads buddhyākāro vā ...prasajyarūpo vā .... Since the position of the second vā
is somewhat awkward (one would expect nivṛttimātraṃ vā), I think the reading without these vā-s, as
attested in TBh1 28.27 f., is better.
201Read anyāpohaviśiṣṭo acc. to TBh1 against apohaviśiṣṭo TBh2.
202Cf. the trl. in Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., as well as Akamatsu 1983: 171 ff., n. 22 for valuable notes.
Amongst other things, Akamatsu 1983 notes that Kajiyama 1966 did not translate the qualifier “according
to reality”. Akamatsu 1983: 174 f. then argues that Mokṣākaragupta’s position reflects that of Jñānaśrī-
mitra, and not that of Ratnakīrti, because the three qualifiers, i.e., “according to appearance, determi-
nation, and reality” are essential to the AP: “Pour Jñānaśrīmitra, les trois possibilités de l’interprétation
de l’apoha ont été les trois éléments les plus importants pour composer sa théorie sur l’Apoha. ...C’est
pourquoi, ces trois sortes d’interprétation de l’apoha ne peuvent être pas fausses.” (Akamatsu 1983: 175)
I can not see how this can be right. Neither Jñānaśrīmitra nor Mokṣākaragupta consider these interpreta-
tions to be correct: In the AP, it is a part of the pūrvapakṣa, as Akamatsu 1983: 172 notes. Also in the AS
this is part of an objection, and is answered by a clear no and Ratnakīrti’s definition of what exclusion is
(cf. l. 31, p. 15). So it is difficult to see how Mokṣākaragupta could have taken any one of these three in-
terpretations to be correct. Whether this passage owes more to the AP than to the AS is also questionable:
Mokṣākaragupta does not employ the first of Jñānaśrīmitra’s (or Ratnakīrti’s) alternatives, “anyasmād
apohyate” (AP 202.12). Instead, he adduces the analysis “apohyate ’smād anyad” (TBh2 52.9) in order
to show how an external object is meant by exclusion, which is stated in this explicit form only by Ratna-
kīrti. Also, the three qualifiers are not without basis in the AS (cf. section 5.4 on page 130 for the two
qualifiers “according to appearance and determination”, and § 49 for what words really refer to acc. to
Ratnakīrti).
69
4. Additional comments on the Apohasiddhi
l. 3 in § 2, instead of AP 202.12 apohyate ’nyad ).203
One problem remains. In the TBh there is a clear difference to all etymological in-
terpretations other than those of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti: It associates the locative
construction (apohyate ...’smin buddhyākāre vijātīyam, “...in this form of awareness
that of another genus is excluded”) with the form of awareness, and not, as PVṬFr and
PVSVṬ do, with the external object.204 Considering how much the TBh is indebted to
the writings of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti,205 it could well be possible thatMokṣākara-
gupta saw his interpretation justified in his predecessors’ texts. If that is the case, and
if it is a correct interpretation, then the most reasonable way would be to understand
Ratnakīrti (and per force Jñānaśrīmitra) as follows: anyasmād apohyate and asmād
vānyad apohyate206 lead to an understanding of the external object as exclusion, and
asmin vānyad apohyate to an understanding of the form of awareness as exclusion.207
Taking these considerations together, what can be said about Ratnakīrti’s passage?
It seems that there are two ways to interpret it, both of which have difficulties: follow-
ing Mokṣākaragupta’s understanding, and ignoring the problem that he only uses two
of the three possible understandings, the analysis of anyāpoha as “this is excluded from
another” and as “from this another is excluded” can be taken to support the external
object differentiated from that which is of a different genus, and its analysis as “in this
another is excluded” would explain the form of awareness. The alternative is this: to
give Mokṣākaragupta’s formulation less weight, and take the three forms of etymologi-
cal derivation as summing up the tradition up to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti concerning
the external object and the form of awareness. I tend towards this last option. For, the
positions in the TSP on the one hand, and in the PVṬ and the PVSVṬ on the other would
be loosely summed up in Ratnakīrti’s statement as follows: TSP2 analyzes the form of
203Given that this passage is an objection, it could of course be that another text, where these variations
are originally to be found, is being cited. But this passage is quite closely related to AP 202.12–13, which
is a part of the introductory objection in that text. And it is unclear where that objection comes from.
Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., fn. 333 concludes that “...Jñānaśrīmitra ...must have cited these [passages—PMA]
from an author unknown to us.” Akamatsu 1983: n. 22,p. 175, on the other hand, surmises: “...mais il [le
pūrvapakṣa de l’AP—PMA] est ...l’objection imaginaire produite par Jñānaśrīmitra lui-même, et nous
ne pouvons pas le considére comme une citation de quelque auteur.” This view is also voiced in Patil
2003: 245, n. 7. The character of the AS’s textual dependence on the AP in this passage supports, it seems
to me, Akamatsu’s and Patil’s conclusions: Ratnakīrti obviously feels free to rearrange the arguments
found in the AP, whereas most of the other objections shared by the AP and the AS are actually quite
clearly attributed to their authors, and, at least in the cases where the source texts can be identified, quoted
quite faithfully.
204TSP2 is of little help here, since no etymological derivation using the locative formulation is used.
In the TSP the interpretation as buddhyākāra is associated with the ablative construction.
205Cf. the argument in fn. 300 on page 114.
206The only reason for grouping these two options together is that they share ablative constructions.
This is of course not a very good reason, but if taking the TBh seriously in this point, I see no alternative.
For there must be a division into two groups, and an ablative construction must be associated with the
external object, and a locative one with the form of awareness.
207This is also the understanding reflected in the translation of Jñānaśrīmitra’s passage in Akamatsu
1983: 171, n. 22. A second possibility is that the interpretation in the TBh is simply not correct. It could
be imagined that, Mokṣākaragupta, facing the same problem of how to understand these two explanations
of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, decided to drop the first alternative, anyasmād apohyate, and assign the
remaining two, asmād vānyad apohyate asmin vānyad apohyate, to the external object and the form of
awareness respectively. But I believe that the premiss, that Mokṣākaragupta misinterpreted the very two
writers he drew much of his material from for the TBh, very unlikely.
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awareness as “exclusion from another”208, and the latter two analyze the external object
as “in this another is excluded.” As for the second of Ratnakīrti’s alternatives, “another
is excluded from this”, it could well be that it was endorsed in a text not known to us.
Notes to § 3
In this paragraph the three positions on what it means to say that exclusion is the referent
of words are refuted. The discussion of the “negative” position is rather clear, but the
reduction, before that, of the two other options to a merely “positive” position might
need some comments:
Only a positive thing
The first two positions are refuted only by pointing out that, if other-exclusion is either
an external thing that is differentiated from that of another kind, or a form of awareness,
then it is only a positive element, i.e., a real entity, that is meant by “exclusion.”
The passage is too succinct to allow any precise determination of whose (or if any-
one’s) positions are meant here. But a few pointers might be in order:
That something external, excluded fromwhat is of another kind, is the word referent,
could refer to any of the external-realist theories on the word referent.209 All three
elements of the word referent as adopted in the Nyāya school of thought, the particular
(vyakti), the class (jāti), and the form (ākṛti), are external to the cognizing subject and
real. For the Vaiśeṣika, the very categories of reality, “...padārthas [...] are the sum
total of all that ‘supports’ the meaning of words and guarantees that words are not mere
words, but that they have a denotative value.” (Halbfass 1992: 138) Within the various
strands of Mīmāṃsā, the form (ākṛti), interpreted as a universal, was taken to be the
primary word referent.210 But none of these views seems to be a clean fit for the option
that apoha, and thus the word referent, is only “something external.”211 That the form
of awareness is the referent of a word is probably Bhartṛhari’s view.212
Additionally, there are some precursors in apoha-treatises to the problem that apoha
can be reduced to something external or the form of awareness:
Dharmottara makes it an important point to show that apoha is neither external nor
internal.213
208Cf. the corresponding rows in table 4.1 on page 67, and Ishida 2011b: 202, fn. 12.
209For a clear and general overview of the Nyāya’s, Vaiśeṣika’s, and Mīmāṃsā’s theories cf. Taber
1998b. The classification of these views as external-realist here is based on the discussion in Dravid
1972: chapters 2 and 3.
210Cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3, Taber 1998b, and Hattori 1979: 72, n. 21.
211The very similar passage in the TBh reads “...bāhya eva ghaṭādyarthaḥ apoha iti abhidhīyate”
(TBh2 52.8), unequivocal in understanding “external” as common-sense objects, such as a pot etc.
212Cf. Ogawa 1999, as well as Hattori 1993, and Kataoka 2009: 489. If Ogawa 1999 is correct, then
also the previous view, that an external thing is the word referent, could be attributed to Bhartṛhari.
Moreover, in the TSP ad TS2 882, Kamalaśīla ascribes the view that a substance (dravya) is the referent
of words to Vyāḍi, cf. also Herzberger 1986: 73 f.
213Cf. the programmatic statement in the introductory verse to DhAP (see DhAP, Steinkellner 1976,
Hattori 2006: 63 f., and Ishida’s translation cited in Kataoka 2009: 486, fn. 17).
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The position that the referent of a word is the form of awareness is discussed in the
TSP ad TS2 890 (cf. trl. in section B.5 on page 183), where it becomes clear that this
view is very similar to Bhartṛhari’s position (or one of his positions).214
According to the exposition of the apoha theories as found in the NM, it could also
be that a reduction to an external thing and a form of awareness was the opponent’s
interpretation of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s position respectively. In the introducto-
ry essay in Kataoka 2009, the analysis of Jayanta’s exposition leads to this statement:
“It is evident that Jayanta makes clear the difference of the three views by distinguish-
ing the three phases: external –> internal –> neither external nor internal.” (Kataoka
2009: 483).
Ratnakīrti’s answer to the objection as a whole (§ 8) will be to the effect that none
of these elements, external thing, form of awareness, and exclusion, are free of errors
when individually taken to be the word referent. In consequence, he adopts what can
be seen as a combination of the three (kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ,
l. 31 in § 8).
pratibhāsabheda and vastubheda (ad § 21)
Ratnakīrti’s point here is that the difference between two objects is founded on the
difference of their two natures, and this difference is founded on the difference of the
objects’ appearance in two different ways. Akamatsu 1983: 71 f. adds the following
explanation to his translation of the corresponding passage AP 208.25: “Donc, les objets
qui ont les manifestations des images différentes dans la connaissance doivent avoir les
natures propres différentes, et donc ils ne peuvent être une seule et même chose.” So, if
there are different appearances, these appearances necessarily are of different objects.
Concerning the relation between the difference of appearances and the difference
of real things, AP 209.4–209.14 gives the following inference:
[AP 209.2–209.14] [Objection:] | But surely there is no difference in a tree pp #
even in the case where one and the same tree has a difference in the ap-
pearance as clear and unclear to two [people], one close by and the other
in a distant place, because there is no difference in the causal efficacy [of
the tree]. [For,] the difference in appearance that is really (eva) assisted
by (upakṛta) a difference in causal efficacy is [that which] differentiates.
And in this case there is no difference in the causal efficacy. So how should
the object of a cognition generated by (janitajñānaviṣaya) the sense fac-
ulties [or] words [i.e. verbal cognition], like a cow etc., share (bhāj) [this]
difference?
| [Answer:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to up #
different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there
is the same object [for both appearances]. For it is so: Any appearance that,
with regard to some real thing, is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual
cognition does not have the same object as this [appearance in a perceptu-
al cognition], like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to a [perceptual]
grasping of a pot, or like the appearance of yellow [is contrary] to grasping
a conch shell. And in the same way, with respect to a cow, the appearance
214Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f., and Kataoka 2009: 488.
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at the time of a conceptual cognition is contrary to the appearance in a per-
ceptual cognition. This (iti) [is a case of] perceiving [something] opposed
to the pervading element.215 For, the fact of there being the same object
[for both types of cognitions] is pervaded by the non-difference of appear-
ances, observed [here] as [something] is observed by the left eye and the
other[, right eye]. But if there were no pervasion,216 there would be anoth-
er perception, having an opposed appearance, or217 there would be a real
thing having two natures. And none of these two is [the case]. Therefore,
there is indeed pervasion. And when a cognition, which is different ac-
cording to [its] basis [that is either in the sense faculties or in concepts,]
is made the locus [of pervasion], a difference of appearance is established.
Therefore, where there is a difference of appearance accompanied by a dif-
ference of causal efficacy etc., there there is a difference of the real thing,
as in the case of pot and cloth. Moreover, [a difference in appearance]
occurring without this companion by definition refutes the fact of there be-
ing the same object. Thus here one appearance is only erroneous, like the
appearance of yellow in the case of a conch shell.
Analysis
Jñānaśrīmitra’s argument here is that the fact that perceptual and conceptual awareness
do not have the same object can be ascertained through vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi, the
apprehension of that opposed to the pervading element. This is one of the ways in which
a person can correctly infer the absence of something. The explanation of this type of
non-perception in TBh2 30.9–11 is as follows:218
vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā—nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dahanāt. prati-
ṣedhyasya tuṣārasparśasya vyāpakaṃ śītam, tasya viruddho dahanaviśe-
ṣaḥ [...] tasyehopalabdhiḥ.
The perception of that opposed to the pervading element [is] like this:
There is no feeling of cold here, because of a fire. Coldness is the per-
vader of the feeling of cold, which is to be negated; that contradictory to
this [coldness] is a particular fire; of that there is a perception in this place.
A comparison of the elements involved is given in table 4.2 on the following page.
Accordingly, Jñānaśrīmitra’s argument can be paraphrased as follows: In a perceptual
and a conceptual awareness, two different appearances are observed (hetu). The fact
that there are two different appearances is, obviously, contradictory to the fact that there
are not different appearances. And since all cases, where there is the same object for
two cognitions, imply that there are no differences in the respective appearances, these
two cognitions can not have the same object.
So what do Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti mean by this statement: “We do not say
that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to
the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances].”? The main
intention is to state that different appearances prove the absence of the same object,
215See section 4.1 for an explanation.
216Read avyāptis tu acc. to JNĀms 11b1 against avyāptitas tu AP 209.10.
217Read vā acc. to JNĀms 11b2 against ca AP 209.11.
218See Kellner 1997: 103 ff. and Kajiyama 1998: 151 ff., Appendix 1 for more background on non-
perception, and Kajiyama 1998: 83, fn. 220 for this specific type.
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Table 4.2: Structure of vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi
logical role TBh2 AP
hetu dahana pratibhāsa-bheda
sādhya a-tuṣārasparṣa ekaviṣayatva-a-bhāva
pakṣa iha jñāna
vyāpaka śīta pratibhāsa-a-bheda
vyāpya tuṣārasparśa ekaviṣayatva
contradictory to vyāpaka dahana pratibhāsa-bheda
but not the presence of two different objects.219 This restriction has, as spelled out by
Ratnakīrti in the last two sentences of § 21, consequences as to what can be known
from the fact that two cognitions have different appearances of their objects: depending
on whether there is causal efficacy of the appearing objects or not, the two cognitions
either have different real things as their objects, as in the case of a pot and a cloth, or
one of the appearances is wrong (i.e., has no real thing as its object), as the appearance
of yellow in the case of the white conch. For Ratnakīrti, this differentiation will allow
the argument (in § 22) that a conceptual cognition can have an object which is both
different from the object of perception and not a real thing.
Common to existence and non-existence (bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇya ad
§ 22–§ 24)
About the argument that a word applies to its objects irrespective of the existence or
non-existence of this object, Katsura 1986: 174 f. wrote:
This argument also stems from Dharmakīrti....Dharmottara utilized it in a
skillful and systematic way in his Apohaprakaraṇa....Then he was severely
criticized by Vācaspatimiśra,...who in turn was criticized by Jñānaśrīmitra.
In this context, Katsura (1986: 180, n. 23) refers to PVM 4 223–236 (which is very
similar to PVin 2 15–28).220 Akamatsu 1983: 211, n. 103 refers explicitly to PVM 4 228,
and Ogawa 1999: 275, fn. 17 to PVM 4 226 and 228. The most relevant passage in
Dharmottara’s DhAP is, approximately,221 DhAP 241.11–244.16. The arguments found
therewere criticised byVācaspatimiśra, esp. NVTṬ 444.2–6, and the particular problem
of a word’s object being common to existence and non-existence is mentioned also by
Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, NMK2 467.8–9.
Akamatsu 1983: 211 ff., n. 103, traces the origin of the inference in the background
of the discussion found in § 22 and § 24 to DhAP 244.10–16.222
219For if there were two different objects, a realist can be imagined to argue that one is the particular,
the other the universal. This would obviously be a very unwelcome consequence for an Apohavādin.
220These verses are translated and discussed in Steinkellner 1979: 41 ff.
221Katsura 1986: 180, n. 24 refers to DhAP 244.10 ff. Akamatsu 1983: 212 ff., n. 103 draws on various
passages from DhAP 241.22–244.16.
222Akamatsu (1983: 215) says that this inference is cited in NVTṬ 442.16–18. He supports this claim
by saying that Frauwallner 1937: 267 indicates this dependency, but there is no such indication there.
Nevertheless, the inference found in NVTṬ 442.16–18 is indeed quite similar to Dharmottara’s, but is
not, as far as can be judged on the basis of the Tibetan translation of Dharmottara’s inference, a faithful
quotation. Cf. the trl. in section 4.1 on page 76.
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The argument as given by Dharmottara is as follows:
[DhAP 244.10–24] gaṅ źig dṅos po daṅ dṅgos po med pa thun moṅ du
źen pas ṅes par ’dzin pa de ni gcig las ldog pa ṅes pa lhur byed pa yin
te | dper na bum pa ma yin par śes pas bum pa ma yin par ṅes par ’dzin
pa na yod dam med ces dṅos po daṅ dṅos po med pa thun moṅ du ṅes
par ’dzin par byed pa bźin no || rnam par rtog pa thams cad kyis kyaṅ
dṅos po daṅ dṅos po med pa dag gi raṅ bźin thun moṅ du ṅes par ’dzin
par byed do || gtan tshigs ’di ma grub pa ni ma yin te | rnam par rtog pa
gñis ka’i thun moṅ gi raṅ bźin du dmigs par ñams su myoṅ bas grub pa’i
phyir ro || sṅar bśad pa’i tshul gyis thun moṅ du ’dzin pa’i rgyu mtshan
ni gcig las ldog pa lhur ṅes pa ñid yin te | de ni rgyu mtshan med pa ma
yin la | rgyu mtshan gźan yaṅ mi dmigs pa’i phyir ro || de la mi mthun
pa’i phyogs la ’jug na khyab par byed pa rgyu mtshan daṅ ldan pa ñid
med par ’gyur ba’i phyir khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pas mi mthun pa’i
phyogs las ldog pa na thun moṅ du ’dzin pa ldog pa gcig gi mthar thug
pa la gnas pa’i phyir khyab pa grub po |
What ascertains [something] by grasping [it] as common to existence and
non-existence, that only determines the differentiation from some [other
thing], like a cognition [of something] as not-a-pot ascertains [something],
in ascertaining [it] as not-a-pot, as common to existence and non-existence
[since one can say]“It exists or does not exist.” And all conceptual cogni-
tions ascertain [something] as having a nature common to both existence
and non-existence. This logical reason is not unestablished, because a
conceptual cognition is established by direct perception as apprehending
[something] that has a nature common to these two. In the manner previ-
ously explained, the cause for grasping [something] as common [to both]
is the ascertainment as only different from something [else], because this
[ascertainment] is not without a cause, and another cause is not apprehend-
ed. In this regard, when there is a differentiation [of the pervaded element]
from the counter-instance due to not apprehending the pervading element,
because the pervading element[, i.e.,] the state of having a cause, does not
exist considering/in223 the counter instance, the grasping as common [to
existence and non-existence] occurs [only] for that based on some differ-
entiation. Therefore pervasion is established.
The inference given at NVTṬ 442.16–20, which is referred to in NVTṬ 444.2–6,
the passage quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 24, runs like this (in the voice of an opponent,
most likely Dharmottara):
tathā hi—yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇaṃ tadanyavyāvṛttirūpam224 eva, ya-
thā amūrtatvam. tat khalu vijñāne ca śaśaviṣāṇe ca sādhāraṇam. tathā
ca vivādādhyāsitā vikalpaviṣayā ghaṭapaṭādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ. gaur
asti gaur nāstīti hi bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇo gāvādir vikalpaviṣayo vidhi-
rūpasvalakṣaṇavad bhāvāsādhāraṇye nāstīty anena na saṃbadhyate vi-
rodhāt.
223The import of the phrase ’jug na, as Frauwallner 1937: p. 266, fn. 2 notes, is not clear here.
224Read °rūpam eva acc. to NVTṬD 476.9 instead of °rūpayeva in NVTṬ 442.16.
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For [it is] so: What is common to existence and nonexistence, that has only
the nature of exclusion from others, like incorporeality. That [incorpore-
ality] indeed is common to cognition[, which exists,] and a hare’s horn[,
which does not exist]. And the objects of conceptual cognitions, which are
subject to discussion, like pot, cloth, etc. are like this. This [is an inference
with] a logical reason of the type “nature.” For [in the sentences] “a cow
is, a cow isn’t”, cow etc., the object of conceptual cognition, could not be
connected with this [predicate], “is not”, if it were specific (asādhāraṇa)
[only] to existence, like a particular that has a positive nature, because of
a contradiction.
The logical elements used here are: the reason, hetu, is “common to existence and
nonexistence,” what is to be proven, the sādhya, is “having the nature of exclusion from
others,” and the site of the inference, the pakṣa, is “objects of conceptual cognition.”
Dharmottara’s inference is basically the same: Cognizing something as common to the
referent’s existence and non-existence can only work for exclusion from others, not for
a real positive entity.
In the passage quoted in § 24 on page 23, Vācaspatimiśra criticizes this inference
by showing that it is possible that a genus can be the object of conceptual cognitions.
For, even though it is by its nature eternal and hence exclusively existent, it can be com-
mon to both existence and non-existence: a genus becomes applicable to both of these,
so Vācaspatimiśra, depending on its connection to presently existing or presently not
existing particulars. What he has thus shown is that the reason, being common to exis-
tence and non-existence, can occur in the counter instances, i.e., when something—in
this case the genus—does not have the nature of exclusion from others. The reason thus
becomes inconclusive (anaikāntika), because one can not be certain that it does not also
qualify things, or objects of conceptual cognition, that do not have other-exclusion as
their nature. The alternative225 is that the reason is “established in another way,” i.e.,
that being common to both existence and non-existence can be shown to pertain even
when exclusion is not the nature of conceptual objects.226
The position of Kumārila’s followers (ad § 25)
As Akamatsu 1983: 218, n. 112 has pointed out, the position that words apply to parts
of their referent is found in ŚV Āv 64ab:
sāmānyāṃśān apoddhṛtya padaṃ sarvaṃ pravarttate |
Every word applies [to its object] in extracting the part [that is] the univer-
sal.
Cf. also these arguments in the ŚV, where it is quite obvious that there is an aware-
ness of a closely related problem:
ŚV Av 125ab: nirbhāgo ’pi hi vastvātmā śabdair bhāgena gamyate |
na hi sacchabdavijñānād ghaṭādyarthaḥ pratīyate ||
225If one accepts the reading veti (l. 110, p. 23) instead of ceti in NVTṬ 444.6.
226It is not really clear to me what anyathāsiddhameans here. Glossing on NV 62.4–5 ad NSū 1.1.10,
NVTṬ 276.7–8 notes: asiddhārthatā anyathāsiddhārthatā hetoḥ hetuvacanasyety arthaḥ. (The aim of
the reason[, i.e.,] of the statement of the reason, is unestablished[, i.e., its] aim is established in another
way. That is the meaning.) Cf. Gokhale 1992: 83 f. for a helpful example of this fallacious reason. He
also gives this definiton: “The hetu is called anyathāsiddha when the existence of hetu is capable of full
explanation without reference to sādhya.” (Gokhale 1992: 84)
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For [something] having the nature of a real thing is partially understood
through words, even though it has no parts. For there is no cognition of an
object such as pot etc. due to understanding the word “existing.”
ŚVVak 309cd–311: na ca śabdena sadbhāvas tasya cārthasya bodhitaḥ ||
astitvādyanapekṣaṃ hi sāmānyaṃ tena gamyate |
astiśabdaprayogo ’pi tenaivātropapadyate ||
jāter astitvanāstitve na ca kaś cid vivakṣati |
nityatvāl lakṣyamāṇāyā vyaktes te hi viśeṣaṇe ||
Neither is the real existence even (ca) of this object understood through a
word. For a universal, which is independent of the state “it is” etc., is un-
derstood through this [word]. Also the usage of the word “it is”227 applies
here[, i.e., to this pot,] only for this [reason]. No one wishes to express
[either] the state “it is” [or] the state “it is not” of a genus, because [it]
is permanent. For these two [states] are qualifiers of the particular that is
characterized [by a genus].
In the commentary on ŚV Vak 309cd–310ab, Pārthasarāthimiśra explicitly address-
es the problem of sadasattvasādhāraṇa (which I take to be the same as bhāvābhāva-
sādhāranya):
NRĀ 657.5–8: syād evaṃ yadi ghaṭaśabdena ghaṭasya sattvaṃ bodhitaṃ
syāt. sa tu sadasattvasādhāraṇaṃ ghaṭasvarūpamātram abhidhatte. ta-
tsvarūpaṃ hi prādeśikatvād anityatvāc ca kvacit kadācic ca sat, kvacit
kadācic cāsad iti sādhāraṇaṃ sāmānyam iti, sadasattvasādhāraṇam ity
arthaḥ.
It would be so[, i.e., there would be a problem about being common to ex-
istence and non-existence,] if the existence of a pot were cognized through
the word “pot”; but this [word] denotes a pot’s own form alone, common
to the state of being and non-being. For, the own form of this [pot] exists
in some places and at some times, and does not exist in some [other] places
and at some [other] times because [this pot] has its own place and is not
permanent. In this sense a universal is common, which means “common
to being and non-being.”
upakāra (ad § 30)
upakāra literally means assistance or support (cf. Böthlingk and R. Roth 1855: 237.1).
Dharmakīrti discusses the relationship of property and property-bearer under the head-
ing of an upakāra relation in PVSV 29.6–31.5 (trl. on pages 152–155), and in PVin
2 67.4–68.2 (trl. on the basis of the Tibetan text in Steinkellner 1979: 66–69).228
In § 30, it is “contact” (pratyāsatti) that is characterised as upakāra. Ratnakīrti says
that the other options, such as inherence (samavāya) etc., for what this contact could be
have been refuted. The question is what he means by “etc.” Various forms of contact
227“It is” translates the single Sanskrit 3rd person present word asti, lit. “he, she or it is.”
228Steinkellner (1979: 68, fn. 213) notes that upakāra was also used in a similar sense by Kumārila,
and the interpretation of upakārāt in VP 3.3.5 by Houben (1995: 170, and 173 f.) is strikingly similar.
See also PSV 5 5cd for a similar employment (guṇopakārāt).
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between a property bearer and a property (one case of such contact being that of a partic-
ular with the universal qualifying it) were assumed by the realist schools: samavāya and
saṃyoga by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, and non-difference or a form of inherence
by the Mīmāṃsakas.229 Since Ratnakīrti does not discuss the Mīmāṃsakas’ opinions in
the following paragraphs, I take “samavāyāder” (l. 139, p. 26) to mean samavāya and
saṃyoga.
samavāya, mentioned by Ratnakīrti, is the sixth category in the Vaiśeṣika system
(cf. Halbfass 1992: 70–75). There, it “[...] is the relationship between entities that
cannot occur separately. It is the one omnipresent principle [...] that integrates parts
and wholes, particulars and universals, substances, qualities, and motions.” (Halbfass
1992: 72) It was also endorsed by the Naiyāyika thinkers, and in the context of the
Apohasiddhi it is relevant specifically as the relation that a universal, that which inheres,
has to the particular, in which it inheres. Cf., e.g., NV 305.14–16:
[NV 305.15–16:] kathaṃ tarhi gotvaṃ goṣu vartate? āśrayāśrayibhāve-
na. kaḥ punar āśrayāśrayibhāvaḥ? samavāyaḥ. tatra vṛttimad gotvam,
vṛttiḥ samavāya itīhapratyayahetutvād ity uktam.
| How then230 does cowness exist in cows? | Through the relation of sup- pp #u
porter and supported. | What then is [this] relation of supporter and sup- pp #
ported? | Inherence (samavāya). Here, cowness is that having existence up #
[in the particulars], [and] the existence is inherence. Therefore “because
[inherence] is the reason for the cognition ‘[cowness is] here [in a cow]”’
was said.
saṃyoga, contact, which is a different form of contact assumed at first in Vaiśeṣika
ontology, is a quality (guṇa), the second category in all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems.
It had a rather broad scope of application,231 but the main difference to the category of
inherence was that contact exists between two things that can exist separately from each
other (such as between a stick and a stick-bearer).
For a criticism of saṃyoga and samavāya as the relation between a property and its
bearer in the TS, cf. section B.2 on page 179.
upādhi (ad § 28 and § 30)
Ratnakīrti, as well as Vācaspatimiśra in the passage quoted in § 30, use the term upādhi
in a way strikingly different from that commonly ascribed to Naiyāyika authors. In the
following, I would like to inquire what, if any, cause this term’s different employment
229For the BhaṭṭaMīmāṃsā idea that properties and their bearers are different aspects of the same entity
(e.g., sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi naḥ, ŚV Ps 141cd), cf. Taber 2005: 106–12. Cf.
D’Sa 1980: chap. 12, and Taber 2005: 217 f., n. 40 for clear summaries of the ŚVĀv’s main points, where
the specific relation of a class to its particulars is discussed in the same terms. Cf. also Dravid 1972: 64–66
for some notes regarding the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā stance that the universal and that qualified by it are
really distinct and related by a non-eternal samavāya.
230NSū 2.2.64, which Uddyotakara is discussing here, is one of a row of sūtras refuting that either
ākṛti, vyakti, or jāti alone is the word referent (cf. Biardeau 1964: 229–240, Much 1994: 351–352).
Here, Uddyotakara has just repeated his argument from NV 206.21–22 that the relation of a whole to its
parts can not be understood in terms of a unitary thing (such as a genus) existing in manifold things (such
as its manifestations, vyakti-s). So the opponent wonders what their relationship might then be. Parts of
this passage are also quoted in PVSVṬ 277.3–4, and 305.6–11.
231Cf. Frauwallner 1956: 127 ff., Halbfass 1992: 122 f., 147.
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has for the two different schools of thought, and whether any particularly important
issues are attached to it.
General observations
An upādhi is usually described as a non-essential universal: “Other general character-
istics such as ’cookness’, ’tallness’, ’blindness’, etc., which are adventitious features,
are recognised not as universals (jāti) but as upādhis.” (Dravid 1972: 25; cf. also Potter
1977: 135 ff.and references given there.)
The term upādhi, in the context of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, is usually translated
as “‘nominal’ properties”, “superimposed condition”, “imposed properties”, or “limit-
ing condition”232 Acc. to Halbfass 1970: 148, “Udayana was the first Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
author who took into full account all the difficulties involved in the jāti-upādhi problem,
and the jātibhādaka doctrine in his Kiraṇāvalī became fundamental for all subsequent
considerations,...for the period following the conflict with the Buddhists.” This would
mean that before Udayana, i.e., also for Ratnakīrti, there were no fixed and conclusive
criteria for what differentiated a universal proper from an imposed universal.
But it seems that at least since Trilocana (cf. Potter 1977: 202 ff.) upādhi had im-
portant implications also for the Nyāya analysis of svabhāva reasonings (cf. Kajiyama
1998: 101, fn. 271 and the reference there to RNĀ1 42,20–23233). The central point
is, acc. to Kajiyama 1998: 100 f., fn. 270, that smoke always implies fire (svābhāvi-
kasambandha Kajiyama 1998: 100, fn. 270), whereas fire only implies smoke when a
specific additional attribute of fire, i.e., wet fuel, is given (“aupādhika- or sopādhika-
sambandha” Kajiyama 1998: 101, fn. 271).
As Kajiyama (1998: 101, fn. 271) points out, Ratnakīrti’s and Mokṣākaragupta’s
definition of upādhi as “...arthāntaraṃ kiṃcid apekṣaṇīyam is based on this explana-
tion of Vācaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in
NVT.” (NVT = NVTṬ) The passage containing this definiton in the TBh is translated,
Kajiyama 1998: 101, as “...for by the word upādhi is meant some other thing by the
dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if x needs z in order
to be related with y, this z is called upādhi].”
Buddhist logicians, on the other hand, called all universals supposed by realist
schools upādhi.234
To these observations, the following two comments based on the material in the AS
might be added:
Comment 1 For one thing, in the argument of § 48 Ratnakīrti subsumes all the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika categories except substance (dravya) under the heading upādhi. The phrase
indictating this equivocation is “for the circle of additional attributes like universal,
232Cf. B. K. Matilal 1986: 382, Halbfass 1992: 252, Halbfass 1970: 148, and Kajiyama 1998: 101
respectively.
233This corresponds to ĪSD 47.6–10. Cf. section 4.1 on the following page and Patil 2009: 123 f. for
translations, as well as Patil 2009: 174 ff. for a discussion of the role of upādhi in inferential cognitions.
234Akamatsu 1983: 225, n. 121 is of the same opinion. I was not able to trace the term upādhi in either
PSV 5 or Hattori 1968. Dharmakīrti employs it in much the same sense as Ratnakīrti, cf. PV 1 52–55
(trl. section A.1 on page 152, cf. also fn. 414 on page 152). Śāntarakṣita subsumes all categories under
the term upādhi in TS2 2ab: guṇadravyakriyājātisamāvāyādyupādhibhiḥ (cf. section B.1 on page 177
for a translation).
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property, action etc.” (sāmānyaguṇakarmādyupādhicakrasya). This would also con-
cur with the following explanation, ĪSD 47.4–10:
tathā hi svābhāvikas tu dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ tadupā-
dher anupalabhyamānatvāt. kvacid vyabhicārasyādarśanād iti tvayaivā-
sya lakṣaṇam uktam. etac cāsiddham. yataḥ, upādhiśabdena svato ’rthā-
ntaram evāpekṣaṇīyam abhidhātavyam. na cārthāntaraṃ dṛśyatāniya-
tam, adṛśyasyāpi deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya sambhavāt. tataś ca
dhūmasyāpi hutāśena saha sambandhe syād upādhiḥ, na copalakṣyata
iti katham adarśanān nāsty eva yataḥ svābhāvikasambandhasiddhiḥ.
For it is so: “But the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc. is natural (svā-
bhāvika), because an additional attribute in this [relation] is not cognized,
[and] a deviation [of smoke from fire] is nowhere observed.”235 This defi-
nition of a natural relation was given by you[, an opponent, at ĪSD 46.8–9].
But it is not established, since what is meant by the word[s] “additional at-
tribute” is [some] required thing other than [the relation of smoke etc. with
fire etc.] itself. But another thing is not limited to visible [things], because
an invisible [thing], distant in location, time or essence, is possible. And
therefore, there may be an additional attribute in the relation even of smoke
with fire (hutāśa), but it is not seen. So how does [this additional attribute]
not exist at all [only] because [it is] not observed, so that [you believe]
there is an establishment of a natural relation?236
In the explication of what the word “additional attribute” means, Ratnakīrti makes
two points: it is another thing, and it is required. This can be expected to include all
categories except the first, substance, since that would hardly be what is dependent on
another object, whereas all other categories are dependent on substances.237
The example in the background of this passage238 is that smoke is a correct reason for
inferring the presence of fire. It is correct because, amongst other reasons, no additional
attribute is involved in the relation between the two that causes the connection of smoke
with fire.239 I understand this to mean that there is no thing other than the relation of
the two terms that is what makes the inference from smoke to fire valid. This also finds
support in Ratnakīrti’s somewhat ironic conclusion that “in the relation even of smoke
with fire”, a standard example of a correct pervasion, an additional attribute could be
present if all that is required is that it is not observed.
235I follow the translation of this passage in Patil 2009: 123 f., and understand the two justifications to
be in the same relation to the main sentence, adding an “and” to reflect this. So smoke is a sure sign of
fire, because a) no additional attribute of smoke that might cause its relation to fire is perceived, and b)
smoke is never seen where there is no fire. It is the first point that Ratnakīrti attacks in the next sentences.
236For the broader context of this passage, cf. Patil 2009: 105 ff., and see Patil 2009: 123 f. for another
translation.
237Acc. to Ratnakīrti the only way any kind of dravya (as dharmin) can be qualified by sāmānya-
guṇakarmādi (as dharma) is in fact upakāra, cf. § 29.
238Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 100 f., fn. 270 and Patil 2009: 105.
239It is important to note that here “relation of smoke with fire” is not the same as “relation of fire
with smoke”: in the first case, an inference from the relation’s first term, smoke, to its second term,
fire, is valid, but in the second case it is not. Cf. ĪSD 46.7-8: tathā hi dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ saha
sambandhaḥ svābhāviko na tu vahnyādīnāṃ dhūmādibhiḥ. (translated Patil 2009: 105) Fire is not a
correct reason for inferring smoke since smoke depends on the “additional attribute” wet fuel.
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The second point is that this additional attribute is required. As quoted above, Ka-
jiyama 1998: 101 translates a similar passage: “...some other thing by the dependence
on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if x needs z in order to be relat-
ed with y, this z is called upādhi].” This brings out the import of the second point very
nicely: there is no relation of fire with smoke without the element “wet fuel.”
Comment 2 In § 30, Vācaspati’s phrase ekopādhinā sattvena viśiṣte tasmin suggests
that he accepts that sattva is an upādhi. This usage of the term upādhi at this point is
perhaps not as decisive as it could be expected to be.
The passage that Ratnakīrti quotes is addressing one of the points made byVācaspati
in NVTṬ 110.2 ff. (=PV 1 52; 53ab; 55), exemplified by the following objection:240
NVTṬ 109.14–17: api ca vastuniveśe jātyādīnām upādhīnām ekasya va-
stunaḥ sattvaṃ ca dravyatvaṃ ca pārthivatvaṃ ca vṛkṣatvaṃ ca śiṃśa-
pātvaṃ copādhaya iti dūrād ekopādhiviśiṣṭasya grahe sarvopādhiviśiṣṭa-
grahaprasaṅgaḥ.
Moreover, if additional attributes such as a genus etc. rest in a real thing,
then—because a single real thing has [these] additional attributes[, i.e.,]
existence, substantiality, treeness, and śiṃśapāness—there is the unwant-
ed consequence that, when that [thing] qualified by a single additional at-
tribute is grasped from a distance, it is grasped as qualified by all additional
attributes.
I think that it is fair to interpret Vācaspati’s statements as following the formulation
of this objection very closely in his answer (quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 30), and does
therefore not have to be taken as endorsing that sattva really is an additional attribute
and not a proper jāti.
svabhāvopavarṇana (ad § 30 on page 27)
The rule mentioned in this argument is invoked in various passages of Ratnakīrti’s
works. Two passages give more details, PABhP 103.6 f. and KBhSA2 77.10 f.:241
PABhP 103.1–7: naiyāyikaparikalpitopamānanirākaraṇārtham apy ayam
eva prayogo draṣṭavyaḥ, tasyāpi nirviṣayatvāt. tathā hi samākhyāsamba-
ndhas tasya viṣayo varṇyate. sa ca paramārthato nāsti. sa hi sambandhaḥ
sambandhibhyāṃ bhinno ’bhinno vā. yadi bhinnas tadā tayor iti kutaḥ.
na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktavyam, tad api kathaṃ teṣām iti cintā-
yām anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ. na ca yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśāntaram antare-
ṇa prakāśate tathā sambandho ’pi sambandhāntareṇa sambaddho bhavi-
ṣyatīti vaktum ucitam. pramāṇasiddhe hi vasturūpe ’yam asya svabhāva
iti varṇyate. yathā pradīpasyaiva. sambandhas tu na pramāṇapratītaḥ.
240Udayanācārya 1996 274.1 says: yasyāpītyādivārttikārthaṃ dūṣayati—na caikeneti. (With the
words “Not by a single [additional attribute]” [Vācaspatimiśra] falsifies the aim of the Vārttika stated
by the words “For whom” etc.) “Vārttika” here refers to PV 1 52, which was quoted in NVTṬ 110.3–4.
241Probably VyN 14*.2–3 (VyN2 111.17 f.) should also be considered here: pramāṇasiddhe hi rū-
pe svābhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvalambanenaiva vastusvarūpavyavasthā. Trl. acc to Lasic
2000b: 71: “Wenn nämlich ein Ding (rūpa) durch eine gültige Erkenntnis erwiesen ist, stützen wir uns
(bei der Erklärung) auf das Wesen. Nur kraft dessen, daß man sich auf das Wesen stützt, ergibt sich aber
keine Feststellung eines realen Dinges.”
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Exactly this inference242 is to be observed also in order to reject resem-
blance[, a means of valid cognition] imagined by the Naiyāyikas,243 be-
cause that too does not have an object. For it is so: the connection with a
name is described as the object of this [resemblance]. But that connection
does not really exist. For this connection is either different from the two
[things] that have a connection, or not different. If different, then why [is it
a connection] “of these two”? Neither is “because of another connection”
to be said [in answer to this question], since, when one considers: “Also
this [other connection], how [could it belong] to these two?”, [there is] the
unwanted consequence of an infinite regress.244 And it can not be said that,
in the same way that a lamp illuminates without another illumination, so
also a connection becomes connected without another connection. For if
the form of a real thing has been established by a valid means of cognition,
it is explained: “That [is] the nature of that.” As it indeed is for a lamp.
But a connection is not known through a valid means of cognition.
KBhSA2 77.10 f. sthiratve ’py eṣa eva svabhāvas tasya yad uttarakṣaṇa
eva karotīti cet. hatedānīṃ pramāṇapratyāśā. dhūmād atrāgnir ity atrāpi
svabhāva evāsya yad idānīm atra niragnir api dhūma iti vaktuṃ śakya-
tvāt. tasmāt pramāṇasiddhe svabhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvala-
mbanena pramāṇavyālopaḥ.
[Objection:] | Even though persistent, this [thing], which produces [an ef- pp #
fect] only at a later moment, has precisely this nature.245 | [Answer:] Now up #
confidence in the valid means of cognition is destroyed. Because it is pos-
sible to say even here [in this inference,] “Because of smoke, [there is]
fire there.”, that, at the time of that which has [this] very nature, there is
smoke here, even though there is no fire.246 Therefore there is reliance
(ālambana) on a [thing’s] nature when [something] is established by valid
242I.e., the inference in PABhP 102.10–11:
ihāpi prayogaḥ — yasya na viṣayavattvaṃ na tasya prāmāṇyam. yathā keśoṇḍukajñāna-
sya. na siddhaṃ ca viṣayavattvam upamānajñānasyeti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. For that
which has no object[, hetu,] there is no being a valid cognition[, sādhya]. As the cognition
of a net of hair [has no object, and therefore is not valid, dṛṣṭānta]. And that a cognition
through comparison has an object is not established. This [is an inference by the reason]
non-apprehension of the pervader[, i.e., of being a valid means of cognition].
243Cf. NSū 1.1.3.
244I am not quite sure how to construe the tad api (which is correct acc. to RNĀms 54b5). Another
possibility might be to start a new sentence with tad api, taking it as expressing causal force. A translation
would then be: “...is not to be answered. [For,] because of this [answer] too, there is the unwanted
consequence ....”
245I.e., uttarakāryotpādanasvabhāva, the nature of producing a later effect. The point is that a thing
that remains identically the same during a given period of time can produce an effect at a certain time
(such as its last effect in its last moment) but not at others. The opponent (Bhāsarvajña in the previous
two paragraphs acc. to Woo 1999: 211) thinks that a nature such as “producing an effect at a later time”
could help explain how this is achieved.
246I am not sure I properly understand this argument. My best explanation is: the nature of smoke is
to be caused by fire. But if the opponent is right, and a thing can have a nature that sometimes produces
an effect and sometimes doesn’t, i.e., sometimes is in effect and sometimes isn’t, then smoke could
sometimes be dependent on fire and sometimes not.
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cognition. But there is no dispelling (vyālopa) of a valid cognition by re-
liance (avalambana) on a nature.
Both passages, as § 30 on page 27, make the point that when something is cognized
by a means of valid cognition, its nature is made known. And since a real thing, known
by the validmeans of cognition perception, does not appear in such a cognition as having
the structure of property and property bearer, it cannot really have it.
Moreover, Ratnakīrti refers to this description of a thing’s nature as a rule, nyāya.
A formulation such as this would usually appeal to a text of highest authority, cf., e.g.,
SJS2 21.32–22.1: ...iti nyāyaḥ. yad vārttikam..., which is then followed by a quote of
PV 3 532b-d (see Bühnemann 1980: 63 for a translation of and notes on this passage),
or ĪSD 44.10–11. But I was not able to find an exact source for this particular rule.
A similar idea, at any rate, is expressed in the following passage, TSP2 808.13–15:
tasmād yat pramāṇasiddhavastu na tasya kenacid bādhā. anyathā hi pra-
māṇalakṣaṇopapannasya bādhāyāṃ tallakṣaṇam eva dūṣitaṃ syād iti sa-
rvatrānāśvāsān na kvacit tat pramāṇaṃ syāt.
Therefore, there is no refutation by anyone of a real thing that has been
established by a means of valid cognition. For otherwise, when there is a
refutation of that having arisen characterised as valid cognition, that char-
acteristic itself would be falsified. Therefore, without assurance in every
instance, this would not be a valid means of cognition in any instance.
At least Dharmakīrti is clear about the fact that conceptual cognition does not de-
termine the nature of a real thing, but only has exclusion from others as its object:
PVSV 28.19–22: tadviveka eva cānyāpohaḥ. tasmāt tad api tanmātrāpo-
hagocaram. na vastusvabhāvaniścayātmakam. tathā hi kasyacin niścaye
’py anyasyāpratipattidarśanāt, tatsvabhāvaniścaye ca tasyāyogāt. 247
But perhaps it is Dharmakīrti’s principle that the own nature of a thing is at least
remotely involved in conceptual cognition that gave rise to this rule that Ratnakīrti refers
to:
Die Sonderung (apohaḥ) als Gegenstand der Vorstellung und derWortkon-
vention beruht also auf dem Svabhāva der Dinge selbst, insofern es dieser
ist, der einerseits mit den Svabhāvas anderer Dinge eine gleiche Wirkung
und andererseits, indem er an verschiedenen Ursachenkomplexen teilhat,
mehrere Wirkungen hervorbringt. (Steinkellner 1971: 191)248
Notes to § 31
The discussion found in the NBhūṣ about the supporter (upakāraka) and the supported
(upakārya), quoted in part by Ratnakīrti in § 31, is directed against Dharmakīrti’s anal-
ysis of this problem in PVSV 29.7–31.1 (cf. the trl. in section A.1 on page 152). After
having fully quoted the lengthy passage, Bhāsarvajña says:
NBhūṣ 246.30-247.5: sarvopadṛśye sūryādau gṛhyamāṇe ’pi na sarva-
tra draṣṭṛdarśanagrahaṇam asti. anenaitad api nirākṛtam — na hy anya
247Cf. section A.1 on page 151 for a translation.
248Cf. also PV 3 166 (trl. on page 168) for a passage supporting this.
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evānyopakārako yo na gṛhītaḥ syāt. na cāpy upakārake tathāgṛhīte upa-
kāryāgrahaṇaṃ tasyāpy agrahaṇaprasaṅgāt, svasvāmitvavad iti. evaṃ
hi sūryagrahaṇe tadupakāryasya trailokyasyāpi grahaṇaṃ syāt. na hy
upakārakatvena gṛhītād anya eva trailokyopakārako bhānur yo na gṛhī-
taḥ syāt. upakārakagrahaṇe copakāryāgrahaṇaṃ nāsti svasvāmitvavad
ity evaṃvādinaḥ sūryopakāryatrailokyagrahaṇaṃ durnivāraṃ syāt.
Even if that [which is] visible everywhere, the sun etc., is grasped, there
is no grasping of the observations of observers everywhere. By this [state-
ment] also this [following one]249 is refuted: | For there is no really different pp #
supporter of something else that would not be grasped. Nor is there, when
a supporter is grasped in such a way, no grasping of that which is support-
ed, because of the unwanted consequence of not grasping that [supporter]
either, as in the case of being the property and owner. | For, in this way, up #
if the sun is grasped, the threefold world too, which is that supported by
the sun, would be grasped. For since [the sun] is grasped as being the
supporter there is no truly different light supporting the threefold world
which would not be grasped. And if the supporter is grasped, there isn’t
no grasping of that which is supported, as in the case of being property and
owner. For [those] believing [that it is] so, the grasping of the threefold
world supported by the sun is hard to avoid.
varṇākṛtyakṣarākāra ...(ad § 34, PV 3 147)
PV 3 147250 poses two problems: Whose opinion is expressed here, and what exactly is
a universal free of?
Dharmakīrti does not say who holds the opinion that the universal is empty of
colour, form, etc..251 Manorathanandin simply identifies them as Sāmānyavādins, peo-
ple teaching universals (PVV 161.17, cf. section A.4 on page 170). The same position
is stated by Kamalaśīla to be held by the Naiyāyika Bhāvivikta (cf. its presentation in
TSP2 ad kk. 715–717, and its criticism in TSP2 ad k. 738, trl. section B.3 on page 180).
It is not clear whether Dharmakīrti’s intention here is that a sāmānya is said to be
free of the forms of colour, form and letter, or whether it is that it is said to be free
of colour, shape, and the form of a letter. Ratnakīrti’s interpretation leans towards the
latter option: he uses the phrase “akṣarākāraparikaritāḥ” (l. 160, p. 28), suggesting
that he understands akṣarākāra as a unit, and therefore “colour, shape, and the form
of letters” also in Dharmakīrti’s verse. Whilst Kamalaśīla explains that in Bhāvivikta’s
position by akṣara-s the individual letters are meant that make up a word (“C-o-w”),
he does not say how he understands the compound as a whole. Manorathanandin un-
derstands it (cf. section A.4 on page 170) differently from Ratnakīrti: according to that
249This corresponds to PVSV 29.24–26.
250Cf. section A.3 on page 167 for a translation.
251AsAkamatsu 1983: 245, n. 158 points out, a very similar thougt is also to be found in PVSV 55.9–10
(cf. trl. in section A.1 on page 158). Note that Karṇakagomin ends his explanation of this pas-
sage as follows, PVSVṬ 223.26–28: tad evam udyotakarādyabhihitam abhinnapratibhāsam abhy-
upagamya vyatiriktasyāvyatiriktasya ca sāmānyasyāyogād bhrāntir evāyaṃ vyaktiṣv ekākārapratibhā-
sa ity uktaṃ. (Thus, having assumed in this way an undifferentiated appearance as proposed by Uddy-
otakāra etc., a universal [either] separated [or] unseparated [from particulars] is not possible; therefore
this appearance of a single form of awareness for particulars is only an error.)
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interpretation a universal is free of the appearances or forms of awareness (ābhāsa or
ākāra, PVV 161.13 ad PV 3 147ab) of colour, shape, and letters.252
Forms of khyāti (ad § 35)
In § 35, Ratnakīrti gives four explanations for the error that might account for the cogni-
tion of a universal. These four explanations are apparently closely linked to four theories
of khyāti, appearance or false appearance, the equivalences being as follows:253
1. ātmakhyāti (appearance of a self): that a cognition of a false universal is nothing
but the unfolding of awareness itself due to mnemonic impressions (vāsanāvaśād
...vivarto ’yam astu, starting l. 165, p. 28).
2. asatkhyāti (appearance of an inexistant thing): that that which appears as a uni-
versal has no real existence at all (asad eva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu, starting l. 166,
p. 29).
3. anyathākhyāti (appearance in another way): that it is only the particulars that
appear other than they are, due to their differences being concealed (vyaktaya
eva ...°vyavadhānāt, starting l. 166, p. 29 ).
4. smṛtipramoṣa (deprivation of memory): that memory interferes in the correct
cognition, but does not come to awareness as memory (smṛtipramoṣo, starting
l. 167, p. 29).
Respectively, these theories are endorsed by authors belonging to the Yogācāra,
the Madhyamaka and Vedānta, the Nyāya and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, and the Prābhākara
Mīmāṃsā schools.254
Ratnakīrti himself, even though he says here that it doesn’t matter which of the error
theories is the right one,255 explains the appearance of a universal as an erroneous cog-
nition that is close to the ātmakhyāti position as described in the VV.256 This becomes
fairly clear from an argument in § 53 (ll. 240–242):
kiṃ tarhi svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva buddhir apaśyanty api
bāhyaṃ bāhye pravṛttim ātanotīti viplutaiva. (Trl. on page 62)
252Karṇakagomin, glossing on the similar passage in PVSV 55.9–10, mentions an opponent who tries
to escape by saying that “a universal certainly has the form of colour etc.” (PVSVṬ 223.17–18: varṇā-
dyākāram eva sāmānyam iti ced ...)This would also hint at an understanding of the compound as “forms
of colour, shape, and letters.”
253In general, see Schmithausen 1965: 141 ff. for a systematic discussion of the following (and other)
error theories. Without giving a full account, the main ideas are as follows: ātmakhyāti means that the
content (or object appearing) in an erroneous cognition is only that cognition itself, not an external object.
asatkhyāti means that there is an appearance of a non-existing object in erroneous cognition. According
to anyathākhyāti something real appears differently than it is. smṛtipramoṣa, usually associated with the
akhyāti (non-appearance) theory, means that the memory involved (according to this theory) in erroneous
cognition does not come to awareness: “The fifth theory [of the 8 different theories of erroneous cognition
discussed in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa—PMA] (smrṭipramoṣa) is held by the Prābhākaras. They maintain that
the perceptual error expressed as “this is a snake” is, in fact, partly confused with the memory of the
snake, but the perceiver is not aware at that moment that it is a memory.” (Potter 1977: p. 412, cf. also
Schmithausen 1965: 206 f.).
254This is how the VV presents the matter, acc. to the analysis in Schmithausen 1965: 92–106.
255This is only a preliminary statement, and is meant to support only the main point of this paragraph:
that cognition of a real universal is entirely wrong (bhrāntir eva āsau, § 35).
256Acc. to Schmithausen 1965: 233 f., this is also Dignāga’s, Dharmakīrti’s, and Jñānaśri’s position.
For Dharmakīrti’s position, also cf. PV 1 68–70 (translated in Dunne 2004: 339).
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Ratnakīrti here makes two points important for the khyāti context: An awareness
event does not “see” an external object, so that nothing other than itself appears in it.257
And an awareness comes about only by force of the ripeninig of its own mnemonic
impressions (vāsana-s). These two statements, in addition to the usage of adhyava-
sāya that, based on an internal form of awareness, externalises the object of cognition
(cf. section 5.4 on page 130), undoubtedly support his endorsement of ātmakhyāti to
explain the erroneous cognition of a commonness in particulars.
Kataoka 2009: esp. pp. 484–482 (15–17) has made it clear that, at least for Bhaṭṭa
Jayanta, these error theories were of importance for describing the differences between
the apoha theories of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, who explained the erroneous cog-
nition of universals according to, respectively, ātmakhyāti and asatkhyāti theories.
Proving a universal like a sense faculty (ad ll. 173–176 in § 36)
Ratnakīrti here presupposes an opponent who wishes to prove a universal in the same
way as a sense faculty is proven.258 The opponent is not named in this passage. This
sort of proof is already referred to in PVSV 16.12–14, where an opponent wishes to
show that the self or the soul (ātman) is inferrable like a sense faculty. The argument
there is as follows:
PVSV 16.12–14: indriyādīnāṃ tu vijñānakāryasya kādācitkatvāt sāpe-
kṣyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate — kim apy asya kāraṇam astīti. na tv
evaṃbhūtam iti.
But259 the general acceptance of the sense faculties etc., which [is] due
to an establishment of [their] dependency based on [their] effect[, i.e.,]
cognition, being occassional, is stated as “This [cognition] has a certain
cause.”,260 but not as “[This cause is] just so.”
Karṇakagomin’s commentary on this passage is as follows:
[PVSVṬ 73.8–16]: yathā nityaparokṣāṇām apīndriyādīnām anumānaṃ
tathātmano bhaviṣyatīti ced āha—indriyāṇām ityādi. ādiśabdāt smṛtibī-
jādīnāṃ. vijñānam eva kāryaṃ tasya kādācitkatvāt. tathā hi satsv api
rūpālokamanaskāreṣu nimīlitalocanādyavasthāsu vijñānasyābhāvāt, pu-
naś conmīlitalocanāvasthāsu bhāvāt, vijñānakāryaṃ kāraṇāntaraṃ sā-
pekṣaṃ sidhyati, tato ‘sya sāpekṣyasiddhyā indriyādīnām prasiddhir ucya-
te. etad uktam bhavati—yat sāpekṣam idaṃ kādācitkaṃ vijñānam, tat kim
apy asya vijñānasya kāraṇam astīty anumīyate. tad eva cendriyam iti vya-
vahriyate. na tv evambhūtam iti na rūpaviśeṣeṇa mūrttatvādinā yuktam
indriyam anumīyata ity arthaḥ.261
[PVSVṬ 73.8–13]:
[Objection]: | There should be [an inference] of the self in the same way pp #
as there is an inference even of what is permanent and hidden, such as the
sense faculties etc.. | [So Dharmakīrti] said: For the sense faculties etc. up #
257Cf. also the discussion of Ratnakīrti’s position in § 16.
258Cf. also Kajiyama 1998: 74 for a reference to such a proof of a sense faculty.
259This passage is also translated in Gillon and R. S. Hayes 2008: 347.
260This sentence seems to have been skipped in Gillon and R. S. Hayes 2008: 347.
261I have changed the text’s punctuation in part according to handwritten marks in Frauwallner’s copy
of Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1943.
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From the word etc. [one unterstands also] for memory, seeds, etc. Because
this, a cognition, which alone is the effect, is occasional. For it is so: Be-
cause, even when form, eye, [and] cognitive activity exist, [that] cognition
does not exist in [certain] conditions, such as when the eyes are closed etc.,
and because, furthermore, it exists in [certain other] conditions[, such as
when] the eyes are opened, the effect cognition is established as having a
dependency on another [hidden] cause; therefore, the general acceptance
of sense faculties etc. through an establishment of its[, i.e., the effect cog-
nition’s,] dependency is expressed. [By this] the [following] is said: That,
which is this dependent, occassional cognition, is inferred as “This [cog-
nition] has some cause.” And only this [cause] is normally referred to as
“sense faculty.” But not [as] “[This cause is] just so.” meaning that a
sense faculty is not inferred as connected with being corporeal etc.
According to Karṇakagomin’s interpretation, sense faculties are inferred from the
fact that perceptions, dependent on the sense faculties, don’t occur when the sense fac-
ulties are not active. But what can not be inferred from their non-occurrence is of what
nature those faculties are.
In Dharmakīrti’s argument the self (ātman) is hidden from perception and perma-
nent. In Ratnakīrti’s passage it is the universal (sāmānya) that, so the opponent, is
hidden from perception (or at least not perceivable apart from its manifestation) and
permanent. The following points can be made about Ratnakīrti’s appeal to the argu-
ment as found in the PV 1:
The opponent’s argument seems to be: That which is hidden can be known by its
effect. A universal is hidden, but there is the effect of a cognition of sameness between
things. This must be the effect of the universal, which proves that it exists.262
Ratnakīrti’s counter then is: What is established is only an occassionally active
cause. I.e., when the cognition “cow” occurs, that cause, a universal according to the
opponent, is active, but is inactive when the cognition does not occur. But, so Ratnakīrti,
since the absence of the cognition cow can be explained by the absence of all particular
cows, no other cause needs to be postulated.
At first sight, it might seem that there is an important difference betweenDharmakīr-
ti’s and Ratnakīrti’s arguments, though: for the former, the effect is occasional, but for
the latter it is the cause that is occasional.263 But Ratnakīrti makes it clear in the next
sentence (yadā hi ...), which is an explication of the reason “by the effect cognition”
jñānakāryatas, that the cognition is occasional too.
For Ratnakīrti, it is the fact that the assumed cause is occasional which opposes that
a sāmānya be considered as that cause, since it is, at least for all known opponents of
Ratnakīrti, not occasional, but permanent.
It should also be noted that this argument, in proving an only “occasional cause”,
indicates a rather specific theory on the opponent’s part, namely, that the universal is
omnipresent in both space and time (spatially and temporally not occasional), and not
only present in all its manifestations (or particulars of the same class). For consider
this: if a universal were present in only its instances, then its permanence (that it is not
262How this last sentence follows from the previous one is very unclear, mainly since the opponent
and the exact theory supporting this relation of a hidden cause and the effect is unknown.
263In a similar discussion in TS2 1400-1, it is also the effect, the cogniton, which is occasional, and
not the cause. Cf. Kunst 1939: 40 ff. for a translation of and comments on that discussion.
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occasional in respect to time) would not really matter, since it would not be constantly
causing a cognition of itself anyway, but only via its particulars.264
Chance cognitions (ad § 36)
In JNĀ 221,11–16, a more detailed variant of this argument is found:
yat punar ākasmikatvam uktaṃ tad ayuktam, janakasāmagrībhedasya
bhavatāpy avaśyasvīkaraṇīyatvāt. katham anyathā indriyārthau nirvika-
lpakajñānajanananiyatau dṛṣṭau vikalpam utpādayataḥ ? tasmāt pūrva-
piṇḍadarśanasmaraṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānasāmarthyeyaṃ sāmagrī vi-
kalpam utpādayatīti nirviṣayaṃ jñānam utpādayaty evārthaḥ, nirviṣaya-
tāniṣṭhatvād vikalpatāyās tadaṃśena. tad varaṃ vijātīyavikalpavad vi-
spaṣṭapratibhāsād anubhavād bhinna eva sajātīyavikalpo ’pīty eva sā-
dhu, tasmān na jātisiddhir adhyakṣāt.
The265 accidentality [of a universal’s cognition,] whichwas stated [by you],
is not correct, because even you necessarily have to admit a difference
of the producing collection [of causes]. How else can sense faculty and
object, both observed as restricted to generating unconceptual cognitions,
produce a concept? Therefore, that this collection [of causes], possessing
a capacity enriched by the assisting cause of a memory of an earlier ob-
servation of a material thing, produces the concept, only means (evārtha)
that it produces a cognition without an object, because [the fact] that there
is a concept [due to] a part of that [object] is based on not having a [real,
and thus partless,] object. So [it would be] better that also a concept of that
of the same genus, like a concept of that of another genus, is really dif-
ferentiated from experience[, i.e., perception,] which [alone] has a distinct
appearance [of an object]. That alone is right. Therefore there is no proof
of a genus from perception.
Note that Ratnakīrti’s argument seems to end on a different note: A genus does not
appear in either perception or in verbal apprehension (cf. l. 171, p. 29). Of course, if
verbal apprehension is taken to be perception, or at least sufficiently like perception in
respect of its appearing content, then this would only be an explication of the intent of
Jñānaśrīmitra’s argument.
264Such a position is endorsed, for example, by Vācaspati, as is mentioned in Potter 1977: 139, and
also in the summary by B. K. Matilal (1977: 474 f.). The passage referred to is probably this one:
NVTṬ 353.13–15: tathā sāmānyam api sarvāsaṃbaddham api sarvaiḥ sahāvatiṣṭha-
te. yās tv asya vyaktayas tābhiḥ paraṃ sambadhyate. tathā ca yatra jāyante vyaktayas
tatrāsambaddhāv api staḥ sāmānyasamavāyāv iti. tāsāṃ janmaiva sāmānyasamavāyā-
vacchedaḥ.
In that way also a universal, even though not connected with everything, exists together
with everything; but later (param) [it] is connected with its manifestations. And in such
a way, a universal and inherence exist in that [place], even though [previously] not con-
nected [to that place], where a manifestation is generated. The very generation of these
[manifestations is] the limitation of universal and inherence [to a particular place].
265Cf. also the translation in Akamatsu 1983: 119 f.
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That a genus is the cause for words and cognitions is argued for both by Kumārila
and by Naiyāyika authors.266 In the Apohasiddhi, this position is also ascribed to Trilo-
cana in § 41, and is also involved in the effect-reason (kāryahetu) used in the inference
of § 44. So it is quite possible that Ratnakīrti is here generalising the views of opponents
postulating a real universal as a cause of cognitions.
Nevertheless, a lead to a historical person might be found in NV 303.11 ff., where
a position is presented (and argued against) that appeals to the non-accidentality of par-
ticulars’ cognitions as a proof for the genus being the word referent (viśeṣapratyayā-
nām anākasmikatvācca NV 303.11). This passage is also quoted by Karṇakagomin
(PVSVṬ 301.19–25) as an exemplification of the position that a universal is imag-
ined as existing only in its proper substrates, even though it is different from them (cf.
PVSV 76.25–77.4, trl. section A.1 on page 163). Whoever endorsed that particular
position might be expected to argue that there is the result of the accidentality of con-
ceptual cognitions, because the genus responsible for the correctness of these cognitions
is missing. Also note the similar discussion in PVSV 82.4–25 (cf. trl. section A.1 on
page 164), where Dharmakīrti defends himself against the objection that, without a uni-
versal, cognitions and denotations are without cause. Acc. to Frauwallner 1933: 69,
and p. 83, Dharmakīrti is arguing against Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas in these passages.
Dharmottara’s argument (ad § 51)
DhAP 243.27–244.9:267
gal te dgag pa’i śes pa phyi rol la ni ma yin te, de mi snaṅ ba’i phyir ro.
blo daṅ gzuṅ ba’i rnam pa la yaṅ ma yin te, de gñis ni ñams su myoṅ bar
bya ba ñid yin pa’i phyir ro. sgro btags pa la yaṅ ma yin te, de yaṅ de’i
tshe sgro btags kyi raṅ bźin du gzuṅ ba dgag par mi nus pa’i phyir ro. de
bźin du sgrub pa’i śes pa yaṅ phyi rol la ni ma yin te, mi snaṅ ba’i phyir
ro. blo la sogs pa rnams kyaṅ yod pa la ’khrul pa med pa’i phyir ’di dag
la mi rigs ma yin nam źe na   bden te, phyi rol daṅ blo daṅ rnam pa daṅ
sgro btags pa la yaṅ dgag pa daṅ sgrub par rtog pa ma yin no. sgrub pa
daṅ dgag pa dag ni sgro btags gaṅ źig phyi rol ñid du ṅes par byas pa
de daṅ ’brel pa yin te, dper na sbrul sgrub pa daṅ dgag pa’i śes pa thag
pa’i rdzas la ni ma yin te, mi snaṅ ba’i phyir ro. sbrul gyi blo daṅ gzuṅ
ba’i rnam pa daṅ268 sgro btags kyi sbrul la yaṅ ma yin te, de dag ni raṅ
gi raṅ bźin du yod pa la mi ’khrul pa’i phyir ro. ’on kyaṅ sgro btags kyi
266 For an argument of Kumārila’s, cf. ŚV Āv 37–38, a passage also quoted by Karṇakagomin
(PVSVṬ 320.12–15) in the context of PV 1 162 (trl. section A.1 on page 164).
As regards the Naiyāyika positions, this point is typically made in commenting on NSū 2.2.70: sa-
mānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ., which Angot 2009: 523 translates: “La jāti ‘genre’ c’est ce qui produit la
connaissance de l’identité.” Cf. also NVTṬ 450.15–17: prasūta iti prasavaḥ. samānabuddher bhinneṣu
prasotrī jātiḥ. atra ca yā jātiḥ, sāvaśyaṃ samānapratyayaṃ prasūte. na punar yā samānapratyayaṃ
prasūte sā jātiḥ, pācakādiṣu vyabhicārād iti. ([NVTṬ 450.15] It produces, so production. A genus is
productive of the same awareness for different things. And here, that is the genus, which necessarily
produces the same apprehension. But that which[, not necessarily,] produces the same apprehension is
not the genus, because of the deviation in such cases as cook etc.)
267Also cf. the translation in Frauwallner 1937: 265 f.
268Frauwallner places a śad after this daṅ, DhAP 244.6. It is probably only a misprint, since the daṅ
has a dash affixed to it which indicates that it was not to be separated from the following word.
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sbrul gaṅ źig phyi rol gyi sbrul ñid du ṅes par byas pa de ni sgrub pa daṅ
dgag par ṅes pa bźin no.
[Objection:] | There is no negating cognition for an external [thing], be- pp #
cause it does not appear. Neither is there [a negating cognition] for an
awareness and a grasped form, because these two are perceived. Nei-
ther is there [a negating cognition] for a superimposed [object], because
it too—being grasped at that time with its own nature of superimposi-
tion—can not be negated. In the same way, there is no affirming cog-
nition for an external [object], because [it] does not appear. And because
awareness and so on do not go astray with regard to what exists, [an affirm-
ing cognition] is not incorrect with regard to these[, i.e., awareness and so
on].269 | [Answer:] True. For an external [object], awareness, a form, up #
and a superimposed [thing] there is no negating or affirming conceptual
cognition. Affirming and negating are connected with some superimposed
[thing] that is ascertained as being external. Like there is no cognition af-
firming and negating a snake for the material entity rope, since [that rope]
does not appear [to that cognition]. [Such a cognition] does also not exist
for the awareness of snake, the grasped form of “snake”, and the snake that
is superimposed, because [that cognition] does not go astray with regard
to what exists as their own proper nature. However, some superimposed
snake that is ascertained as an external snake is ascertained as established
or negated.
Five canditates for śabdārtha (ad § 55–§ 57)
The verse, spread over § 55 and § 57 and interspersed with a prose sentence, is in the
vasantatilakāmetre, as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 7. Frauwallner 1931: 234
is doubtful as towhether this versewaswritten by Jñānaśrī. I could not find it in the JNĀ,
and it might have been composed by Ratnakīrti himself, who is not basing himself on
Jñānaśrīmitra in his formulation of the inference establishing exclusion (starting § 54).
In § 55, Ratnakīrti lists five opinions on what a word referent is if it is not anyāpoha:
a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to that additional attribute, something
qualified by an additional attribute, and, lastly, a form that appears to awareness.
The verse in which he says this has thematical equivalents throughout apoha trea-
tises. PSV 5 says that a word for a genus does not denote either particulars, a connection
with a genus, a genus, or that having the genus:
PSV 5 2: na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyād vyabhicārataḥ |
vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apṛthakśruteḥ || 270
269This interpretation is not the same as that in Frauwallner 1937: 266: “Und da auch die Erkenntnis
usw. mit dem Sein fest verbunden ist (avyābhicāraḥ), ist sie auch bei diesen nicht am Platz.” I think the
idea is as follows: awareness, a grasped form and a superimposed object can not deceive a person with
regard to something that exists. As Dharmottara explains in his answer (DhAP 244.7–8: de dag ni raṅ
gi raṅ bźin du yod pa la mi ’khrul pa’i phyir ro.), this means they can not be deceiving with regard to
what exists in their own form. But if these objects of an affirming cognition must exist when and as they
are cognized, an affirmation of them is useless.
270This verse is in anuṣṭubh metre, with a na-vipulā in the first quarter (°bdo bhe dā° are 3 long
syllables, cf. Steiner 1996: 229). Cf. R. P. Hayes 1988: 255 ff., Hattori 2000: 140 f. and Pind 2009: 76–77
for translations, and Hattori 1996: 387 ff. for an overview of Dignāga’s arguments in this section.
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sādhya (what is to be proven): S hetu (what proves): H
pakṣa (about which something is proven): p dṛṣṭānta (the example): d
sapakṣa (something similar to p): s vipakṣa (something dissimilar from p): v
Table 4.3: Abbreviations for anumāna elements.
PSV 5 4ab: tadvato nāsvatantratvād upacārād asambhavāt | 271
The same point, but with the addition that a form of awareness is not the referent of
a word, is made in TS2 870 (cf. trl. section B.4 on page 181):272
TS2 870 yataḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogo jātimāṃs tathā |
buddhyākāro na śabdārthe ghaṭāmañcati tattvataḥ ||
4.2 The inference and logical errors in the AS
The273 inference found at the end of the AS makes use of various elements that are per-
haps not immediately clear. In the following an overview of the usage of these elements
will be given, inasfar as necessary for an understanding of this specific inference.274
The similar instance and the counter instance
In the following discussion, two terms, similar instance (sapakṣa) and dissimilar, or
counter instance (vipakṣa), as well as the relationship of the logical reason (H) to them
will be of central importance.
The similar instance is something similar to the instance under consideration in that
they both are qualified by the property that is to be established.275 The counter instance,
conversely, is something that is not qualified by the property that is to be established.
What the similar instance and the counter instance actually are becomes clear from
the opponent’s statement thatH is ambiguous (ll. 251 ff., in § 54):
In reality,
that denoted must be a particular, an additional attribute, a con-
nection to an additional attribute, [something] possessing an ad-
ditional attribute, or must be a form of awareness,
because there is no other way [for a word to have an object], and because,
if there is no object [for a word], it is not possible that [a word] denotes.
271Again, cf. the translations in R. P. Hayes 1988: 261 f., Hattori 2000: 142, and Pind 2009: 78.
272The refutation of these positions is found in TS2 871–884.
273This section is a supplement to section 5.2 on page 114.
274The abbreviations used for frequently recurring terms are listed in table 4.3.
275Cf. NPSū 399.11–12: sādhyadharmasāmānyena samāno ’rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ. ...vipakṣo yatra sā-
dhyaṃ nāsti. (Trl.: A similar instance is an object that is similar [to the pakṣa] due to a commonness
of the property that is to be proven. ...A dissimilar instance is where the property to be established
does not exist.) Cf. also Tachikawa 1971: 121, Gillon and Love 1980: 363, and the comments on the
sapakṣa passage in Tillemans 1999a: 94 f., as well as Tillemans 2004. The explanation in TBh2 25.7–8
runs: samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣaḥ. pakṣeṇa saha sadṛśo dṛṣṭāntadharmīty arthaḥ. (Tillemans (1999a: 91)
translates: “Sapakṣa are instances which are similar (samāna), that is to say, subjects which are examples
(dṛṣṭāntadharmin) that are similar to the pakṣa [i.e., to the subject of reasoning].”)
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Two of the claims made here are important for understanding the scope of similar
instances and counter instances:
1. What is the object of a denotation (i.e., that which is denoted) is something other
than S.
2. Denoting presupposes having an object.
In consequence of these two statements, v must be whatever does not have that
specific object that Ratnakīrti is trying to prove, i.e., “a mere thing that is determined
and distinguished from that of another form”, but has some other object, and denotes.
The counter instance is not what does not have any object at all. For this latter position,
even on the view of the opponents speaking here, would preclude that anything can
denote at all.
Pseudo reasons
Reason as unestablished (asiddha)
The exact reason why a hetu is not established or certain can vary. An early exposition
of a distinction widely accepted amongst Buddhist logicians (cf. Funayama 1991: 1027,
and p. 1022 f., n. 2) is made in NPSū 400.19–401.4, which can be summed up as follows:
1. The reason is unestablished for both the proponent and the opponent (ubhayāsi-
ddha).
2. The reason is unestablished for either the proponent or the opponent (anyatarā-
siddha).
3. The reason is unestablished because it is doubtful whether it really is what qual-
ifies the pakṣa (sandigdhāsiddha).
4. The reason has an unestablished basis, i.e., the pakṣa it is supposed to qualify
does not exist (āśrayāsiddha).
I can not trace explicit mention of the first and second kind of asiddhahetu-s in
Ratnakīrti’s works. A sandigdhāsiddhahetu is mentioned, e.g., in KBhSA2 81.8–9: na.
dṛśyādṛśyasamudāyasya kāraṇasyādarśane ’py abhāvāsiddheḥ kāraṇānupalabdheḥ
sandigdhāsiddhatvāt. (Cf. Woo 1999: 242 f. for the context and a translation.) The
āśrayāsiddhahetu is mentioned by Ratnakīrti as well (see below for an example).
According to Funayama (1991: 1027) “there were some other asiddhas which were
sometimes mentioned in the post-Dharmakīrtian period, e.g. svarūpāsiddha and viśe-
ṣaṇāsiddha.” Both of these are used by Ratnakīrti in various contexts, the first, and the
āśrayāsiddha mentioned above, e.g., in the KBhSA2 67.18–19: ...iti na svarūpeṇāśra-
yadvāreṇa vāsiddhi sambhāvanāpi., and the latter, e.g., in the SJS2 3.17–18: tan nāyaṃ
viśeṣaṇāsiddho ’pi hetuḥ. (For translations of these passages cf. Woo 1999: 145, and
Bühnemann 1980: 8 respectively.)
TBh2 24.14–18, explaining NB 2.5, says: anumeye parvatādau dharmiṇi liṅga-
syāstitvam eva niścitam, tad ekaṃ rūpaṃ pakṣadharmatāsaṃjñakam. atra sattvagra-
haṇenāsiddhasya nirāsaḥ, yathā— anityaḥ śabdaś cākṣuṣatvāt, cākṣuṣtvaṃ cakṣurvi-
jñānagrāhyatvam ucyate, tac ca śabde dharmiṇi nāsti. (Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 65 f. for a
translation and more on the context.) The asiddhahetu being explained in this passage
is not specified, but the example is that which is used in NPSū 401.1: tatra śabdānitya-
tvaṃ sādhye cākṣuṣatvād ity ubhayāsiddhaḥ. Moreover, in TBh2 51.13–14276 the same
276TBh2 51.13–14: svarūpāsiddhyā ’py asiddho hetvābhāso bhavati. yathā anityaḥ śabdaś cākṣuṣa-
tvād iti.
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example is again used to exemplify a hetu’s svarūpāsiddhi. This would suggest, at least
for Mokṣākaragupta, an equality between a hetu’s svarūpāsiddhi, its being ubhayāsi-
ddha, and its being asiddha without any specification, explained merely as consisting
in the hetu’s non-existence in the pakṣa. The comments in Funayama 1991: 1027, and
p. 1021,n. 4 that svarūpāsiddha “...means the incompatibility between the reason and
the locus.” could be understood as supporting a stronger interpretation, such that it is
impossible that the hetu in question ever qualify the pakṣa. It is not difficult to see how
this would hold for visibility and sound in the example of ubhayāsiddha. And a link
between the two ways for a hetu to be false could be seen by understanding that a hetu
would be unestablished for both sides if it is impossible through the hetu’s nature itself
that it qualify the pakṣa.
Patil (2009: 240 f., and fn. 110) understands the asiddha here as svarūpāsiddha,
and, amongst others, references TBh2 61.3–62.3. The proof of an omniscient person is
there followed by a defence introduced by the phrase na tāvad āśrayadvāreṇa hetu-
dvāreṇa vāsiddhasambhāvanā. (TBh2 61.8–9). This phrase is taken almost verbatim
from Ratnakīrti’s SJS2 1.25 (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 93,n. 12). Thus an equality between
*hetudvāreṇāsiddha and svarūpāsiddha seems to be implied in the analysis at Patil
2009: 240 f. This is also supported by the strikingly similar construction, referred to in
Patil 2009: 240, fn. 110, found in KBhSA2 67.18–19: na svarūpeṇāśrayadvāreṇa vāsi-
ddhi sambhāvanāpi. (Instead of vāsiddhi° ms “S” reads ’siddha°, acc. to KBhSA2 67,
fn. 4, as also ms “N” acc. to Woo 1999: 41, fn. 7.)
So it appears that Ratnakīrti made no important differentiation between *hetudva-
reṇāsiddhi and *svarūpeṇāsiddhi. The latter seems, in turn, to have been equated with
a hetu’s being generally asiddha, at least by Mokṣākaragupta, which is, according to
the example, classified as ubhayāsiddha in NPSū 401.1. I will therefore understand Ra-
tnakīrti to be examining the problem that a hetu does not qualify a pakṣa, so that the
statement “p is qualified byH .” is false for both the opponent and the proponent.
Reason as contradictory (viruddha)
As before, the logical literature on this topic is extensive (e.g., NPSū, NB, NBṬ). The
NPSū 402.11–403.8 for example discusses four subtypes of this error, summed up as
follows:
1. dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana: establishing the opposite of a property’s na-
ture,
2. dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana: establishing the opposite of a part of a property,
3. dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana: establishing the opposite of a property bearer’s
nature,
4. dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana: establishing the opposite of a part of a property
bearer.
Due to the brevity of Ratnakīrti’s argument in l. 249 (§ 54, also cf. section 5.2
on page 116), any classification will have to be speculative. One argument that can be
made is that since the argument is so short, it can be understood to mean the simplest (or
perhaps most common) category of this error, which would be the first in the above list,
as is exemplified, e.g., by TBh2 25.9–12: atra sattvagrahaṇena viruddhasya nirāsaḥ,
yathā— śabdo nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat. kṛtakatvaṃ hi nityatvavipakṣeṇānityatvena
vyāptam iti viruddham ucyate., and TBh2 26.2–4: atrāpy asattvagrahaṇena viruddha-
sya nirāsaḥ. yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavat. viruddho hi vipakṣe ’sti. (For
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translations cf. Kajiyama 1998: 10.1 and 10.2.) Also see Patil 2009: 67, fn. 94 for a
clear formulation of this error based on Keśavamiśra 1934. (This particular edition is
not available to me.) More material from the RNĀ is given in section 5.2 on page 117.
Reason as ambiguous (anaikāntika)
NPSū 401.5–402.10 lists six ways in which a hetu can be ambiguous:277
1. sādhāraṇa: common [to sapakṣa and vipakṣa]
2. asādhāraṇa: not common [to sapakṣa and vipakṣa]
3. sapakṣaikadeśavṛtti, vipakṣavyāpin: occurring in a part of the sapakṣa and hav-
ing a pervasion by the vipakṣa
4. vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti, sapakṣavyāpin: occurring in a part of the vipakṣa and hav-
ing a pervasion by the sapakṣa
5. ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛtti: occurring in a part of both the similar and counter
instances
6. viruddhāvybhicārin: not deviating from what is contradictory
As Iwata (2002: 235) has argued (translating anaikāntika as “inconclusive”), Dhar-
makīrti in the Pramāṇaviniścaya “...bases the inconclusiveness of the reason not on the
ascertainment of the reason’s presence or absence in similar and dissimilar instances,
but on the doubt of the reason’s presence in things possessing the property to be proved
and its absence in things which do not possess the property to be proved.” This leads
Dharmakīrti to a classification of “...the inconclusive reasons ...as follows: both anvaya
and vyatireka are doubtful; either anvaya or vyatireka is doubtful; vyatireka is reversed,
namely, unestablished.” (Iwata 2002: 236)
Mokṣākaragupta defines this type of error as follows in TBh2 47.19–48.1: vyāptya-
niścaye hetor anaikāntiko doṣaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ — asādhāraṇānaikāntikaḥ sādhāra-
ṇānaikāntikaḥ sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikaś ceti (If [there is] no ascertainment of per-
vasion, the reason’s error is “ambiguous.” And that [ambiguous error] is threefold: am-
biguous due to non-commonness, ambiguous due to commonness, and having a doubt-
ful exclusion from the counter instance.)278 The examples adduced by Mokṣākaragupta
for these various pseudo-reasons are:
1. for asādhāraṇānaikāntika:
a) TBh2 48.1–2: sātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram, prāṇādimattvāt. (This corresponds
to the example in NB 3.97 for a reason that is ambiguous because both pos-
itive and negative concomitance are doubtful.)279
b) TBh2 48.6: anityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt. (This corresponds to the example
for the same kind of pseudo reason in NPSū 401.8: śrāvaṇatvān nitya iti)
2. for sādhāraṇānaikāntika, TBh2 48.7–8: nityaḥ śabdaḥ prameyatvāt. (This cor-
responds to the example for the same error in NPSū 401.8: prameyatvān nitya
iti)
3. for sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttika, TBh2 48.9–10: saḥ śyāmas tatputratvāt.
277The following is adapted from Tachikawa 1971: 122 f.and notes, where these terms, as well as the
examplifications of each type of error, are translated.
278 Cf. Kajiyama 1998: 113 for another translation.
279For an early note on the history of this proof, cf. Stcherbatsky 1994 2: 208 f., fn. 1. See Potter
1977: 95–100 for a short general overview of the Naiyāyika’s ātman proofs, and Oetke 1988: 320 ff. for
a discussion of this and similar proofs as they appear in VS 3.2.4.
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Leaving the “unspecified” ambiguous pseudo-reasons aside, Ratnakīrti uses at least
all the types of anaikāntika defined by Mokṣākaragupta:
1. sādhāraṇānaikāntika, e.g., KBhSA2 68.25, SSD2 114.16–7
2. asādhāraṇānaikāntika, e.g., KBhSA2 80.8
3. sandigdhavyatireka-hetvābhāsa, e.g., SAD 147.4, or, in a formulation as reason
and consequence, e.g., ataḥ sandigdhavyatirekitvād anaikāntikatvam eva pra-
meyatvam. (SSD2 124.23–24)
Ratnakīrti, in representing a Naiyāyika point of view, also uses their typification of
ambiguous reasons, including a characterization as anupasamhārya:
ĪSD 36.21–25 na cānaikāntikaḥ. sa hi bhavann asādhāraṇo vā syāt, yathā
nityā pṛthvī gandhavattvād iti, anupasamhāryo vā, yathā sarvaṃ nityaṃ
prameyatvād iti, sādhāraṇo vā yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ, asparśavattvād iti.
tatra na tāvad ādimau pakṣau, sapakṣasadbhāvadarśanena pratikṣipta-
tvāt. nāpy antimaḥ, adhigatakartṛnivṛtter vyomāder vipakṣād vyāvṛtter
upalabdheḥ.
Neither280 is [the reason] ambiguous. For the existing [reason] would be
either uncommon, as in “Earth is permanent because it has odour.”, or [it
would be] unrestricted, as in “Everything is permanent, because it is cog-
nizable.”, or [it would be] common, as in “Sound is permanent, because it
is intangible.”
Amongst these [alternatives], to begin with, the first two are not [right],
because they are refuted by an observation as really existant in a similar in-
stance. Neither is the last [correct], because an exclusion from the counter
instance, ether etc., which is qualified by the exclusion of a known maker,
is perceived.
But in the context of the AS’s inference, other than in the context of the ĪSD, this
scheme is in all probability not applicable, since this inference is one valid according to
Buddhist rules of inferring.
sādhāraṇānaikāntika An instance of a reason that is supposedly sādhāraṇānaikānti-
ka is advanced against Ratnakīrti, e.g., in the following passage:
CAPV 130.33–131.3: nanv ekatve sādhye tatpracyutir dvitvaṃ ca vipa-
kṣaḥ, tasmāc ca vipakṣād dhetuvyatirekapratipattyavasare kiṃ vipakṣā-
tmā prakāśate na vā. pratibhāsapakṣe prakāśamānatvasya hetoḥ sādhāra-
ṇānaikāntikatā, vipakṣe ’pi dṛṣṭatvāt. atha na prakāśate tadā sandigdha-
vyatirekitvam, kuto vyatireka ity avadher evāprakāśamānaśarīratvāt ka-
tham ataḥ sādhyasiddhipratyāśā.
| Now, if oneness is to be proven, the loss (pracyuti) of this [oneness] andpp #
twoness [are] the counter instance. And therefore, on the occasion of the
cognition of the exclusion of the reason[, i.e., appearance,] from the counter
instance[, i.e., twoness], does the nature of the counter instance appear or
not? In the case that it appears, the reason “being appearing” is inconclu-
sive [because of] commonness, because it is observed also in the counter
instance. If[, on the other hand, the counter instance] does not appear, then
280Cf. also Patil 2009: 76 f.
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the [reason’s] being qualified by exclusion [from the counter instance] is
doubted, because for the limit itself (eva), [answering] to [the question]
“exclusion from what?”, there is no appearing solid support (śarīra). How
[is there], from this, any expectation of establishing what is to be estab-
lished?
In this argument, Ratnakīrti’s opponent is trying to show that the counter instance
can not be ascertained, and that therefore the reason used in the inference281 is either am-
biguous due to being common to similar instances (what is one) and counter instances
(what is not one), or is doubtful as to its exclusion from the counter instances. The
counter instance is that not qualified by “oneness”, which is what is to be established.
The reason is “appearing.” Accordingly, if there were an appearance of the counter
instances, it would obviously be qualified by the reason, which would thus fall under
the error of the type “ambiguous because of commonness to similar and dissimilar in-
stances.”
Ratnakīrti’s strategy in the answer is to show two things: first, that the reason is not
doubtful as to its exclusion from the counter instance, because the counter instance can
be known without directly appearing to a cognizer, and second that the counter instance
can not be qualified by the reason, because then—since things not directly appearing
would become known as if they appeared—all inferences would be useless:
[CAPV 131.4–10]: atrocyate. iha dvividho vijñānānāṃ viṣayaḥ grāhyo
’dhyavaseyaś ca. pratibhāsamāno grāhyaḥ. agṛhīto ’pi pravṛttiviṣayo
’dhyavaseyaḥ. tatrāsarvajñe ’numātari sakalavipakṣapratibhāsābhāvān
na grāhyatayā vipakṣo viṣayo vaktavyaḥ, sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt,
sarvatra sakalavipakṣapratibhāsābhāvāt tato vyatirekāsiddheḥ. pratibhā-
se ca deśakālasvabhāvāntaritasakalavipakṣasākṣātkāre sādhyātmāpi vi-
rākaḥ sutarāṃ pratīyata ity anumānavaiyarthyam. tasmād apratibhāse
’py adhyavasāyasiddhād eva vipakṣād dhūmāder vyatireko niścitaḥ.
| To this it is said. Here282 the object of cognitions is twofold, that to be up #
grasped and that to be determined. The appearing [object] is [that] to be
grasped. The object of activity (pravṛtti), even though not grasped, is [that]
to be determined.
With regard to this [inference], in the case of a non-omniscient inferrer, the
counter instance is not to be called an object due to being grasped because
of the absence of the appearance of the whole counter instance; because of
the [unwanted] consequence that all inferences would be destroyed, since,
because there is no appearance of all the counter instances in any [infer-
ence], there is no establishment of the [reason’s] exclusion from this [whole
counter instance].
281The inference is given in CAPV 129.22–24: yat prakāśate tad ekam. yathā citrākāracakramadhya-
vartī nīlākāraḥ. prakāśate cedaṃ gauragāndhāramadhurasurabhisukumārasātetarādivicitrākāra-
kadambakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ. (What appears, that is one. Like the form of blue occurring in the
middle of a circle of various forms. And this collection (kadambaka) of various forms, such as white
(gaura), the sound “ga” (gāndhāra), sweet (madhura), fragrant (surabhi), soft (sukumāra), pleasure and
its opposite (sātetara), etc. appears. [This is a proof using] the own nature [of the pakṣa as] a reason.)
282Here probably refers to the writings of Ratnakīrti in general, since this idea of a twofold object of
both conceptual and perceptual cognitions is expressed in various treatises, e.g., VyN 8*10–15, § 16 on
page 20, KBhSA2 73.20 (where it is said that the object of perception is twofold).
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And if there is an appearance, which is a direct presentation (sākṣātkāra)
of the whole counter instance distant (antarita) in space, time, and its own
nature, then that having the nature of what is to be proven, that poor fellow,
would be easily (sutarām) cognized. Thus an inference would be pointless.
Therefore, even though there is no appearance [of the whole counter in-
stance], the exclusion of smoke etc. from the counter instance[, i.e., places
where there is no fire etc.,] which is indeed established through determi-
nation, is ascertained.283
So, at least in this passage, the reason’s being ambiguous due to its commonness to
the similar instance and the counter instance is refuted by showing that the reason can
not pertain to the counter instance on pain of an unwanted consequence.
Two further examples for a reason’s ambiguity due to its being common to sim-
ilar and counter instances are found in the KBhSA and the CAPV. In both cases, it
becomes clear from context that the error must be sādhāraṇānaikāntika: In the KBh-
SA there is one case in which it is certain that an “unspecified” ambiguous reason is to
be understood as being ambiguous due to being common to both the similar instance
and the counter instance: anaikāntiko ’py ayam, sattvasthairyayor virodhābhāvād iti
(KBhSA2 72.1, trl.: This [reason, existence,] is also ambiguous, because there is no
contradiction between existence and [temporal] continuity.)284
The example in the CAPV 130.5–6 (discussed fn. 312 on page 118), is also clear in
this respect: A reason (“to appear”, in this case) is contradictory when it occurs only in
the counter instances (here, in what is not one). If the reason also occurs in the similar
instances, the reason is subject to the fault of ambiguity due to commonness.
asādhāraṇānaikāntika The second candidate for the way the reason can be ambiguous
is that it is ambiguous due to not being common to both the similar instances and the
counter instances. One of Ratnakīrti’s examples for such a reason that is correctly called
“ambiguous due to un-commonness” is contained in the following passage:
KBhSA2 82.6–11: tad etau dvāv api vyāpakānupalambhāv asiddhau na
kṣaṇikāt sattvaṃ nivartayata iti nāyam asādhāraṇo hetuḥ.
api ca vidyamāno bhāvaḥ sādhyetarayor aniścitānvayavyatireko gandha-
vattādivad asādhāraṇo yuktaḥ. prakṛtavyāpakānupalambhāc ca sarva-
thārthakriyaivāsatī ubhābhyāṃ vādibhyām ubhayasmād vinivartitatvena
nirāśrayatvāt.
tat katham asādhāraṇānaikāntiko bhaviṣyatīty [...].
Thus, also these two unestablished non-perceptions of a pervader do not
exclude existence from a momentary [thing]. Thus, this reason is not un-
common [to the similar instance, impermanent things, and the counter in-
stance, permanent things].
Moreover, an existent thing, which has an unascertained positive and neg-
ative concomitance of that to be proven and its opposite, like the fact of
283The last sentence contains a hint that this way of ascertaining negative concomitance by determi-
nation is applicable to all inferences, not only those which have, like the guiding inference of the CAPV
(cf. fn. 281 on the preceding page), a svabhāvahetu: otherwise the exemplification “of smoke etc.”,
typical of a kāryahetu, could not be explained. This exemplification will appear again a bit further on,
CAPV 131.18.
284Cf. Woo 1999: 177 f. for another translation and some comments.
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having a smell etc., is correct as a non-common [ambiguous reason]. But
because of the non-perception of the pervader that is being discussed[, i.e.,
momentariness,] causal efficacy itself would be inexistent in every way,
due to the fact that there is no basis [for the pervader] since it is complete-
ly excluded from both [the similar instance and the counter instance] by
both disputants. Therefore, why should [the reason] be ambiguous due to
un-commonness?285
Here, Ratnakīrti is arguing that in the proof of the momentariness of all things,
the reason—that these things exist—does not have the fault of being uncommon to the
similar instance (momentary things) and the counter instance (non-momentary things).
Acc. toWoo 1999: 228 f., the issue is whether two pervaders of “existence”, namely
dependence and independence (sāpekṣatvānapekṣatva) on the one hand, as well as one-
ness and manyness (ekatvānekatva) on the other,286 exclude existence from momentary
things. If existence were thus excluded not only from permanent things (as assumed
by Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādins like Ratnakīrti, cf. Woo 1999: 226), but also from momentary
things, it would be a reason that is not common to both the similar instances and the
counter instances.
Additional note: not anaikāntika in any sense
Interpreted from a more systematic (and less literal) perspective, the argument in the AS
can also be understood to subvert all three varieties of a reason’s being ambiguous: For
Ratnakīrti’s answer is that all counter instances (particular, universal, etc.) are impos-
sible, in consequence of which (and in view of the fact that the preceding two possible
faults of the reason, that it is unestablished and contradictory, have been shown not to
be the case) one has to admit that the reason can not be ambiguous in any sense of the
term:
1. H can not be ambiguous such that it qualifies both the similar and the counter
instance, for the counter instance does not exist.
2. H can not be ambiguous such that it does not qualify both the similar instance and
the counter instance, because it has been shown to occur in the similar instance
(the argument in the section about the reason not being contradictory, section 5.2
on page 116).
3. H can not be ambiguous such that it is doubtful whether it is excluded from the
counter instance, because the counter instance does not exist and can, as in the
first argument in this list, therefore not be qualified by it.
4.3 The argument structure of the Apohasiddhi
Overview
The paragraph numbers refer to the paragraphs in the critical edition.
A. § 1: Statement of the basic thesis: apoha is the referent of words.
B. § 2–§ 7: Introductory objections and replies concerning this thesis.
285 Cf. Woo 1999: 250 for the context and another translation of this passage.
286Cf. KBhSA2 79.11–13,79.25–26, and 80.7–8 for the main points in the argument.
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C. § 8–§ 9: Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: the referent
of words is a positive element qualified by exclusion of others.
D. § 10–§ 32: Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified
by a genus can be the referent of words.
E. § 33–§ 48: Arguments showing that a universal or genus can not be the referent
of words.
F. § 49–§ 50: Restatement of thesis that the referent of words is a positive element
qualified by exclusion of others, and further explanations.
G. § 51–§ 53: Refutation of a view held by Dharmottara which concerns a central
cognitive function involved in conceptual cognition.
H. § 54–§ 58: A formal proof establishing the thesis.
I. § 59: Verse summarizing the main points.
J. § 60–§ 63: Colophon.
Detailed analysis
In the following, a detailed analysis of the AS’s argument structure is given. The num-
bers in the margin again refer to the paragraphs in chapter 2.
A. [Proponent:] General statement of thesis: Exclusion is the referent of words. § 1
B. Introductory objections and answers concerning the thesis. § 2–§ 7
B.1. [Opponent:] Three explanations of exclusion are presented and refuted: § 2
B.1.1. [Proponent:] Exclusion is either
B.1.1.1. the external object itself (bāhya),
B.1.1.2. the form of awareness (buddhyākāra), or
B.1.1.3. mere exclusion of others.
B.1.2. [Opponent:] The first two alternatives (B.1.1.1.,B.1.1.2.) are wrong, because § 3
they are only positive elements.
B.1.3. The third (B.1.1.3.) alternative is wrong,
B.1.3.1. because conceptual cognition has the form of a positive element, and
does not make inexistence known, and
B.1.3.2. because what is so faulted by perception cannot be saved by another
proof.
B.2. Discussion of theories that the cognition of an inexistent object implies or is § 4–§ 7
somehow connected to the cognition of inexistence.
B.2.1. [Proponent:] A conceptual cognition does not cognize inexistence itself, § 4
but only what is inexistent.
B.2.1.1. For a cognition of a qualifier (inexistence) (B.1.3.1.) is implied by the
cognition of that qualified by it (that which is inexistent).
B.2.1.1.1. This is an instance of the qualifier-qualified relationship.
B.2.1.2. For others, a conceptual cognition’s object is not the universal as such,
but the universal as the qualifier of some instance,
B.2.1.2.1. because of the appearance of a common form of awareness.
B.2.1.3. In the same way, the cogniton of what is inexistent, which implies the
cognition of inexistence, justifies the common talk of “cognition of exclusion”.
B.2.2. [Opponent:] Why call a cognition which has a positive form (B.1.3.1.) and § 5
results from the appearance of a common form of awareness (B.2.1.2.1.) a cogni-
tion with a nonappearing (B.2.1.), inexistent (B.2.1.) form of awareness?
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B.2.2.1. If a cognitive form of inexistence appeared, nobody would deny that
there is a cognition of inexistence.
B.2.2.2. Otherwise, a cognitive form of one thing could be taken for the cognitive
form of another.
B.2.3. [Proponent:] Due to the qualifier-qualified relation (B.2.1.1.1.), a cognition§ 6
of inexistence is contained in the cognition of what is inexistent.
B.2.4. [Opponent:] Inexistence as a qualifier is only an addition to the cognition of
some positive element, so how should such a cognition be defined as a cognition
of inexistence? For the qualifier inexistence does not appear.
B.2.5. [Proponent:] What actually appears has a positive form (B.1.3.1.), but there§ 7
is also an exclusion of others for it. Therefore it is called cogniton of inexistence.
B.2.6. [Opponent:] Still, exclusion is only connected, and it is only a positive ele-
ment that is actually cognized.
B.2.6.1. Otherwise also direct perception would have exclusion of others for its
object,
B.2.6.1.1. because it also has a single thing excluded from all others as an
object.
B.3. Conceptual cognitions therefore have a positive element as objects, just like per-
ception.
C. Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: [Proponent:] A word’s§ 8–§ 9
referent is affirmation qualified by the exclusion of others.§ 8
C.1. Affirmationists/negationists think that affirmation/exclusion is the primary ob-§ 9
ject of a conceptual cognition, and that negation/an excluded thing is understood by
implication.
C.2. This is wrong, since there is no sequentiality in conceptual cognitions. Cognition
of the positive element is the cognition of that excluded from others.
C.2.1. Even though a verbal expression does not represent its object as that exclud-
ed from others (B.1.3.1.), exclusion is cognized as it is a qualifier of a conceptual
cognition (B.2.1.1.)
C.2.1.1. because a word is based on what is excluded from others.
C.2.2. Therefore, a conceptual cognition of a positive element is necessarily simul-
taneous with a cognition of exclusion.
C.2.3. Absence can be grasped in a nonimplicative or implicative way both by per-
ception and conceptual cognition.
C.2.3.1. As for perception
C.2.3.1.1. the nonimplicative form is a capacity to generate a conceptual cog-
nition of absence, and
C.2.3.1.2. the implicative form is an awareness of the thing itself,
C.2.3.2. so for conceptual cognition
C.2.3.2.1. the nonimplicative form is a capacity to impart activity in confor-
mance to what appears in it, and
C.2.3.2.2. the implicative form is a consciousness of the thing itself, as for
perception (C.2.3.1.2.).
C.3. So if the exclusion of others were not formed simultaneously with the cogni-
tion of an object, no differentiation between objects would be possible in everyday
activity.
D. Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a univer-§ 10–§ 32
sal/genus can be a referent of words.
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D.1. [Opponent:] Vācaspati says: The object of a conceptual cognition is a particular § 10
qualified by a genus.
D.1.1. Since these are differentiated from that which is not of that genus,
D.1.2. there is activity avoiding wrong objects (C.3.).
D.2. [Proponent:] If it is the form of a particular that is excluded from that of another
genus, then, even if it possesses a genus, how should other-exclusion not be true?
D.2.1. For if it is only due to the particulars themselves that they are differentiated
from other particulars, the genus doesn’t matter.
D.3. If the particular is not cognized as differentiated, then how couldwe act correctly § 11
with respect to particulars?
D.4. If it is only the genus that differentiates certain particulars from others, then § 12
cognizing that differentiated is a cognition of differentiation,
D.4.1. may it really be the genus, or only the particular’s causal sequence (E.4.,
E.7.1.3.),
D.5. Logical problems of exclusion being a qualifier dismissed:
D.5.1. There is no error of mutual dependence in the theory that the positive ele- § 13
ment, which the convention of the word “x” is made for, is what is excluded from
non-x
D.5.1.1. because this error also pertains to the theory that a convention is made
for a universal or that qualified by it:
D.5.1.1.1. For universal does not meanmere universal, but a specific universal.
And so:
D.5.1.1.1.1. Cognition of xness depends on cognition of the particular x, and
D.5.1.1.1.2. cognition of that denoted by the word x, i.e., the particular, de-
pends on cognition of xness.
D.5.1.2. Therefore there is no error of mutual dependendency if the conventional
designation is made for a form of conceptual awareness which, preceded by a
perception of a single particular, is generalized externally as if common to all
things.
D.5.1.3. And if this manner of using a word is accepted, then it is also accepted
that the rest, i.e., every other thing, is designated by this word’s negation.
D.5.2. Neither is there a contradiction between excluded and exclusion, nor damage § 14
to the qualifier qualified relationship,
D.5.2.1. because they are not mutually distinguished from each other
D.5.2.2. since they are related to something common.
D.5.2.3. For there is contradiction to its own absence, not to another thing’s ab-
sence.
D.6. Also a sentence is understood due to exclusion only. § 15
D.7. Therefore an affirmation characterized by exclusion is understood from a word
(C.).
D.8. [Opponent:] If affirmation alone is the referent of words in this way, why is § 16
exclusion asserted?
D.9. [Proponent:] By the word exclusion affirmation qualified by exclusion of others
(C.) is meant.
D.9.1. This means, exclusion is simultaneously (C.2.2.) understood as the qualifier
in understanding affirmation.
D.9.2. Exclusion can not be taken as the object of perception (B.2.6.1.) in the same
way, because there is no dispute as there is for conceptual cognition.
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D.10. And by affirmation
D.10.1. the external referent excluding others is meant according to determination,
and
D.10.2. the form of awareness is meant according to appearance.
D.11. The external referent is what is to be denoted by a word because of determina-
tion only, not because an external thing appears as in perception
D.11.1. Scriptual evidence: Because of a word an object does not appear to some-§ 17
one as it would because of perception.
D.11.2. [Opponent:] Even the same thing appears differently, depending onwhether§ 18
it is known by a sense faculty or by a word.
D.11.3. [Proponent:] Different cognitions have their basis in different real things.§ 19
So how should the form of a single thing make different forms of awareness man-
ifest?
D.11.3.1. For there are no two contradictory forms of a single thing, so that one§ 20
could appear to perception, the other to conceptual cognition.
D.11.3.2. For there is no difference of a thing apart from the difference of its own
nature.
D.11.3.3. And there is no difference of its own nature apart from the difference
of appearance.
D.11.4. [Opponent:] But there are different appearances of one and the same thing.§ 21
D.11.5. [Proponent:] A difference of appearances is not a sure sign for different
things, but it is a sure sign for there not being the same object for the two cognitive
faculties.
D.11.5.1. Therefore a difference of appearances accompanied by a difference of
causal effectiveness etc. means a difference of the thing, and
D.11.5.2. a difference of appearances alone means that one appearance is wrong.
D.11.6. [Opponent:] Vācaspati: Even if both faculties have the real thing for an§ 22
object, still they would apprehend it differently
D.11.6.1. because the difference between perceivable and unperceivable results
from different causes.
D.11.7. [Proponent:] That’s wrong, because there is no thing that is an object of the
apprehension of something hidden.
D.11.7.1. The difference of causes (D.11.6.1.) is fullfilled by the fact that an
apprehension of an imperceivable thing (e.g., an inference) does not grasp a sense
object.
D.11.7.2. Therefore a particular does not appear in conceptual cognition.
D.11.7.3. Moreover, if words made a real thing known, negation and affirmation§ 23
of properties would be either
D.11.7.3.1. superfluous, as when “it exists” or “it does not exist” is said of an
existent or inexistent thing respectively, or
D.11.7.3.2. meaningless, as in the opposite case,
D.11.7.3.3. because a thing would be completely known on hearing the word
alone.
D.11.7.4. Therefore, the commonness of what appears in conceptual cognition
to the nonbeing and being of an external referent excludes that a real thing could
be its object.
D.11.7.5. [Opponent:] Vācaspati: This commonness (D.11.7.4.) is possible,§ 24
because
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D.11.7.5.1. a universal can be qualified by existence and nonexistence in so far
as it is connected to present or past and future spatiotemporal things respec-
tively.
D.11.7.6. [Proponent:] This is not the topic, and there is no harm to what we say
D.11.7.6.1. insofar as it makes clear that Vācaspati also accepts that particulars
are not denoted by words.
D.11.7.7. Additionally, the existential qualifications are cognized according to
the nature of the particulars.
D.11.7.7.1. But to say that a universal is so qualified because of a connection
to a particular is foolish.
D.11.7.8. There is the same error for a particular qualified by a genus (D.1.).
D.11.7.8.1. For, if the cognition is established because of a particular, there is
always the error of this cognition, may an additional genus (D.2.) be cognized
or not.
D.11.7.9. [Opponent:] Kumārila’s followers: Commonness (D.11.7.4.) is not § 25
erroneous because a thing has parts.
D.11.7.9.1. By one word one aspect is made known, e.g., treeness, indepen-
dently of existence. This other aspect is made known by another word.
D.11.7.10. [Proponent:] Cognition of a permanent universal independently of its
existential status is not possible.
D.11.8. [Opponent:] A word presents its object in a different way than perception § 26
because they have different capacities.
D.11.9. [Proponent:] This was proven wrong by the error of two appearances when
a single nature is grasped by perception and conceptual cognition ( D.11.5. on the
facing page).
D.11.10. The difference between the capacities of these two means of valid cog-
nition is achieved by perception directly perceiving its object, whereas conceptual
cognition determines it.
D.11.11. So, without the same appearance, conceptual and perceptual cognition do
not have the same objects.
D.11.12. And nonbeing (the object of conceptual cognition?) can not make per-
ception’s object known.
D.11.13. [Opponent:] The word “tree” refers to the part treeness, and the word § 27
“is” refers to the part existence.
D.11.14. [Proponent:] For a particular completely comprehended by perception,
there is no possibility of affirmation or negation of another property through either
another word or another means of valid cognition.
D.11.14.1. [Opponent:] The need of a different means of knowledge is observed
even in perception.
D.11.14.2. [Proponent:] Only when perception has an object with an ill known
nature,
D.11.14.2.1. because perception has an unascertaining nature.
D.11.14.3. But what would another means of valid cognition help in the case of
conceptual cognition, which is itself of an ascertaining nature?
D.11.14.4. But the need for other words and logical marks is a fact.
D.11.15. Consequently, the nature of a real thing is not grasped by conceptual cog-
nition.
D.12. Discussion about properties and property bearers.
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D.12.1. [Opponent:] Properties are different from each other, and different from§ 28
the property bearer.
D.12.2. So, in conceptual cognition, different properties are cognized through dif-
ferent expressions.
D.12.3. [Proponent:] This is wrong,
D.12.3.1. since perception refutes a distinction between property and property
bearer, and
D.12.3.2. since otherwise everything would be everywhere.
D.12.3.2.1. Scriptural evidence: The appelations property and property bearer
are only based on a conceptual difference.
D.12.4. And even if this difference were real,§ 29
D.12.4.1. the only possible relation between property and its bearer is that of
proximity qualified as assistance,
D.12.4.1.1. because other relations like inherence etc. have been refuted.
D.12.4.2. And in that case (D.12.4.1.), conceptual cognition would work in the
same way as perception, because
D.12.4.2.1. as perception grasps all properties when grasping the property bear-
er due to their proximity to the sense faculties,
D.12.4.2.2. so a cognition by a word or logical mark, which are both connected
to their objects as denoting and denoted etc., would cognize all properties,
D.12.4.2.3. because there is no difference in mere proximity.
D.12.4.3. [Opponent:] Vācaspati: But grasping a nature as qualified by an ad-§ 30
ditional attribute, like existence, does not imply grasping all the other additional
attributes also qualifying that nature, because
D.12.4.3.1. because the nature of a substance is qualified by additional at-
tributes,
D.12.4.3.2. but is not identical with either the additional attributes or being that
qualified by them (D.12.1.).
D.12.4.4. [Proponent:] Bad argument, because grasping the other additional at-
tributes (D.12.4.3.) does not follow from nondifference (D.12.3.1.),
D.12.4.4.1. since grasping the assistedwhere the assisting is grasped (D.12.4.1.)
follows only after their difference is assumed (D.12.4.).
D.12.4.5. Additionally, a cognition of a property and property bearer is not de-
pendent on a real property and property bearer, because they are not established
by a means of valid cognition, and the rule is:
D.12.4.5.1. When established by a means of valid cognition, the thing’s nature
is exactly described.
D.12.4.6. [Opponent:] Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: Then there would be the cognition of all§ 31
assisted things as soon as there is the cognition of an assisting thing like sun etc.
D.12.4.7. [Proponent:] This is the result of misunderstanding our explanation:
D.12.4.7.1. In your view, if there is a difference between property and property
bearer (D.12.1.) and proximity is only assistance (D.12.4.1.),
D.12.4.7.2. then only an assisted that is in the same place and has the property’s
form can be grasped when the assisting is grasped (D.12.4.4.1.).
D.12.4.7.3. So it does not follow that that is grasped which is
D.12.4.7.3.1. an assisted in a different place and
D.12.4.7.3.2. another substance deviating from the observed.
D.13. Therefore, wherever a thing’s own nature is cognized, it is cognized as a whole.§ 32
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D.14. So it is settled that a particular does not appear due to a word, a concept, or a
logical mark (D.11.).
E. Arguments showing that a universal or genus can not be the referent of words. § 33–§ 48
E.1. Neither does a universal appear in conceptual cognition. § 33
E.1.1. On hearing a word the generalized constituent parts of an object appear
which
E.1.1.1. are accompanied by letters, and
E.1.1.2. are mixed together because the differences of things of the same genus
are disregarded.
E.1.2. And this appearance is not a universal,
E.1.2.1. Scriptural Evidence: since a universal is said to be free of colour, form, § 34
and the form of letters.
E.1.3. So a universal is only an agglomeration of an object’s generalized constitu- § 35
tent parts which,
E.1.3.1. although completely different for each particular,
E.1.3.2. are identified with the particular.
E.1.4. This is only an error,
E.1.4.1. because such an exterior object is not attainable.
E.1.5. Therefore the cognition of a universal has no object, no matter if its false
cognition is due to
E.1.5.1. the external object being a transformation of the mind itself, or
E.1.5.2. the form being completely inexistent, or
E.1.5.3. the particulars themselves appearing so that the differences between them
are obscured, or
E.1.5.4. a lapse of memory that causes differences to be overlooked.
E.2. So, there is no news about a universal.
E.3. [Opponent:] If there is no universal, cognitions of the same things are accidental. § 36
E.4. [Proponent:] Wrong, for a causal complex that, aided by memory, generates a
cognition that overrides specific differences produces the concept of a universal.
E.5. So a genus appears neither in conceptual cognition (E.1.) nor in perception.
E.6. A genus is not established by inference, because a logical mark connected to the
universal can not be seen.
E.7. A genus is not established like a sense faculty, because by the effect, cognition,
only incidental / occasional other causes are established,
E.7.1. because the absence of the genus cognition depends solely on the absence of
all the particulars of that genus, not on the absence of the genus itself.
E.7.1.1. [Opponent:] A cow is a cow only because of its cowness. If not, also a
horse could be the material object cow.
E.7.1.2. [Proponent:] In that case, cowness is cowness only because of the ma-
terial object cow. If not, horseness would also be cowness.
E.7.1.3. Therefore there is a material object “cow” only because of a sequence
of causes (D.4.1.), but cowness may exist or not.
E.8. [Opponent:] The capacity to cause a cognition of a universal can be either § 37
E.8.1. identical with a singular material object:
E.8.1.1. then it is impossible that another object could make the same universal
known, or
E.8.2. different from a particular:
E.8.2.1. then this is a universal and we are only arguing about the name.
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E.9. [Proponent:] The capacity is indeed not different for each thing.
E.9.1. But two things with the same capacity are no problem (E.8.1.1.).
E.9.2. As for you a genus is
E.9.2.1. the cause of a common term, and
E.9.2.2. independent of all other genera
E.9.3. so for us a particular is
E.9.3.1. independent of genera and differentiated by its own nature,
E.9.3.2. the cause of a common term.
E.10. [Opponent:] Trilocana: The cause for the cognition and appelation of universals§ 38
is the inherence (D.12.4.1.1.) of specific universals (D.5.1.1.1.) in their respective
basis.
E.11. [Proponent:] If only inherence in the particulars is the reason for these cogni-
tions, what are the universals for?
E.12. And even inherence (D.12.4.1.1.) is not possible:
E.12.1. Inherence is proven by the cognition “here in this that inheres.” And the§ 39
cognition “here” results from observing two different objects, one inhering in the
other.
E.12.2. But these are never perceived in any object of cognition.
E.12.3. So inherence is a conceptual construct.
E.13. [Opponent:]What Trilocana speculates: A continuous cognition is then impos-§ 40
sible, because it depends on a continuous object. But if the particulars are completely
different, how can there be a basis for such a cognition?
E.14. [Proponent:] is shown to be wrong,
E.14.1. because there is a logical deviation by a continuous cognition when the
universals themselves are particularized by mutual exclusion.
E.15. What Trilocana says against the opposite case:§ 41
E.15.1. [Opponent:] “There is no other reason for the occurrence of continuous
cognitions in only certain cases.”
E.16. is wrong, because it is proven (E.4.–E.9.) that one must accept the continuity
(E.13.) of appelations and apprehensions (E.10.) due to the specificity of a thing’s
own nature which is excluded from that of another nature.
E.16.1. Only the proximity (D.12.4.1.) according to which a genus extends to some§ 42
but not other particulars is the basis for cognition.
E.17. [Opponent:] What the Nyāyabhūṣana says to this§ 43
E.17.1. i.e.: In the Buddhist view then, the proximity of the thing x to the thing y
is the basis of the common usage «has x.» So what use is the x then?
E.18. is wrong, since what is meant is this:
E.18.1. That the observation of x in proximity to y is the reason for the cognition
«has y» is not denied.
E.18.2. But no universal is ever observed.
E.18.3. Therefore it is better, if one wants to imagine a universal at all, to only
imagine proximity as the cause of continuous cognitions.
E.19. [Opponent:] This is an inference proving a universal:§ 44
E.19.1. The hetu is the cognition of something qualified (x-ly).
E.19.2. The sādhya is the necessary involvement of the cognition of a qualifier (x).
E.19.3. The pakṣa is the cognition “This is x-ly.”
E.19.4. The dṛṣṭānta is “This is stick-ly.”
E.19.5. The type of logical reason used is the effect reason.
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E.20. [Proponent:] What are you trying to prove: § 45
E.20.1. the necessary involvement of the cognition of a separate qualifier, or
E.20.2. the necessary involvement of the cognition of a mere qualifier?
E.20.3. In the first case (E.20.1.): § 46
E.20.3.1. perception refutes the pakṣa (E.19.3.), because a perception does not
grasp both a particular and the universal (E.12.2.).
E.20.3.2. Additionally, the cognition of something qualified is an ambiguous rea-
son for a universal, because it occurs also without a separate qualifier.
E.20.4. In the second case (E.20.2.) there is proof of what has already been proven, § 47
E.20.4.1. because of postulating a difference between particular and universal as
in the cognition “This particular possesses that universal.” a relation of qualifier-
qualified is postulated (D.12.3.2.1.)
E.20.4.1.1. because the common expression “This is x-ly.” is really due to an
experience of that differentiated from non-x (D.5.1.2., D.5.1.).
E.21. So there is no proof of a universal. § 48
E.21.1. The reason that refutes all the additional attributes like a universal, proper-
ty, action etc. is
E.21.1.1. a clear perception that grasps a whole particular (discussion under point
D.),
E.21.1.2. or the nonperception of something otherwise observable (discussion
under point E.).
F. Restatement of thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by § 49–§ 50
exclusion of others, and further explanations.
F.1. Thus only affirmation is the referent of a word. (C., D.10.) § 49
F.1.1. And this referent is the external object (D.10.1.) and the form of awareness
(D.10.2.).
F.1.1.1. The form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated in reality or con-
ventionally, because
F.1.1.1.1. it is directly understood through self-awareness,
F.1.1.1.2. and is not determined.
F.1.1.2. And the external object is neither affirmed nor negated in reality,
F.1.1.2.1. because it does not appear in a conceptual cognition.
F.1.1.3. In reality, all entities are inexpressible because
F.1.1.3.1. they are not determined, and
F.1.1.3.2. do not appear.
F.1.1.4. Conventionally, external things are affirmed or negated, because
F.1.1.4.1. otherwise there would not be everyday activity.
F.1.2. Therefore: Neither an external object nor a form of awareness can be af- § 50
firmed in reality.
F.1.3. For only an external object can be conventionally proven to exist.
F.1.4. But a form of awareness is not affirmed even conventionally.
G. Refutation of Dharmottara. § 51–§ 53
G.1. [Opponent:] Dharmottara’s thesis: § 51
G.1.1. There is affirmation and negation of a superimposed external thing.
G.1.2. [Proponent:] This is also rejected by this (F.).
G.2. [Opponent:] If no determinable thing appears in determination, then what does § 52
it mean to say “It is determined?”
G.3. [Proponent:] Even though it does not appear, it is made an object of activity.
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G.4. [Opponent:] There is no difference between two things that do not appear (G.3.).
So how does activity, which is directed at a certain object, avoid other objects (C.3.)?
G.5. [Proponent:] Even if no object is grasped, still there is only activity restricted to
certain objects
G.5.1. because the capacity of a conceptual cognition is limited according to the
form of awareness
G.5.1.1. because a form of awareness is limited by its specific set of producing
factors ( E.4.).
G.6. For objects that have particular capacities are§ 53
G.6.1. well established through means of valid cognition, and
G.6.2. are beyond doubt as to a mixing of their capacities.
G.7. Therefore a concept’s being determined is its being productive of activity only
with regard to certain objects ( G.2.)
G.7.1. because it is connected to a specific form of awareness.
G.8. There is no activity through superimposition (G.1.1.) because of similarity, since
there is the
G.8.1. possibility of an error through superimposition of an external object on an
image or
G.8.2. vice versa.
G.9. Rather, a cognition arises due to remaining impressions and extends activity
towards an external object without being able to see it.
G.10. So it is actually always erring.
G.11. So in this sense
G.11.1. a positive element is the referent, which is
G.11.1.1. specified by the absence of other things, and
G.11.1.2. differentiated from that of another genus.
G.11.2. Exactly this (G.11.1.), which is meant by the word exclusion, is
G.11.2.1. the referent of words, and
G.11.2.2. the object of positive and negative activity.
G.12. This is established.
H. Inference establishing the thesis (A.,C., F.1.,G.11.1.):§ 54–§ 58
H.1. A conceptual cognition which denotes (svabhāvahetu) something has only a§ 54
thing determined and differentiated from that of another form as its object (sādhya).
H.2. The example (dṛṣṭānta) is: “There is water in the well here.”
H.3. And this is denoting: an expression having the form of the word “cow” etc.
H.3.1. The reason, denoting, is not unestablished because
H.3.1.1. even if there is no real denoted-denoting relation (D.12.3.1., D.12.4.2.2.),
H.3.1.2. everyone performing everyday activities necessarily accepts that rela-
tionship as made through determination, because otherwise there is no such ac-
tivity (F.1.1.4.1.).
H.3.2. Neither is the reason contradictory
H.3.2.1. as it exists in the similar instance.
H.3.3. Neither is the reason ambiguous, for the following reason:
H.3.3.1. [Opponent:] The denoted must be either a particular, an additional at-§ 55
tribute, a connection to an additional attribute, possessing an additional attribute,
or must be a form of awareness,
H.3.3.2. because it must be bound to something and must be one of these.§ 56
H.3.3.3. [Proponent:] There is no convention for the particular and the form§ 57
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of awareness, because they are useless for convention (F.1.1.2., F.1.1.1.). And
for the others there is no convention, because there is no additional attribute
(D.12.4.3., E.21.1.).
H.3.3.4. So there is a pervasion of the reason by the property to be proven, be- § 58
cause denoting can not exist in a counter instance
H.3.3.4.1. as there is no other pervader with the quality of having an object
H.3.3.4.1.1. because nothing else that could be denoted exists.
H.4. Thus pervasion is established.
I. Summary: Words express an object. Exclusion is understood as its quality (C.). One § 59
object is explained as determinated (D.10.1.), the other as appearing (D.10.2.). But in
reality nothing at all is expressed (F.1.1.3.).
J. End of the Apohasiddhi, which was written by Ratnakīrti. § 60
K. Colophon. § 61–§ 63
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Chapter 5
The apoha-theory in Ratnakīrti’s AS
apoha-theory, as used in these pages, is the equivalent to the Sanskrit term apohavā-
da. Other translations of this term could be “the teaching of apoha”, or “the apoha
doctrine”.
For more than 80 years this theory has been the subject of study. Pioneering work
was done by Stcherbatsky, as well as by Mookerjee.287 The latter discusses quite a
few passages of Ratnakīrti’s AS, based on the editio princeps in Shāstri 1910. Ma-
jor early insights are due also to Frauwallner’s series of articles on the theory of apoha
(1932,1933,1935), where the main tenets of the apoha theory have been brought into
sight, at least as developed by Dharmakīrti.288 And from the 1960s onwards, there has
been a steady increase in ever more specialised studies on the topic.289 It thus would
seem that yet another general introduction to this theory of apoha is perhaps not really
in place here. For one thing, plenty of the very insightful studies that have been pub-
lished in recent years are certainly not in general to be challenged, even though I believe
it will be necessary to discuss some elements of these interpretations in the light of the
AS.
Apart from this, it is often not quite clear what the scope of the term apoha-theory is
supposed to be. Some regard it as a methodological device290 that provides a substitute
for universals as really existing entities in whichever context these universals might be
invoked to explain something. Others would equate “apoha-theory” with the language
theory developed by Buddhist epistemologists from Dignāga onwards, or seem to make
287Cf. reprints of their classical works for this, Stcherbatsky 1994 2 and Mookerjee 2006: Chapter VII
respectively.
288Of course, Frauwallner 1937 should also be mentioned here. There the apoha theory of Dharmot-
tara has been presented through a translation and discussion of the Tibetan translation of the DhAP. As
pointed out by Akamatsu 1986: 75 f. though, this translation suffers from a systematic misinterpretation,
mistranslatingma yin dgag andmed dgag as prasajyapratiṣedha and paryudāsa respectively. Frauwall-
ner notes this, but does not really justify it (cf. Frauwallner 1937: 263, fn. 1).
289Some examples, by no means comprehensive: Vetter 1964, Katsura 1979, Akamatsu 1983, Katsura
1986, R. P. Hayes 1988, Katsura 1991, Dreyfus 1997, Bronkhorst 1999, Ogawa 1999, Pind 1999, Siderits
1999, Dunne 2004, Saito 2004, Hattori 2006, McCrea and Patil 2006, Kataoka 2009, McCrea and Patil
2010, Tillemans 2011a, Tillemans 2011b, Siderits, Tillemans and Chakrabarti 2011.
290Katsura 1986: 178, n. 10, crediting Prof. Steinkellner with having the idea, speaks of a “working
hypothesis”. Ogawa 1999 makes a very interesting point, culminating in the following assessment: “...I
cannot refrain from saying that there is nothing original to be found in Buddhist epistemologists’ linguistic
theory, other than the theory of apoha.” (Ogawa 1999: 284, with a typo corrected)
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no strict distinction between the two.291
But an inquiry broad enough to provide a definition of “the” apoha-theory, even
if it ever existed, is certainly not in this author’s powers. So I will try and give an
explanation of the apoha-theory as it is detailed in the AS of Ratnakīrti. I hope this will
serve as an introduction to the main aspects of the apoha theory as it appears in the AS.
5.1 Establishment of apoha—The purpose of the AS
The title of the AS means “establishment of exclusion”, or “proof of exclusion”. Even a
short glance at the analysis of the arguments given in this text (cf. section 4.3 on page 98)
makes it obvious why this is a very adequate name for the text: After the presentation
of various versions of apoha theories and their possible criticisms, there follows a fairly
short exposition of Ratnakīrti’s own opinion. This in turn is followed by discussions and
refutations of various positions that try to argue that there is some form of a universal
(sāmānya, jāti, etc.). At the end of this section Ratnakīrti also distances himself and
criticises an aspect of Dharmottara’s, a Buddhist thinker’s, theory of apoha. There
then follows a formal proof, prayoga, establishing that every word has as its object a
generalized thing (vastumātra) that is determined and excluded from others. This proof
is closely knit into the preceding arguments of the text, in that they are here adduced to
show that none of the typical logical fallacies applies to this inference.292
In this final inference, anyāpoha (or, more precisely, atadrūpaparāvṛtta, “distin-
guished from that of another form”) becomes established as a part of that thing that
anything that names anything refers to or has as its object. It is in this sense that the
establishment mentioned in the title will probably best be understood: establishment of
exclusion as a part of the word referent.293
Additionally, this inference can be used as a general guide to the rest of the AS.
According to Thakur (1975a: 5 f.), Ratnakīrti’s works “[...] are written in a style that is
more common in neo-logic than in the old system. In each case the discussion is started
just in the way of a formal debate, as if the opponent is present before the author. Argu-
ments are syllogistic. The refutations are generally through the hetvābhāsa fallacies.”
Steinkellner (1977: 385) concludes that “Ratnakīrti [...] is using the logical forms in the
macro-structure of his texts. The analyses of his texts are therefore structured by logical
titles.”294
291Cf., e.g., Dunne 2004: 116: “...our aim here is to raise the central issues ...in the apoha-theory, and
to avoid surpassing ...that goal, we must forego any detailed examination of ...other analyses, despite
their importance to my understanding of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy of language.” Hattori 1982: 103 even
says that what a word refers to is “a concept formed through the mental process of anyāpoha, ....”
292From this it can also be seen that the AS is a carefully composed and well structured text, even
though much of it is taken essentially verbatim from the AP of Jñānaśrīmitra.
293The other property composing the word referent is adhyavasita (that it is determined). The substrate
of the two properties, “determined” and “differentiated from others”, is the vastumātra, a mere thing,
which is said to be what a word has as its object. That this is the object of words is the sādhya, the
property (or rather, in this case, the fact) which is to be established in this inference.
294It might be helpful for a chronology of Ratnakīrti’s works to remember that of all of Ratnakīrti’s “si-
ddhi” texts (SJS2, AS, KBhSA2, KBhSV, as well as CAPV, cf. the classification in Thakur 1975a: 3–4),
the AS has two specific characteristics within that group: it is the only text that has the inference summing
up its main purpose at its end, and it is least strictly built around that inference.
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So it can be assumed to be a characteristic of Ratnakīrti’s texts to be constructed
along the lines of formal proofs. For example, the CAPV is constructed in this way,
building around this central inference:
CAPV 129.22–24: yat prakāśate tad ekam. yathā citrākāracakramadhya-
vartī nīlākāraḥ. prakāśate cedaṃ gauragāndhāramadhurasurabhisuku-
mārasātetarādivicitrākārakadambakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ. 295
Similarily, according to Woo 1999: 126 ff. , and Woo 1999: 141 f., the KBhSA is
structured around the following logical proof KBhSA2 67.7–8: “yat sat tat kṣaṇikam,
yathā ghaṭaḥ, santaś cāmī vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthā iti.”
The VyN, on the other hand, is characterised by Lasic (2000b: 19) as follows: “An-
ders als der Titel es vermuten läßt, wird in diesem Werk jedoch nicht die Feststellung
des logischen Nexus schlechthin diskutiert, sondern ausschließlich der durch das Ver-
hältnis von Rauch und Feuer exemplifizierte.” Whereas this text is not centered around
a formal inference, it does discuss the pervasion of smoke by fire, the heart of what is
perhaps the stock example of inference in Indian logical theories.
For the SJS, themain structure at least of the first part of the text is titled “Der Beweis
und seine Verteidigung” by Bühnemann (1980: XXIX ff.) , i.e., the formal proof and
its defense. But also the next two sections are closely related to this inference: sections
2 and 3296 consist of a systematic refutation of elements that could make this inference
invalid.297
Consequently, it might be in order to try and take this inference at the end of the AS
as a guideline to understanding and explaining this text. In the following, I will therefore
give first an analysis of this inference, and then try to explain the various points in the
AS that are needed to fully appreciate the inference.298
Before this, a methodological caution might be in place: There are two groups of
problems that have to be dealt with when explaining the AS in this way. First, what the
precise import of each of the elements of the inference is, with special interest perhaps
attaching to the complex quality that this supposedly central inference is supposed to
prove (i.e., what this inferencemeans). And second, why it is logically coherent to state
that the reason leads only to this consequence (why this inference is valid). After all,
as will be seen, it is not directly a matter of logic why it should be the case that a word
295Cf. fn. 281 on page 96 for a translation.
296According to Bühnemann 1980: XXX–XLV, these sections are respectively: “Verteidigung der
Möglichkeit einer Schlußfolgerung überhaupt” (SJS2 3.30–6.21) and “Polemik” (SJS2 6.22–31.11), i.e.,
the defense of the possibility of a reasoning concerning the existence of an enlightened person, and a
polemical section against the opponent’s attempts to disprove this reasoning.
297Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 101, n. 62, noting on section 2: “Es folgen nun Einwände gegen den Beweis
der Existenz des Allwissenden im allgemeinen [...] und gegen die Beschränkung des Beweises auf den
Beweis des alles für die Erlösung Nützliche Wissenden [...].”, as well as Bühnemann 1980: 106, n. 102,
noting on section 3: Es “[...] folgt nun eine ausgedehnte Polemik [...]. Ein den Allwissenden aufheben-
des Erkenntnismittel könnte seine Nichtexistenz beweisen bzw. seine Existenz widerelegen.” Cf. also
Steinkellner 1977, quoted section 5.1 on the preceding page.
298Another reason for proceeding in this way is that the more obvious explicatory approach, the one
that follows the order of explanation in the text fairly closely, has already been very successfully taken in
both Patil 2003, and, in a broader fashion, in Patil 2009: Chapter 4, p. 197 ff., although there it is observed
that “[Ratnakīrti’s] decision to conclude his essay [by providing an inferential reason to support his view]
is important, because it brings together the various subarguments used throughout his essay and does so
in a more “formal” context.” Patil 2009: 239 It is of course obvious that the results of both expositions
will, if correct, be the same (or both wrong in the same way).
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is expressive and therefore must not have any other sort of object than the one proven
in Ratnakīrti’s inference.
Moreover, it is difficult to explain these two groups of problems separately. On the
one hand, it will not be possible to make it completely clear why the inference is valid
without understanding its components and their relations, mainly because these facts
are ascertained in separate, mostly ontological or epistemological, considerations about
how everyday use of language works (e.g., what it means that a word is expressive).
The pervasion299 at work in this inference is one that is a matter of fact. On the other
hand, and if the idea is correct that the preceding parts of the AS build towards this
inference, an explanation of all its components and their relations should be expected
to go only so far as is useful for correctly understanding the inference. This means that
an analysis of the various components involved in establishing the involved matters of
fact (the nature of words, their objects, how language works, etc.) need go only so far
as to make the inference valid. This is important for understanding the scope of the
analysis, or the explanatory strategy, of the AS: much of it is a preparation that gives
the inference its quantificational force, that all that is expressive has that sort of object.
So it could happen that without having the inference in mind it might be difficult to
understand certain elements of the discussion of the AS.
This last point needs clarification: It need not be that all of the preceeding passages
in the AS are directly dedicated to this aim, but it should be the case that these passages
somehow have a bearing on the inference, or are superfluous (which of course is not a
problem per se). So, as not to overstate the importance of this inference for the AS, a
caution might be in place: Its role in this text is a hypothesis. There is good reason to
have it, judging from Ratnakīrti’s general style, but it does not mean that any passage
that does not fit the picture is somehow out of place. Each of the arguments will have to
be scrutinized for its own value, and in the immediate context it appears in. And only
then should it be decided how or whether it serves this inference.
Moreover, if the mentioned supposition about the structure of the AS is wrong, none
of the passages preceeding the inference would have the aim ascribed to them at all. But
even then the interpretation of the individual passages should not suffer much, and it
should be more a matter of rearrangement than reassessment that lets one strike closer
to home.
5.2 The central inference
The inference that the AS is built around runs as follows:
All that, which is denoting, has as [its] object a mere thing that is deter-
mined [and] distinguished from that of another form, as the expression
“Water [is] here in a well.” And this [expression] having the form of a
word like cow etc. is denoting. [This is] the logical reason of essential
property
The formal elements at work here are:300
299For more information about this technical term of Indian logic cf. section 5.2.
300A detailed exposition of the Buddhist theory of inference is not in the scope of this study. Cf.
Kajiyama 1998: § 9–10.2 for an overview of this theory, and Kajiyama 1998: § 12 “Logical mark of
essential identity” for a succinct discussion of inference based on a thing’s nature. The TBh will in the
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1. hetu, the reason (of the type “essential property”): denoting. (This hetu will be
abbreviated asH .)
2. pakṣa, the instance301 qualified by H: that which has the nature of words like
“cow etc.” (This pakṣa will be abbreviated as p.)
3. sādhya, that to be proven: having as an object a mere thing that is determined
and distinguished from that of another form. (This sādhya will be abbreviated as
S.)302
4. dṛṣṭānta, example: Water here in a well. (This dṛṣṭānta will be abbreviated as
d.)
The pervasion (vyāpti) governing this inference is expressible as the implication of
“having as its object a mere thing, which is determined and distinguished from that of
another form” by “something denotes.”
The pakṣa, the locus of the hetu and consequently of the sādhya, is said to be what
has the form or nature of “words like cow etc.”, a statement that seems to elicit little
controversy.303 The gist of the inference thus is that any word must, by its very nature of
being denoting, have as its object a mere thing that is a) determined and b) differentiated
from that which has a form other than its own.
This is only a part of the inference. Its validity depends on the truth of the pervasion
of the property that is the reason by the property that is to be inferred. “Because p
is qualified by H , it is qualified by S.” is true of p if everything that is qualified by
H is also qualified by S, or every instance of H is also an instance of S. Among the
various factors that have an influence on the truth of this pervasion, Ratnakīrti discusses
three: That the reason is not unestablished, that the reason is not contradictory, and that
the reason is not ambiguous. These are the three types of fallacious reasons or pseudo
reasons (hetvabhāsa).304
following arguments be used as a fairly normative text for interpreting some of Ratnakīrti’s terms, based
on the arguments given in Kajiyama 1998: 3–5. The model used there is, in all points that will be relevant
in the following analysis, the same as “the orthodox scenario” described in Tillemans 1999a: 90–92.
Additionally, I have in all cases attempted to find passages in Ratnakīrti’s texts that shed light on the
logical terminology employed in this inference. But if it is true for Jñānaśrīmitra that he rarely enters into
lengthy explanations of topics he presumes his audience well acquainted with (cf. Lasic 2000a: 19 f.,
Franco 2002: 192), the same is certainly true for Ratnakīrti, writing in a manner “more concise and
logical, though not as poetical and elaborate as that of his spiritual father.” (Thakur 1975a: 12) Other
texts taken into consideration in the following are the NPSū, NB, and its commentary, the NBṬ.
301In this context, pakṣa is usually translated as “locus of inference” (e.g., B. K. Matilal 1985: 50 f.),
“subject” (e.g., Tillemans 1999a), or “site of the inference” (e.g., Patil 2009: 60 f.). For the context that
the argument under discussion works in, I will translate pakṣa with “instance”, mainly because it fits in
well with the translations of “similar instance” for sapakṣa and “counter instance” for vipakṣa. Another
reason is that this specific reason and this property which is to be established seem to be understood more
easily as co-occurring in an instance (of some sort, awareness for example) rather than a subject, site, or
locus of inference.
302Various formulations of this are used by Ratnakīrti. For the time being (until an explanation starts
in section 5.2 on page 120) only this first formulation will be used.
303To which group of things the quality “denotes” in fact applies according to Ratnakīrti, and what this
means, is discussed in section section 5.3 on page 123. For the moment, it is enough to take it for granted
that words like cow etc. denote.
304hetvabhāsa is translated as “pseudo-reason” in B. K. Matilal 1985: 42, Kellner 2010a. The hetvā-
bhāsa is generally considered as threefold, cf., e.g., NPSū 400.18 (asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhā hetvābhā-
sāḥ), NB 3.109 (evam eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇām ekaikasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe
vā yathāyogam asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ), Kajiyama 1998: § 10 (and the notes
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The reason is not unestablished (asiddha)
In lines 247–249 in § 54, Ratnakīrti shows that H is not unestablished (asiddha). A
hetu is considered unestablished when it is not certain that it actually qualifies, or is a
property of, the pakṣa, so that the premiss in this inference becomes false (“p is qualified
byH .”).305 Ratnakīrti thus has to defend the statement “An expression, having the form
of a word like cow etc., denotes.”
His argument here draws on various points in the AS:
1. A statement widely proven in an authoritative text (line 136 in § 28).
2. A statement about the denoted-denoting relation (line 141 in § 29)
The statement proven in the śāstra is the reason for the concessive subclause in this
argument: that the distinction between properties and their substrates is a conceptual
one, and thus is not true about real things. According to this rule and its consequence,
it could be argued that “p is qualified byH .” is not, in fact, a true statement.
But thatH qualifies p is true in a “conventional” sense. Ratnakīrti’s argument is that
the relation of denoting word and denoted referent is made by determination, a function
operating in conceptual cognition and allowing it to classify its object and to generate
awareness of it as an external thing (cf. section 5.4 on page 130). So, whereas this
conceptual construction of the relation does not reflect reality, it is to be endorsed by all
people who engage in worldly activity (vyavahāra). Obviously two important positions
are implied in this statement: Worldly activity presupposes a distinction of denoted and
denoting (as of substance and quality) in order to work. And, second, this distinction
is only conceptually constructed. Accordingly, the proposition thatH qualifies p must
be endorsed by all people on pain of not being able to engage in normal activity, even
though it is not a true statement when taken to be about reality.
In this way, Ratnakīrti can show that any conceptual cognition must be taken to
have an object. Accordingly, that H qualifies p, that words denote, must be accepted
by everyone. Consequently, no one can reasonably argue that H is unestablished, or
that expressions do not denote anything at all.
The reason is not contradictory (viruddha)
Ratnakīrti’s defence against this type of logical error is quite curt, l. 249 in § 54:
Neither is that [reason] contradictory, because it exists in a similar instance.
This type of error consists in the reason proving something opposite thanwhat some-
one inferring with it wants it to prove.306 If H were contradictory, then H would be
a sign for what is not qualified by the S, so that instead of the statement “Because H
qualifies p, S qualifies p.” being true, its opposite would be true: “BecauseH qualifies
p, S does not qualify p.”, i.e., if something denotes it never has the sort of object that
Ratnakīrti describes (S).
for some secondary literature), and Oetke 1994: 33 ff. Ratnakīrti himself regularly uses these distinctions
to discuss the validity of inferences, e.g., SJS2 29.19–20 (in an objection): kiṃ ca sarvajñasattāsādhane
sarvo hetuḥ trayīṃ doṣajātiṃ nātivartate asiddhatvaṃ viruddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ceti (cf. Bühne-
mann 1980: 89 for a translation), or KBhSA2 67.10: hetvābhāsāś ca asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikabhedena
trividhāḥ. Cf. Patil 2009: 70, fn. 102 for a detailed list of the pseudo reasons that the Naiyāyikas defend
themselves against in the ĪSD.
305Cf. section 4.2 for a discussion of Ratnakīrti’s definitions of this pseudo reason.
306Cf. section 4.2 for a discussion of Ratnakīrti’s definitions of this pseudo reason.
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Others of Ratnakīrti’s explanations for why a reason is contradictory are as follows,
clearer in stating why the respective hetu is contradictory:
1. SJS2 13.8: tathā ca sati sādhyaviparyayavyāpter viruddhatā hetoḥ.
2. SJS2 29.21–22: asarvajñe dharmiṇi na sarvajñasiddhiḥ, hetoḥ sarvajñaviparīta-
sādhanatvena viruddhatvāt.
3. ĪSD 33.21–23: nāpi viruddhaḥ. tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva vartate sa khalu sādhya-
viparyayavyāpteḥ sādhyaviruddhaṃ sādhayan viruddho ’bhidhīyate. yathā ni-
tyaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti. na cāyaṃ tathā, prasiddhakartṛkeṣu sapakṣeṣu sa-
dbhāvadarśanāt.307
In view of these formulations, as well as the one in the TBh2 25.9–12 (cf. section 4.2
on page 93), the problem Ratnakīrti is facing could be understood like this:
In the inference “BecauseH qualifies p, S qualifies p.”,H would be contradictory
because H is pervaded by  S, i.e., by not “having as an object a mere thing that is
determined and distinguished from that of another form.”
So the basic charge is that the reason is contradictory because it is the counter in-
stance, i.e., what has a real universal as its object, that is expressive.
A logically sufficient defence against this would be to show that H is indeed per-
vaded by S, i.e., that there is at least one instance beside p that has both the H and S.
In this passage, Ratnakīrti merely states this to be the case. But why does he see himelf
entitled to this?
To begin with, the problem of knowing what pervades what is not a problem of
logic (at least not always), but is a problem of knowing a matter of fact. For exam-
ple, a logical error of the same type is discussed at some length in the answer to an
objection starting at KBhSA2 67.20. There the matter is resolved through a prasaṅga
and prasaṅgaviparyaya which show that both the hetu “existing” and the sādhya “mo-
mentary” are true of one sapakṣa instance, namely a pot (which is the example in the
inference, KBhSA2 67.7–8).308 In ĪSD 33.21–23 (cf. section 5.2), this kind of error is
argued against by an appeal to a generally acknowledged matter of fact. The question
must therefore be what other statements in the AS allow Ratnakīrti to make the claim
at this point thatH occurs in that which is similar to p.
I believe the claim can be defended by appealing to two arguments:
1. that Ratnakīrti believes he has already shown that something that denotes has this
kind of an object, and
2. that no one engaged in the discussions of the AS believes that words do not ex-
press anything at all.309
The second argument is fairly easy to see: None of the opponents in the AS argues
that there is no referent or object of words at all: Vācaspati, quoted in § 10 17, expressly
307For translations of the first two of these passages cf. Bühnemann 1980: 35, and p. 84. Patil 2009: 71
translates the last, spoken in the voice of “Ratnakīrti’s Naiyāyikas” (Patil 2009: 71), as follows:
It is well know that a [reason property] that exists in only dissimilar cases proves what
is opposed to the target property, through its being pervaded by the absence of the target
property, and that it is named “opposed” (viruddha). ...But this [reason property, “being an
effect”] is not like that, since it is observed to really exist in similar cases such as a pot, for
which a maker is well known.
308Cf. the assessment in Woo 1999: 163.
309For Ratnakīrti it is only conventionally true that words denote something, cf. § 49 on page 34 and
references there.
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states that “Particulars qualified by a class are the objects for concepts and words.” And
none of the other objections contains any statements that would be to this effect.310
The first argument amounts to the claim that S is at least a possible way in which
words can denote.311 This possibility is explained in the presentation of his own view
of what the word referent is, given in paragraphs § 8 on page 15 to § 9 on page 15, and
repeated in the answer given in § 16 on page 20 to the objection that apoha is not the
referent of a word because it is only the positive elment that is called the word referent.
So Ratnakīrti’s claim at this point is: If an expression like “There is water here in
the well.” denotes (H(s)), it is possible that it “has an object that is a mere thing which
is determined and distinguished from that of another form” (S). That it is always the
case that it has this object is shown only in the next step of the inference.312
The reason is not ambiguous (anaikāntika)
The third error that could afflictH is that it could be ambiguous (anaikāntika). Put sim-
ply, a logical reason that is ambiguous is one that is at least doubtful as to the terms of
its presence or absence in both similar instances and counter instaces.313 Again, Ratna-
kīrti’s defence against this error (see lines 249–256, p. 37) does not detail which variety
of this logical error it is against. Judging from the outcome of the investigations into
the two other pseudo-reasons, it is to be expected that this error will be the “standard”
form of an ambiguous reason: sādhāraṇānaikāntika.
From the three possibilities mentioned by Ratnakīrti in the RNĀ, the situation for
H would be as follows:314
1. asādhāraṇānaikāntika:“H does not qualify v and does not qualify s.” would be
true.
2. sādhāraṇānaikāntika: “H qualifies v and qualifies s.” would be true.
3. sandigdhavyatirekānaikāntika: “H does not qualify v.” would not be certain.
Sowhich of these positionsmost closely resembles the situation in the passage under
discussion?
The first candidate, ambiguity of H due to not being common to both s and v can
not be accepted, because then the opponent would have to admit that “to denote” is a
310This argument is supposed to defend against the possibility of the opposite of the sādhya being
“having no object at all.”
311In the next step of his inference (cf. section 5.2), Ratnakīrti will show that is the only way in which
words can denote anything.
312This is not an uncommon tactic in Ratnakīrti’s writings, cf., e.g., the objection in CAPV 130.5–6
(punctuation and paragraphs modified): tad ayaṃ sādhyaśūnyo dṛṣṭānto hetuś ca vipakṣe paridṛśyamā-
no. yadi tatraiva niyatas tadā viruddhaḥ, tatrāpi sambhave ’naikānta iti cet. (Therefore this example is
free of the [property] to be proven[, i.e., oneness], and the reason is observed in the counter instance. If
the [reason] is limited to this [counter instance] alone, [it is] contradictory, [and if] limited to this [counter
instance] also, it is inconclusive.) This refers back to the inference in CAPV 129.22–24, where the reason
was “it appears”, and the example was “the form blue amid other forms” (cf. fn. 281 on page 96). Here
the opponent states that if the faulty reason is ascertained only for the counter instances, then the reason
is contradictory, and if for the counter instances as well as for the similar instances, then the reason is
ambiguous. A similar link is presupposed in the argument in SJS2 3.30–4.2 (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 9,
and p. 102, n. 64).
313 Put more precisely, the situation is much more complex. Cf. section 4.2 on page 94.
314Cf. section 4.2 on page 94 for the arguments underlying this.
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quality neither of the similar nor of the counter instances— a consequence which surely
is to be avoided, since the counter instances include all the options for the word referent
endorsed by the opponent.315
The second candidate, ambiguity of H due to being common to both s and v, en-
tails no such consequence. On the contrary, this understanding would have quite a few
advantages: First, as claimed before, since in both cases the analysis of the other two
“unspecified” pseudo-reasons above returned that the simplest, or default version, was
to be understood, this might be expected here also.316 Second, the opponent is not ar-
guing that v is not specified by H , but rather that “what denotes” must have one of a
range of things as its proper object, none of which agrees with S. Lastly, Ratnakīrti’s
defense against this error consists in showing that none of the other options are viable
alternatives to S, implying that the important thing to do is to show that v is not qual-
ified by S, which is the fault defined in the typical case of the reason’s ambiguity due
to commonness.317
The arguments sofar do not yet decide whether H is being criticised because it is
doubtful as to its negative concomitance with the counter instance. But it is quite plainly
not what the opponent is arguing for, since he is not criticising the way the reason’s
negative concomitance with the counter instances is shown, but rather claiming that the
counter instances are indeed also qualified byH .
So, since, first, there are no good reasons to consider the ambiguity in this passage
as one either due to non-commonness or due to a doubtful negative concomitance with
the counter instance, since, second, Ratnakīrti’s unspecified mention of ambiguity in
other cases means ambiguity due to commonness, and since, third, this understanding
fits the argument, this argument will be interpreted as concerningH’s ambiguity due to
its commonness to both s and v.
Once this is settled, the structure of the argument in this passage can be analysed as
follows. There is an objection by an adversary, making three claims:
1. H , “to be denoting”, can also be said of the counter instance, i.e., instances that
denote something and are qualified by having as their object either a particular, an
additional attribute, a combination of these two elements, or a form of awareness.
2. These options are all the options there are.
3. If these counter instances have no object at all, they cannot be called “denoting”.
Ratnakīrti’s answer is that all options suggested by the opponent are wrong. The
particular and the awareness act can not be objects of denoting instances, because no
convention can be made with regard to them, since doing this would not lead to any use-
ful result.318 And all the options involving an additional attribute are precluded because
additional attributes don’t exist.
In consequence of this, the pervasion ofH by S is established:
1. There are no options other than S for how a denoting instance could have an
object.
315This, in itself, is not a particularly strong argument, as it is rather hypothetical. But from the dis-
cussion of the other options it will emerge that it is strong enough.
316Cf. section 4.2 on page 97 for some examples of unspecified “ambiguous” reasons that are of the
sādhāraṇa type..
317Cf. the discussion in section 4.2 on page 94.
318Meaning convention, and thus everyday activity, would not be possible. Cf. fn. 185 on page 63.
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2. Therefore, a pervader qualified by having an object but not S is excluded.
3. Due to this,H , “being denoting”, is excluded from the counter instances.
4. Therefore, H is pervaded by S, so that “Because H qualifies p, S qualifies p.”
is true.
This is the formal end of the inference. Pervasion of the reason by the property to
be proven is established, due to which the inference—that the instance under discussion
is qualified by the property to be proven because it is qualified by the reason—is true.
Claims made in the inference
The above discussion about the inference’s structure has, for the reasons stated in sec-
tion 5.1 on page 114, not discussed but only mentioned the various claims and positions
that are involved in the inference. To recapitulate, and to begin deciding on a strategy
for explaining the various elements, an overview might be in order:
1. H is “to be denoting”. Its characteristics are:
a) it depends on there being an object (acc. to the opponent at least, cf. l. 253,
p. 37);
b) it is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between de-
noting and denoted (l. 247, p. 37).
2. p: The instance under discussion that is
a) qualified byH ,
b) qualified by S,
c) dissimilar from v, i.e., not qualified by anything opposed to S, and
d) similar to s, i.e., qualified by S.
3. S:
a) It is variously formulated as:
i. adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocara (l. 245, p. 37).
ii. vācya (l. 247, 37, and, by the opponent, l. 252, p. 37.)
iii. adhyavasitavijātivyāvṛttavastumātraviṣayatva (l. 250, p. 37).
iv. adhyavasitabāhyaviṣayatva (l. 256, p. 37).
b) Its characteristics are:
i. It is what denoting instances have as their object.
ii. It is what is denoted.
iii. It is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between
denoting and denoted (l. 247, p. 37).
iv. It is capable of supporting a linguistic convention (l. 254, p. 37).
v. It is a mere thing that is:
A. determined,
B. differentiated from what is not the same= differentiated from that
of another kind,
C. external.
4. s: All instances qualified by S.
5. v: All instances not qualified by S. The alternative options discussed319 are that
what is denoted is either
319There must be options, since the possibility of not having any object is not accepted. Cf. l. 253,
p. 37, as well as 3 on the preceding page.
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a) a particular,
b) an additional attribute,
c) a connection to an additional attribute,
d) what has the same additional attribute, or
e) a form of awareness.
It is notable that Ratnakīrti is not arguing for any of these claims in much detail.320
It is therefore required to supply the relevant arguments from the main corpus of the
AS. As argued above (section 5.1 on page 112), the various elements appearing here
will be interpreted as giving the AS its structure. A schematic overview of the relevant
passages is given in table table 5.1 on the following page.
5.3 The referent of words
Ratnakīrti gives various definitions of what the word referent is. The most concise is
perhaps that the referent (artha) of words321 is an affirmation or positive element qual-
ified by exclusion from others (anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, l. 31 in § 8).
Since this is also a definition that has no equivalent in Jñānaśrīmitra’s AP,322 it is to
be expected that it represents Ratnakīrti’s own point of view on the subject in a form
clearer than he considered it expressed in Jñānaśrīmitra’s writings. But it is not the only
definition that Ratnakīrti gives of the word referent. Some of his other explanations are
collected in table table 5.2 on page 123. Only those have been included that use formu-
lations significantly different from those that have been used in the passages preceding
each occurrence.
Patil (2003: 230) has already presented “[...] Ratnakīrti’s analysis of this complex
entity [anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa-vidhi—PMA] by describing each of its analytically separable
components [...]”, and I too believe that this is the best tactic to follow in explaining the
sense of this definition.
One thus comes to ask these four questions, one for each part of the definition anyā-
pohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ (l. 31 in § 8):
1. What is meant by “referent of words” (“...śabdānam arthaḥ”)?
2. What is this vidhi or positive element?
3. What is this vidhi’s property, anyāpoha?
4. How does this property qualify its substrate, or what is the relation of anyāpoha
and vidhi?
Apart from this analysis of the definition’s content, it is also important to see how far
Ratnakīrti must let the explanation go: It has to be made clear that this thing is capable
of being the word referent, in order to fullfil its role as S in the inference establish-
ing apoha. The passages that deal directly with Ratnakīrti’s idea of this word referent
are: § 8 on page 15– § 9 on page 15, § 49 on page 34, § 53 on page 36.
320Cf. the observation about the impossibilty of a denoting instance having a particular or universal
as its object: “We know this to be the case since, as Ratnakīrti has shown earlier in his essay, infer-
ential/verbal awareness-events cannot have either particulars or real universals as their objects.” (Patil
2009: 243)
321This translation of śabdārtha has been preferred to a possible “meaning of a word” only because
the latter does not make good sense in the context of section 5.3 on page 123 and section 5.5 on page 138.
322Cf. the apparatus to the passage just cited, as well as the table in Akamatsu 1986: Appendice A,
which shows no correspondence in column “RNA (AS)” for 59,4–6.
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Table 5.2: Definitions of śabdārtha found in the Apohasiddhi
Formulation Crit. ed. (starting
line)
apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate. 2
...anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ. 31
...apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ ... 69
tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. 222
...anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyāvṛtto ’rtho vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpohaśabda-
vācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, pravṛttinivṛttiviṣayaś ceti ...
242
yad vācakam, tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātra-
gocaram ...
245
What is meant with “referent”
What has to be understood by the expression “referent of a word” (śabdārtha) is not
explicitly discussed in the AS. But some passages clearly show that Ratnakīrti here fol-
lows the standard account as it is expressed already by Dharmakīrti,323 namely that the
word referent is the same as the object of all conceptual cognitions. Thus, the discussion
about the word referent is of great consequence for an understanding of what conceptual
awareness is, and how it operates.
Two examples of such passages show that Ratnakīrti shares this assumption:
One passage appears in the answer to Vācaspatimiśra’s contention that a particular
qualified by a class is what a word refers to (cf. § 10 on page 17). Ratnakīrti there effec-
tively endorses that verbal and conceptual cognitions have the same objects by using the
phrase: “...those that become the object of words and concepts ...” (śabdavikalpayor
viṣayībhavantīnāṃ, l. 51, p. 18). It seems highly improbable that he would use such
an expression without any qualification and not touch on the subject anywhere in the
following if he did not accept it.
Another clear indication of this tacit equation is found at the end of the section dis-
cussing the possibilty of the word referent being some sort of particular (qualified by
a universal). He there says: “Therefore it is settled that a particular does not appear
because of a word, a concept or a logical mark.” (cf. § 32 on page 28) This statement
suggests that there is an equivalence amongst verbal, conceptual, and inferential cogni-
tions in that they do not have a particular as their object.
These two instances should suffice to show that Ratnakīrti takes the equation of
conceptual, verbal, and inferentially produced cognitions for granted.
vidhi—The positive element
The term vidhi is explained by Ratnakīrti in various statements that, taken together,
suggest it would either best be left untranslated, or can only be rendered by a very loose
323See, e.g., PV 3 183ab (cf. section A.3 on page 169). I do not know of any scholarly disagreement
on this topic, cf., e.g., Steinkellner (1967b: 92, fn. 25), or McCrea and Patil 2006: 305 f. for a concise
discussion of the two means of cognition and their objects, and of the problems involved. Dharmottara
subverted this clear distinction, cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 325, fn. 64. To what extent this subversion is
upheld in Ratnakīrti’s texts will become apparent in the course of the next sections, especially section 5.4
on page 130.
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approximation, as a positive or affirmative element or aspect of the word referent, as
opposed to its negative aspect, exclusion of others. The first step in understanding what
could be meant by vidhi certainly must be to collect Ratnakīrti’s explanations of this
term and try and see what results from these. To this end, a close look at the following
two passages is helpful:
ll. 75–78, § 16 on page 20: And by the word “positive element” an external
object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according
to determination, and according to manifestation a form of awareness [is
meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be ex-
pressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a partic-
ular’s appearance, since there is no manifestation of an manifest particular
that is limited as to space, time and condition, as there is in the case of
perception.
ll. 222–227, § 49 on page 34: So in this way only a positive element is the
referent of a word. And this [positive element] is intended to be called the
external object and the form of awareness. Amongst these, [there is] no
affirmation [or] negation of the form of awareness in reality or in a relative
sense, because of the fact that [it] is understood through the perception self-
awareness, and because of non-determination [of the form of awareness].
Neither is there in reality a negation or affirmation of the external, because
of its non-appearance in verbal apprehension. Precisely for this [reason]
all properties [of an object] are inexpressible in reality, because there is no
determination [or] appearance [of them]. Therefore there is conventional
affirmation and negation of an external [object] only, because otherwise
there is the unwanted consequence of insufficiency for everyday interac-
tion.
The main points these two passages make about the affirmative element are:
1. by vidhi a twofold object is meant — a form of awareness and an external object,
2. two modes of awareness are indexed to these two aspects of it — appearance and
determination,
3. the vidhi as a determined, external object is the object of practical activities.324
vidhi as a twofold object
In ll. 75–78, § 16 on page 20, Ratnakīrti defines what is meant by the word vidhi: An
external object according to determination and a form of awareness according to appear-
ance. The phrasing of the passage, yathādhyavasāyam ...yathāpratibhāsam, makes it
clear that the vidhi is either the external object or the form of awareness depending on
the way in which a person becomes aware of it. This suggests that the vidhi is better
described as a single entity which can play two roles according to the awareness it is
324This allows for a notion of true and false cognitions in the sense that a cognition can lead to an ex-
ternal object that is able to fulfill a desired aim. Cf., e.g., the succinct formulation in Krasser 1995: 247:
“Following Dharmakirti, Dharmottara defines correct or valid cognition (pramāṇa) as reliable cognition
(avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānam). Avisaṃvādaka is explained as causing a person to obtain (prāpaka) the in-
dicated (pradarśita) object (vastu), which itself is capable of producing an effect or of fulfilling one’s
purpose (arthakriyāsamartha).”
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present in, as opposed to a description of two modes of awareness having two different
objects which both are a vidhi.325
In the same passage, the vidhi as external object is then explained not to be a partic-
ular that appears in a conceptual awareness, but to be due to determination alone. And
it is to this external object that the qualification atadrūpaparāvṛtta, differentiated from
that of another form, is applied. This should be noted as one way in which the anyā-
pohaviśiṣṭa of the central definition in ll. 31–31 (§ 8) can be predicated of the vidhi.
Taking into account that this aspect of the vidhi is the one that is brought to awareness
in the form of determination, a first main line of understanding the central definition
comes into focus: An external object qualified by other-exclusion is the referent of
words, speaking in terms of determination.
Qualified by other-exclusion (anyāpohaviśiṣṭa)
So, presupposing the above two sides of vidhi, the affirmative element, what can be said
about its quality, the exclusion from others?
As already analysed by Patil (2003: 231 ff.), exclusion is presented by Ratnakīrti
both as a quality of the positive element, and as a capacity of conceptual awareness.
That it is a quality (or property) of the positive element is clear from the definition
anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ (ll. 31–31 in § 8).
In ll. 42–44 in § 9, grasping exclusion as a quality of the form of awareness is stated
to be a capacity (śakti) that conceptual awareness has. These two aspects, being the
qualifier of something and being a capacity, are presented alongside a comparison of
two types of negation that can be brought to bear on perceptual as well as conceptual
cognition of absence.326 The structure of the example is the following:
1. prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa: grasping absence in a non-implicatively negating
form327
a) For perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa) this is the capacity to produce a con-
cept of absence (abhāvavikalpotpādanaśakti), i.e., what is meant by “per-
ception of non-x” is the capacity to produce the conceptual cognition “There
is no x there.”
b) For the concept of a positive element (vidhivikalpa) this is the capacity of
leading to activity in conformance with the grasped absence (tadanurūpā-
nuṣṭhānadānaśakti), i.e., what is meant by “conceptual cognition of non-x”
325About the two modes of awareness, cf. also the comments in section section 5.4 on page 130.
326Whilst the perceptual grasping of an absence is a special case of perception, the conceptual grasping
of absence is not a special case of conceptual cognition. For the object of conceptual cognition is always
anyāpoha, cf. section 5.3 on page 123.
327The terms prasajya and paryudāsa have long been the subject of discussions. The standard account
is Staal 1962. Cf. Kellner 1997: 92, fn. 135 for further literature on the topic. Additionally, there is a
useful discussion in Kajiyama 1998: 3 f. where the difference is postulated as a driving factor behind
the development of different types of apoha. I will use implicative and non-implicative negation for
paryudāsa and prasajyapratiṣedha respectively. One way of making sense of this distinction is: “This
is a non-red apple.”, which implies that the subject is an apple, and “This is not a red apple.”, not implying
that the subject is an apple.
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Table 5.3: Grasping absence
prasajya paryudāsa
object of abhāvapratyakṣa ghaṭābhāva bhūtala
object of vikalpa agavapoḍha (not non-cow) buddhyākāra
cognitive function adhyavasāya pratibhāsa
classification śakti niyatasvarūpasaṃvedana
is the capacity that a concept of the positive element has by which it makes
activity possible.328
2. paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇa: grasping absence in an implicatively negating
form
a) the awareness of something with a fixed own form, niyatasvarūpasaṃve-
danam, for both perception and the conceptual awareness of a positive ele-
ment.
This comparison is not easy to make sense of.329 I will try and argue that it corre-
sponds to the schema shown in table 5.3.
The two main problems that need to be solved in this passage are the following:
1. How is the absence in the two cases relevantly similar — how is it useful to
compare the perceptually cognizable absence of a pot on a perceived stretch of
floor with the conceptually cognizable absence of something not being not that,
i.e., its quality “the exclusion from others”?
2. What is the relationship between the non-implicative and implicative negation:
Is each just possible and sometimes the one and at other times the other will have
to be applied in the analysis of these cognitions, or are they somehow interdepen-
dent?
What seems clear is that the absence which is grasped both by perception and con-
ceptual cognition can be grasped in two forms: as non-implicative and implicative nega-
tion cognized bymeans of that which is present to cognition, i.e., an empty piece of floor
or the form of awareness.330 In the case of conceptual cognition, the absence which is
cognized is anyāpoha, exclusion from others, e.g., non-cows. In the case of perception,
328The relevant example (l. 46) is that someone is told “Tether a cow!”, and tethers a cow, but not a
horse. “Tether a cow!” generates a conceptual cognition of cow, which in turn is the awareness of the
absence of non-cows that makes activity with regard to any cow possible.
329It seems that both in Patil 2003: 232 and Patil 2009: 213 only the first part of the example (pra-
sajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa) is translated and discussed. The only detailed scholarly discussion of the cor-
responding passage in the AP is in Akamatsu 1983: 56–7. Katsura 1986: 174 notes that the context in
which this comparison appears in the AP is based on the HBChapter V: anupalabdhihetuḥ. The reason
he gives there is that Jñānaśrīmitra cites a HB passage in the same context (cf. Katsura 1986: 174 and
p. 180, fn. 20), apart from the fact that clearly the grasping of absence in perception is anupalabdhi. Note
that, according to the explanations by Steinkellner (1967b: 167, n. 6), the prasajya-paryudāsa distinc-
tion in HB 21*22 has to be understood as follows: It is the perception itself that is either implicatively or
non-implicatively negated, and not the absence that it lets the subject cognize.
330The absence of the pot in some place is the standard example of non-perception, used, e.g., in
HB 23*22, as well as in § 14 on page 19. That it is the form of awareness, buddhyākāra, that is present in
conceptual awareness is apparent from the argument that a form of awareness is not affirmed or negated
because of being comprehended through self-awareness, l. 223 in § 49.
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it is the non-existence of something in a specific, perceptually cognized place, e.g., on
a stretch of floor.
There seem to be two ways of interpreting these statements: either both forms of
negation can occur or both must occur so that a full flung331 perceptual and concep-
tual cognition of absence is such a cognition of absence. I would like to argue for
the latter option: Both in perception of absence and in the conceptual awareness of
absence, which means in every conceptual awareness given that its object always is
other-exclusion (anyāpoha, cf. section 5.3 on page 123), an abhāva both in the non-
implicatively negating form as well as in the implicatively negating form is involved.
In the perception of an empty floor, for example, the absence (abhāva) of all things
not on the floor becomes known in a non-implicatively, or absolutely, negating way. It
is not actually all things that are cognized as absent (which would require a judgement
like “There is no pot, no cloth, no chair, ...here on the floor.”), but the absence itself of
all these things (so that a judgement like “There is no pot here on the floor.” or “There
is no chair here on the floor” becomes possible). Correspondingly, in the conceptual
awareness “cow” the non-implicatively negating absence (abhāva) of all things that
aren’t cows becomes known for the appearing form of awareness (ākāra). In both cases
this is a non-implicative negation, i.e., a negation that, upon perception, can potentially
be expressed as “It is not the case that anything is here on the floor.”, and in the case of
conceptual cognition can lead to activity directed towards anything of which it is true
that it is not a non-cow: in the case of the perception of the empty floor, this grasping of a
non-implicative absence or negative constituent, which explains the adjective “empty”
(i.e., the absence of a pot on the floor, bhūtalaghatābhāva), is discernible only as a
capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence: “There is no pot, chair, etc.
on the floor.” In the case of conceptual cognition, the grasping of a non-implicatively
negating element, the anyāpoha, becomes apparent only in the cognition’s capacity to
lead to an act with regard to what is in accordance with this negation, which, in the
example, is any cow.332
According to Ratnakīrti’s comparison, one also grasps an absence in the form of an
implicative negation. The result of this is the same for perception and conceptual cog-
nition: the awareness of something with a fixed own form, niyatasvarūpasaṃvedana,
meaning a particular. In the case of the perception of an absence, the awareness of ab-
sence is identical with the awareness of the presence of another thing. It is implicative
negation or absence in that it is the affirmation or presence of some other positive thing,
in this case a particular piece of floor. In the case of conceptual cognition, which al-
ways has absence or the exclusion from others as its object, it is the buddhyākāra that is
qualified by absence in an implicatively negating manner, the form of awareness which
is a particular that is present in any given awareness event.
331With “full flung” I want to say that the cognitive event is as complete as it can get, which of course
must not happen in every case. I.e., in the case of perceptual cognition of absence, there is an event of
direct perception, followed by a perceptual judgement. Both together, at the very least, make for this
“full flung” perception of absence (cf. also the careful interpretation of HB 25*9–19 in McCrea and
Patil 2006: 322–324). In conceptual cognition the case is not as clear. But important events will be the
“becoming aware” of a particular form of awareness, ākāra, and a determinative state that, somehow,
relates to it.
332Actually it depends a bit on the situation. The speaker could be referring to a particular cow that
she wishes to be tethered. In that case, the proper other-exclusion would be “what is not not that cow”,
instead of “what is not a non-cow.”
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The absence in a non-implicatively negating form is determined, and the absence in
an implicatively negating form is grasped — both in the perception of absence and in
conceptual awareness. For it is a particular that is manifest and grasped in perceptual
awareness333, and it is a form of awareness that is directly manifest and grasped in
conceptual awareness.334 This is one of the aspects of the vidhi. From the side of
determination however, it is commonness as a “genericized-particular” (Patil 2009: 259,
fn. 32) that is determined in perception, and thus makes activity possible with regard to
it (one activity being the formation of the concept “No pot here.”), and it is an external
object that is determined on the grounds of the appearing form of awareness in the case
of conceptual cognition.
Consequently, the exclusion from others that qualifies the positive or affirmative
element is
1. the capacity in a conceptual cognition to make action that accords to expecta-
tion possible in so far as this exclusion is understood (determined) as a non-
implicatively negating element, and
2. a quality of the form of awareness in so far as it is understood (grasped) as an
implicatively negating element.
The second point can be understood as founding the quality aspect “exclusion” on
the ontological level, because it states that the reason exclusion is cognized when a word
is understood is that that word is defined as referring to something, a cow particular, in
so far as it is differentiated from non-cows (cf. § 9 on page 15).
On Ratnakīrti’s explanation,335 this does not present more problems than the expla-
nation of reference as a word’s referring to a real commonness taken as a really existing
universal: in that case too, the word referent is supposed to be a specific commonness,
not a particular or a commonness as such (“ness-ness”, or the fact that a universal is
common to various things, as opposed to cowness, the specific commonness).
The question remains how Ratnakīrti’s definition of the referent of a word as “af-
firmative element characterized by the exclusion of others” should be understood as a
whole. It is with regard to the relation of the positive and negative aspect involved in
this definition that the above differentiation between the capacity aspect and the quality
aspect of exclusion from others comes into meaningful perspective.
Relation between anyāpoha and vidhi
A distinctive feature of Jñānaśrīmitra’s and Ratnakīrti’s version of the apoha theory is
the stress they lay on the simultaneous cognition of the two parts of the word referent,
exclusion and the positive or affirmative element:336
333About this there is no dispute, so it is not expressly proven. This seems to be the argument in
ll. 73 f., § 16 on page 20.
334This is, in my opinion, implied in the argument given in l. 223: There is no activity with regard to
the form of awareness, because it is known through the form of perception that is self-awareness. I am
here supposing that Ratnakīrti held a notion of self-awareness very similar to that explained in Kajiyama
1998: 47: self-awareness is “...[a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and
unerring ....”
335Cf. § 13 on page 18. The point of the arguments given there is to show that anyāpoha does not lead
to any worse logical problems than the assumption of a really existing universal.
336This is also the central point of the critique of the affirmationist and negationist positions (vidhi-
and pratiṣedhavādin positions) in this passage. This distinction made by Ratnakīrti has been an impor-
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ll. 37–42 in § 9: Therefore the cognition of that excluded from others is
called cognition of a cow. And even if the non-representation of the words
“excluded from others” has been taught, nevertheless there is no noncog-
nition at all of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word
cow is founded only on that excluded from non-cow. As the appearance of
blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the cognition of a blue lotus
because of the word indīvara[, i.e., blue lotus,] which is founded on a blue
lotus, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable,
because it is a qualifier, in the samemoment as there is the cognition of cow
from the word “cow” which is founded on that excluded from non-cow.
From this passage it follows that the cognition “cow” is equivalent with the cogni-
tion of that excluded from others, from non-cows in this example. In other words, the
positive element, vidhi, is that excluded from others, anyāpoḍha, due to having exclu-
sion, anyāpoha, as its qualifier. The point of the example is that the cognition of “blue
lotus” is impossible without the qualifier “blue” being cognized in the same moment as
“lotus”. This means that what can be understood as the vidhi’s quality, exclusion from
others, is essential to it in the sense that it can not be grasped or cognized without it.
Understanding the word cow is simultaneous to, and inseparable from, understanding
“not non-cow.”
The question that this analysis leads to is the following: Given that the positive
element is both present in the mode of appearance and determination (cf. section 5.3
on page 124, section 5.4 on the following page), is its qualifier, the exclusion from
others, also present in both modes?337 I think that on the background of the arguments
above (section 5.3 on page 125), this can be answered with a yes. It is with respect
to the implicative and non-implicative modes of absence that it can be made sense of
how differentiation qualifies and is present in every event in the sphere of conceptual
awareness.
Accordingly, the main constituents of the “complex entity” (Patil 2003: 230) that is
the referent of words, the anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ, might be analysed as follows:
The positive element (vidhi) both appears and is determined. Appearing, grasped
by a perception of the type self-awareness, it is the form of awareness qualified by the
exclusion from others in the manner of an implicative negation. Determined, it is a form
of awareness qualified by the exclusion from others in the manner of a non-implicative
negation. It is in this sense that determination, which also involves externalisation,
makes action according to an expectation possible.
tant factor in periodizing the apoha theory’s development. The main secondary literature on how to
understand this aspect is: Mookerjee 2006: 132 ff., Kajiyama 1998: 125, fn. 338, Akamatsu 1986, Kat-
sura 1986, Siderits 1986, Patil 2003: 230 f., and—given the reasonably probable similarity of the AS to
Jñānaśrīmitra’s AP—also McCrea and Patil 2006.
337This is not supported in the place where a direct clarification could have been given by Ratnakīrti,
l. 75 ff., § 16 on page 20: “And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished
from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation a form of
awareness [is meant].” Here Ratnakīrti qualifies only the determined aspect of the positive element, the
external object, as distinguished from that of another nature, but not the form of awareness. On the other
hand, if it were not the case that differentiation from others would qualify the form of awareness also, it
would be hard to see how Ratnakīrti separates his view from that of the affirmationist (vidhivādin). Cf.
Akamatsu 1986 for a description of their view.
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5.4 Two modes of awareness: pratibhāsa and
adhyavasāya
In describing the complex object that is the word referent (cf. § 49 on page 34), Ratna-
kīrti makes use of a distinction between appearance and determination of that complex
object. I would like to make some comments on this distinction, in order to gain a
clearer picture of Ratnakīrti’s general idea of cognition and its structure, and because
this structure is one that is repeatedly invoked in Ratnakīrti’s writings, for conceptual
as well as perceptual cognition.338
The most extensive analysis of this matter is found in Patil 2009: Chapter 5. The
basic theory developed in Patil 2009: 250–299339 is that each means of valid cognition,
pratyakṣa and anumāna, has two kinds of object: a direct object, grasped in virtue of
directly appearing (pratibhāsa) to either perceptual or conceptual awareness, and an
indirect one, known to340 perceptual or conceptual awareness in virtue of determination
(adhyavasāya).
There are, therefore, three pairs of concepts that are used to classify the
contents of awareness: “perceptual” or “inferential/verbal,” which indi-
cate the kind of awareness-event in which a particular object/image ap-
pears; “manifest” or “determined,” which indicate the way in which it ap-
pears; and “particular” or “universal,” which indicate (in retrospect) what
appears. (Patil 2009: 253)
The analysis then goes on to show how the direct and indirect objects of perception
and conceptual awareness are related to these concepts.
Ratnakīrti’s statements about the two states of awareness, perception and conceptual
cognition, and their objects are not, at first sight, easy to make sense of. A problem
might arise, for example, if the following statements from the VyN and the KBhSA, are
read alongside each other:
VyN 8*.12–15 (VyN2 109.14–18): yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad
grāhyam. yatra tu yataḥ341 pravarte, tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣa-
sya svalakṣaṇaṃ grāhyam, adhyavaseyaṃ tu sāmānyam atadrūpaparā-
vṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ.
For, what appears in some cognition, that is what is to be grasped. But
that, with regard to which [someone] acts because of some [appearance],
is what is to be determined. For perception, amongst these [two objects],
338See, for example, SJS2 20.11–13: āgamānumānayor dvividho viṣayaḥ grāhyo ’dhyavaseyaś ca.
tatra grāhyaḥ svākāraḥ, adhyavaseyas tu pāramārthikavastusvalakṣaṇātmā. (Scriptural tradition and
inference have a twofold object, grasped and determined. Amongst these, the grasped [object] is the
own form [of awareness], but the determined [object] has the nature of a particular, an ultimately real
thing.); KBhSA2 73.20: dvividho hi pratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ, grāhyo ’dhyavaseyaś ca. (For perception has
a twofold object, grasped and determined.), as well as section 5.4 on page 135.
339An overview of the various characteristics assigned to these four objects are shown in table 5.4 on
the next page.
340As Patil 2009: 254, fn. 14 points out, Ratnakīrti is not terminologically strict about words related
to √bhās (“appear”). So, instead of “known to” one could expect Ratnakīrti to say “appears to”. It is too
early to say whether it is inexact terminology on Ratnakīrti’s part, or our inexact understanding which
affords us this puzzle.
341Read yataḥ acc. to VyN 8.13, against Thakur’s emendation to tat VyN2 109.16.
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Table 5.5: Objects of pratyakṣa and anumāna
Awareness mode Obj. of perception Obj. of conc. cognition Ontological status
grahaṇa svalakṣaṇa svākāra svalakṣaṇa
adhyavasāya vastumātra svalakṣaṇa sāmānya
a particular is what is to be grasped. But what is to be determined is a
universal, having the nature of a particular in general excluded from that
of another form. But for inference the opposite is [the case].342
Apparently Ratnakīrti here claims that perceptual and conceptual cognition have
the same kinds of objects, but in inverse modes of awareness. This passage, taken
for itself, would thus come to mean that perception’s grasped object, a particular, is
the same as the determined object in conceptual awareness, i.e., a particular, and the
determined object of perception is the same commonness or universal343 that is grasped
in conceptual cognitions. So it would be the very same particular that is grasped and
determined in perception and conceptual awareness.344 There is nothing here to indicate
that the particular is a very different entity in both cases. In a similar vein, Ratnakīrti
states:
KBhSA2 73.9–17: na, adhyavasāyasvarūpāparijñānāt. agṛhīte ’pi vastu-
ni mānasādipravṛttikārakatvaṃ345 vikalpasyādhyavasāyitvam. apratibhā-
se ’pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtatvam adhyavaseyatvam. etac cādhyavaseyatvaṃ
svalakṣaṇasyaiva yujyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād arthipravṛtteḥ.
evaṃ cādhyavasāye svalakṣaṇasyāsphuraṇam eva.346
In the last sentence of this passage, Ratnakīrti categorically (“eva”) denies that a
particular can appear in determination. So, according to these two passages, a particular
appears, but is not determined, in perception, and is determined, but does not appear, in
conceptual cognition.
342Cf. also the translation and note in Lasic 2000b: 64. This passage is closely modelled on VC 13.3–6.
In the translation of that passage, Lasic (2000a: 95, fn. 52) refers to Kajiyama 1998: 58, Steinkellner and
Krasser 1989: 77 f. and Krasser 1991: 41 ff. for information about the view that every cognition has two
objects. To this should be added the translation of the same passage and the discussion in McCrea and
Patil 2006: 334–336. Note also that in VC 13.6–8, Jñānaśrīmitra adds the following: tatra sādhanapra-
tyakṣaṃ tadaivārthakriyārthinaḥ kṣaṇavīkṣaṇe ’pi santānāpekṣayā sāmānyaviṣayam. (Trl. by Lasic
(2000a: 95): “Dabei hat die Wahrnehmung eines Mittels [zur Zweckerfüllung] (sādhanapratyakṣa), ob-
wohl der, der auf eine Zweckerfüllung abzielt, zu eben dieser Zeit (nur) eine Phase sieht, mit Rücksicht
auf das Kontinuum eine Gemeinsamkeit zumObjekt.”) With this statement it becomes clear that the “uni-
versal” determined by perception is a continuum of point instants that make up the “thing” of everyday
parlance. In as far as this generalisation from a single phase to a continuum of phases is not essentially
different from the generalisation from one particular to a class of particulars (cf. Patil 2003: 233 f., as
well as Kajiyama 1998: § 7.1.2), Ratnakīrti’s use of the term sāmānya without further qualification is of
course perfectly justified.
343As pointed out Patil 2009: 259, this universal’s characterisation, atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇa-
mātrātmakam, is importantly reminiscent of what words have as their objects: adhyavasitātadrūpa-
parāvṛttavastumātragocaram (l. 245 in § 54).
344This would also have to be understood from SJS2 20.11–13, quoted and translated in fn. 338 on
page 130.
345Corrected against mānasyādi° acc. to Woo 1999: 72.
346Cf. chapter C on page 193 for a translation.
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There is a different set of statements that points to quite the opposite. Interestingly,
these passages usually involve a hint at self-awareness, a perceptual mode common to
all cognitive events, perceptual as well as conceptual.
Probably the clearest passage in Ratnakīrti’s œuvre is the following, where he an-
swers a Mīmāṃsā (cf. Mimaki 1976: 123, and notes) objection that inference would
be both a perceptual and non-perceptual cognition, a non-conceptual and conceptual
cognition, and a non-superimposition and superimposition:
SSD2 118.8–11 ...[i]ty apy ayuktam. anumānasya hi paramārthataḥ sva-
saṃvedanapratyakṣātmano ’vikalpasyāsamāropasvabhāvasyāpratyakṣa-
tvavikalpatvasamāropatvādeḥ parāpekṣayā prajñaptatvād viruddhadha-
rmādhyāsābhāvāt kathaṃ bhedasiddhiḥ.
That also is not correct. For, how should a difference of inference[, due to
which it would have said contradictory properties,] be established, since, in
reality, [inference,] which has the nature of the perception self-awareness,
is unconceptual, and has the nature of non-superimposition, is not deter-
mined as having contradictory properties because being perception, con-
ceptual cognition, super-imposition, etc., are defined in respect of each
other?347
So, according to this passage, inference, and perforce conceptual awareness, is not
really different from perceptual cognition in as far as they are unconceptual, have the
nature of self-awareness, and do not perform any super-imposition.348 But if conceptu-
al cognition is thus reducible to perception, then, amongst other difficulties, the above
distinction of two objects in two modes of awareness can not hold. So either one or the
other of the positions following from these passages will have to be taken less serious-
ly.349
In the last passage, SSD2 118.8–11 (on the current page), however, the modifier “in
reality” might be given a very literal interpretation that can help understand these two
positions as not constituting an opposition. For if the second group of positions is taken
as being about how things really are, and the first conversely about how things appear,
their discrepancy might be removed. To begin with, therefore, two explanatory motives
347Cf. the translation in Mimaki 1976: 123:
...cela ne pas juste non plus. En effet, du point de vue [de la vérité] absolue ..., l’inférence
possède la nature de la perception en tant que connaissance-de-soi ..., n’est pas imagi-
nation et a la nature propre de non-surimposition .... Mais [du point de vue de la vérité
conventionelle] on qualifie l’inférence, par rapport à l’autre [c.-à-d. la perception], de non-
perception, imagination et surimposition. Donc, pour l’inférence on ne peut pas mettre [ces]
attributs contradictoires [sur le même plan]. Ainsi comment peut-on prouver une différence
dans l’inférence?
348This contradiction, or at least tension, arises also in light of formulations important for understand-
ing central issues in the AS, e.g., that the appearing objects are not different for perception and conceptual
cognition (l. 44 in § 9: ”...ubhayor aviśiṣṭam.”); also cf. l. 223 in § 49, and the analysis of this statement
in section 5.3 on page 125.
349Alternatives might be to suppose that Ratnakīrti changed his mind, or that he simply made a mis-
take. But the first alternative would have to be supported by an analysis of the chronology of Ratnakīrti’s
writings, a project that might not be wholly conclusive, and the second would be very surprising, giv-
en that determination and direct appearance are central structural elements in both Jñanaśrīmitra’s and
Ratnakīrti’s writings. (Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006.)
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that Ratnakīrti uses should be distinguished: statements about the ontological status of
cognitive objects, and statements about the phenomenal status of these objects.
This is also supported by § 49 on page 34 of the AS: There too a double standard, in
reality and conventionally, is appealed to to help explain what the word referent actually
is. Neither in reality nor conventionally is a form of awareness an object of activity,
because it appears in the perception self-awareness. This corresponds to the respect in
which SSD2 118.8–11 on the previous page expresses that conceptual awareness is no
different from perception: A true particular is the grasped object in both cases, and, since
this is the perception of a particular, there is no determination (or superimposition)350
of that particular. But conventionally the external particular is the determined object of
both a conceptual and perceptual cognition, in as far as practical activity is directed at
it.
It also emerges that the “parallelism” of the double object for both perceptual and
conceptual cognition can not be a simple one. Otherwise one would have to assume that
Ratnakīrti both claims that conceptual cognition has a particular as a determined object,
and that it does not. The method of distinguishing 4 objects of cognition, a grasped
and a determined object each for perception and conceptual awareness, prefigured in
McCrea and Patil 2006, and fully worked out in Patil 2009: chapter 5, is certainly a
good solution to this apparent contradiction.
A similar, but perhaps more parsimonious solution to this problem might be to put
increased emphasis on the two modes of awareness that objects can be known through.
The idea is to show that whatever appears to awareness is a particular, and whatever is
determined is a universal. Thus there would be only two objects of awareness, instead
of four.351
A first point can be made in noting that, according to Ratnakīrti, both perception and
conceptual cognition have a twofold object, a grasped and a determined one.352 As ex-
350Whether this equation of superimposition and determination is appropriate to Ratnakīrti’s under-
standing of thematter is a very difficult question. Cf., e.g., CAPV135.31–136.2 tathā vikalpāropābhimā-
nagrahaniścayādayo ’py adhyavasāyavat svākāraparyavasitā eva sphuranto bāhyasya vārtāmātram
api na jānantīty adhyavasāyasvabhāvā eva śabdapravṛttinimittabhede ’pi, tat kathaṃ yuktyāgamaba-
hirbhūto ’nātmāsphuraṇam ācakṣīta (Read śabdapravṛttinimittabhede ’pi acc. to RNĀms 73a1 against
the misprinted śabdapravṛttimittabhede ’pi in CAPV 136.1. The emendation by Thakur from yuktyāga-
mābahir in RNĀms 73a1 to yuktyāgamabahir does not seem necessary to me. Trl.: In the same way, also
conceptual cognition, imposition, conceit (abhimāna), taking [something for something else], ascertain-
ment and so on, like determination, only ending in the form of awareness itself [as they are] appearing,
know not even the merest news of the external thing. So (iti) [these] have the nature of determination in-
deed, even though there are different causes for the use of [these] words. Thus, how should someone not
transgressing reasoning and scripture assert a manifestation of [something that] is not the self [of aware-
ness]? ) Here Ratnakīrti, on the one hand, equates forms of conceptual cognition, imposition, etc. with
determination, but immediately adds the reservation that there are different causes for the employment
of the different terms.
351As noted in Patil 2003: 237, and explicated in Patil 2009: 249, an assessment of Ratnakīrti’s epis-
temological framework, or “...theory of mental content ...” has to proceed “...by providing an interpre-
tation of his scattered remarks on...mental objects/images ...and does not present Ratnakīrti’s position as
he himself presented it ....” (Patil 2009: 249) So all attempts at outlining this framework can only be
interpretations and reconstructions. One important factor is how broadly the passages that such an inter-
pretation is based on are scattered. For Patil 2009, passages of nearly all of Ratnakīrti’s writings were
used. Here, I will focus mainly on the AS, and claim coherence only for it and the CAPV. As such the
reconstruction, or perhaps only construction, of Ratnakīrti’s epistemological framework, whilst probably
not as unifying as that in Patil 2009, will hopefully be simpler.
352Cf. note fn. 338 on page 130 for textual evidence of this claim.
134
5.4. Two modes of awareness: pratibhāsa and adhyavasāya
plained, this in itself leads into interpretative difficulties: In some instances this object
is said to be, respectively, a particular (as grasped) and a universal (as determined) for
perception, and a universal (as grasped) and a particular (as determined) for conceptual
cognition.353 In other instances, especially where self-awareness is discussed or men-
tioned in the context of conceptual cognition, this clear differentiation is not upheld.354
A second point lies in the fact that “grasped” and “determined” are indexed to two
modes of awareness, appearing and determination, or being an object of intentional
activity:355
CAPV 131.4–5: iha dvividho vijñānānāṃ viṣayaḥ grāhyo ’dhyavaseyaś
ca. pratibhāsamāno grāhyaḥ. agṛhīto ’pi pravṛttiviṣayo ’dhyavaseyaḥ.
(Cf. section 4.2 on page 96 for a translation.)
As seen in the interpretation of Ratnakīrti’s comparison of perceiving and conceptu-
ally apprehending absence or negativity (section 5.3 on page 125), he equates perception
and conceptual awareness as to the directly appearing object: “paryudāsarūpābhāva-
grahaṇaṃ tu niyatasvarūpasaṃvedanam ubhayor aviśiṣṭam.” (ll. 44–44 in § 9) This
passage also shows an equivalence between grasping absence in an implicative form
(i.e., as the presence of something else) and an awareness of something having a “limit-
ed own form”, meaning that that awareness has an object that is fixed as to its location,
time, etc.356 This means that both perception and conceptual cognition have a particular
as their object, at least in respect of what appears in them. In the AS, this is supported
by Ratnakīrti’s statement that a form of awareness is not positively or negatively act-
ed towards since it is present to awareness through the perceptual mode self-awareness
(l. 223 in § 49).357 And, being perception, it must have a particular as its grasped or
appearing object.
As their determined object both perception and conceptual cognition have a con-
structed mere thing. Within the AS, a number of passages support this as far as con-
ceptual cognition is concerned.358 The argument for perception can be made by an
353Cf., e.g., VyN 8*.12–15 (VyN2 109.14–18, quoted and translated section 5.4 on page 130).
354Cf. the material section 5.4 on page 133, as well as l. 223 in § 49.
355It might be debatable as to how being an object of intentional activity is actually a mode of aware-
ness. But at least for themental activity (“thinking about”) a successful argumentmight bemade (cf. fn. 54
on page 40 for some pointers to the various modes of activity). Another thing to notice in the following
quote is that the object of activity will probably have to be understood as including (but not as being
limited to) real particulars, especially in light of such arguments as this: etac cādhyavaseyatvaṃ svala-
kṣaṇasyaiva yujyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād arthipravṛtteḥ. (KBhSA2 73.11–12, cf. chapter C on
page 193 for a translation.) A more detailed argument about pravṛttiviṣaya, highlighting that determina-
tion is what makes something into an object of activity, is found in KBhSA2 73.9–12 (cf. the references
in note fn. 168 on page 61).
356 Cf., e.g., the (negative) formulation in § 16 on page 20: “...deśakālāvasthāniyata-
pravyaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.” This is the defining characteristic of a particular: “The term
svalakṣaṇa ...entails from the beginning that the phenomenon is individual, unique and distinct.”
(Yoshimizu 2004: 119) Cf. also the similar formulation SSD2 124.22–23: nanv ananuvṛttāv api tadarpi-
tākārasvarūpasaṃvedanam eva tadvedanam. tad eva ca saviṣayatvam. (Trl. by Mimaki (1976: 159):
“[Les Bouddhistes:] Même si [l’objet] ne dure pas [jusqu’au moment de la connaissance], la connais-
sance de la nature propre de la forme projetée par l’[objet], c’est la connaissance de l’[objet], n’est-ce
pas? Et ce fait [montre] précisément que la [connaissance] a un objet ....”)
357Cf. section 5.4 on page 133.
358 Cf., e.g., the guiding inference of the AS (cf. section 5.2 on page 114): yad vācakaṃ tat sa-
rvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram. (ll.245–246 in § 54), and see also table 5.1 on
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interpretation of the following passage:
[KBhSA2 73.18–24] tathā tṛtīyo ’pi pakṣaḥ prayāsaphalaḥ. nānākāla-
syaikasya vastuno vastuto ’sambhave ’pi sarvadeśakālavartinor atadrū-
paparāvṛttayor eva sādhyasādhanayoḥ pratyakṣeṇa vyāptigrahaṇāt. dvi-
vidho hi pratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ, grāhyo ’dhyavaseyaś ca. sakalātadrū-
paparāvṛttavastumātraṃ sākṣād asphuraṇāt pratyakṣasya grāhyo viṣa-
yo mā bhūt, tadekadeśagrahaṇe tu tanmātrayor vyāptiniścāyakavikalpa-
jananād adhyavaseyo viṣayo bhavaty eva, kṣaṇagrahaṇe santānaniśca-
yavat, rūpamātragrahaṇe rūparasagandhasparśātmakaghaṭaniścayavac
ca. anyathā sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt.359
As mentioned before, Ratnakīrti here asserts that perception also has two objects: a
grasped and a determined object. But he goes on to specify that the determined object
of perception is a mere thing that is excluded from that which is not like it (sakalāta-
drūpaparāvṛttavastumātraṃ). And this is quite obviously the same as the determined
object of conceptual cognition, which is explained in basically the same phrase in l. 245
in § 54: adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram.360
So how should VyN 8*.12–15 be reconciled with these statements? I think that
the simplest answer is as follows: perception grasps a particular and determines it as a
generalised thing excluded from others.361 In this latter form it can become an object
of activity. But when Ratnakīrti, in VyN 8*.12–15, states that it is the opposite for
inference, he does not mean that inference determines a particular in the same sense that
perception grasps that particular: rather, a conceptual cognition determines what seems
to be a particular, but is in fact a commonness of things (i.e., a non-difference from
others erroneously but effectively imposed upon something external), and is directly
aware of what seems to be a universal, but is in fact a particular (the form of awareness).
Therefore, Ratnakīrti is, in VyN 8*.12–15, not speaking about the ontological status of
the objects, but about their phenomenal status.
5.5 Double negation
anyāpoha is a tatpuruṣa compound that is usually analyzed as exclusion from others,
or exclusion of others.362 Taking “other” to mean “not that”, or “not the same,” one
quickly faces the most baffling and counter-intuitive aspect of the apoha theory: it is a
form of double negation.
Dharmakīrti expresses the situation as follows:
PVSV 38.9 f. uktaṃ yādṛśaṃ sāmānyam asaṃsṛṣṭānām ekāsaṃsargas
tadvyatirekiṇāṃ samānateti.
page 122 for a list of passages where these points are argued for.
359For a note on the context of this passage, a translation, and an emendation against KBhSA2,
see chapter C on page 194.
360Cf. also fn. 343 on page 132.
361In other words, as stated in the passage quoted above, KBhSA2 73.23 f.: ...kṣaṇagrahaṇe santāna-
niścayavat, rūpamātragrahaṇe rūparasagandhasparśātmakaghaṭaniścayavac ca. (...as, when a mo-
ment of a particular is grasped, a continuum [of such moments] is ascertained, and as, when only the
form [of a particular] is grasped, a pot is ascertained which has the nature of a form, a taste, a smell, [and]
a feel.)
362Cf. the discussion of the various options in § 2 on page 13, and the materials indicated there.
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It was explained what a universal is like: That things unmixed [with each
other] are not mixed with one thing is the sameness of these things different
from that.363
This passage is a succinct formulation of what apoha does in substituting for, or
perhaps even being, a universal: It differentiates some things from those that are differ-
ent.
On a formal level, the insight that double negation is equivalent to a positive state-
ment is not difficult to have.364 It might perhaps be counterintuitive and unwieldy, but
it certainly won’t make a statement wrong to negate it twice.
Ratnakīrti discusses two logical problems365 that might ensue: a circular dependen-
cy, that the negation of non-cow is dependent on the notion of cow, and a contradic-
tion between that qualified by exclusion and exclusion itself (cf., respectively, § 13 on
page 18 and § 14 on page 19).366
Circular dependency Ratnakīrti’s general strategy to rid himself of this problem is
quite remarkable. He basically counters the objection by saying that the same fault
applies to the opponent’s theory of real universals.367 The parallel, as I understand it, is
as follows:
A realist might define cow like this: “A cow is what is qualified by cowness.”, and
an exclusionist might do the same with this sentence: “A cow is what is qualified by
exclusion from non-cow.” Structurally, both statements are of the form “X is what is
qualified by x.”
The realist now says that, in the exclusionist approach, to know what is qualified by
the exclusion from non-cow presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. The circular
dependency consists in “exclusion from non-cow” (=x) being dependent on “cow” (=X),
and “cow” being defined in terms of x. Ratnakīrti does not, at this point, supply a reason
for why someone may say this.
Ratnakīrti counters this as follows: to knowwhat is qualified by cowness presuppos-
es a knowledge of what a cow is. Here, the dependency consists, again, in x (“cowness”)
363Cf. Vora and Ota 1980: 6–7 for another translation and the context.
364Cf. Quine 1980: §16(4) showing the equivalence of the schemata “p” and “p”, or Goldfarb
2003: 12, using “–” as the sign for negation: “It should be clear that “– –p” amounts to the same thing
as “p”. For “– –p” is true just in case “–p” is false, and “–p” is false just in case “p” is true. Double
negations, therefore, are redundant.”
365For pointers to the objections of this kind that were made against anyāpoha, cf. fn. 82 on page 45,
and fn. 86 on page 46.
366Ratnakīrti’s explanations in § 14 on page 19 concerning the contradiciton are rather succinct, and
I am not sure I understand them very well. A restatement of the problem, based on Kumārila’s criticism
of the apoha theory as outlined in Hattori 2006: 62, could be as follows:
The contradiction that Ratnakīrti refers to can be explained like this: there is a contradiction between
something excluded from others and an exclusion from others, in so far as both are existing things. The
main problem therefore is that there is a contradiction in one thing (e.g., a particular blue lotus) being
two things at the same time: an absence of non-blue and an absence of non-lotus.
This kind of criticism is a consequence of Kumārila’s understanding of abhāva as a sort of bhāva, as
Hattori (2006: 62) pointed out. Ratnakīrti’s answer (as I understand the the last sentence of § 14) is that
there is no problem: In the apoha-theory a qualified thing is qualified only by the absence of another
(more precisely, an absence of a difference from another), because absence is not a positive qualifier.
367This is remarkable in my opinion because Ratnakīrti is not even trying to save his own position.
He merely states that it is just as wrong in this respect as that of his opponents. The same strategy is
employed by Dharmakīrti, cf. the discussions in Hugon 2009: 535–540, and Hugon 2011.
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being dependent on X (“cow”), and X being defined in terms of x. For this he supplies
a reason: When “cow” (X) is not known, the universal cowness (x) is not known, and,
when the universal cowness (x) is not known, that to be designated by the word cow
(i.e., X) is not known.368
In other words, Ratnakīrti here shows that setting the convention “cow” for what is
qualified by cowness is just as problematic as setting it for that qualified by the exclusion
from non-cow.
Denoting and denoted
In the following I will present some observations on how Ratnakīrti sees the relation
between a denoting element,369 such as a word, and a denoted element, the referent of
the word. From the arguments in § 28 on page 25 and the statements about the denoting-
denoted relation in § 54 on page 37, it is plainly obvious that Ratnakīrti does not believe
that there really is such a relation, but that it is a conceptual construction. Two questions
might be posed here: What kind of relation is this conceptually constructed relation of
a word and its object, and of what consequence is the ontological status of this relation
according to Ratnakīrti?
Conceptual construction of reference
According to section 5.3 on page 124, Ratnakīrti supposes that there are two aspects
of a word’s object: the subjective one, a form of awareness, and the objective one, an
external thing. They are known in two different awareness modes, perception (of the
type self-awareness) and determination respectively.
The question in this section is what sort of relation a word has to this twofold object,
and, more specifically, if it can be said to refer to, denote, or express this object.
In lines 75–78 (§ 16), as well as in § 49 and the following verse, Ratnakīrti argues
that in reality no real external thing is denoted by words (in the first passage), or is
affirmed or negated by words (in the second passage). Rather, it is only due to the
determination of a form of awareness that an external object becomes the object of
any kind of activity, including the activity of denoting it.370 Ratnakīrti explains that an
external object is said to be denoted by a word only because of determination:
tatra bāhyo ’rtho ’dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācyo vyavasthāpyate, na sva-
lakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyatapravyaktasva-
lakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt. (ll. 76–78, p. 20. Trl. on p. 47.)
Consequently a word can be said to denote its object, an external object, only by
means of determination, not directly. If it were directly denotative of a real external
368In accordance with this argument, the following reason could be the one that led the opponents to
charge the apoha theory with circularity: When a cow (X) is not known, exclusion from non-cow (x) is
not known, and when the exclusion from cow (x) is not known, a cow (X) is not known.
369Patil usually translates the terms important for this discussion as follows: vācya and vācaka re-
spectively as “expressed” and “expressor” or “expressive” (Patil 2009: e.g., p. 239, p. 241), artha as
“meaning, object, or semantic value” (Patil 2009: 202, fn. 13).
370The details of these arguments are discussed in section 5.3 on page 124. For short examples of the
various forms of activity that are induced by conceptual cognition, cf. CAPV 139.18–19 (trl.
fn. 71 on page 43). See also the references given in footnote fn. 54 on page 40.
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thing there would be the undesirable consequence that a word would make its object
known in the same way as a perceptual cognition of that object.371
The other aspect of an object of a word is the form of awareness, which directly
appears to selfawareness, a perceptual type of cognition.372 But there is no denoted-
denoting relation between a word and this aspect of its object because direct appearance
refutes the assumption that there is a real relation of a quality and a thing qualified by
it (dharmadharmibhedasya pratyakṣapratikṣiptatvāt, l. 135, p. 25).373
To summarize: as regards an external particular a word does not denote, and as
regards the form of awareness a word does not denote either. It is only with regard to
the determined object that a referential relation can properly be understood. But since
this determined object, that everyday activity centers upon, does not really exist, words
do not, in reality, refer to anything.
In § 29 on page 26, Ratnakīrti advances an argument that is very important for un-
derstanding the relation of word and object. That argument might be paraphrased as
follows: If a relation of property and property-bearer were real, the connection would
have to be that of supported and supporter, i.e., a property-bearer supporting its proper-
ties.374 Perceiving a property bearer, e.g., a tree, entails perception of all its properties,
e.g., its height, etc. For a particular (the proper object of perception) can not be in con-
tact with a sense-faculty with only one of its properties or its property-less self (perhaps
a substance), because a supporter is a supporter only in as far as it actually is seen to
support its properties.
On the opponent’s theory now, a word, e.g., “tree”, and a logical reason, e.g., “pres-
ence of smoke”, make something real known (a particular qualified by treeness, a par-
ticular place qualified by smokey-ness, cf. § 10 on page 17). This real thing they make
known, by the previous argument, must be related to its other properties, height, colour,
etc., as a supporter. And since this supporting relation is not different from the support-
ing relation that causes perception to always grasp the whole particular (properties and
their bearer), it follows that that made known by words or logical marks would also be
grasped with all its properties at once. Therefore, if words were to make something real
known, and there really were this difference of properties and their bearer, conceptual
cognition would not be discernable from perceptual cognition.
For Ratnakīrti, the theory of apoha in combinationwith the concept of determination
offers a way out of this conundrum: Since it is only a determined difference from other
things that a word makes known, it is not a real thing (an entity) that is brought to
awareness, and thus the consequences involved in cognizing a real thing do not result.375
371Cf. the quote of PVin 1 1.15a-c in § 17.
372Cf. the arguments in § 49 on page 34, as well as section 5.3 on page 124.
373Otherwise it would have to be presumed that a word could denote its object (e.g., the word cow
denote a form of awareness cow) without all aspects of that form of awareness being known to the person
experiencing that cognitive event, so that self awareness would only have partial knowledge of its own
object.
374That the only connection is that of supported and supporter was advanced by Dharmakīrti. Cf. the
references to the translation of paragraph § 29 on page 26.
375Cf. the notes above as to how exclusion is a capacity, section 5.3 on page 125. Also in perception
there is a possibility of an (indirectly) perceived generality: absence. Perceiving an empty stretch of
floor, an absence of many things in that place can be correctly cognized, although not every absence has
to actually be cognized.
Cf. also PV 3 167 (translated in section A.3 on page 168) about the word not being a part of the
referent. The point there is that the referent is an external thing, and it is not possible that something in
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Furthermore, that there is no real relation of denoted and denoting should, one ex-
pects, hold for Ratnakīrti’s theory as well: As the particular height of a particular tree
can not be perceivedwithout perceiving all other perceivable characteristics of that same
tree, so that which a word signifies, the twofold positive element qualified by other-
exclusion,376 must be apprehended in its entirety. For the form of awareness, this is
not problematic, since it comes to awareness in the form of direct appearance or self
awareness. An account of the external object, on the other hand, is a little more difficult
to give. The determined external object (as opposed to a real particular) is known in
conceptual awareness by determination. As argued above, section 5.3 on page 125, the
external thing, to which activity can be successfully directed by a correct conceptual
cognition, does not become directly present to awareness, but is constructed only due to
a capacity lying in an awareness of a form of awareness. It is thus only a cognition that
has negative content, and that does not require any entity, imagined or real, to appear.
And this absence (or difference from what is of another kind) does become fully known
in conceptual awareness—as the capacity for a cognition (cf. table 5.3 on page 126).
But, since an external object is what everyday activity is directed at, it is conventionally
considered as what is denoted by a word.377 This is also supported by ll. 247–249 (in
§ 54), where Ratnakīrti says that the relation of denoted and denoting, that does not exist
in reality, does exist as something constructed by determination.
To sum up: there is no real denotative function at work in conceptual awareness,
mainly because neither the subjective or objective aspect of the object that a wordmakes
known is a thing that is denotable (the form of awareness is private and a particular, the
constructed external thing is only a negation). It is only conventionally that one has
to assume that a word denotes an external particular because otherwise no everyday
activity is possible.
Ontological status of reference
Since denotation is only conceptually constructed, it is not real.378 Its components are
relata differentiated from each other only conceptually, and have the same ontological
status as the relation of a quality and the thing qualified by it, i.e., they do not really
have separate existence.379 But since the relation of denoted and denoter is necessary
for language and concepts, this relation has to be assumed to be real by anyone who
uses language and concepts.
the cognition of a speaker (or hearer) really be a part of the external thing. But it can be a part, or aspect,
of the conceptual cognition.
376Cf. the analysis in section 5.3 on page 124.
377Cf. § 49 on page 34. Affirmative and negative activity are there said to be applicable only to the
determined external thing.
378Cf. § 49 on page 34.
379Cf. the discussion in § 29 on page 26, and fn. 119 on page 52.
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About the appendices
The following sections consist of translations of, and notes to, various material that I
found helpful in understanding the AS. The purpose of these sections is not to provide
a thorough study of all these texts, but rather to acquire at least a basic understanding
of their intent, scope, and arguments. As a consequence of this, it will probably not be
very useful to read these passages, often not more than sketches, separately from the
discussions in the previous sections that reference them.
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Appendix A
Dharmakīrti on apoha
A.1 Passages from the apoha section in the PVSV
Acc. to Frauwallner 1932: 248, Dharmakīrti introduces the concept of apoha in an
answer to the objection that there is a petitio principii in his svabhāvapratibandha.
Frauwallner (1932: 248) describes the apoha-theory as “[...] Lehre von den Vorstellun-
gen, also die Apohalehre.”380
PVSV 24.16–25.26
[PVSV 24.16] | Then precisely that which is produced is precisely that which is imper- pp #
manent, because there is no difference [between these two]. [There] would be a reason
that is a part of the object of the thesis.381 | [There is] no such error, for [the following up #
reason:]
All entities have, through [their] own nature, a part in the differentiation
from both the same and other entities382 because [they] subsist in their own
own nature.383// PV 1 40 //
For this reason (yasmād—tasmād) different genera, which are based on
whatever the referents are differentiated from, and which fathom (ava-
√gāh) [the particulars’] specific differences (viśeṣa), are construed (pra-
√klṛp).384 // PV 1 41 //
380 Also see Frauwallner 1937: 278 f. for some remarks on the relationship between “Vorstellungen”
and object of words.
381Cf. PVSVṬ 108.6 f.: tathā hi yāvad uktam anityaḥ śabdo ’nityatvād iti tāvad anityaḥ kṛtakatvād
iti tathā cāsiddho hetur. (For it is so: the proposition “Sound is impermanent because of being imper-
manent.” [would be] as much as [the proposition] “[Sound is] impermanent because of being produced.”
And in this way the reason would not be established.)
382For understanding svabhāva as sajātīya here, cf. the explanations in PVSV 25.14, and Steinkellner
1971: 198, fn. 66.
383Cf. the translation of these verses in Steinkellner 1971: 198, where Steinkellner also says that
Dharmakīrti explains the main structure of conceptuality (“wesentliche Struktur dieser Begriffslehre”,
Steinkellner 1971: 190) in these verses.
384Here it is quite obvious that differentiation (vyāvṛtti), specific difference (viśeṣa), and also differ-
ence (bheda, which is then substituted for vyāvṛtti by Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in
PVSV 25.15–23) comes to be a synonym for property, aspect, or quality of a thing, in the sense of some-
thing that makes it different from other things. This connotation has to be understood in the following
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Therefore, whichever specific difference is recognized through some prop-
erty, that [specific difference is] not capable [of being recognized] through
a [property] other than that one. By this (tena) a differentiated subsistence
[of two properties with respect to the same thing is shown]. // PV 1 42 //
For indeed all entities stand in their own form. They do not mix their nature with
a different [entity], because [then] there is the consequence of this[, one entity,] not
being a different [entity]. Also, that [form] is not theirs, which is an undifferentiated
form for them [and] has become [their] self,385 because then (tadānīm) they[, i.e., these
entities with a nondifferent form,] do not exist. [PVSV 25.1] For there would be only
this [one form for them], because [there] is an undifferentiated [form only], because
[there] is no [other form for the entities, which is] distinct from this [undifferentiated
form] (vyatirikta) and differentiated, and because, further, exactly this [nonbeing of
a different form] contradicts [their] difference. And therefore (tac ca) [each thing is]
subsists in [its] self, completely unmixed [with other natures].
[PVSV 25.3] Also a different thing, even if connected to many [things], is not a
commonness to them, because of [their] not being of that [common] form, because of
the unwanted consequence [of being a commonness] also in [the case of] twoness etc.,386
connection, and substance as effect (kāryadravya). For, even due to one (anya) having
a connection [to others], the others should not be called common, [but they] should be
called having that (tadvat), like figures [are connected] by a garland at the neck [are
not called the same]. [They, entities having something in common, are] not objects of
also. Cf. also PVSVṬ 111.28–112.5:
yasmād ityādi. yasmāt sarvasmāt sarvabhāvā vyāvṛttās tasmād yato yato nityākṛtakādeḥ śabdādī-
nām arthānāṃ vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ, vyāvṛttyāvadhivyāvṛttinibandhanā dharmabhedā anityakṛta-
kādayaḥ kalpyante vikalpair āropyante. kiṃviśiṣṭāḥ, tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ. tasya svalakṣaṇasya ye vi-
śeṣā akṛtakādivyāvṛttirūpalakṣaṇās tadavagāhinas tadavagāhanaśīlāḥ, tadabhedāvabhāsanaśīlā ity
arthaḥ. (For that reason etc.[, i.e.,] for the reason that all beings are differentited from everything
[else, as explained in PV 1 40], therefore, from whatever the objects of words are differentiated from[,
e.g.,] from permanent, non-produced etc., based on that, i.e., based on the differentiation of [their] lim-
it[, i.e., what is not something else (cf. PVSVṬ 347.28–30),] different properties, such as impermanent,
produced, etc., are constructed through differentiation[, that is,] superimposed by conceptual cognitions.
How [are those different genera or properties] qualified? [As] tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ. [They] fathom[, that
is, they] have the disposition (śīla) of fathoming, its[, i.e.,] a particular’s, specificities which are charac-
terised by the form of a differentiation from [those that do not qualify this particular,] such as unproduced
etc. [This] means (artha) that [these different genera or properties] have the disposition of manifesting
the non-differences of these [particulars].)
385Probably the point is that this same form is identified with the particulars themselves. Karṇaka-
gomin glosses ātmabhūtam with “unseparated” in PVSVṬ 115.19 f.: “teṣām iti bhāvānām abhinnam ity
ekam ātmabhūtam ity avyatiriktaṃ yad rūpaṃ svabhāvo ...”. (Read ekam ātma° acc. to PVSVṬms 44b7
against printed ekātma°.)
386PVSVṬ 116.21–24: tadā dvitvādikāryadravyeṣv api prasaṅgaḥ. dvitvam api hy anekadravyasa-
mavetam(.) ādigrahaṇād bahutvādiḥ. tathā saṃyogo ’nekadravyasamavetaḥ. kāryadravyaṃ cāvaya-
visaṃjñitamārambhakadravyeṣu samavetamato dvitvādiṣu sāmānyarūpatāprasaṅgaḥ. (Then there is
an unwanted consequence also [for the case of] twoness etc., [as well as for the case of a] material
cause. For twoness also inheres in multiple substances. From using [the word] “etc.” many-ness etc. [is
understood]. In the same way, contact inheres in multiple substances. And a substance as effect, called
a whole, inheres in the producing substances. Therefore, there is the unwanted consequence of being a
universal for twoness etc.)
The point is that all these things are not universals, acc. to Vaiśeṣika ontology. Number and contact are
qualities, and the kāryadravya, here equated with the whole (avayavin), is a substance. Cf. the general
explanations in Halbfass 1992: 93 f., and 122 f., as well as in Franco and Preisendanz 1998: § 4.
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nondifferent apprehensions, like figures [connected by a garland]. For an awareness,
mixing together their very selves, appears as having commonness as an object, but not
[as having] “two [objects] connected by one” [as an object], as [it does in the case of]
the figures.
[Objection:] | This [is] an error of seeing [only] this [commonness].387 | [Answer:] pp #
up #Why “seeing [only] this”? [Objection:] | Because an error not having a cause is impos-
pp #sible. | [Answer:] Only those having this same effect are the cause, because [such an
up #error] does not exist in [things] possessing number, connection, substance as effect (kā-
ryadravya), plurality etc. and [it doesn’t exist] in figures etc.388 Therefore, because in
this way there is no impression [of a commonness] on the cognition of a commonness, a
commonness is not something other [than the things]. Or if this [commonness] existed
[as something else], it would not be mixed with something else because of subsisting in
its own self (svātman). Therefore these entities are completely distinct (vyatirikta) from
that considered (abhimata) to be of the same genus and from something else, because
they are of only one form due to [their] own nature.
[PVSV 25.15] Based on the difference from whatever [things are] different from,
multiple properties are cognized through words which are settled upon (kṛtasaṃniveśa)
for causing the apprehension of these differences, even though there is no difference in
[a thing’s] own nature. These words also are only based on this particular (svalakṣaṇa),
even though [they] do not indicate (anākṣepa) all differences [of a particular], because
they indicate a single difference; [remembering that]389 there is a difference of this [par-
ticular] from that single [difference] also. Therefore, as many [things having] different
forms [there are] for a single entity, so many differentiations [are there] with regard to
these [things of different forms], because [what] has an effect and a cause which can not
occur for this [other thing] is different from that [thing].390 [PVSV 25.21] And as many
387Cf. PVSVṬ 118.5–6: sāmānyaṃ kevalaṃ paśyaty eva buddhiḥ. tasyās tu taddarśinyāḥ samavā-
yasya sūkṣmatvāt sā bhrāntir yad etad vyaktīnāṃ sāmānyābhedena grahaṇam iti cet. (Awareness sees
only the commonness. But for this [awareness] seeing this there is, because of the fineness of inherence,
this error, which is exactly this grasping of the particulars without a difference to [their] commonness.)
388The argument is that a cognition as the same can exist for things which are not qualified by any
real, common thing inhering in them. This shows that commonness is cognisable without such a universal
being the cause of that cognition, which in turn is an error because particulars do not, in fact, have anything
in common with each other.
389PVSVṬ 119.20: tadekasmād api yato yato vyāvṛtto ’rthaḥ śabdair viṣayīkriyate tasmāt tasmād
atatkāraṇād atatkāryāc caikasmād api tasya svalakṣaṇasyānekavyāvṛttasya bhedo ’stīti kṛtvā tadviṣa-
yā ucyante na tu tadviṣayā eva. (Read °ānekavyāvṛttasya acc. to PVSVṬms 46a6. Trl.: This, a particular
which is differentiated from many [differences with other causes and effects], is different also from this
single [thing, i.e.,] from whatever has another cause and has another effect, differentiated from which an
[external] object is made the object [of a cognition] by words. Thinking so, [words] are said to have this
[external thing] as an object, but they do not really have it as an object.) In PVSVṬ 119.13–14, ekabhe-
dacodanāt from PVSV 25.17–18 was glossed by ekaikasya binnasya svabhāvasya codanāt (...because
they indicate some differentiated nature [of a particular]). So in these passages, Karṇakagomin equates
“difference” (bheda) with a certain aspect of a particular’s real being. It is thus permissible to understand
the somewhat awkward phrase “differentiated from a difference” simply as “having a certain quality”.
We could then render PVSVṬ 119.20 as “This, a particular which has many qualities, is different also
from this single quality, that is, from whatever thing has another cause and effect ....” So even though
words are based on particulars, the particulars do not actually have the qualities (or differences) which
words pick out in order to make that quality the object of a conceptual cognition.
390PVSVṬ 119.26–28: kiṃ kāraṇaṃ. tasmin vyāvarttye ’vidhibhūte dharmiṇy asambhavi kāryaṃ
kāraṇaṃ ca yasya vivakṣitasya dharmiṇaḥ sa tadasambhavikāryakāraṇas tasya tadbhedāt. tasmād ata-
tkāryād atatkāraṇāc ca bhedād vyāvṛttatvāt (What is the cause? Because of a difference of this[, i.e.],
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differentiations [there are], so many sound complexes (śruti) [are there] which have the
purpose of everyday activity (vyavahārārtha) by turning away [that of] another (atat)
cause and effect. Like [this expression:] “A sound following immediately on an effort
is audible.” has the purpose of turning away [that of] another cause and effect. There-
fore, even though the own nature [of a thing] is without difference, which characteristic
(viśeṣa) difference is known through some property[, or] name, that [difference] cannot
be made known by another [property, or name]. So words do not all have the same
referent. Therefore the logical reason is not a part of the object of the thesis.391
PVSV 25.26–27.6
[PVSV 25.26] | [Question:]392 How then is this understood: Through both a word andpp #
a logical mark a removal (vyavaccheda) is arrived at,393 [but] not [something] that has
the form of a real thing in an affirmative way (vidhi)?
| [Answer: It is known] because of the use of another means of valid cognition andup #
another word. For [it is] so:
Which other part of an object’s single own nature that is itself directly
perceivable could be unobserved, [so that] it is examined by [other] means
of valid cognition? // PV 1 43 //
[PVSV 26.4] For the self of an object (artha) is one. It is perceptible, because in the
case of an unestablished property bearer an establishing [reason] is not possible. Like a
sound (śabda) [is perceptible], when [its] impermanence is to be established. Because
of the establishment of this[, a thing’s nature,] through perception alone, [there is] an
establishment of all [the thing’s] forms (ākāra), because there is no unestablished [own
nature] other than this [own nature of a thing]. Or, if it exists, [it is] not the own nature
[of that thing]. For what does not exist as having the same acquisition and keeping
(yogakṣema) as something, that is not suitable as the own nature of that,394 because
[of] that [property bearer] which has an effect and cause that does not occur there; [this] property bear-
er, which one wishes to express, has an effect and cause that do not occur where [there is] this property
bearer that is to be excluded[, or, in other words,] is the limit; [“because of a difference from this” must
be understood like this:] because of a difference[, i.e.], because of being excluded, from that[, i.e.], from
that which does not have that effect and that which does not have that cause.)
I think the argument works like this: A, which onewants to express, has an effect and cause (properties,
for example), neither of which occurs in the case of B. So B is the limit of A, or that which one wishes
to exclude. In this sense, A is different from B.
391As pointed out by Much 2008: 8, fn. 9, this is the preliminary end of the discussion starting at
PVSV 24.16 f., and the same point is made at the end of the apoha section, PVSV 93.4–5.
392Cf. Kellner 2004b: 4 f. for another translation of the next few sentences.
393pratipādyate is glossed as adhyavasīyate (is determined) in PVSVṬ 121.8. This strong connotation
of cognition should not be missed. But in the following discussion in the PVSV, where the opponent’s
question is answered, it will become apparent that a very factual sense of “arriving at” must also be
understood: cf., e.g., the formulations °vyavacchedakāni ...pramāṇāni (PVSV 26.23) or yadānumānam
...pratyāyayati na vyavacchedakṛt (PVSV 27.9–10), where it is obvious that removal or distinction of
a wrong concept from the object of cognition is something that is done (and not, primarily at least,
understood) by conceptual cognition or inference.
394 PVSVṬ 121.28–29 explains: alabdhadharmānuvṛttir yogaḥ. labdhadharmānuvṛttiḥ kṣemaḥ. eko
yogaḥ kṣemaś ca yasya sa tathā. tulyadharmeti yāvat. (Acquisition is an activity towards unobtained
properties, keeping is an activity towards obtained properties. That which has [the same] acquisiton and
keeping is [called] so. [It means] as much as “having the same property.”) Much (2008: 9, fn. 32) cites
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everyday usage of [things] having differences is bound (nibandhana) to this alone[, i.e.,
to the sameness in acquisition and keeping]. Because otherwise there is the consequence
of nonexistence [of everyday activity]. [This] has been said.395 Therefore, because in
the case of a perceived property bearer there is a complete discernment of its own nature,
the use of another means of cognition does not have any opportunity here,
unless a cause for an error causes [someone] to attach a different quality
(guṇa) [to something] like396 the form “silver” to mother of pearl (śukti)
because of observing a likeness of form. // PV 1 44 //397
[PVSV 26.14] [This means another means of valid cognition is not possible] if the
cause of an error, which obstructs the ascertainment (niścaya) of an entity as [it is],
even though it is seen with [its] complete reality, does not cause another quality to
be attached, as the form of silver to mother of pearl. For there are not two forms for
mother of pearl, one common [to it and silver] and a specific [one], because of the
[unwanted] consequence [that there is] a cognition like that.398 Or because, if [these
two forms are] not cognized separately, this concept of twoness would be wrong, and
because of the overreaching consequence.399 Therefore someone seeing what has the
form of mother of pearl sees only [its] specific form. But because of the defectiveness
of the circumstances (pratyaya) of ascertainment [he], without ascertainment, thinks “I
see a commonness to this [form of silver].” Therefore there is the superimposition of
silver for him. In the same way, [there is], because of the superimposition of that state[,
i.e., persistence], the error [of a cognition of] persistence for [someone], who does not
cognize a difference [of two moments of a causal continuum] due to the production of
a different [second moment], similar [to the first]. As many other states there are for
this[, a thing’s own nature,] exactly so many superimpositions are there, coming into
existence according to their own cause.400 So means of valid cognition, which become
what removes these [superimpositions from the objects], do indeed have a result. But
these means of cognition resulting in [such a] removal are not applied for causing the
apprehension of an uncognized part of a thing, because that [part] has [already] been
the following explanation given in Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 99, n. 1: “This is the commonplace
cliché in philosophical parlance. Things supposed to be identical must have identical yoga and kṣema.
...That which has the same incidents, gain or loss with another, is identical with the other.”
395Gnoli 1960b: 189 notes that PVSVṬ 122.7 says that this refers to PVSV 20.21.
396For vā as iva, cf. Gnoli 1960b: 26, note to line 13.
397Cf. also the translation in Steinkellner 1971: 194, fn. 55.
398PVSVṬ 123.14–15: tathā sāmānyaviśeṣarūpeṇa śavalābhāsāyāḥ pratipatteḥ sarvadā prasaṅgāt.
(...because of the unwanted consequence that there is always a cognition like that[, i.e.,] a multifarious
appearance in a both common and particular form.)
399This consequence, which results when there is a construction of a twoness of qualities or forms
without a difference in appearance, is that such a construction of twoness would be possible also in
another case, where mother of pearl is considered as being only silver, because of the consequence that
the negating judgment, “this is not silver,” could not arise. (Cf.PVSVṬ 123.17–19: pratibhāsabhedam
antareṇa dvitvakalpanāyām atiprasaṅgāt. anyatrāpy ekatvābhimate dvitvakalpanā syāt. nedaṃ rajatam
iti bādhakasyānutpādaprasaṅgāc ca.)
400 tasmād yāvanto ’sya śabdādeḥ kṣaṇikānātmādisvabhāvasya parabhāvā nityādayas tāvanta eva
yathāsvaṃ nimittabhāvinaḥ yasya yad anurūpaṃ nimittan tadbhāvinaḥ samāropā iti | (Read yathāsvaṃ
acc. to PVSVṬms 48a1 against yathāsva° in PVSVṬ 124.12. Trl.: From this, i.e., from a word etc., as
many other states, i.e., permanent etc., of this, i.e., of that having a nature such as momentary, without
self, etc., exactly so many superimpositions [are there], which have come into existence according to
their own cause, i.e., which have come into existence from a cause according to it.)
149
A. Dharmakīrti on apoha
observed; for, moreover, observing a partless [thing] by [only] one [of its] part is not
correct.401
Therefore each quality of an observed entity is indeed observed, [but] is
not ascertained because of an error. So a logical reason is applied.402 // PV
1 45 //
This is the recapitulating verse. Therefore no other means of valid cognition is
applied to [what was] observed in order to grasp something that wasn’t observed.
PVSV 27.7–29.5
And if a real thing [were] grasped because of an inference [there would be]
a grasping of all properties when [only] a single property is ascertained.
This error does not follow in the case of exclusion. // PV 1 46 //
[PVSV 27.9] Not only is there no application of another means of valid cognition for
[something that] has been observed by direct perception, but also, if inference caused
the apprehension of a thing in an affirmative [form], [and did] not perform a removal [of
a wrong idea], then all properties would be ascertained when one property is ascertained
because [they] are not completely distinct from this [one property]. So there [would be]
no application of another means of valid cognition. For it is not correct that the self of
this [one property] is not ascertained if this [one property] is ascertained. Furthermore,
if the removal of a superimposition [from an object] is performed by inference, then,
because of the removal of one superimposition, a removal of another would not become
effected. So, to this end, another [inference] is applied. [Objection:] | Now,403 anpp #
ascertainment of an uncognized [thing] is not necessarily preceded by a mistake. Like
inadvertently404 [there is] a cognition of fire because of smoke. For in this case the
superimposition of non-fire is not considered possible. Therefore, a removal is not
performed in every case [of conceptual cognition]. | [Answer:] To this it was said:405up #
when a property bearer is cognized there is the cognition of all [properties] because of
[their] non-difference. Or, if different, there is no cognition of [a property] which is
unconnected in this [case of cognizing a property bearer]. Therefore, also here [in this
example] there is no ascertainment of the own nature of this [fiery place as fiery] for
401Apart from the evidence in the Tibetan tradition mentioned in Gnoli 1960b: 27, ad. l. 1,
PVSVṬ 124.17 attests to a version where these two reasons are not linked by ca: ...dṛṣṭatvāt. kiṃ kara-
ṇam. anaṃśasyaikadeśena darśanāyogāt. Since this seems to make quite good sense, I have not taken
the two ablatives to be in the same, supporting, relation to the main sentence, but instead understand that
the second supports the first (which is the primary reason for the statement). A free rendering would be:
Other means of valid cognition only ever remove something from their object, but never make anything
about a real thing known, because that must already have been observed. And it must have been observed,
because it is not possible to observe a partless thing by only one of its parts.
402Cf. the translation of this verse in Steinkellner 1971: 198, fn. 70.
403For more on the context and a translation of this passage, cf. Kellner 2004b: 11 f.
404PVSVṬ 126.7–8 explains: akasmād ity atarkitopasthitāt. sahasaiva kvacit pradeśe dhūmād agni-
pratipattiḥ. (Inadvertently, i.e., having come about without thought. The cognition of fire because of
smoke in some place [occurs] all suddenly.)
405As Much 2008: 12, fn. 43 observes, this point was made in PVSV 26.5–7, although not in the exact
same words.
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someone seeing that [smoke]. Why? Because of a mistake.406 And how should he, who
ascertains that place in a form separated from this [fire] through an awareness that is
free of the notion of the existence of fire, be called unmistaken? And someone who is
free of both a superimposition of this cognitive form [of nonfire onto a smokey place]
and doubt407 would not follow the [logical] mark [smoke] in the case of this cognition.
Neither would he respect [it] in the case of its logical concomittance and separation.
Therefore the logical mark is proclaimed to have exclusion as an object.
[For] otherwise, if the property bearer is established, what apart from it
would [still] be unestablished? // [PV 1 47] //
This[, above,] is a recapitulating verse.
Even when something is observed, a cognition having commonness as a
referent, [i.e., a] conceptual [cognition], has, if there is no other part that is
superimposed, exclusion of that [other part] alone as [its] object.408 // [PV
1 48] //
[PVSV 28.8] | An ascertaining cogniton, that follows immediately on seeing form pp #
etc., [and] has no logical mark, how can that [cogniton], which exists when there is
no superimposition, exist as having removal as an object? [| ] Because it does not ex- up #
ist where [there is] an object of superimposition. For an ascertainment does not exist
concerning that difference, for which there is a superimposition for a person, such as
“persistent” or “having a self,”
because there is the relation of defeated and defeating between an under-
standing by ascertainment and by imposition. // [PV 1 49ab] //
[PVSV 28.13] For an entity, even though it is observed as differentiated from every-
thing, is not understood in this way alone; because a covering is possible for some dif-
ference, like in the case of mother of pearl’s mother-of-pearlness [which is then thought
to be its silverness]. But for which [difference] a cognizer has no cause for an error, for
that alone a mnemonic ascertainment exists, even though there is no different observa-
tion of this [difference] for him[, as opposed to the observation of the other differences
or aspects of the same thing]. Because of the defeated-defeating relationship between
superimposition and ascertainment, [there is], for ascertainment,
an application of it when there is a removal (viveka) of a superimposition.
This is understood. // [PV 1 49cd] //
[PVSV 28.19] And precisely the removal of this is other-exclusion. Therefore this
[ascertaining cognition] too409 has the exclusion of this alone as its object. [It] does not
have the nature of the ascertainment of a thing’s own nature. For it is so, because, even
if some [part] is ascertained, the non-cognition of another is observed, and because if
406Acc. to PVSVṬ 126.18: viparyāsād evānagnimatā pradeśena tulyatvagrahaṇād eva. (Only [be-
cause of a mistake], i.e., only because of the grasping of a sameness with a place not having fire.) The
argument is, probably, that because the cognition of fire is inadvertently (akasmād) arrived at, there is no
proper ascertainment of this fact, and therefore there is no difference between this place and one where
there is no fire.
407PVSVṬ 126.30–127.6: anagnyākārasamāropeṇa saṃśayena ca rahitaś ca ...
408Cf. the translation of this verse and the next half-verse in Steinkellner 1971: 199, fn. 71.
409tad api refers to niścayajñāna in PVSV 28.8.
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its own nature were ascertained, this [cognition of one part but not another] would not
be consistent.410
As many superimpositions of parts [there are], just so many clear ascer-
tainments and words [are there] in order to remove them. Therefore they[,
words and ascertainments, each] have different objects. // [PV 1 50] //
Otherwise, if a single thing were pervaded by a single word or by an aware-
ness, [there would] not be any other [uncognized]411 object. So there would
be synonymity [of all words]. // [PV 1 51] //
[PVSV 29.5] These are two intermediary verses.
PVSV 29.6–31.5
Also412 for whom413 a cognition (dhī) grasps a referent that, having differ-
ent additional attributes,414 is differentiated, // [PV 1 52ab] //
[PVSV 29.7] Whoever thinks this: “Additional attributes [are] different from each
other and from their basis; sound complexes, which are based on them, apply to sub-
strata (ādhāra) of these [additional attributes], or to these [additional attributes] alone.
Therefore there is no such unwanted consequence [as synonymity].” For that [person]
also,
if that, which has a nature undifferentiated from the capacities that are an
auxiliary (aṅga) to the additional attributes’ support, is grasped with all
its self, which difference of [that which is] supported would not be ascer-
tained? // [PV 1 52cd—53ab] //
[PVSV 29.12] Even if the really different additional attributes [are] the cause of
other words and cognitions about a referent, still only this single [referent] having these
[additional attributes] is clung to415 by these [words and cognitions]. [There is] no dif-
ference in the own self of a [property possessor] that has the nature of a capacity for
supporting the various additional attributes; therefore, if grasping [this supporter] with
all its self, indeed which particular additional attribute would not be ascertained, since
one grasps [this supporter] as being what supports all the additional attributes.416 For
[it is] not [the case that] a completely different supporter-state of that grasped with its
410Cf. also the argument in PVSV 26.24–27.2. The construction tathā hi plus two ablative clauses and
no main sentence strikes me as somewhat awkward.
411Cf. PVV 306.11–12: nānyo ’pratipanno viṣayo ’stīti ....
412For PVSV 29.6–47.13 (kk. 52–94) cf. also the translation in Vora and Ota 1979, Vora and Ota
1980, Vora and Ota 1982.
413PVSVṬ 132,l. 4 identifies this as “vaiśeṣikasya” (for a Vaiśeṣika). PVV 306.17 identifies the opin-
ion as “naiyāyikāder mate”, i.e., as held “in the theory of the Naiyāyikas and so on”. This “and so on” is
paraphrased as “vaiśeṣikāder”, “for a Vaiśeṣika and so on” in Vibhū 306, fn. 3.
414upādhi, a non-essential attribute or pseudo universal in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theories, is glossed as
meaning the proper universals “substance-ness, etc.” by both PVSVṬ 132.9 (upādhayo dravyatvādayaḥ)
and PVV 306.17 (nānopādher dravyatvādyanekadharmaviśiṣtasyā° ...).
415PVSVṬ 133.26: “...upalīyate viṣayīkriyate.” (“...clung to, i.e., made an object.”
416In other words: A thing’s nature is not different from the capacities by which it can support its
attributes. Therefore the thing, grasped with its own nature, can not be grasped without being grasped as
supporting these additional attributes. And since there can not be two separate supporting states for the
same thing, it must be grasped as the supporter of all its additional attributes.
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own self is not really grasped. Therefore, exactly that, which is grasped with its own
nature, [is grasped] also as being a support. So [it is stated].
Both are grasped in the cognition of one because of a connection of both
in [their] self. // [PV 1 53cd] //
[PVSV 29.20] Because of grasping the relation of supported and supporter, which
has become their self,417 between the additional attribute and that having it, all two are
grasped in the cognition of one. So, where this[, which has an additional property,] is
grasped, even if [it is] characterized by [only] one additional attribute, there is a grasping
of all additional attributes, because grasping that possessing additional attributes is not
separable from (nāntarīyakatva) grasping that [single additional attribute]. Otherwise,
it would not be grasped as such418 either. For [there is] no really different supporter
of another [additional attribute], which would not be grasped. Neither is there a non-
grasping of the supported when the supporter is grasped in this way[, i.e., as a supporter],
because of the consequence of not grasping this [supporter] either, as in the case of being
the owner and property.419 Therefore, even in the teaching that an additional attribute
is a different object [than its supporter], there is a similar consequence. | But those pp #
capacities, through which the [different] additional attributes are supported, could also
be really different from that having these capacities. Therefore this consequence [does]
not [follow].
| Given there is a difference of the capacities that are the support of the up #
properties, why are these [the capacities] of this [having these capacities],
if there is no support of those [capacities] by that [possessing them]? In
this way there would be no stopping.420 // [PV 1 54] //
[PVSV 30.3] If the states of being a supporter for each additional attribute are (bhū-
ta) not really the own self of this [which has the additional attributes], nor do [these
states] experience support from this, why are they called “its”? Or, if there is a support,
this single [supporter], [which] supports capacities with capacities that have become its
own self, and is grasped even by only a single additional attribute, is grasped with its
whole self. For [it is] so: If a single additional attribute is grasped, the capacity sup-
porting it is grasped. If that is grasped, the entity supporting it, having been grasped as
the support of all capacities which have become its own self, causes [a person] to grasp
all [its] capacities. And these [capacities cause the grasping of] their own additional
attributes. So the consequence remains.421
[PVSV 30.10] Or, also these capacities that support the capacities are really differ-
ent from an entity. Because in this way [there is] an endless connection (ghaṭana) of
the additional attributes and their capacities to always different capacities, this single
417Cf. the comment above, fn. 385 on page 146.
418PVSVṬ 234.25 f. comments: upādhīnām upakāraka upādhimān ity evam api na gṛhyeta. ([It]
would not be grasped in this way either: that supporting the additional attributes [is] what has the addi-
tional attributes.)
419For the criticism of this argument by Bhāsarvajña, cf. section 4.1 on page 83.
420I.e., a regressus ad infinitum.
421PVSVṬ 136.22 points out: tadavasthaḥ prasaṅgaḥ ko bhedaḥ syād aniścita iti ya uktaḥ. (So the
consequence remains, which was explained as “Which difference would not be ascertained?” [in PV
1 53b].) Indeed, the infinite regress mentioned in PV 1 54 does not follow from this argument, but is
discussed in the next few lines.
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[entity having additional attributes], not having been grasped with these [capacities] at
any time, [and] having a self [consisting in] the support of those [capacities],422 is not
grasped as having these [capacities]. | If on the other hand words and cognitions werepp #
to adhere[, i.e., refer,] exclusively to the additional attributes, then, because there is no
inclusion of this [entity having the attributes],423 there is no cognition of all [additional
attributes] by means of the cognition of that [which has the attributes]. | Nevertheless,up #
because of its not being indicated by words, there would not be an application [of words]
to it. So the usage of words would be useless.424 For all everyday activity [engaged]
with425 affirmation and negation has a basis in causal efficacy. And, since additional
attributes [are] without power as to this [causal efficacy], and that having the power[,
i.e., a specific particular,] is not named, what [is achieved by] the usage of words? And
therefore the additional attributes would not be additional attributes. For it is because
[additonal attributes] are, when there is an application [of a word] to something, part
of some primary [thing], that [additional attributes] are so called with reference to that.
These [additional attributes] are not parts of any [primary thing], because this [primary
thing] is not indicated by words. So why [are they] additional attributes? If this [is said]:
| “Because of the characterization [of a thing] through [additional attributes] character-pp #
ized [by words]426 there is no error.” | , then there is [that] same consequence.427 Toup #
begin with, that [having properties,] which is inseparably428 beheld (upa-√lakṣ) with
these additional attributes, is, if [it] is beheld by even [only] one [additional attribute],
beheld with its whole self. So the [unwanted] consequence has this [same] position [as
before]. For what difference (viśeṣa) is there here [in this matter]—either words should
let [a person] behold that [having attributes], or the additional attributes characterized
by these [words should let a person behold that having attributes]? [PVSV 31.1] For, to
that extent, this [thing having the additional attributes] is ascertained as supporting all
[additional attributes] at that time. So this [difference] is nothing. Therefore,
if that supporting a single [additional attribute] is to be grasped, [there are]
no supports that are different (apara) from it, which would be unobserved
422I.e., the secondary capacities, PVSVṬ 137.7–8 ...tadupakārātmā. śaktyupakārātmā. upādhyupakā-
rikāṇāṃ śaktīnāṃ yāḥ śaktayas tadātmeti yāvat (...having a self consisting in the support of those, i.e.,
having a self consisting in the support of those capacities. That is to say, having a self consisting in the
support of those, which [are] the capacities of the capacities supporting additional attributes.)
423PVSVṬ 137.14: tasyopādhimataḥ śabdajñānairasamāveśād aviṣayīkaraṇāt. (Because [there is]
no inclusion of this, i.e., because there is no making an object of that having additional attributes by
words and cognitions.)
424vyartha, useless, can also literally mean “without a referent”.
425This is a qualification of activity acc. to PVSVṬ 137.21: itthaṃbhūtalakṣaṇā (pāṇiniḥ) .... Also
see Speijer 1998: § 67.
426PVSVṬ 138.13–14: yady upādhimātraṃ codyate tathāpi śabdair lakṣitā ye upādhayas tair upā-
dhimato lakṣaṇāt paricchedād adoṣaḥ. śabdaprayogavaiyarthyadoṣo neti cet. (If it [is said by an oppo-
nent]: If only the additional attribute is meant, still [there is] no such error, i.e., there is no error of word
usage being useless, because of a characterization, i.e., a delimitation of that having additional attributes
by those additional attributes which are characterized by words.)
427I.e., the consequence of grasping all of the thing’s additional properties. Cf. PVSVṬ 138.15: ...ta-
davasthaḥ sarvopādhigrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ.
428This was also argued in PVSV 29.22 f. Cf. also PVSVṬ 138.16: nāntarīyakatayety upādhyupā-
dhimator avyabhicāreṇa. (Due to not being separabale, i.e., since there is no deviation of additional
attribute and that having an additional attribute.) This means additional attribute and that having it do not
occur separately from each other.
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if it is observed. If it is grasped, the whole is grasped. // [PV 1 55] //
This is the recapitulating verse.429
PVSV 32.13–32.18
Moreover,430 in this [case]431 words as well as ascertainments, even though
[they name and cognize] a differentiation from another and [that] differ-
entiated from another, only conform (anu-√rudh) to convention.432 // PV
1 59 //
[PVSV 32.15] There also, in the case of other-exclusion, the differentiation [is] not
one, and truly another that [which is] differentiated, because of the unwanted conse-
quence that that, which is being turned away from the differentiation of this, is this.433
And in this way there is the nonbeing of differentiation. Therefore exactly that is differ-
entiated, which is a differentiation. But the difference of [both] a word and the cognition
[due to a word exists] because of convention. There is no difference of that designated.
429This repeats the main intent of the section starting at PV 1 52ab (trl. on page 152).
430This verse and a part of the PVSV concerning it are translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f.
431PVSVṬ 143.14: tatrāpi cānyāpohe śabdārthe. (Moreover, in that [case], i.e., when other-exclusion
is the referent of a word.) For the discussion preceding this verse, cf. Kellner 2004b: 19 f. The main
point that Dharmakīrti was trying to prove in the preceding passages (starting with PV 1 52, trl. on
page 152) was that in all cases of a word denoting a real thing (property or property bearer), the result
is an understanding of the whole thing in all its aspects. Dharmakīrti now proceeds to show that this
problem does not exist when words denote exclusion.
432Cf. PVSVṬ 143.16–17, explaining saṃketam anurundhate: ye śabdā dharmadharmivācanāḥ ni-
ścayāś cobhayaviṣayāḥ, te saṅketam anurundhate. saṅketānuvidhānenaiṣāṃ dharmadharmiviṣayavi-
bhāgaḥ kalpitaḥ. paramārthatas tu vyāvṛttir eva nāstīty arthaḥ. (Words, naming properties and prop-
erty bearers, and ascertainments, which have these two as [their] objects, [only conform to convention].
This means that in conformity with convention their[, the words’ and ascertainments’,] separation of ob-
jects [into] properties and property bearers is conceptually constructed. But in reality there is no [such]
differentiation at all.)
433This passage is also translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f. and Kataoka 2009: 491. Accord-
ing to these interpretations (which I agree with), the unwanted consequence is that the thing differentiated
from others becomes identical to these others, because it’s differentiation is not identical with it itself. A
cow is qualified by, but not identical with, not non-horseness, and thus is not distinguishable from horses,
which are also not identical with not non-horseness.
This is also how PVSVṬ 143.21–24 understands this passage: yadi cāśvād vyāvṛttir anaśvatā godra-
vyasyānyā syāt tadāśvavyāvṛtter api godravyeṇa nivartitavyam bhedāt. tataś ca tadvyāvṛtter anaśva-
tāyāḥ sakāśān nivartamānasya gos tadbhāvaprasaṅgāt. aśvabhāvaprasaṅgād aśvavat. evaṃ hy aśva-
vyāvṛtter anaśvatvalakṣaṇāyā gaur vyāvṛtto bhavati yady asyāśvatvaṃ syāt. (And if the differentiation
from horse, the non-horseness of the material entity cow, were different [from that entity], then also the
differentiation from horse would be turned away by the material entity cow, because of a difference [be-
tween that differentiated and the differentiation]. And therefore, for a cow[, which is] that being turned
away from non-horseness[, that is,] from the differentiation from this [horseness], there is the conse-
quence of being this, i.e., the consequence of being a horse, like a horse. For in that way a cow would
become differentiated from the differentiation from a horse, which is characterised as non-horseness.)
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PV 1 64
Therefore434 the depiction [of the errors occurring for] the opinion [that a
thing] possesses this [genus] is rejected when the [word’s] object [is] other-
exclusion. For [this] error would exist if there is a separation of genus and
that possessing it.435 // PV 1 64 //
[PVSV 34.19] What was said: | “Even if other-exclusion is the referent of a word,pp #
every [unwanted] consequence arising for the position of [a thing] possessing that [genus]
[would be the] same, because that qualified by this [exclusion of others] is designated
[by words].”, | that also [a defense] is drawn up against by that [explanation].436 For inup #
this [theory of a thing possessing a genus], a word that is applied by means of anoth-
er referent[, i.e., by means of the genus,] to some other [referent, that possessing the
genus,] is oppressed by the errors of non self-dependency etc.437 But438 differentiation
from another is not a referent other than that differentiated, because both designate the
same. This was explained.439
[PVSV 34.23]| How then, [when a differentiated thing and its differentiation are one,pp #
could] the differentiation from another [be] a commonness, since the one differentiated[,
being a particular,] does not correspond to another? | Because there is an appearance inup #
this way [as corresponding to another] in the awareness of this [commonness].440 Indeed
there is no true (nāma) commonness at all. An awareness based onwords is generated as
434Cf. the translation and interpretation of this verse in Hattori 1996: 393 and Tillemans 2011a: 452 ff.
It is also translated and discussed in Kataoka 2009: 493(6), but I think a slight misunderstanding has hap-
pened there: “...tadvatpakṣoparṇanam / pratyākhyātaṃ...” is interpreted as “...the [opponent’s] explana-
tion of the [Buddhist] view of tadvat (a locus qualified by apoha) is refuted ...” (Kataoka 2009: 493(6)).
This doesn’t concur with the understanding of the same phrase in Hattori 1996: 393: “mention (made by
Kumārila) in reference to (the theory of) anyāpoha, of (the faults to be found with the tadvat theory (viz.,
the theory maintaining that a word denotes that which is qualified by the universal) has been rejected.”
Apart from the following explanation in PVSV 34.19–21, cf. also PVSVṬ 153.17–19: yataś ca vyā-
vṛttivyāvṛttimator abhedas tena kāraṇenānyāpohaviṣaye jātimān śabdair abhidhīyata iti tadvatpakṣaḥ.
tatra yo doṣaḥ, so ’nyāpohe ’pi syād iti tadvatpakṣopavarṇanaṃ pratyākhyātam. (°viṣaye corr. acc. to
PVSVṬms 57b7 against °viṣayo in PVSVṬ 153.18. Trl.: And for the [reason that there is] no difference
between differentiation and differentiated [thing], due to that, as a cause, given that other-exclusion is
the object [of words], [the] depiction [of these errors occurring] for the position of “[a thing] possessing
that [genus]” is rejected[, i.e., the depiction which consist in this statement]: the error, which [exists]
for this[, i.e., for] the position [that a thing] possesses this [genus][, expressed as] “Words designate that
having this [genus].”, would exist also for other-exclusion.)
435 As first explained in Frauwallner 1932: 260–263, it was Kumārila’s objection against Dignāga’s
apoha-theory that it entailed all the same errors levelled against the tadvat-theory by him. Cf. the refer-
ences in Frauwallner 1932: 261, fn. 2, the explanations and the references in Kataoka 2009: 493(6), as
well as the references in fn. 435.
436I.e., that there is no difference between the differentiated thing and the differentiation qualifying it.
Cf. PVSVṬ 143.26–27: aneneti vyāvṛttivyāvṛttimator ananyatvena prativyūḍhaṃ pratyākhyātam.
437PVSVṬ 153.29: ādiśabdād asamānādhikaraṇyopacāradoṣaparigrahaḥ. (From the word “etc.”
the errors of non-co-referentiality and metaphor [should be] understood.) Cf. Much 1997 for a discussion
of the first problem, whether and how words can denote the same thing, and cf. Pind 2009: 78–79, and
notes thereto for a translation of Dignāga’s discussion of all three problems.
438For another translation of PVSV 34.22–35.7, see Tillemans 2011a: 453, fn. 12.
439Cf., e.g., PVSV 32.15–17 (trl. section A.1 on the previous page).
440Cf. PVSVṬ 154,l. 7 f.: sāmānyabuddhau vikalpikāyāṃ tathaikākāreṇa pratibhāsanād ekākāra eva
vyāvartyate ’neneti vyāvṛttiḥ. sāmānyam ucyate. (Because of an appearance in this way[, i.e.,] with the
same (eka) form of awareness, to the conceptual awareness of a commonness, exactly the same form of
awareness is differentiated by this [appearance]. So differentiation is called commonness.)
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mixing together actually unmixed properties, because of the capacity of beginningless
mental impressions. By the power of the appearance for this [awareness], commonness
and a coreference are defined, nomatter [that this appearance has] a nonexistent referent,
because there is neither mixing[, so as to justify the commonness, nor] difference[, so
as to justify coreference,] of referents.
[PVSV 35.2] The basis for all of these[, commonness and co-reference, are] the ref-
erents differentiated from others by having this cause and this effect, and words lead to
activity by avoiding the unwanted. Therefore the object [of words] is said [to be] other-
exclusion. In this [theory], [an object], which has an external reality that is not indicated
[by words and concepts], which is one, and which is differentiated from many by the
power of the appearance in awareness, is made an object by words, [and] by concepts,
[which] have an origin in the awakening of impressions that are conceived by the expe-
rience of this [singular thing] [and that] have referents [which are] determined as being
so[, i.e., as an externally existing thing]. And only there[, in the appearance to aware-
ness,] does this which is commonly used[, i.e., spoken about,] as property and property
bearer, which are not designatable as being the same [as] or being different [from] each
[other], spread out. For there is no property different from a property bearer because
[they] do not denote a different referent. Neither is this [property] only [the property
bearer], because, like for that denoting this [property bearer], there is the consequence
of indicating another distinction[, i.e., another property,] also for that denoting the prop-
erty,441 and because, in this way, that which [a person] desires [to express with a word
for a property] is not made clear [since it would express a property bearer], no particular
convention would be made. This then (iti) is the fact that property and property bearer
can not be named442 with regard to the word referent. But for a real thing, a particular,
the common characteristic can not be named because [commonness] does not exist.
PVSV 54.17–55.13
If this is thought: | There is no cognition having a nondifferent appearance pp #
for different [things]. // PV 1 107ab //
[PVSV 54.18] We [opponents] do not say: what is not the same (aneka) does not
create the same (eka) effect. Rather [we say:] an awareness, which has the form of
something fixed upon different objects, should not have a non-different appearance. | -
Indeed there is no appearance of particulars[, which are not the same,] in [awareness up #
events]443 grasping a commonness, because444 these [awareness events] exist even if
441Which means that by saying “blue” about something also other qualities would be known (such as
that the thing is a lotus, a plant, etc.).
442Acc. to PVSVṬ 156.28–29: etad anantaroktan tattvānyatvābhyām avācyatvaṃ dharmadharmiṇoḥ
śabdārthe buddhipratibhāsiny arthe uktam. (This, which was just explained, is the fact that property
and property bearer can not be named as being the [other] (tattva) or different, [which is] explained
for the word referent, i.e., for the object appearing in awareness.) This argument thus shows that even
though property and property bearer are differentiated in everyday activity, this is not really true with
regard to the word referent as the object appearing in awareness. And since there is, ultimately, no
difference or identity between property and property bearer in this way, the errors that Kumārila thought
arised for Dignāga’s apoha-theory (cf. PV 1 64) are shown not to pertain to it.
443Cf. PVSVṬ 221.24 sāmānyagrāhiṇīṣu buddhiṣu (In [those] grasping a commonness, i.e., in
[those] awareness events.)
444The three reasons given now are, according to PVSVṬ 221.25–222.10, aimed against three different
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those [particulars] do not exist, and because of the appearance in their own cognition[,
i.e., perceptual cognition,] with another form of awareness[, i.e., other than the form of
the commonness], and because [there is] an overreaching consequence445 since a single
[thing] is not consistent with multiple forms of awareness [of it]. Therefore this [aware-
ness of a commonness] does not appear as grasping different objects, as nondifferent,
[or] as arising from these [different objects]. Even though [it] has no appearance of this[,
a particular], [conceptual awareness] causes the world to engage in everyday activity
because of the confusion of determination. But this form, appearing in this [concep-
tual awareness], does not exist in the objects, other (anyatra) than as a difference that
has no difference.446 But this [common form of awareness] is unreal. In this way this
[awareness] grasping only this [unreal common form] goes astray. This was already
explained.447
[PVSV 55.6] Moreover: even for those teaching a commonness as a real thing,
the particulars are completely differentiated. How [should there be] an awareness hav-
ing a nondifferent form of awareness with regard to these [particulars]? This is to be
questioned in the same manner.448 | [It is] not [to be questioned] in the same manner,pp #
because a non-different commonness really exists there [in the particulars]. | Now,449up #
opinions about the relation between something that appears and particulars or universals: first, the form
in which a particular appears to perception is the same as the form in which it appears to conceptual
cognition. Second, the form appearing in the awareness of a universal is the form of the particulars. Third,
the same individual has a twofold form: with one it appears to perception, with the other to conceptual
cognition.
445PVSVṬ 222.8–10: tṛtīyam pakṣaṃ nirākartum āha—anekākārāyogād iti. ekasyānekatvam ayu-
ktam ekānekatvayor virodhāt. atiprasaṅgāc cety ekasyānekatvakalpanāyāṃ na kvacid ekatvaṃ syād
ity arthaḥ. (In order to refute the third position (cf. fn. 444 on the preceding page), [Dharmakīrti] said:
“Because it is not consistent with multiple forms of awareness.” Being many is not consistent for one,
because being one and being many are contradictory. And because there is the overreaching conse-
quence[, i.e.,] there would not be oneness for anything when there is the option that one [thing] is many
[things]. This is the meaning.
446For this way of construing anyatra, cf. Böthlingk and R. Roth 1855: 265–266, anyatra, 7. A dif-
ference that has no difference, is nothing but other-exclusion. Cf. PVSVṬ 222.22–25: kathaṃ tarhi
vyaktiṣv abhinnākārapratibhāsa ity āha—anyatra bhedādabhedina iti. bhedo ’nyāpohaḥ sa eva prati-
vyaktyabhedī. tathā hi yathaikā govyaktir agovyāvṛttā tathānyāpi. tad anena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇā-
ny eva vijātīyavyāvṛttāny abhedīni bheda ity ucyante. anyatraśabdaś cāyaṃvibhaktyantapratirūpako
nipātaḥ. anyaśabdasamānārthaḥ. na tv ayantralpratyayāntaḥ saptamyarthasyāvivakṣitatvāt. tenāyam
artho yathoktena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇātmakād bhedādabhedino ’nyaḥ pratibhāsamāna ākāro ’rtheṣu
nāsti kiṃ tu svalakṣaṇātmaka eva bhedo vijātīyavyāvṛtter abhedī sarvatra vidyate ’bhedādhyavasāyāt.
abhedādhyavasāyasya ca sa eva bhedaḥ pāramparyeṇa nimittam. (Because of [the question]: “How
then is there an appearance of a non-different form in particulars?”, [Dharmakīrti] said: other than a
difference that has no difference. This difference, i.e., other-exclusion alone has no difference for [mul-
tiple] particulars. For [it is] so: As one cow-particular is differentiated from non-cow, so also another
[cow-particular is differentiated from non-cow]. Thus, by this method, the particulars alone, which are
differentiated from that of another genus, i.e., non-different, are called “difference.” And this word
“anyatra” is an indeclinable that accords to a case ending. It has the same meaning as “other.” But this
is not the tral ending[, i.e., tra,] because the sense of the seventh[, locative,] case is not meant. Thus this
is the meaning: An appearing form, which is different from the non-different difference—which has the
nature of a particular in the way explained—does not exist in the objects; rather, a difference, which only
has the nature of particulars, [and which is] without difference due to a differentiation from [things] of
a different kind, is seen in all [particulars of the same class] because non-difference is determined. And
for a determination of non-difference precisely this difference is the indirect cause.)
447As pointed out in Gnoli 1960b: 190, acc. to PVSVṬ 223.9–10 the reference is to PVSV 50.16–17.
448I.e., in the samemanner that Dharmakīrti’s theory was questioned in PV 1 107a: abhinnapratibhāsā
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the appearance of this commonness in that [particular], even though it [may] exist, is
not noticed. For this [conceptual awareness] is regarded as having an appearance of
colour, [and] constellation. But the commonness is not like this [, i.e., it does not have
colour, constellation, etc.], and neither is there any undifferentiated form apart from
this. Also for one teaching shape (ākṛti) as the commonness, there is no occurrence [of
the commonness] in another object because, like [the particular] having a specificity,
this commonness is not separate [from the particular]. Therefore (iti), because of this
difference, an undifferentiated appearance is not consistent.
PVSV 56.10–57.23
| [Objection:] Now,450 a cognition is their [the particulars’] effect and it is pp #
differentiated. // PV 1 108c”d //
PVSV 56.11 According to [its] object[, that is], because, like this [particular], also a
cognition which has an appearance of this [particular] is different. How [then can there
be] the same (eka°) effects? For this [cognition] is their effect and differentiated. Also
what is the same effect of a pot etc., like carrying water etc., that also is differentiated
because of the difference according to the thing. Therefore different [things] do not
have the same effect. | [Answer:] This error [does] not [exist], for [this reason]: up #
Because451 of being the reason for the same judgement (pratyavamarśa), a
cognition (dhī) is without difference. Through being the reason for a single
cognition also the particulars are not differentiated. // PV 1 109 //
[It has been] made known earlier (nivedita)452 how there is no mixing of the own
natures of beings. An awareness (buddhi) having a mixed form of awareness with re-
gard to these [things] is merely an error. And this (iti) [has also been explained]:453
“But the different referents of words (padārtha), indirectly being reasons for a concept,
generate this [awareness] because of [their] own nature.” But this discrimination (vi-
veka) of the own nature causing non-that [i.e., different effects], [is] called their [the
referents’] nondifferent difference, because [it is] the cause for some [thing] which is
the same, [i.e., the same] cognition etc. Even though it[, an effect like cognition etc.,]
also [is] differentiated according to the thing (pratidravya), [it] appears (√khyā) as non-
different, being (bhavat) by [its] nature the reason for the same judgement which covers
(°avaskandin) [different things] with non-difference. Because of being the reason for
an object like cognition etc., [which a)] [is] the reason for the judgement of being like
this [thing, and b)] is qualified by an appearance of a nondifference, things too generate
by [their] own nature a single (eka) cognition [which has] a mixed form (ākāra)[, and
dhīr na bhinneṣv iti cen matam.
449Karṇakagomin says that “nanu” here introduces the Siddhāntavādin’s, i.e., Dharmakīrti’s statement
(nanvityādi siddhāntavādī, PVSVṬ 223.14).
450Also cf. the translation and discussion of this and the next verse in Dunne 2004: 120–126.
451Cf. also the translation of this verse and the following commentary up to PVSV 57.7 in Steinkellner
1971: 190, fn. 46.
452Acc. to Gnoli 1960b: 190, note to p. 56, l. 18 and PVSVṬ 227.26–27, this refers to PV 1 40. Dunne
2004: 122, fn. 111: “a likely candidate is PVI.68–75 and PVSV ad cit.”.
453PVSVṬ 228.7–8 cakāro niveditam ity āsyānukarṣaṇārthaḥ. etad api tatraiva prastāve niveditam.
(The conjunction “ca” has the purpose of pulling over this [phrase]: “it was explained”. This too was
explained in the same passage[, i.e., PV 1 40].)
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has] the difference [of the thing’s] own nature as [its] real referent. This has often been
said.454 Therefore the non-difference of entites is only that [they] have the same effect.
And this[, that they have the same effect,] is the separation (viśleṣa) from
[things having] other (atat) effects // PV 1 110a //.
alone
because of the non-observation and negation // PV 1 110c //
of a real thing
other than that [particular], [which would] persist [in different particulars]
// PV 1 110b //
[PVSV 57.13] “For there is no observable [thing] not appearing separately [from
the particulars].” This has been said,455 or [also]: “If [it] exists, how [could it,] having
no basis anywhere[, be] the reason for a cognition?”, and [also this was said]: “And
because [its] negation is performed (vidhāna) it is impossible to conceive of it.”
Therefore it is correct that
convention (saṃketa) // PV 1 110d’ //
also
has a knowledge of that [difference] as [its] purpose // PV 1 110d” //
alone. Also the convention which is made should shine forth (√śubh) only for the
[sake of the] cognition of that which is this mutual discrimination of things, since [con-
vention] serves [successful] activity by [means of] a discrimination of [that] causing
non-that. If there were no convention with the purpose of a cognition of that [differ-
ence], one would not be acting by [means of] an avoidance of others, because, even
at the time that there is everyday activity [directed at] this [thing differentiated from
others],456 there is no contact to it [anymore]. For [then] a discrimination of these [that
have the same effect] from those [different effects] is not indicated by a word.457
PV 1 113cd–123
| If the object “tree” is grasped through the exclusion from non-trees, bothpp #
have a basis in each other. So, if one [of them] is not grasped, both are
not grasped. Convention is impossible because of that. | So some (kecit)up #
454Gnoli 1960b: 190, to p. 57,l.6: “see f. ex. the words tām tu bhedinaḥ padārthāḥ, etc. (above p. 56,
ll. 19–20) and stanzas 73–74.”
455Acc. Gnoli 1960b: 190, note to p. 57, l. 13: “[...] see the stanzas 71–75.” Cf. Dunne 2004: 341–352
for a translation of these verses and Dharmakīrti’s autocommentary.
456Cf. PVSVṬ 230.16: tasyānyavyavṛttasya svabhāvasya ....
457I think the argument here is that if a verbal convention were to be made for something real, then
that thing would not exist anymore when that convention is used. And the reason is that words would not
indicate a difference (viveka) of things, as they do in the apoha-theory.
PVSVṬ 230.18–21 explains: etad uktam bhavati. yadā vidhirūpeṇānyavyāvṛto ’rtho viṣayīkṛtas ta-
dānyavyavacchedaḥ pratīyeta. etad evāha — na hītyādi. viveka iti viviktaḥ svabhāvaḥ, teṣāṃ tatkāri-
ṇāṃ, tebhya ity atatkāryebhyaḥ. yadi hi tasya viviktasya svabhāvasya pratītaye saṅketaḥ kṛtaḥ syād
evaṃ vyavahāre ’pi śabdena codyeta. tathā cānyaparihāreṇa pravarteteti saṅketo ’pi tadvidarthika eva
yuktaḥ. ([By this] the [following] is said: When an object differentiated from others is made an object
[of conceptual cognition] in a positive form, then [its] separation from another would be cognized. Ex-
actly this [Dharmakīrti] said: “For not” etc. Discrimination, i.e., a discriminated nature of these, i.e.,
which have that effect, from those, meaning those with different effects. For if a convention were made
in order to cognize this discriminated nature [itself], it would be indicated by words in the same way
also in everyday activity. And in this way a convention also, as (iti) [it] should apply [to an object] only
through avoiding what is other, has only knowledge of this [separation] as its object.)
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say.458 // PV 1 113cd–114 //
[PVSV 58.22] | If the difference from non-trees [is] tree, [then,] because this [tree] pp #
can not be grasped in this way without grasping non-tree, [and] because also non-tree,
which is has the form of a distinction from that [tree], is not known by [someone who]
does not know tree, convention is not possible for an object that has not arisen in aware-
ness. | So some [say]. up #
For these [people], are non-trees distinguished in convention or not? // PV
1 115ab’ //
[PVSV 59.2] For those [persons], who, assuming a commonness as a single real
thing, so question (√cud) the mutual basis when convention [is made] through distinc-
tion (vyavaccheda) from others, [for them], when a convention is made for this [real
commonness] too, [are] non-trees distinguished or not?
If [non-trees are] distinguished, how [are they] known without (ṛte) first
grasping tree? // PV 1 115b”cd //
[PVSV 59.7] For then459 a cognizer (pratipattṛ) does not know tree, nor non-tree,
because [the cognizer] approaches intent on [learning about] this [convention] only in
order to know that[, what a tree and a non-tree is]. How does this unknowing [person]
understand the distinction from non-tree when a convention [is made]? And if [that
distinction is] not understood, [then]—because of a word [which is] based on [what is]
other than that which is not avoided—
those engaging in everyday activity would, if [there were] no negating [of
nontree at the time a] convention [is made], not act avoiding that [non-tree],
as [they would not act avoiding] a particular kind (bheda) of tree. // PV
1 116 //
[PVSV 59.13] Activity because of a word which, at the time a convention [is made],
is based [on something] without a distinction from that which is different (para), is
not possible as avoiding that [which was not distinguished] at [the time of] everyday
activity, as a particular kind [of tree], such as Śiṃśapā etc. [is acted towards because
of the word tree]. Or also [this] may be [objected]:
| Affirming [is] not negating another. Pointing out one [thing]460 stand- pp #
ing infront [of one], an agreement is made: “This is a tree.” This [same
thing] is acted towards also at [the time of] everyday activity. Therefore
this error [of mutual dependency] doesn’t exist [for this position]. // PV
1 117–118ab’ //
[PVSV 59.18] Indeed, by someone [adhering to the] teaching that commonness is
an existing real thing nothing is affirmed through the distinction of something. Rather,
clearly seeing a single real thing positioned in front [of one], the convention is made:
458PVSVṬ 233.20–28 cites both Uddyotakara (NV 314.5–7) and Kumārila (ŚV Av 83–85ab, cf. sec-
tion B.7 on page 185 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84) as maintaining that other-exclusion as a word referent
leads into a circular dependency between A (e.g., a cow) and non-A (e.g., a non-cow).
459Acc. to PVSVṬ 234: tadeti saṃketakāle pratipattā, yasmai saṃketaḥ kriyate. (Then, i.e., at the
time of a convention, a cognizer, i.e., for whose sake a convention is made.)
460PVSVṬ 236.18 ekam iti sāmānyam. (One[, i.e.,] commonness.)
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“This is a tree.” This object, exactly as observed at the time when the convention [is
made], or that connected to it,461 is cognized also in everyday activity. [PVSV 60.1]
So [there is] no similar [unwanted] consequence[, i.e., that tree and non-tree are inter-
dependent]. | [Answer:] There is no dissimilar consequence. For also here[, when aup #
convention is made for a real thing, by saying]
“This also [is] a tree”, “only this [is a tree]”. So the [unwanted] conse-
quence is not averted. // PV 1 118b”cd //
Also someone saying “This is a tree.”, [whilst] pointing out a single [thing] does not
go beyond these two options: “That also [is a tree].”, [or] “That only [is a tree].” And
for both of these there is precisely this error. | [Opponent:] [There is] no error, becausepp #
a cognition of what is opposite to that seen is easy. For, in someone seeing some single
[thing] [and] experiencing an awareness that has a form distinct from that [thing], an
ascertainment of difference, which distinguishes these [things], arises according to the
experience “[this is] other than that.” For, someone who has been taught “Only this is
a tree.” whilst being shown [a tree] cognizes all by himself exactly this non-tree just
where he does not see this [tree]. This is not possible for someone teaching exclusion,
because a form observed in one [instance] does not continue in some [other instance].462
When there is a cognition [of tree and non-tree] through observation, there would not
be a cognition in this way even for another particular. | [Answer:] Thus then also hereup #
there is this same [error], due to this [reason]:
For, based (sthita) on a single cognition called a single judgment, the cog-
nizer (prapattṛ) himself divides the referents which are reasons for this
[cognition] and for another (atad) [cognition]. // PV 1 119 //
[PVSV 60.16] As this has been made known earlier,463 some such entities, even
though different as to [their] original form (prakṛti), produce a single effect, like a cog-
nition etc., [but] not others. These this [cognizer] cognizes there[, at the time a conven-
tion is made], all by himself distinguishing reasons for that [same effect] and reasons
not for that [same effect].
[The learner of a convention] should cognize the entities present in his464
awareness of them—[which] appear as a cognition’s cause, [which] lack
the form of not [being that] cause, [and so are] as if of the same form—as
different [from those which do not cause that cognition].465 So an expres-
sion is bound to a difference. A cognition, making this [difference] known
461I.e., the particular which is connected to a universal, cf. PVSVṬ 236.22–23: tatsambandhinaṃ veti
sāmānyasambandhinam āśrayam. (Or that connected to it, i.e., the basis which has a connection to a
commonness.)
462According to PVSVD 294b1 ananvayāt should be understood as giving the reason for the previous
sentence, that this is not possible for someone adhering to an exclusion theory: rnam par gcod pa smra
ba la ni ’di mi srid de, gcig na mthoṅ ba’i ṅo bo ni gaṅ la yaṅ rjes su ’gro ba med pa’i phyir ro.
mthoṅ bar rtogs na ni gsal ba gźan pa yaṅ de ltar rtogs par mi ’gyur ro źe na. This is also reflected in
PVSVṬ 237.22–29 (the opponent is speaking): anyāpohavādino ’py evam iti cet. āha — nedam ityādi.
ekatra saṃketakāle dṛṣṭasyāsādhāraṇasya rūpasya kvacid vyaktyantare ’nanvayād ananugamāt.
463PV 1 73–74 acc. to Gnoli 1960b: 190, note to p. 60, l. 13 (sic!), cf. Dunne 2004: 344–345 for a
translation. Also see PVSV 25.15–23.
464tasya is not part of the verse.
465Cf. PVSVṬ 239.23: ...atatkāribhyo bhedena ...
162
A.1. Passages from the apoha section in the PVSV
because of this [expression], beholds [this difference] as if it were the same
real thing due to an error. // PV 1 120-1 //
[PVSV 60.23] Since466 these [things] are experienced only according to [their] na-
ture (prakṛti) [there is] continuity (anvaya) of such a concept’s causes. Therefore a
learner467 cognizes [those things which]
1. occur in the mind of someone seeing this [same effect amongst the things],
2. are determined as being a cause for this cognition and as excluding what is other
than this [cause for this cognition] even though they are really not like [this],
[and]
3. have a difference of external and internal [form] that is not distinguished,468
[this learner now] who is based on conceptual cognition after having been shown in
accordance with [this] cognition [just described] those [things] appearing as the same
in his own and the other’s concepts, [this person] will cognize as different the reasons for
this [conceptual] cognition. [PVSV 61.1] Therefore [the learner] binds an expression
to the difference [of these things] from those [things which are] not reasons for that[,
i.e., what is not a reason for the conceptual cognition of tree]. [It is] only in virtue of
an error [that] a conceptual awareness, understanding this [difference] because of that
[expression], appears as if (iva) grasping one single real thing[, i.e., a commonness].
Further, no [such] single thing is observable there [amongst the particulars], because
of seeing and not-seeing469 which [he], even though seeing [things] as different, could
make a distinction between tree and non-tree, because [he] does not grasp it [the single
real thing, e.g., treeness,] separately from the appearances of branch etc. like [he grasps]
a stick where [there is] a stick-bearer. Also, because [such a single thing] which is not
grasped as separate (pravibhāga) from others (āpara) is not noticed (anupalakṣaṇa),
[as] also because a form (ākṛti) seen in one [thing] can not be seen in another,470 only
a single particular would be a tree, given that [that] having that [form] and [that] not
having that [form] are[, respectively,] a tree and not a tree.
PVSV 76.5–77.11
[PVSV 76.25] What’s more, some [person] imagining a commonness as an object dif-
ferent [from a particular]471 will imagine [it] either as being in (gata) its own basis alone,
or as being in everything, as [in the case of] ether etc. If, amongst these [options], [it is
imagined] as being in its own basis alone, [then], if pot etc. comes into being in places
that are free from potness etc., how is a commonness, which occurs in material things
in different places, possible where these [are]? For this [commonness]
466The following passage is translated and discussed in McCrea and Patil 2006: 312 ff.
467PVSVṬ 241.7: yasmai saṃketaḥ kriyate sa pratipattā. (For whose sake a convention is made, that
is a learner.)
468Meaning the learner does not differentiate between what is internal and external to his cognition,
the form of awareness and the real thing.
469Emend darśānādarśaṇābhyaṃ PV 1 61.3–4 to darśanādarśaṇābhyaṃ, supported by
PVSVṬ 242.14.
470According to PVSVṬ 242.22 f., this is an argument against an anarthāntarasāmānyavādin. Cf. also
the reference to an ākṛtisāmānyavādin in PVSV 55.21 (cf. PVSVṬ 223.20–25).
471PVSVṬ 301–302 refers to discussions found with Kumārila (ŚV Āv 25–29a and ŚV Vv 30 and
32, with variations) and Uddyotakara (NV 302.21–303.13, approximately, I could not find the last few
sentences (following nīlapratyayas, PVSVṬ 301.21) in the NV).
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does not go // PV 1 152a’ //
from an earlier material thing into a material thing wanting to arise, because inac-
tivity [of the commonness] is admitted to [by you]. For an entity occurring in another
material thing, which does not move from this [and] which does not pervade the inter-
mediate space between the two, can not be connected with an entity having a different
place. This [entity], at an earlier [time],
was not there, [but] is there later // PV 1 152a”b’ //
and it has not arisen there, nor come from anywhere. So who is capable of shoul-
dering (ud-√vah) this burden of obstacles, except because of stupidity (jāḍya)?
PVSV 82.4–25
[PVSV 82.4–25] | How then, when there is no undifferentiated real thing[, i.e., no uni-pp #
versal], is there now an occurrence of a cognition and word which conform [to many
things]? | [In the same way] as for cook etc.472 | But this is considered: How [can cogni-up #
pp # tion andword apply] to these also? | [But] this was considered, how (yathā) [a universal]
up # is not possible for these.
473 | So then would these two[, word and cognition,] be without
pp # a cause? | [The two are] not without cause, but rather, they do not have a cause that is
up #
an external reality. The generation of a concept is due to an awakening—according to
[its] self474—of mnemonic imprints. From this, words [follow]. Further, that the basis
of a concept and a designation is not the existence of a real thing was explained often,475
because, even though there is an observation of mutually different [real things], these
two[, cognitions and words,] are observed to conform [to these different things] by an
association (samāveśa) of contradictory forms in virtue of the mnemonic imprints from
a convention [set for a thing]. But amongst these [things] there is no own nature at all
that has a binding to this[, word and cognition], because an association of two [things],
contradictory to each other, in one [thing] at the same time is not possible. | Then [app #
word and a cognition] would be without any restriction (aniyama). For an existing
[thing] that has no cause is not capable of restriction, since [it can be said at will:] “[It]
exists somewhere, [it] doesn’t exist somewhere.” | Truly, that [word and cognition] isup #
not without a cause, because the specific quality of a mnemonic imprint is a cause. But
an external [thing] that exists in such a way[, i.e., as a cause for the same cognition,] is
not observable. This is what we say. Nor must [a conceptual cognition] not be, when
this [external cause] does not exist,476 because such a concept is generated when [there
472PVSVṬ 317.30–318.10 yathā pācakādiṣu pācakatvādisāmānyan nāsti, tathā prasādhitam. atha ca
tatra pravartete anvayinau jñānaśabdau. tathānyatrāpy antareṇa sāmānyan tau bhaviṣyataḥ. (Corrrect
bhivaṣyataḥ in PVSVṬ 318.10 to bhaviṣyataḥ acc. to PVSVṬms 117a1. Trl.: As for a cook etc. there is
no commonness cookness etc., as is well established. But still (atha ca), conforming words and concepts
apply to this cook etc., so also for another [thing] they will exist without a universal.)
473Whether the universal cookness qualifies cooks was discussed following PV 1 63 and again in
PVSV 80.18–81.23 (cf. the translation of these verses from the Tibetan and their explanation in Frauwall-
ner 1933: 79 ff.).
474I.e., every conceptual cognition is due to the awakening of specific (its own, or its proper) mnemonic
imprints.
475Cf., e.g., PVSV 35.2–9 ( section A.1 on page 157).
476Additions acc. to PVSVṬ 319.14–15: na cāsati tasminn anvayini bāhye nimitte vikalpena na bha-
vitavyam bhavitavyam eva. (Nor, when this does not exist, i.e., the continous external cause [of a cog-
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are] inexistent objects, grasped by sleepers and [persons suffering from] timira, and
when there are specific forms that are superimposed [due to] mnemonic impressions of
an agreement. And it is not [the case that] all forms of awareness [occur] for everything
because these [concepts] are generated for inexistent [objects], since those which are
perceived in such a way[, i.e., separately,] are [also] conceptualized entirely separate.
And about this something was said477 by us: even by the nature [of things there are]
certain causes for the same cognition, because of a difference in [these things’] own
nature. Moreover,
by which contact a genus spreads out into something when [there is] the
same difference of things, but not into another, that [contact] alone should
be the basis of both words and cognitions. // PV 1 162 //
[PVSV 82.25] This is an intermediate verse.
nition], must a conceptual cognition [not exist][, i.e.,] it really must exist.) For this construction of the
3rd case (instrumental) with bhavitavyam cf. Böthlingk and R. Roth 1868: 224 f.
477According to Gnoli 1960b: 191, this refers to PV 1 73. This is also said in PVSVṬ 319.28–29.
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A.2 PVSVṬ 114.9–21 ad PVSV 41
Because of this478, that which was said by Kumārila[, i.e.]:479
| “But there is no word which performs other-exclusion,480 as described onpp #
your position. Mere negation is simply not understood481 in this appear-
ance.
Rather, from words, such as “cow,” “gayal” (gavaya), “elephant,” [or]
“tree,” a verbal awareness (mati) turns up through a determination having
an affirmative form.
Therefore, only for those words, to which the [negating particle] nañ is
joined, shall there be an element of negation of another. For others[, i.e.,
words that are not negated,] only482 the own self [of this word] is under-
stood.”,
| establishes only what is [already] established [for us], because it is assumed [byup #
us] that the referent of a word has an affirmative form.483
| How then is the Buddhist opinion different from the opinion of others? Or, why ispp #
the object of word and [logical] mark called exclusion?
| Now, there is a big difference between [these two opinions], because conceptualup #
cognition, which is postulated by the others as being [something that] has a real thing
as [its] object, is postulated by the Buddhists as being [something that] has an imag-
ined [thing] as its object. And484 the imagined form (ākāra), because of being based
on exclusion, is called exclusion, or [one states this fact with the words] “[Another] is
excluded by this.” But the mere negation of another, which is implicitly (arthāt) re-
ferred to [in the previous statement], is called [exclusion] since [one says] “[the act of]
excluding [is] exclusion.” But the particular is called exclusion since [one says] “In this
[particular the other] is excluded.”
478The reference is to PV 1 126, which Karṇakagomin has just quoted.
479As pointed out by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), the first two of the following three verses are
not found in the ŚV, and might therefore be from Kumārila’s lost Bṛhaṭṭīkā. The last verse corresponds
to ŚV Av 164.
480Cf. PV 3 164 (trl. on the next page) and the references to Dignāga given there.
481The words have been awkwardly separated here, read pratibhāse ’vagamyate instead of pratibhā-
seva gamyate in PVSVṬ 114.11.
482Read svātmaivānyatra acc. to PVSVṬms 44b2 against svātmevānyatra in PVSVṬ 114.15.
483Cf. the argument in PVSVṬ 113.6–7.
484For the rest of this paragraph, cf. the material in PVṬFr.
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A.3 Material from PV 3
The most detailed modern study of the PV as a whole was carried out in Japanese by
Tosaki (1979–1985). Even though I do not read (or speak) Japanese, Masamichi Sakai
was so kind as to discuss with me the main differences he found between Tosaki’s and
my interpretations.
PV 3 147
Even485 if [there is] a continous (avayavin) cognition, it [is a cognition
possessing] the manifestation (avabhāsi) of a word [and] a particular. [But
the universal] cowness is indeed declared [to be] free of the form (ākāra)
of a colour (varṇa), a shape (ākrti), [and] a letter (akṣara).486 // PV 3 147 //
PV 3 161–173
Objects,487 even though [there is] a difference [between them], are causes
for a similar (tādṛś) cognition only due to their nature [of being] a real
thing. This (tat) [similar] cognition, which [occurs] for some [objects],
cognizes these [objects] as such[, as being the same]. // PV 3 161 //
Cognitions too, [even though there is a] difference [between them],488 [are
a cause] for a judgement of a non-difference. So a continuity of a separation
(viśleṣa) from what does not have that effect, but not of a single real thing,
exists for real things.489 Therefore a sound complex,490 referring to this
[separation, applies] to a real thing. // PV 3 162–163ab //
Even though there is no reference (niṣṭhā) to a distinction of a capacity of
external [things], a sound complex for this [distinction] is bound to [those]
reflections in conceptual cognitions [which] have a reference to that [dis-
tinction]. Therefore, because of referring to an exclusion from others, a
485For Manorathanandin’s commentary on this verse, cf. section A.4 on page 170.
486As explained in section 4.1 on page 84, Ratnakīrti’s understanding of the compound varṇākṛtya-
kṣarākāraśūnyaṃ differs. Cf. the translation of § 34.
487The section PV 3 163cd–173 is titled anyāpohacintā (“A Consideration of Other-Exclusion”) by
Sāṅkṛtyāyana (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940: iv), and Miyasaka 1971–1972: 62 probably adopted this
title. But it seems easier to understand the question of “continuity” (a word can repeatedly refer to similar
objects) and the relation between word, its object, and the real thing starting in PV 3 163cd as following
from the context of PV 3 161–163ab.
The translation presented here depends strongly on Manorathanandin’s commentary
(PVV 166.16–170.26, trl. section A.4 on page 170). Tosaki 1979: 263–272 lets the section start
at PV 3 163ab (but notes, as Masamichi Sakai explained to me, that it can be understood to start
with PV 3 161 in Tosaki 1979: 262, fn. 141) and Dreyfus 1997: 225–232 translates and discusses PV
3 163cd–170, adding plenty of information about Tibetan interpretations of these verses.
488This interpretation follows that in Tosaki 1979: 259 f. as explained to me by Masamichi Sakai.
489Tosaki does not, as Masamichi Sakai told me, construe vastūnāṃ vidyatewith anvayaḥ as I do (and
as I think PVV sees it, cf. section A.4 on page 170), but with a supplied anyāpohaḥ. Probably this is due
to the fact that acc. to Tosaki a new section starts before PV 3 163ab.
490śruti could simply be a synonym for śabda (“word”) as indeed Tosaki 1979 understands it here. I
have chosen to translate it as sound complex nevertheless, since it seems to me that Dharmakīrti might
have in mind not only words, but also parts of words like suffixes etc.
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sound complex was called “making an exclusion from others” [by Dig-
nāga].491 // [PV 3 163cd–164] //
Which reflection492 of an object appears in a cognition [arising] because
of a word, as if separate [from a cognition], that also [is] not the nature of
[that] object. This error arises from impressions. // [PV 3 165] //
[Objection:]493 | If this [reflection] is designated by sound complexes, whichpp #
part is understood regarding the object? And if that [part] is not under-
stood, making a convention would be meaningless [as it] has that pur-
pose.494 // [PV 3 166] //
[Answer:] | To this [question:] “Which part of an object does a wordup #
express?”, exclusion from others is said [in answer]. But this form does
not exist in the object. How [should a word] expressing that [form] partake
of the object? // [PV 3 167] //
A continuous word’s interest (kārya) is in a continuous object. But this
[form of awareness is] discontinuous, because of [its] non-difference from
thought, and [it is] formed by the repetition of [a thing’s] observation. // [PV
3 168] //
Further, because of understanding that differentiated from others by means
(gatyā) of a superimposition of that form, there is no contradiction if [there
is] this formulation: “That object alone (eva)[, the form of awareness,] is
the object of a word.” // [PV 3 169] //
Or, apprehensions, which are formed by words, have an erroneous appear-
ance. And since [these apprehensions] accord to this part of an object, a
sound complex [is called] performing exclusion. // [PV 3 170] //
Therefore, even at the time [of forming] a convention, exclusion from oth-
ers—which has been connected with an object pointed out [that] results in
one’s own cognition [of that exclusion]495—is connected496 to the sound
complex. // [PV 3 171] //
491Cf. PSV 5 11d, and see the corresponding passages in Pind 2009: 85, and notes and the references
to TS2. According to Pind 2009: 183 f., n. 182 this phrase is part of the last verse in the first part of Dig-
nāga’s exposition of the apoha theory, where all alternatives are shown to be untenable, and anyāpohakṛt
remains as the only alternative.
492I understand pratibimbaka here as a noun (equal to pratibimba), which is also how it is understood
in Tosaki 1979. If it is taken as a bahuvrīhi, one could understand “as if separate and as if reflecting an
object.” This has some support in the PVV, cf. section A.4 on page 171.
493Acc. to the interpretation in Dreyfus 1997: 228–229, this verse is Dharmakīrti’s answer to a Bud-
dhist’s objection. I follow the interpretation in the PVV and the explicit identification of the pūrvapakṣa
and uttarapakṣa in Vibhū 168, nn. 4 and 6 (cf. section A.4 on page 172 and section A.4 on page 172),
according to which PV 3 166 is spoken from an opponent’s point of view. One text-immanent argument
for this is that the question introducing PV 3 167 (śabdo ’rthāṃśaṃ kam āheti) seems to make more
sense this way, since it can be understood as taking up the central concern of the objection.
494Cf. PV 1 110d, referred to in Tosaki 1979: 266, fn. 151 (cf. trl. on page 160), where Dharmakīrti
says that the purpose of convention is to make exclusion known, which is understood as a part of an
object (e.g., a thing’s difference from all non-red things, its difference from all non-chair things etc.).
495I.e., an object (e.g., a red apple) is pointed out to a person who is learning a convention (e.g., “red”),
and this object causes that person’s own cognition of the relevant object’s exclusion from others (“is red”,
or different from all non-red things).
496I would actually prefer the causative saṃbandhyate (is caused to be connected) found in PVM 3 171
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Because [a convention] depends on a non-observation [of a word]497 for
another [thing], [and] because it depends on an observation of this [word]
for some [thing], exclusion is bound to a sound complex. This [double
dependency] is not possible in [the case of] a real thing. // [PV 3 172] //
Therefore class etc., [and] a connection to these, are not in an object, and a
sound complex is [therefore] not bound to these, because words indeed498
are joined to differentiation from others. // [PV 3 173] //
PV 3 183ab
Words designate a commonness, and a conceptual construction has the
same referent [as words]. // PV 3 183ab //
PV 3 233–235
Even if [a universal such as] whiteness etc. exists, this, [which is] such
an object of the sense-faculties, is not designated by words, because of the
difference of the form [appearing in] the two cognitions[, a perception and
a conceptual awareness]. // PV 3 233 //
If [this is said:] | “Even though awareness [events all] have the same ob- pp #
ject, this [difference does exist], since there is a different basis [for these
awareness events].”, | then cognitions (citta) [based on] hearing etc. have up #
different objects. So why [is] that [the case]? // PV 3 234 //
The basis of thoughts (cetas) is truly different [in each case]. [So] why
does a completely unique real thing (vastu) have a nature that appears with
different forms of awareness (ākāra)? // PV 3 235 //
PV 3 407ab
[That an object is] manifest [or] non-manifest [to awareness] can not be
due to a difference such as distant, near, etc. // PV 3 407ab //
to sambadhyate (is connected) here. On the one hand, it is uncommon that the seventh, locative, case
“śrutau” is construed with sambadhyate (which typically construes with the third, instrumental, case),
but it is typical for the causative form (cf. Böthlingk and R. Roth 1868: 13–14). On the other hand,
understanding a causative would mean that in setting a convention the learner is caused to connect a
difference that an object has with a word, which reflects the situation of setting a convention as described
by Dharmakīrti quite well (cf., e.g., PV 1 120–121 and PVSV, trl. on page 163). But since PV 3 172
contains the same phrase without any variants, it seems more likely that sambadhyate is actually the
correct form, and I have followed this in my translation.
497This addition follows Tosaki 1979 (explained to me by Masamichi Sakai). In a convention, a word
is bound to some things, but not to others.
498Note that PVV 170.26 reads anyavyāvṛttāv eva, resulting in “because words are joined only to
differentiation from others.” This is also how Tosaki 1979 understands this passage.
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A.4 Material from the PVV
PVV 161.9–18 ad PV 3 147
[Objection:] | If universals do not exist, then how [can there be] a continuous (anvayin)pp #
cognition for completely differentiated particulars? | So [Dharmakīrti] said: Also [that]up #
continuous cognition,499 which arises, that also (ca) is cognized as having that[, i.e.,
having] an appearance [or] form of a word (śabda) such as “cow” etc., and [the appear-
ance] of a particular thing with a specific colour (varṇa) [and] shape (saṃsthāna); [but
it is] not [cognized] as having an appearance of a genus (jāti).
[Objection:] | What then, is [there] no [cognition] at all having an appearance of app #
universal? | So [Dharmakīrti] says: For cowness is explained by the Sāmānyavādins toup #
be empty (śūnya) of the form, cognized as such, of these[, i.e., of the form of] colour[,
i.e.,] blue etc., shape[, i.e.,] figure, letter[, i.e.,] the word “cow.” Therefore, that which,
having colour, shape, etc., appears in a continuous cognition is not a universal.
PVV 166.20–170.26 ad PV 3 161–173
PVV 166.20–167.3 ad PV 3 161
[Objection:] | If a universal is not differentiated from the particulars (vyakti),500 thenpp #
how [can] an apprehension [be] continuous (anugāmin) [for various particulars]? | Soup #
[Dharmakīrti] said: Some objects, even though there is a difference between them, are
the cause for a similar, continuous, cognition[, i.e., a cognition] that has the differen-
tiation from that not having that effect as its object, only due to their nature [of being]
a real thing[, i.e.,] only due to [their] basic nature (prakṛti).
A cognition, which accords to some objects, cognizes these, i.e., the objects which
are without differences, as such, as being the same. But there is no cognition as such in
virtue of a single universal.501
PVV 167.4–167.13 ad PV 3 162–163ab
[Objection:] | May it be that also cognitions are differentiated according to [each] par-pp #
ticular. How [then can] a cognition [be] continuous [with regard to these particulars]?
| So [Dharmakīrti] said:up #
Cognitions too, [even though there is] a difference between them, are, in the same
way[, i.e.,] like the objects, due to their nature [of being] a real thing,502 a cause for a
judgement of a non-difference. Therefore, cognitions also are called continuous appre-
hensions due to having as their object the same judgement of this [difference]. So, i.e.,
in this way, a continuity of a separation[, i.e.,] of a distinction of an object from that
not having that effect amongst the different things exists. But a continuity of a single
real thing[, i.e.,] of a universal [does not exist for real things],503 [i.e.,] for individuals
499Note that PVV (as well as PVVms 31a5) reads yad apy (“Also which”) instead of the yady apy
(“Even if”) accepted in PV 3 147.
500Which would result in there being as many universals as there are particulars.
501Emend sāmānyaṃ balāt in PVV 167.3 to sāmānyabalāt acc. to PVVms 32a7, as suggested by
Sāṅkṛtyāyana.
502Read vastudharmatayā acc. PVVms 32a7 against vastudharmitayā acc. to PVV 167.7.
503Vibhū 167, n. 1 glosses “for real things” as: “Amongst the real things.”
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(viśeṣa), because that [universal] is refuted by non-perception[, a valid means of cogni-
tion]. Therefore a sound complex, referring to this[, i.e.,] which has [that] distinction
as its object, applies to a real thing.
PVV 167.16–168.3 ad PV 3 163cd–164
PVV 167.16–20 [Objection:] | Now, the differentiation from [that having] a different pp #
(atat) effect is the own nature of real things. Therefore, given that the object [of a word]
is distinction, only the real thing would be the object of a word.504 | So [Dharmakīrti] up #
said:505 a distinction of the capacity, such as not having that effect etc., of an exter-
nal real thing; a reference to this[, i.e.,] the state of having [that] as an object; even
though that does not exist, a sound complex for this[, i.e.,] a sound complex designat-
ing this distinction,506 is bound at the time a convention507 [is made] to the reflections
of conceptual cognitions508[, i.e.,] to forms of awareness, which have a reference to
these[, i.e.,] which have a constancy (vyavasthiti) for everyday activity concerning those
[things] due to the fact that a classification (vyavasthā) [of these things] has an object
since the differentiation of these [things from that not having that effect] is real.
Therefore, because reflections of conceptual cognitions are the object of everyday
activity due to being of the nature of the external [thing]509 which is differentiated[,
that is to say,] because of referring to an exclusion from others[, i.e.,] because of
[this] cause, a sound complex was called “making an exclusion from others.” [I.e.,]
because of the generation of a conceptual cognition through a form that is differentiated
from others, and because of the application510 to those [real things] differentiated from
others, a sound complex is called “making an exclusion from others.”
PVV 168.4–10 ad PV 3 165
[PVV 168.4] [Someone objects]: | Now, that to be grasped in a verbal cognition is pp #
recognized only as an external [thing], not as being the image in cognition. | So [Dhar- up #
makīrti] said: What appears in a cognition arising because of a word as reflecting an
object [and] as if separate[, i.e.,] as if differentiated [and] external, that also [is] not
the nature of [that] object[, i.e.,] does not have the own form of an externally [existing]
object; rather, this error arises from impressions.511
Like the mistake of [thinking] “external [thing]” with regard to the hair etc. that
is seen by someone [suffering from] timira, so [there is] even for the form of concep-
504Vibhū 167, n. 2: This [objection] is considered contradictory with this statement: A word does not
touch a real thing.
505The verses of the PV printed in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940 are not actually part of the PVV, cf.
Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940: iv. For their translation, cf. section A.3 on page 167.
506Vibhū 167, n. 3: katham iti na vṛttena sambandhanīyaḥ [This statement] is not to be connected with
the mentioned [word] “how.” (I.e., this is not an answer anymore to the question raised in PVV 167.4.)
507Vibhū 167, n. 4: Due to the mistake of [thinking] that a particular and an object of conceptual
cognition are one.
508I take the sixth, genitive, case as possessive here, i.e., reflections of external things that a conceptual
cognition has.
509Vibhū 168, n. 1: Because of referring to the distinction of a real thing.
510Vibhū 168, n. 2: Because of identifying a visible [thing] and a concept.
511Vibhū 168, n. 3: The reason [being] the impression [left by] the experience of particulars.
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tual cognition everyday activity [taking that form as] an external [thing] in virtue of
ignorance. That (iti) [is] the meaning.
PVV 168.11–16 ad PV 3 166
PVV 168.11–16 | Then the form of cognition,512 which is a real thing, would be what ispp #
to be denoted. [So, explaining the objection,] [Dharmakīrti] said [as follows:]513
If this form of a cognition is designated by sound complexes, which part is un-
derstood regarding the object, which is differentiated from that not having that effect
[and] not named by a word? None at all. And if that[, i.e.,] an object that is excluded
from that which does not have that effect514 is not understood, truly making a con-
vention would be meaningless because515 this [making of a convention] is assumed as
having that purpose[, i.e.,] as having a cognition of an object differentiated from that
not having that [same] effect as a result.
PVV 168.17–24 ad PV 3 167
Then in that way, if a convention is made, even with regard to the exclusion from others,
there would be no activity towards the referents, because this [exclusion from others]
lacks the nature of a referent.516
| [Answer:] To this question: “Which part of an object does a word express?”,up #
exclusion from others[, i.e.,] a differentiation from that not having that effect, which
is possible for all distinctions, is said[, or declared] as that which is to be designated.
Therefore a person who has grasped a convention with regard to other-exclusion, which
has the nature of [being] a part of an object, acts towards that [object], having recog-
nized the object because of an uttered word.517 This is correct. But518 which form of
awareness is to be grasped,519 that is not in the object. How should a word, express-
ing that form of awareness, partake of the object[, i.e.,] be qualified by expressing the
external object?
512Vibhū 168, n. 4: The verse introduced (sāvatāra) [here] is an objection.
513According to Śākyabuddhi, this is the objection of a Buddhist, PVṬt 191b4–6: de ñid kyi phyis
bstan par bźed nas, de lta na yaṅ don gyi rnam pa ’dzin pa źes bya ba la sogs pas re źig raṅ gi sde pa
la brgal źiṅ brtags pa byed pa yin te, gaṅ dag rnam par rtog pa la snaṅ ba’i ṅaṅ tshul can gyi rnam
pa dṅos su sgra’i brjod par bya ba yin no źes de ltar źugs pa’o. don gyi rnam pa źes ’dzin pa ni don
gyi rnam pa ’dzin pa ste, rnam par rtog pa’i rnam par śes pa la snaṅ ba’i gzugs brñan no. don gyi źes
bya ba ni phyi rol gyi raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi’o. gaṅ gi tshe de las gźan pa las ldog pa źes bya ba ni dṅos
po la gnas pa’i gźan sel ba’i raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi bdag ñid can no. Acc. to Dreyfus 1997: 228 f., and
n. 36 on p. 515, also Go rams pa understands this as an objection by a Buddhist.
514Perhaps °ścittadakārya°, appearing in both PVVms 32b3 and PVV 168.15, should be emended to
°ścitatadkārya°. The meaning I take to be the same in both cases.
515Vibhū 168, n. 5: [Asked] “Why?” he says.
516Vibhū 168, n. 6: To this the Siddhantin says.
517Read śabdād uccaritād arthaṃ pratītya (PVVms 32b4) against śabdād uccaritārthaṃ pratītya
(PVV 168.22).
518Read yas tu grāhyākāraḥ acc. to PVVms 32b4 against yas tatrākṣarākāraḥ PVV 169.23.
519Vibhū 168, n. 7: What was attained (āyāta) by the repetition of observing an external blue [thing]
etc. is to be known.
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PVV 169.1–6 ad PV 3 168
PVV 169.1 Moreover: A continuous word’s interest520 [is] in a continuous object, [,
i.e., a word’s] purpose has the character of a cognititon [of the same object] at the time
of everyday activity. But this form of awareness is formed from impressions through
the repetition of observing particulars, [and is] not continuous,521 because of [its] non-
difference from thought which is [itself] not continuous.
PVV 169.7–14 ad PV 3 169
[PVV 169.7] | Now, if the [real] object is not the word’s object, then how can other- pp #
exclusion, even though it is of the nature of a part of that [object], [be] what is to be
designated? | So [Dharmakīrti] said: By means of a superimposition of that form[, up #
i.e.,] of the exclusion which is a part of the object, onto the form of awareness,522 [that
is,] through a determination [of exclusion and form of awareness] as being one, the
object,523 differentiated from another, is understood; because [of this understanding,]
exclusion, which is a part of the object of a word,524 is called word object. But an
object is not understood from a word because of a universal. If, however, because
of cognizing a form of awareness as being the differentiated object, this very form of
awareness is metaphorically called “word referent” by someone proclaiming that the
form of awareness is the word referent (buddhyākāraśabdārthavādin),525 then, if there
is such a formulation, there is no contradiction at all, because there is no assumption
by [Dharmakīrti] that a form of awareness, which is not qualified by continuity, is the
word referent.
PVV 169.17–170.3 ad PV 3 170
[PVV 169.16] Or, these erroneously appearing apprehensions that are formed by
words. For [it is] so: first of all a [real] object is not the object of an awareness [that is]
due to a word, because the own form of this [object] does not appear [in that awareness],
and because for this [object] there is no convention of words. Neither [is] the form of
awareness [the object of a word], even though there is a cognition of this [form], because
[this form] is not determined as being the object, because it is a particular, and because
520Vibhū 169, n. 1 glosses śabda as: “Cow, cow.” Probably the point is that the word “cow” can be
used twice with the same meaning, and is so continuous.
521Vibhū 169, n. 2: yatra buddhau bhāsate tato ’bhinnaḥ jñānavat. (From that awareness, in which
something appears, [the form] is not different, like cognition.) The construction of this short phrase is
not quite clear to me.
522Vibhū 169, n. 3: vināropaṃ vyavahārābhāvāt yathā saṃgatis tasya tathāha (Tentatively: Because
there is no everyday activity without imposition, [Dharmakīrti] spoke so as if it is applicable to this [form
of awareness].)
523Vibhū 169, n. 4: “a particular [...is understood].”
524Perhaps śabdārthāṃśāpohaḥ should be emended. One possibility is an emendation to śabdārthā-
nyāpohaḥ (“...other-exclusion, which is the word object...”). This is, as Masamichi Sakai informs me,
also how Tosaki 1979–1985 1: 269, fn. 160 translates this passage, albeit without making an emendation
in the text.
525A similar position is shown to be different from that of an exclusion theorist in TSP2 352.5 ff.
(cf. section B.5 on page 183), where PV 3 169 is also quoted. Manorathanandin is here saying that Dhar-
makīrti’s explanation is not contradictory to the position that the word referent is the form of awareness,
but qualifies that position as metaphorical usage. This qualification is not made in the TSP.
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there is no convention [with regard to it]. For the form of awareness is not external, nor
is an external [thing] a form of awareness, due to which an appearance as “like”526 would
be a true appearance. In reality, therefore, verbal apprehensions have no appearance of
a real thing.
[Objection:] | In this case then, how is a sound complex called performing an ex-pp #
clusion [that is] a part of the referent?527 | So Dharmakīrti said: Words, even thoughup #
they do not have an appearance of that [object], accord to this, exclusion from others,
[that is to say,] a part of the referent, [meaning they] cause a classification as being
the object of activity (vṛtti), because [they] are indirectly connected with it due to being
arrived at by an observation of an [external] object.528 And so [articulate] sound [is
called] performing exclusion.529
PVV 170.5–12 ad PV 3 171
For the [reason] that, due to a word, [there is] a cognition of that separated from an-
other [thing] at the time of everyday activity, therefore also at the time [of forming] a
convention is the exclusion from others, connected to the sound complex as that to be
designated, [but] nothing else.
[Objection:] | Now, a convention is made pointing out an object. So how [can it be]pp #
called exclusion? | So [Dharmakīrti] said:up #
Connected with an object that was pointed out[, i.e.,] [an object] that is exclud-
ed from others, [and] whose result[, i.e.,] purpose, is a cognition of [one’s] own at
the time of everyday activity—[connected with such an object, i.e.,] brought near to
identity [with that object] because of a determination of non-difference [between the
two object’s exclusions], other-exclusion, having the nature (svabhāva) of a form of
awareness, is connected to a sound complex, [but] the [external] object itself (eva) [is
not connected to a sound complex].
PVV 170.13–21 ad PV 3 172
For [it is] so:530 Because convention depends on [a word] not being observed for an-
other [thing, i.e.,] for a non-tree that is to be distinguished [from tree, and] because [it]
depends on an observation of this [word] for some [thing, i.e.,] for one instance (eka-
deśa) of a tree that is not to be distinguished, exclusion is bound to a sound complex.
This is ascertained.
In [the case of] a real thing[, i.e.,] for an object of convention [such as] a univer-
sal etc., [this] dependence on the observation and non-observation of that to be dis-
tinguished and that not to be distinguished is not possible.531 If a real thing is to be
cognized in an affirmative way, what use is the dependence on the non-observation in
526I.e., either the external thing would be like the form of awareness, or vice versa.
527Vibhū 169, n. 5: aniṣṭaṃ parityajya iṣṭe pravartanāt śabdāḥ. (Words [perform exclusion], because
of activity towards that which is desired avoiding that which is not desired.)
528Read paraṃparayā acc. to PVVms 32b7 against parasparaṃ yā in PVV 170.2.
529Vibhū 170, n. 1: “Dignāga [said]: Not to these, [but] to the object should they apply.” I was not
able to find out where Dignāga said this.
530Vibhū 170, n. 2: [Manorathanandin] states the error in the case of the application of a word caused
by a commonness [existing] in an affirmative way[, i.e., in the case of a real commonness].
531Vibhū 170, n. 3: “For it is so: in the case of a commonness[, which is a real thing].” (Introducing
the following argument.)
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some other place? But it depends [on this observation]. Therefore, only a distinction
from others is to be cognized. This is understood. If [someone says] that | distinction pp #
from others depends on [such things as] commonness etc., which have the aim of an
apprehension by avoiding a dissimilar instance,532 | then [we say] enough with [this] up #
commonness. Because only by the distinction from others is everyday activity fully
achieved.
PVV 170.22–26 ad PV 3 173
And for the [reason that] qualifiers such as genus, quality, movement, etc. do not appear
in a cognition grasping a real thing, therefore genus etc., and a connection to these533
are not in the object.534 And, therefore, a sound complex is not bound to these, be-
cause words are joined only to a differentiation from others that is established by
cognition.
PVV 189.14–190.9 ad PV 3 233–235
Or may it be that a universal truly is a real entity, nevertheless, this is not an object of
words and concepts. So [Dharmakīrti] said: Even if whiteness etc., i.e., a universal, is,
in a property bearer such as a garment etc., this object of the sense faculties, which has
a clear form of whiteness etc., [nevertheless] this[, i.e.,] an object that is the object of a
cognition of the sense-faculties, is not named by words, because there is a difference
[between the two objects] due to the clarity or vagueness of the form, i.e., the form of
awareness, of these two cognitions, which are generated by the sense faculties [and]
words.
If [this is said]:| “Even though awareness events,which are generated by sense fac- pp #
ulties and words, have the same object[, i.e., even though] they have the same object,535
[there is] this, a difference of the forms of awareness which has the nature of the differ-
ence of their cause[, i.e.,] since there is a different basis [for these awareness events.]”
| Then[, i.e.,] in such a situation, this is explained: cognitions [based on] sense faculties up #
such as hearing etc. have different objects[, i.e., ] have different objects such as sound
(śabda), shape, smell etc. Why is that[, i.e.,] from [which] means of valid cognition is
this ascertained?
Also, what is not contrived [in this result of your thesis]: “These cognitions, even
though there is no different object for them, have different forms of awareness because
of the difference of the sense faculties that are their basis.”?
Moreover, the basis of cognitions of universals etc.[, i.e., their] cause is truly dif-
ferent[, i.e.,] a sense faculty and a word,. Nevertheless, why does a completely unique
real thing, like a universal etc., have a nature that appears with different forms of
awareness[, i.e.,] appears as clear and unclear[, or, have] a clear and unclear appear-
ance. For a single [form], appearing with its own form, [and] having a differentiated
appearance is not coherent.
532Vibhū 170, n. 4: Grasping an object that is filled with constructions.
533Vibhū: “Connection (sambandha).” He is giving a synonym for yoga, which I have also translated
as connection here.
534Vibhū 170, n. 6: In the object of sense-faculties.
535Manorathanandin glosses artha with viṣaya, both of which have to be translated as “object” here.
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Appendix B
Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on apoha
B.1 TS2 2.5–6
[TS2 5–6] This Tattvasaṃgraha is composed having bowed to the omni-
scient one, who, [being] the best of the teachers [and] not hanging on to
an autonomous teaching,536 taught, due to a wish for what is beneficial for
the world—he had great compassion which had become his nature during
a large number of time-periods—dependant arisal, which ...537
[TS2 2] is devoid of additional attributes such as quality, substance, ac-
tivity, genus, inherence etc., [and in which] the object of a [conceptual]
cognition and a word [has the nature of] a superimposed form.
TSP2 ad TS2 2
[TSP2 14.15] | Now, substance, quality, movement etc. are real things. Why is it not pp #
[the case] [that] they [arise in dependence on other factors]?538
| To this [objection Śāntarakṣita] said “quality” etc. “Qualities, substances, move- up #
ments, genus, as well as inherence”, that is a copulative compositum. Through the word
“genus” the (api) twofold universal, the primary (para) and secondary (apara) [one],
is included.539 By the word “etc.” there is an inclusion of those properties of the spe-
cific characteristics occurring in the lowest substances which, separate from a property
bearer, are described by some [as] beginning in such a way as “For all six categories,
is-ness (astitva) is the state of being an object of a valid means of cognition that grasps
[the property] ‘existing’.”540 [These are] both qualities etc. and additional attributes[,
which are the] qualifiers [of qualities, substances, etc.]. This is a modifier compound
536I.e., vedic teachings: TSP2 18.20–21: svatantrā śrutiḥ = svataḥ pramāṇabhūto vedaḥ, nityam va-
canam iti yāvat. (An autonomous teaching, [meaning] the Veda, which is a means of valid cognition by
itself, which is to say, [it is] an eternal statement.)
537TS2 1–4 are to be construed with TS2 6ab (cf. TSP2 13.13–14). A full translation of these verses,
along with a general appreciation for their role in the TS, can be found in McClintock 2010: 96 ff. Cf.
also the translation in Jhā 1937: 1 ff.
538Cf. TSP2 14.13–14: sa punar ayaṃ pratītyasamutpādaḥ skandhadhātvāyatanānāṃ draṣṭavyaḥ,
teṣām eva pratītyasamutpannatvāt. (Moreover, this very dependent arisal is to be observed for the ag-
gregates, the elements, and the sense spheres, because only these have arisen in dependence.)
539Cf. Halbfass 1992: 117.
540Cf. the comments on astitva in Halbfass 1992: 144 f., and 156 ff.
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(viśeṣaṇasamāsa). Emptymeans void of these. With regard to this, this was said by the
Lord: “Everything everything, o Brahmin, [that means] just as far as the five aggregates
(skandha), the twelve sense spheres (āyatana), the 18 elements (dhātus) [go]!”541 And
this is a hint at the investigation of the six categories.542
[TSP2 14.23] | Now, if there are no additional attributes, then how can dependentpp #
arisal be made an object through both words and concepts? And what is not made an
object through these can not be denoted, nor is there [any] usage of word and concept
without an additional attribute. [So] how did the Bhagavat teach this [dependant arisal
to people]?
| [In answer Śāntarakṣita] said: Superimposed form etc. Superimposed, [meaning]up #
imposed as being external; form, [meaning] nature; the object of words and cognition
which [has] that [nature], that is so called[, i.e., āropitākāraśabdapratyayagocaraḥ]. In
which dependant arisal [there is this] object (gocara)[, i.e.,] the object (viṣaya) of word
and cognitionwhich has a superimposed form, that is so called[, i.e., āropitā...gocaraḥ
pratītyasamutpādaḥ]. The word cognition, because of its close connection with the
word “word” [in the compound śabdapratyaya] is to be understood as [meaning] the
particular cognition “concept,” which has the nature of an internal expression (āviṣṭā-
bhilāpa), because both [word and conceptual cognition] go together [in the compound]
since they don’t deviate with regard to having the same object. By this the [follow-
ing] is said: Even if additional attributes do not exist, still that conceptual cognition
[which is] attained (ā-√i) by means of the observation of real things differentiated from
each other, [which is] determined as being of an external form, has the nature of a re-
flection,543 [and] is the referent of a word, [that conceptual cognition] exists here [in
dependent arisal]. For this is not really the object of words because here [in dependent
arisal] all conceptual cognitions have passed. Rather, exactly as a word referent is es-
tablished for people due to beauty (ramaṇīyatā) that is not [further] considered, so also
the Bhagavats, aiming at the reality which is disregarded [by them during teaching],
explain [that dependent arisal] by closing their eyes like an elephant [and so] veiling
[their] insight into it,544 for the introduction [of people] into the highest truth, because
there is no other way [to do this]. Even though being a superimposed form, the word
referent is, because of an indirect connection with the real thing, truly a reason for the
attainment of this [real thing]. Therefore, in this manner the real thing becomes taught
indeed, because of their[, the word referents’,] ability [to lead to that real thing]. Thus
deception (vipralambha) is not possible. With regard to this the Protector said:
For whichever thing is denoted by some name, that [name] does not exist
in that [thing] at all. For that is the nature of things.545
541This means everything that exists is contained in these factors.
542These, as Jhā 1937: 18 points out, are the topics of the 10th–15th chapter, TS2Dravyapadārthapa-
rīkṣā-Samavāyapadārthaparīkṣā.
543Emend to pratibimbātmakam against pratibandhātmakam found in TSPP 6a1, TSP1 12.6,
TSP2 15.6–7 . Cf. rnam par rtog pa’i gzugs brñan gyi bdag ñid TSPD 143a3 (= TSPP Ḥe 172b6),
as well as the formulation pratibimbātmako ’pohaḥ in TS2 1027.
544Cf. Kyuma 2005: 80 f., fn. 101 for the background of this metaphor, and see also Dunne 2004: 410.
545Cf. Hoornaert 2002: 125 f. and Eckel 2008: 276 f. for other translations and pointers to other
occurrences of this verse. It is quoted again in TSP2 339.22–23 ad TS2 869, which reads:
yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viṣaya ucyate | sa sa saṃghaṭate naiva vastūnāṃ sā hi
dharmatā ||
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And this is a hint at the [16th chapter, the] Śabdārthaparīkṣa.
B.2 TS2 573–574
[TS2 573–574] | These property bearers[, i.e., the categories,] were pro- pp #
claimed to be six. The properties are indeed assumed to be distinct from
them. | If that [is said], what is this relation of this [property] with these up #
[property bearers] that is assumed? Connection (saṃyoga) is not cor-
rect,546 because it is limited to substances, and there is no other inherence,
and another relation is not accepted by the others.
TSP2 ad TS2 573–574
[TSP2 239.24] | There is no [such] error, because that is accepted.547 | If so, how [can pp #
up #it be that] “six categories” are taught? Therefore [Śāntarakṣita] formulated [a pūrvapa-
kṣa starting with] “These are six.” Only those things that are of the nature of a property
bearer are taught as “six categories”, but those [things] that are of the nature of prop-
erties are assumed to be different [from] the six categories.548 For a passage in the
Padārthapraveśaka states: “In such a way, this explanation of the property bearers was
given without the properties.”549 “What is this” etc. was said in answer. [Relation]
“of this” [means] “of a property such as is-ness and so on;”550 “with these”[, i.e.,] with
the six categories. What is the relation on account of which this is a property of those
[six categories]? For without a relation, being property and property bearer is not possi-
ble, because of the overreaching consequence. For in such a way there would be every
property for every [property bearer]; for there is no relation at all with these [proper-
ty bearers]. For it is so: [this] relation is[, according to Vaiśeṣika authors,] twofold,
characterised as connection, and characterised as inherence. Of these, to begin with,
there is no [relation] characterised as connection, because this [connection] is restricted
to substances alone since it is a quality.551 Neither is there [a relation] characterised
as inherence, because that [inherence] is assumed as singular, like being.552 And, if
546Read yukto acc. to TSP 12a1 instead of yuktā. This is also how yuktā is emended in Frauwallner’s
copy of Krishnamacharya 1926, and by Hishida 1971: 13.
547The opponent has just explained (TS2 572a-c) that the is-ness (astitva) of the six categories is the
reality in the case of an object of a valid means of cognition that lets a person cognise “existing” about a
thing. (For some remarks on astitva, cf. Halbfass 1992: 143 ff.) Śāntarakṣita’s reply was that this forces
the opponent to assume a seventh category in addition to the standard six. The opponent counters here
that he accepts that there are dharmas separate from the six categories.
548In Frauwallner’s copy, the text is emended to ṣaṭpadārthavyatiriktā instead of the printed ṣaṭpadā-
rthā vyatiriktā (in both TSP1 and TSP2, as well as TSPP 61a10). This emendation (or one to ṣaṭpadārthe-
bhyo vyatiriktā, as in Hishida 1971: 13,n. 66) is also supported by TSPD Ze 262b6 (=TSPP Ḥe 323b5):
tsig gi don drug las ma gtogs pa ’dod pa kho na’o.
549This seems to refer to PDhS 15.20: “evaṃ dharmair vinā dharmiṇām uddeśaḥ kṛtaḥ.” Cf.
Chemparathy 1970 and the notes to Potter 1977: 282 for more information on this text and its author.
The import of uddeśa in this passage is discussed in Halbfass 1992: 78 f., 96 ff.
550Is-ness, denotability, and cognizability are the three characteristics common to all categories. Cf.
PDhS 16: ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni || . See Halbfass 1992: 158 ff. for a
discussion of this sentence, and Halbfass 1970: 143 f. for how it applies to universals.
551Cf. the explanations in Halbfass 1970: 122 f.
552Cf. PDhS 16.18: “dravyādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ samavāyitvam anekatvaṃ ca.”
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there were a relation of the type inherence with inherence, a second inherence would be
endorsed.553
B.3 TS2 738
[TS2 738] For a recurring cognition has an appearance of words and par-
ticulars. But a genus is declared [to be] free of colour, shape, and the form
of letters.
TSP2 ad TS2 738
[TSP2 300.23] Showing also that the thesis is defeated by an inference, [Śāntarakṣita]
said: “Recurring” etc. [With this] the following is said:554 You wish to prove that
repeated apprehensions have a cause different from the individual things etc., which is
really the basis [for these cognitions]. And this is wrong, because that [cause] does not
appear, and because colour, shape, etc., [all] different from this [cause], do appear. For
it is so: A universal such as cowness etc. is declared by you to be completely empty of
colour, shape, and the forms of letters, but a cognition that conforms to the appearance
of colour etc. is experienced. So how should the basis of this [cognition] be empty of
colour etc.? For there can not be one (anya) basis for a cognition having another (anya)
form, because of an unwanted consequence [that goes] too far. A [formal] proof: that
cognition, which has an appearance of an object different from some [other object],
never grasps that [other object], as a cognition through a word does not grasp the shape
[of a thing]. And a recurring cognition has an appearance of colour etc., [all of] which
are different from a genus. This [is] due to apprehending that opposed to the pervader.555
[The phrase] “it has an appearance of words and particulars” [is analyzed:] Word
is the denomination “a cow” etc., particular is what has the nature of colour, shape,
etc.; this appearance of these two belongs to [cognition], so: “it has [that appearance].”
Letters are such as the letter c, the letter o, the letter w, etc.556
553Incidentally, the explanation of ŚV Ps 148 given in Taber 2005: 109 is remarkably close to this pas-
sage. Since he thinks it is “...better, rather, for the translator to provide his or her own commentary, after
thoroughly studying and digesting the available classical ones ...” (Taber 2005: xiii), these arguments
might actually be related.
554This is a paraphrase of the thesis of Bhāvivikta’s inference, given in TS2 715ab. This thesis is,
as forumlated in TSP2 294.24–295.9: tatra bhāviviktaḥ prāha—gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātaṅgādiṣu
gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ samayākṛtipiṇḍādivyatiriktasvarūpānurūpasaṃsarginimittāntara-
nibandhanā ity avaghoṣaṇā. (To this Bhāvivikta said: In the case of cow, horse, buffalo, boar, elephant,
etc., the particular cognitions and names such as cow etc. depend on another cause mixed together with
[and] according to the own nature [of these things, but] separated from convention, shape, material body,
etc.—This is the declaration [of what Bhāvivikta wants to prove].) After giving a slightly different sec-
ond interpretation of the phrase samayā°...°nibandhanā, TSP2 295.19 clarifies: avaghoṣaṇeti pratijñā
(Declaration means thesis.). For Bhāvivikta, cf. Potter 1977: 281.
555For Bhāvivikta, the pervader, which is what he wanted to prove, was the fact that there must be a
cause other than the perceptible qualities of a thing due towhich there is the same cognition about different
things of the same class, and that this can only be a genus (cf. TSP2 295.12–13: yāni ca tāni nimttāntarāṇi
tāni gotvādīnīti siddham. (And those which are these other causes are cowness etc. That is established.)).
The vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi here consists in showing that in these cognitions something that is not a
genus appears, and that, since cognitions can only be based on what appears in them, they can therefore
not be caused (or have their basis in) a genus.
556Literally: “The letter ga, the letter au, and the visarga”, these spell the word gauḥ, cow.
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B.4 TS2 870
[TS2 870] For557 particular, class, the connection to this [class], that having
a class, as [also] a form of awareness do not really assemble558 where the
word referent [is].
TSP2 ad TS2 870
[TSP2 340.4] If [it is asked:] | Now, which means of valid cognition [is there] for the pp #
fact that a verbal cognition559 [is] both erroneous and without object? | We have stated up #
the means of valid cognition for this, which is [as follows] (yad ...iti): Each and every
verbal cognition is erroneous because it occurrs by means of a determination of non-
difference for different [things].560
For [it is] so: Which cognition is “this” with regard to what is not this, that [cogni-
tion] is erroneous, like the cognition of water where there is a mirage. And this verbal
cognition, which determines non-difference with regard to different referents, is so.
This [is a reasoning based on] the reason of [a thing’s] own nature. And neither does
this [verbal cognition] have a graspable commonness that has the nature of a real thing,
due to which the reason would not be established; for this [commonness] has earlier
been refuted at length.561 Or may a commonness [really] exist, still, given that this
[commoness] is an object different from the differences[, i.e., the different things], the
determination of non-difference with regard to differentiated [things] would be only er-
roneous. For some things similar to something else, [and so] connected to it, would not
be called having that [other thing, i.e., a commonness]. [Alternatively,] even if [you
were to say that] a commonness is not an object different [from the particulars], [then]
the entire universe (viśva) would in reality be only one (eka) real thing; so the cognition
of a commonness in this is entirely erroneous. For the cognition of a commonness does
557This verse gives the reason for the preceding verse, where it was claimed that whatever a word
refers to is not a real thing (cf. fn. 545 on page 178).
558Literally the phrase ghaṭām añcati means “it enters a group/collection”. It is translated as sgra
don du | de kho na nyid du mi ’thad | (“...is not really correct as the word referent.”) in TSD Ze 33a2
(=TSP Ḥe 40b6). I understand it to mean that the particular etc. do not belong to what is rightly catego-
rized as the word referent.
559For the reading śābdapratyayasya see also Ishida 2008: 4.
560Cf., e.g., TSP2 338.10–13:
apohavādināṃ tu na paramārthataḥ śabdānāṃ kiñcid vācyaṃ vastusvarūpam asti. sa-
rva eva hi śābdaḥ pratyayo bhrāntaḥ, bhinneṣv artheṣv abhedākārādhyavasāyena pra-
vṛtteḥ. yatra tu pāramparyeṇa vastupratibandhaḥ, tatrārthasaṃvādo bhrāntatve ’pīti
darśanam.
But for those proclaiming exclusion [as the referent of words] the view [is this]: “For
words there is in reality nothing denotable at all that has the nature of a real thing. For
every verbal apprehension is erroneous, because [it] applies to different referents due to
the determination of a non-different form. But for which [conceptual cognition] there
indirectly is a connection to a real thing, for that there is concurrence with the referent,
even though [the cognition] is erroneous.”
I follow the emendation in Ishida 2008: 1 to tatrārthasaṃvādo, against tatrārthāsaṃvādo in both TSP1
and TSP2.
561As Śāstrī (1968: 340, n. 2), points out, this was the general topic of chapter 13, the
Sāmānya(padārtha)parīkṣā, of the TS.
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not have the same real thing as an object, because this [cognition] requires the grasping
of a difference. And if [this cognition’s] erroneousness is established, [its] objectless-
ness is also established; for[, in the case of a wrong cognition,] there is no referent at
all which fullfills the criteria of a basis [for cognition], in that [it is] productive [of the
cognition] through a projection of its form [into cognition].
[TSP2 340.15] Or else: in another way the objectlessness [of a conceptual cognition]
is proven. For only with regard to which referent sounds are agreed upon, that alone is
consistent as their referent, [and] nothing else, because of an overreaching consequence.
And an agreement of these for any real thing can not exist in reality. Therefore sounds
[producing] a cognition are without objects. A [formal] proof: Whichever [sounds] do
not, in reality (bhāvatas), become agreed upon with regard to something, those do not
truly denote that, like the word horse is not agreed upon with regard to a material entity
having a dewlap etc.[, i.e., a cow]. And in reality no sounds at all become agreed upon
with regard to any real thing. This is because of a non-observation of the pervading
element.562 Because [a word] denotes is pervaded by the fact that [it has] an agreed
upon convention; and this [pervading element] does not exist here[, i.e., words are not
agreed upon for real things].563
And, making it clear that this reason is not unestablished etc.[, i.e., that a word does
not denote any real thing], [Śāntarakṣita] said “for” etc. [in TS2 870].
For it is so:564 [inasfar as] a real thing, which an agreement is grasped for, is defined
as being the word referent, [insofar it is] the particular that is sometimes defined [as
word referent], or the class, or the connection with it—with it[, meaning] with the
class, connection[, meaning] relation—or the thing565 having a class, or the form of
awareness. These are the alternatives. For none of these is it consistent that [it] is the
referent of a word, because a convention is impossible [for them]. By [saying] really,
[he] shows that a conventional referent of words is not negated. Because of this there
is no inconsistency (vyāghāta) in [his] own words. For otherwise [if he hadn’t added
“really”] there would be a contradiction of the thesis to [his] own words. For it is so:
without conveying these, particular etc., through a word it is not possible to convey their
not being the referent of a word etc. And [someone] showing these, a particular etc.,
with words, wishing to convey this [that they are not the word referents] would admit
562Consider also the emendation of vyāpakānupalabdheḥ to vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ in Ishida 2008: 5.
But iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ does occur a few times (e.g., TSP2 119.13; 137.8–9; 198.12), although not as
frequently as iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ. So it could be that it is a usage particular to Kamalaśīla. Also, the
next sentence’s construction is not straightforward, looking more like a gloss on vyāpakānupalabdheḥ
than an additional statement. The Tibetan is not much clearer: ...mi dmigs pa ste. brda byas pa ñid rjod
par byed pa la khyab pa’i phyir la de ’di la med do. (TSPD Ze 313a1–2 = TSPP Ḥe 389a4–5).
563I think the argument is as follows: abhidhāyaktva, therefore kṛtasamayatva, or a-kṛtasamayatva,
therefore an-abhidāyakatva. This understanding follows the schema found in TBh2 31.16–18: vyāpakā-
nupalabdhir yathā—nātra śiṃśapā, vṛkṣābhāvāt. pratiṣedhyāyāḥ śiṃśapāyāḥ vyāpako vṛkṣaḥ, tasye-
hānupalabdhiḥ (A non-observation of the pervading element is like this: “There is no Śiṃśapā tree here,
because there is no tree [here].” Here, there is no observation of a tree, which is the pervading element of
a Śiṃśapā tree, which is to be negated. Cf. also the trl. and note in Kajiyama 1998: 82.) This means that
the following two arguments are correct: śiṃśapā, therefore vṛkṣa, and a-vṛkṣa, therefore a-śiṃśapā.
564Read tathā hi acc. to Ishida 2008: 5, TSP1 276.20 instead of yathā hi TSP2 340.22.
565In the copy I am using there is a handwritten note, in all likelihood by Erich Frauwallner, to the
effect of reading padārtho, probably according to TSPD Ze 313a3 (=TSPP Ḥe 389a6): “...rigs daṅ ldan
pa’i dṅos po pa’am, blo’i rnam pa....” This emendation is also made in Ishida 2008: 5, and a correction
in TSPP 86a7 can be interpreted as “ḥ | ”, also supporting padārthaḥ, ....
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that [they] are word referents. Furthermore, precisely this is negated by the thesis. So
there would be an inconsistency in [his] own words.
By this also what was said by Uddyotakara: “If words do not denote [anything],
[there is] inconsistency both of the thesis and the reason.”566 is answered. For we do
not deny the word referent in every way, because there is a thorough cognition567 of
this [conventional word referent] right down to the cow-herdsman (ā-gopāla). Rather,
the property “being in accordance with reality” is negated, which is superimposed by
[others] onto this [word referent], but not the property bearer.
B.5 TS2 890 (=VP 2.132)
[TS2 890] Or568 that object, which is the object of awareness [and] has a
founding in an external real thing, is assumed by some [to be] the word
referent cognized as “external real thing.”
TSP2 ad TS2 890
[TSP2 351.20] But others state the word referent to be a form that is a) only placed on
(āruḍha) awareness, b) belongs to (viṣaya) the external real things, c) is grasped as be-
ing an external real thing, [and] d) appears as being [of] the nature of awareness. This
[opinion] he explains[, saying] “Or that” etc. Object of awareness[, i.e., ] that going
around in awareness, that is to say, situated in awareness. Has a founding in an exter-
nal real thing[, i.e.,] that has a founding in an external real thing, for which a real thing,
which exists [or] does not exist [and is] external, is undertaken to be shown as the ba-
sis[, i.e.,] the own nature having its place in the letter signs (akṣaracihna).569 Cognized
as “external real thing”, this means: manifest as having the nature of awareness [and]
determined as being external. For it is so: in as far as what has the nature of aware-
ness, that is not projected amongst the objects, is grasped as “only having the form of
awarenss” through a consideration of [its] real state,570 insofar its being the word refer-
ent is not determined, because there is no connection to a specific activity concerning it.
For activities, such as “Bring the cow! Eat the curd!”, are not possible for that having
the form of awareness in such a way; rather, words denote an object that is capable of
a connection to an activity. Thus this grasped as having the form of awareness is not
the word referent. But if it becomes projected onto an external real thing, then someone
erroneously cognizing this (tasmin) [form] as being external, thinks [there is] a capacity
for establishing action. Thus it becomes the word referent.
[TSP2 352.5] | But now, what difference of this is there from the position of an pp #
Apohavādin? For it is so: also by an Apohavādin the form of awareness, grasped as
566As pointed out in Ishida 2008: 6, fn. 2, this is a quote of NV 312.21–22.
567Read atipratītatvāt, as suggested by TSP2 341.13 against api pratītatvāt TSP1 277.2. Cf. also
āgopālam atipratītam eva in TSP2 1072.11.
568This is the last in a series of options of what the word referent could be, starting TSP2 887. This
verse is obviously very close to VP 2.132 (or practically the same as VP (II) 132). It is translated in Rau
2002: 71. Cf. also Houben 1995: 159, who notes there that he sees “...no objective reason to assume that
in Bhartṛhari’s eyes this view in which superimposition is the crucial notion took a foremost position
among the various views [expressed in VP 2.119–142—PMA].”
569This phrase is unfortunately not clear to me.
570tattvabhā° (TSP1 285.14, MS Ishida 89a6) seems preferable to sattvabhā° in TSP2 351.26.
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having the nature of an external [thing], is indeed proclaimed as the word referent. As
it was said [in PV 3 169:]
Further, because of understanding571 that distinguished from others due to
the obtaining of a superimposition of that of that form, that object alone is
the word referent. [Even] if [there is] this formulation, it is not contradic-
tory.
| That is not [so]. For a Buddhyākāravādin572 assumes a form of awareness, whichup #
a) is non-erroneous573 with regard to the external real thing, b) belongs to [the external
things], and c) is imposed on real [things] such as substance etc., to be the word referent
in reality. But574 he does not assume [it to be a form of cognition] that is a) without
basis, b) erroneous because of [its] occurrence due to a determination of non-difference
for differentiated [things], [and] c) based on the [particulars’] differences from each
other. But if [he] says, as we [do, in PV 1 72 ]:
A wholly (sarva) false appearance is this grasping of the things as having
the same nature. A mutual difference [of things], which an expression has
as its object, is the seed of this [grasping].
then that to be established is [already] established. And he[, Śāntarakṣita] will speak
in this way [in TS2 904]:575
If [someone says:] “a mutual difference is the seed of this [grasping],”
[then] that is our position.
But by an Apohavādin in reality nothing denotable for words is postulated, neither a
form of awareness nor anything else. For it is so: What appears in verbal apprehension
due to being what is to be determined, that is the word referent. But the form of aware-
ness is not determined576 by verbal cognition, but rather a completely (eva) external
real thing performing a causal effect. But even an external [thing] is not really deter-
mined by it, because there is no determination corresponding to reality, [and] because
there is no reality corresponding to determination.577 Thus the word referent is only
superimposed. And what is superimposed, that isn’t anything.578 Thus nothing is really
denoted by words. What was further said [in PV 1 72], “Exactly this object is the word
referent.”, that [was said] intending (abhisandhāya) only the superimposed object. But
by a Buddhyākāravādin a form of cognition is assumed as denotable in reality. This is
a big difference [between his view and that of an Apohavādin].
571Read °vyāvṛttādhigateḥ acc. to PV 3 169 against °vyāvṛttyadhigateḥ TSP1 285.20 and °vyāvṛttya-
dhigate in TSP2 352.7.
572This doctrine is also mentioned in PVV 169.13 ( section A.4 on page 173).
573Read vastuny abhrāntam acc. to TSP1 285.22 against vastubhrāntam TSP2 352.9.
574This sentence, TSP1 285.24–25, is not found in TSP2. Read na tu acc. to TSPP 89a11 instead
of nanu, as also noted by Frauwallner’s handwritten emendation, and reflected in TSPD Ze 319a5
(=TSPP Ḥe 397a7–8): ...sgra’i don du ’dod kyi. tha dad pa dag la tha mi dad par zhen nas ’jug pa’i
’khrul pa phan tshun ldog pa’i rgyu mtshan can (TSPD: n.e. TSPP) ’dod pa ni ma yin no.
575Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f. for a translation and discussion of this verse.
576Read vyavasīyate acc. to TSP1 286.2 against the obvious misprint vvaprasīyate TSP2 352.18.
577Cf. NMK2 460, and see AP 219.16–17.
578Cf. also DhAP 239.15 f.: cuṅ zad kyaṅ ma yin no źes smra’o.
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B.6 TS2 923 (=ŚV Av 41)
[TS2 923] And579 a distinction of an awareness event from another aware-
ness event is not cognized. And this awareness event does not carry any
element apart from the arisal of its own nature.580
TSP2 ad TS2 923
[TSP2 364.11] | This might be [said by an Apohavādin]: “There is a differentiation up #
of an appearance [to awareness] from another appearance that is of a different kind;
thus exclusion is constructed.” | So [Kumārila] said: “From another awareness event pp #
etc.” To this [reply:] | “Even though this [distinction of one awareness event from up #
another] is not cognized, nevertheless it really exists.”, | [Kumārila] said: because it pp #
arises with its own nature etc. Even if there is a differentiation of one awareness event
from another awareness event, nevertheless, there is no function of a word regarding
this [differentiation]. For it is so: this awareness event that arises because of a word is
not observed as carrying another element, [which is] qualifed as a differentiation from
another awareness, [and] determined because of a word, apart from the arisal of its own
nature; rather, this means that it arises only as determining what has a positive nature.
And that part of a real thing that is not determined because of a word can not be the
referent of a word, because of an overreaching consequence.581 Therefore, the thesis
[that exclusion is the word referent] is refuted by [experiential] knowledge.
B.7 TS2 942–943 (=ŚV Av 83–84)
[TS2 942] And a non-cow would be excluded which was established and
has the nature of a negation of cow. In this [expression “non-cow,”] only
that cow is expressed which is negated by the [negative] particle na.
[TS2 943] And if that [cow] had the nature of an absence of non-cow, one
would have a connection to the other. If [you say] | cow has been estab- pp #
lished for the sake of exclusion, | [then] the assumption of exclusion is up #
vain.
579This verse is part of a series of objections made by Kumārila in the ŚV Av, and quoted by Śān-
tarakṣita. See Jhā 1985: 303 ff. and Jhā 1937: 498 ff. for translations.
580Read nānyam aṃśaṃ bibharti sā acc. to TSP 46b3 against nānyam saṃjñaṃ bibhartti sā in TS2
and “(vidhirūpāvasāyinī)” in TS1.
581I emend to “śabdād anavasīyamāno” against śabdād avasīyamānao in TSPP 91b17, TSP2 364.17
and TSP1. Cf. TSPD Ze 324b3–4 (=TSPP Ḥe 404a8): sgras ma źen pa’i dṅos po’i cha yaṅ sgra’i don
du rigs pa ma yin te .... The copy of TSP1 with emendations by Frauwallner that I am using has “na?”
written above “śabdādavasīyamāno” so as to suggest “śabdādanavasīyamāno”. The translation of Jhā
1937: 498 also reflects such an understanding, even though there is no note as to why this is assumed.
Also, I am not quite sure which unwanted consequence is supposed to result. A common error pointed
out in these contexts is that, if a word makes something other than its proper object known, it could make
any object known. Cf., e.g., the unwanted consequences mentioned in TSP2 301.11 ( section B.3 on
page 180) and TSP2 373.9–10 ( section B.8 on page 187).
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TSP2 ad TS2 942–943
[TSP2 370.15] | Therefore, because of the unwanted consequence of an error of mutualpp #
dependence, a convention for exclusion can not be made. Explaining this, [Kumārila]
said: “And the established” etc. There is a cognition of cow through the differentiation
from non-cow, and that non-cow has the nature of a negation of cow. Therefore, in
[this expression] here, “non-cow”, the latter word referent is what is to be expressed,
which is negated by the negative particle na as in [this case] here: “A non-cow[, or,] not
a cow.” For something that has a nature that is not clearly known can not be negated.
Moreover, now [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: | “Is that to be expressedup #
here that cow which has the nature of an absence of non-cow?” | Because of this [ques-pp #
tion Kumārila] said: “And if that ....”582 “That” [refers to] cow. For it is so: A cogni-
tion of cow [comes about] only by means of a cognition of non-cow, because [it] has
the essence of an absence of non-cow; and a cognition of non-cow has its very means
in a cognition of cow, because [non-cow] consists in a negation of cow. So (iti) a de-
pendence on each other very clearly presents itself.
Moreover, [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: | “A cow, which is negatedup #
by the word non-cow, is established only as having the form of an affirmation for the
sake of exclusion[, i.e.,] for the sake of an establishment of exclusion as qualified by a
distinction from non-cow. Due to this, there will not be a dependency on each other.”
Therefore [Kumārila] said: | “If cow is established ....”[, meaning:] If it is so, then a con-pp #
struction of exclusion in such a way as [this]: “For all words the object is exclusion.”583
is vain, because the referent of a word has the form of an affirmation. Therefore, no
established word referent at all, which has the form of an affirmation, should be made
an element [in exclusion]. And if not making that [positive word referent] an element,
the error of dependence on each other is hard to avoid.
B.8 TS2 947–949 (=ŚV Av 88–90)
[TS2 947] Neither is an awareness of exclusion generated from words such
as horse etc. In this [world], an awareness of that which is qualified is not
assumed to have an uncognized qualifier.
[TS2 948] Neither should a qualifier having one form cause a cognition of
another kind.584 But how is this[, being of one kind,] called a qualifier for
a cognition of another kind?585
[TS2 949] If a qualifier were assumed even though the qualified [thing] is
[classified] in a different way, then, if it were so, any qualifier whatsoever
could follow.
TSP2 ad TS2 947
[TSP2 372.11] | And this mode586 [of qualifying] is not possible for exclusion. [Kumāri-pp #
582Read sa ced ity ādi acc. to TSPP 93a14 against sa cety ādi TSP2 370.19, TSP1 300.18.
583Read °āpohārtha acc. to TSP2 against °āpoho ’rtha in TSP1.
584I.e., exclusion or difference should not lead to a cognition of a positively characterized thing.
585ŚV Av 89 reads jñāte instead of jñāne found in TS1 949 and TS2 948.
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la’s] words: “neither etc.” show this. For exclusion is not determined through an
awareness of “horse” etc., but rather only the real thing. And for that [reason], because
an awareness of exclusion can not occur, horse etc. is not coloured with this [exclusion]
by the awareness of [horse etc.] itself.
Should this be [said]:587 | “Exclusion, even though not cognized, becomes the qual- up #
ifier [of a real thing, like horse etc.],” then | this is said [in answer]: of that qualified pp #
etc. For, an awareness of a qualified [thing] that does not grasp a qualifier does not
exist. That [awareness] is so called, which has no known qualifier.
[TSP2 372.16 Or] may it really be that there is an awareness of exclusion, never-
theless, because there is no awareness with a form of that [exclusion] when there is a
real object [that is being cognized], this qualifier[, exclusion,] for that [thing supposedly
qualified by it,] is not coherent. Showing this, [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 89]: “Neither
should [a qualifier] having one form” etc. For every qualifier, corresponding to its
own form, is seen to generate an awareness with regard to the [thing] qualified. But a
qualifier of a different kind does not generate an awareness of [yet] another kind with
regard to the specified [thing]. For, [the qualifier] blue does not bring about an aware-
ness “red” with regard to a lotus, or a stick [the awareness] “an earring-possessing one.”
Neither is a verbal awareness for [the words] horse etc. produced here that is tainted by
the absence [of a thing]. Rather, it determines the form of a thing (bhāva).
Should this be [said]: | “[It] is called qualifier, even [if] it produces a cognition [that up #
is] of another kind.”, | [Kumārila] said: “And how, when something of another kind pp #
....” For a [cognition] of another kind [, that is,] for a [cognition] not conforming to the
qualifier.
[TSP2 373.8] Because [of the question:] | “If it were so, what error [would there up #
be]?”, | [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 90 ]: if [...] otherwise etc. If, for you[, Apohavādin], pp #
there should be[, i.e.,] when [there is], an assumption as the qualifier with regard to a
specific quality, even though it is classified in a different way[, i.e.,] as not conforming
to the qualifier, [then,] if that is so, everything indeed, blue etc., would be a qualifier of
everything. And therefore there would be no classification [of anything].
B.9 TS2 977cd (=ŚV Av 143cd)
[TS2 977cd] And588 it is not possible to show absence of another in the
referent of a sentence.
TSP2 ad TS2 977cd
[TSP2 384.15] Moreover, the referent of a sentence is assumed to have a single multi-
farious form, like the colour spotted black (kalmāṣa). Therefore, absence of others can
586In TS2 946 (=ŚV Av 87) it was argued that the mere existence of a qualifier is not sufficient for it
to be a qualifier of something. Rather, a qualifier (apoha) has to “colour” (√rañj) that which it qualifies
(in this case, exclusion has to qualify the object of conceptual cognition). TS2 946cd: svabuddhyā ra-
jyate yena viśeṣyaṃ tad viśeṣaṇam (A qualifier is that with which a qualified [thing] is coloured by the
cognition [of that qualifier] itself.)
587Cf. the argument in par. § 4 on page 14.
588This verse is also discussed in Hattori 1979: 69 f., as is Śāntarakṣita’s answer (TS2 1159–1161); for
the latter also see the discussion in Siderits 1985: 143 ff.
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not be shown in that [referent] because there is no cognition of an opposite [to this sen-
tence’s object] having a completed nature. And the absence of others having the form
of a distinction from non-Caitra etc., which is described [by you] in cases like “Caitra,
bring [the] cow!” etc., by grasping the parts [of the sentence], that is only the meaning
of a word, not the meaning of a sentence, because this [referent of a sentence], which
does not have parts, can not be divided. Thus, the definition of the word referent [as
exclusion] is not comprehensive.589
B.10 TS2 1004–1014
[TS2 1004] The590 reasons for the same judgement [about different things],
which were earlier explained [in the chapter called Sāmānyaparīkṣa],591
are similar objects such as [the herb] abhayā, which are differentiated from
others by [their] very (eva) nature.
[TS2 1005–8ab] To call that object’s reflection, which, based on these ob-
jects, appears in a conceptual cognition, [and] is ascertained just as the
object,592 even though not being of the essence (ātmatā) of an [external]
object, by the name “exclusion” is well founded, because of the difference
from another appearance, because of being the cause of the attainment of
real things that are differentiated from others, as well as (api) because of
[its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to other things],
and593 because the confused determine this [reflection] as identical in na-
ture (tādātmya) to the particular which is differentiated from that of another
class, [and] has that [reflection] as a result.
[TS2 1008cd] Also [to call] a particular that is the reason for this [reflection
by the name “exclusion” is reasonable], because [a particular] is differen-
tiated from others.
[TS2 1009] And the absolute negation is this: “A cow is not a non-cow.”
This is evidently (ativispaṣṭa) understood as exclusion from others.594
[TS2 1010] Amongst these [three sorts of exclusion], the first exclusion[,
a reflection in cognition,] is made known by words, because an awareness
that determines an external thing arises from a word.
[TS2 1011] And, given that, because of a word, there is an arisal of a cog-
nition possessing a reflection of that having that form[, i.e., of that deter-
mined as external,] this relationship of denoted and denoting has resulted
as having the nature of cause and effect.
589I.e., it does not cover all cases of language usage. If taken in a more technical sense as “does not
pervade”, avyāpin could mean that there are some cases where a linguistic referent (hetu) occurs without
exclusion as an object (sādhya).
590For these verses I follow the edition in Ishida 2011b: 201 ff., where they are also translated.
591See the references in Ishida 2011b: 201, fn. 10 (TS2 722–725).
592Read artha ity acc. Ishida 2011b: 201.
593Read ca instead of vā according to Ishida 2011b: 201.
594The translation follows the emendation in Ishida 2011b: 202 of ativispaṣṭa to iti vispaṣṭam.
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[TS2 1012–1014] And if this form is directly cognized in this way[, i.e.,
as the effect of a word,] also absolute negation is understood by implica-
tion, as “That of this nature is not of another nature.” Given that there is
a connection with real things, also a cognition of an excluded real thing
arises by implication (arthāt). Thereby, this [exclusion]595 is also figura-
tively called the proper referent of a word. But this twofold exclusion is
not directly expressed by words.
TSP2 ad TS2 1006–7
TSP2 391.12 | Now, why is there this designation “exclusion” for this [appearance in pp #
awareness]? | Because [of this question, Śāntarakṣita, in TS2 1006] said: “[because of up #
the difference] from another appearance” etc.. Due to four reasons this [appearance] is
named exclusion. Primarily, [this is the case because this appearance] itself appears as
different from other appearances imposed by other conceptual cognitions. [This is] be-
cause of such an etymological derivation: “It is excluded.”, thus exclusion; “exclusion
from another,” thus other-exclusion. But due to metaphorical usage [the name exclu-
sion is given to this appearance] for three reasons: either because of the imposition of
the property596 of an effect[, i.e., a particular,] onto a cause[, a conceptual cognition,]
which was stated by [the words] “due to being the reason for the attainment of a real
thing differentiated from others”; or because of the metaphorical usage of the property
of a cause[, a particular,] for an effect[, a conceptual cognition,] this being explained
by “as well as because of [its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to
other things],”—not connected[, i.e.,] not related to another, meaning that differentiat-
ed from another. Just this [quality of not being connected with others] is the means[,
or] the method, of a real thing [to produce a conceptual cognition], because, in virtue of
an experience of this [real thing], a conceptual cognition corresponding [to that thing]
arises. And [an appearance is rightly called exclusion] because [this appearance] is
determined by erring cognizers as one with the object excluded from that of another
class. This is the fourth cause. This is explained: “that of another class” etc. Its [de-
termination], i.e., [a determination] of the object’s reflection contained in conceptual
awareness. Well founded[, i.e., the word exclusion] occurs [for the reflection] together
with the fourfold foundation (nibandhana) explained with [the words] “because of a
difference from another appearance” etc. So [it is] well founded.
B.11 TS2 1060–1061
[TS2 1060–1061] And a real thing, differentiated from non-cow, is what is
cognized through the sense faculties. A reflection, imposed on it, is cog-
nized by self-awareness. And having observed this [differentiated thing],
a word is used for this [thing] by people. Also an experience of the con-
nection of this [word] with that [thing] clearly arises.
595ayam here refers to the kind of apoha being discussed, the one having the nature of a particular.
Cf. TSP2 393.23: ayam iti svalakṣaṇātmā. The import of the following “also” (api) is that the apoha
having the nature of negation is metaphorically called the word referent, TSP2 393.23–24: apiśabdāt
prasajyātmā ca.
596Read °dharmāropitād acc. to TSP1 instead of °dharmyāropitād in TSP2.
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TSP2 ad TS2 1060–1061
[TSP2 369.13] And what was said, “by sense perceptions” etc.597, is not established.
Showing this, [Śāntarakṣita] said: “And [a real thing] differentiated from non-cow”
etc. Here, first of all, exclusion, which has the nature of a particular, is indeed under-
stood by the sense faculties. And this exlcusion, which has the nature of a reflection of
the object, is established by the very perception self-awareness, because [it, exclusion
as a reflection,] is in reality of the nature of awareness. The uninflected word “and” [is
spoken] in order to include the meanings [of exclusion] not mentioned. Thereby, also
that [exclusion] having the nature of absolute negation is indeed understood by impli-
cation. [This] was shown [in TS2 1013a] with [the words] “That of this nature is not of
another nature.” Thus having observed, cognized,598 only this exclusion that has the
nature of a particular etc.,599 a word is used by people, but not [on having observed]
a real universal, because that is non-existent, and because it doesn’t appear to aware-
ness. A connection of this [word] with that [exclusion] alone is understood, upon the
observation of which people use a word; but no [connection] with another [exclusion is
understood], because of an overreaching consequence [that then a word would refer to
everything].600
B.12 TS2 1063–1064
[TS2 1063–1064] Cows and non-cows were fully established, because of
different judgements. But a word, not established itself, is used as one
wants.
For a different real thing does not, for [the sake of] an awareness [of this
thing], depend on the grasping of another [thing]. Therefore, this error of
dependence on each other is out of place here.
TSP2 ad TS2 1063–1064
[TSP2 407.23] And to that which was said [by Kumārila]: “And non-cow, which was
established, would be excluded” etc.,601 [Śāntarakṣita] said “Cows and non-cows” etc.
For it is on [their] very own [accord] that things like cows etc., which generate different
judgements, are correctly ascertained as separated.602 To these things normal speakers
apply, according to [their] wish, an unestablished word for the sake of every day lan-
guage usage. For it is so: if that having the nature of a different real thing depends,
for the sake of [its] cognition, on a grasping of another object, then there would be the
597This was said in TS2 938 = ŚV Av 78. Kumārila’s argument was that the exclusion of non-cow is
not apprehended by the sense faculties when a linguistic convention is being made, and that consequently
the word would not refer to anything.
598The pratīka ca is mentioned here acc. to TSP2 407.18, but I was not able to construe it with the rest
of the sentence. It is also not reflected in TSPD Ze 345a5 (TSPP Ḥe 430b3–4): de’i phyir raṅ gi mtsan
ñid la sogs pa’i ṅo bo’i sel ba ’di ñid mthoṅ na ste śes nas ’jig rten gyis (TSPP: gyi TSPD) sgra sbyor
gyi spyi dṅos por gyur pa la ni ma yin te.
599By “etc.” here understand exclusion in all senses just described.
600Cf. fn. fn. 581 on page 185.
601This was objected in ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS2 942–943, cf. section B.7 on page 185.
602Cf., e.g., PV 1 119 (trl. and notes trl. on page 162).
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error of mutual dependence. [But] inasfar as a different real thing is known without any
grasping of another [thing], the convention “cow and non-cow” is made as one wishes
given that this [different real thing] is established as separate [from other real things]
due to being the reason for a judgement [as having] a different form. So in what way
could there be a dependency on each other? “vittau” [in TS2 1064b means] “for the
sake of an awareness [of this thing].”
B.13 TS2 1097–1100
[TS2 1097] From603 words such as blue, lotus etc. only a single [object]
is determined. What is differentiated from non-blue, non-lotus, etc. is a
reflection [of a real thing in the mind].
[TS2 1098] But, a real thing endowed with exclusion from others is not
postulated by us as what is to be denoted. For us differentiation is not
different from the thing that is differentiated from others.604
[TS2 1099] Thus, this error of dependency does not, as [it does] for a genus,
come about for the [object of a word] as explained by the clear minded
[Dignāga].605 For there is no separation [of a word’s object, which is qual-
ified by exclusion, from the object excluded from others.]
[TS2 1100] Therefore a classification of being qualifier and qualified, [as
well as] of co-referentiality for the word referent exclusion is not contra-
dictory.
603This verse is an answer to ŚV Av 115–117 (corresponding to TS2 966–968). There, Kumārila had
pointed out that if it were only other-exclusion that a word refers to, words could not have co-reference
or be in a qualifier-qualified relation to each other.
604Read, respectively, bhāvān and anyā vyāvṛttir acc. to TSP 21a14 instead of ’bhāvān and anyād
vyāvṛttir acc. to TS1 1097cd, TS2 1098cd. Cf. also TSD Ze 41a1 (TSP Ḥe 50a4): gźan las ldog pa’i dṅos
po las | gźan pa’i ldog pa’i ṅa la med || .
605Read avadātamatiprokte acc. to TSP 21a14 instead of the avadātamiti prokte as printed in TS1
and TS2. Cf. TSPD Ze 41a2 (= TSPP Ḥe 50a6): blo gros bzaṅ pos gsuṅs pa ni. Also in the copy of
TS1 used by Erich Frauwallner, this phrase is emended to avadātamati-prokte, and accordingly also the
TSP’s pratīka “avadātamiti prokta iti.”
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KBhSA2 73.8–24
KBhSA2 73.8 | But both what is grasped and what is determined are negations of an- pp #
other, not real things, because, if [what is grasped and what is determined] concerns
(avagāhin) only the particular, there would arise no connection to an expression.606
| No, because the nature of determination is not fully understood. Even though a real up #
thing is not grasped, the fact that a conceptual cognition produces activity, like thought
etc.,607 is the fact that it is what determines. To be made the object of activity, even
though there is no appearance [of the real thing], is to be that which is determined.608
And this fact of being what is determined is correct only for the particular, nothing else,
because the activity of someone having an aim (arthin) has an effecting of [this] aim
(arthin) as its aim. And in determination [understood] in this way there is absolutely
no appearance of a particular. But, even though there is no appearance of it, there is no
unwanted consequence [such that] undifferentiated activity towards everything without
difference is instigated, because a capacity of activity toward that [particular] which is
indeed restricted, [and] excluded from others, even though not cognized, is observed,
since a restricted capacity follows from [a thing’s] own restricted form, as [this form
in turn] is generated from a restricted complex of causes.609 As, even though none [of
the possible effects] exist [when there is a seed], it is only from a seed that a shoot
arises, because the observed restricted relation of cause and effect can not be refuted.
Further, when there is a connection with an external object, [conceptual cognition] is a
valid means of cognition. But otherwise it is not a valid means of cognition. That is the
606An emendation of ’bhilāpasaṃsargānupapatter to ’bhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsānupapatteḥ
acc. to SJS2 10.26–28 is also possible, because the former could be taken as a mistaken reproduction of
an original that was like the latter, and because the latter is clearer (“...there arises no appearance that is
capable of a connection to an expression”). But since no variants are given here by Woo 1999: 71 f., and
the meaning is not much changed by the omission, the emendation is not necessary.
In any case, the passage is based onDharmottara’s DhAP: Cf. the references in Frauwallner 1937: 277,
fn. 3 to KBhSA1 33.10 f., and to NVTṬ 444.22. The translation by Bühnemann (1980) of the parallel in
SJS2 10.26–28 is: “Nämlich, was durch Schlußfolgerung erfaßt wird und was bestimmt wird, auch diese
beiden Verneinungen anderer (Bestimmungen) sind keine wirklichen Dinge, weil ein (Erkenntnis-)Bild
(pratibhāsa), das für eine Verbindung mit sprachlichem Ausdruck geeignet ist (abhilāpasaṃsargayo-
gya), nicht entsteht, wenn ein Bezug auf ein Einzelding vorliegt.”
607Emendation of mānasyādi to mānasādi acc. to Patil 2003: 247, fn. 17, following Woo 1999: 72,
n. 1.
608Patil 2009: 257, fn. 23, as well as Patil 2003: 247, fn. 17 read pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam instead of pra-
vṛttiviṣayīkṛtatvam. I take this to be only a typo, since neither RNĀ2 73.10 nor Woo 1999: 72 note any
variants to pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtatvam.
609The interpretation of this sequence of reasons follows Woo 1999: 188.
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difference [between valid and invalid conceptual cognition].
KBhSA2 73.18 In this way, also the third option is a result of hard effort,610 because,
even though a single real thing, [existing] at different times, is not really possible, per-
vasion of that to be established[, i.e., momentariness,] and that establishing [it, i.e., ex-
istence], which occur at all places and times, [and] are indeed differentiated from what
is not of that nature, is grasped by perception. For the object of perception is twofold,
grasped and determined. The mere thing that is differentiated from all that is not of its
form611 must not be the grasped object of perception because it does not appear directly,
but it certainly is the determined object, because, if there is a grasping of one part[, or
instance,] of this [mere thing], [perception] produces a conceptual cognition that ascer-
tains the pervasion of these two as such (mātra), like a continuum is ascertained when
a moment is grasped, and like, when only the form [of a pot] is grasped, a pot is ascer-
tained that [in fact] has the nature of a form, a taste, a smell, [and] a feel. For, [if it is]
otherwise, there is the unwanted consequence that all inference is ended.
610Acc. to Woo 1999: 189: “The third view is the objection in text [71.28–30] above that no logical
reason can have a relationship with momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) in terms of the proving property and
the property to be proved. ...Beginning with this passage, he [i.e., Ratnakīrti—PMA] demonstrates that
perception can grasp the pervasion (vyāpti) between existence and momentariness.”
The opponent there said:
[KBhSA2 71.28–30] yadvā sarvasyaiva hetoḥ kṣaṇikatve sādhye viruddhatvaṃ deśakā-
lāntarānanugame sādhyasādhanabhāvābhāvāt. anugame ca nānākālam ekam akṣaṇi-
kaṃ kṣaṇikatvena virudhyata iti. (Or else, if momentariness is to be established, each
and every reason is contradictory, because, given that [the reason] does not continue in
a different place or time, there is no relation of that which is to be established and that
which establishes it. But if [the reason] does continue, then one non-momentary [entity,
existing] at a different time, is in contradiction with momentariness.)
611An emendation of “°parāvṛttaṃ vastumātraṃ” (KBhSA2 73.20) to “°parāvṛttavastumātraṃ” ac-
cording to Woo 1999: 74, also adopted Patil 2009: 259, fn. 30, does not seem necessary to me.
194
Appendix D
A passage from Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s
Nyāyamañjarī
The paragraph headings are loose translations of the Sanskrit titles supplied by Kei
Kataoka.
D.1 NMK1 187.6–186.3
[3.4 A difference of exclusion, due to which words referring to exclusion are not
synonymous, is not known through a negation of cow] [NMK1 187.6] Now,612 if
only the negation (pratiṣedha) of cow is assumed as the cause for a categorization [of
cow particulars as cows], then, alas! (hanta) a previously established cow has to be
assumed, through the negation of which non-cows must be arrived at. And if the cow
that is previously established is known, what is the use of non-cows, or what is the aim
of this exclusion?
[3.4.1 Such a difference is not known through the negation of the particular cow] If
[it is said:] | The particular cow really is established earlier, | [the answer is:] No, be- pp #
up #cause due to that [particular] there is no common [language] usage. But if the universal
“cow” is earlier established, then the effort of exclusion is in vain (mudhā). This has
been explained.613
[3.4.2 It is not known through the negation of the commonness cow] Now, [if it is
said:] | The universal “cow” is established by the negation of non-cow, | then there is pp #
up #the unconquerable mutual dependence—through the negation of non-cow cow is estab-
lished, and through the establishment of cow the negation of non-cow is established.
612This passage appears within a discussion in which Bhaṭṭa Jayanta shows how Kumārila argues that,
in the apoha-theory, all words are synonymous (starting in NMK1 191.5). The Buddhist opponent then
tries to ward off that unwanted consequence with various arguments. Here, he is trying to argue that a
mere negation such as “This is not a cow.” is sufficient for collecting all cows into the class “cow.” Cf.
also the general summary of this section in Hattori 2006: 59 ff. (which does not focus on this particular
argument). I would like to thank Sanjit Kumar Sadhukhan (Rabindra Bharati University) for his kind
help in translating this passage during my visit to Kolkata in 2009.
613This seems to be referring to the argument in NMK1 192.6–7: tasminn aṅgīkṛte vā kim agovyāvṛtti-
kalpanāyāsena. (Alternatively, if this[, i.e., the universal cowness,] is accepted [by someone endorsing
apoha], then of what use is the exertion of contriving a differentiation from non-cow?)
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English Abstract
The aim of this dissertation is, first, to fixate a specific point in the development of a
philosophical theory, and, second, to give an overview of how it came to this point.
The theory in question is the Buddhist theory of other-exclusion (anyāpohavāda), a
theory about how radically unique particulars can be known to share common features.
The principal textual basis for this investigation is a text called Apohasiddhi (“Proof
of Exclusion”), written by the Buddhist monk Ratnakīrti (fl. 1000–1050 CE). Ratnakīrti
lived in the north-east of modern-day India, during the last vibrant phase of the Buddhist
epistemological tradition in India and approximately 500 years after Dignāga (480–540
CE), the founder of that tradition.
To achieve the first aim it was necessary to critically edit, translate and analyse the
Apohasiddhi in order to determine, as precisely as possible, the form of the Buddhist
theory of other-exclusion in its last Indian phase. For the critical edition five manu-
scripts were compared, three of which had not been edited before.
An answer to the second question was sought by tracing the Apohasiddhi’s central
points in texts of Ratnakīrti’s Buddhist predecessors, and comparing their arguments to
those of Ratnakīrti. This was augmented by a study that tries to reconstruct the theory
of other-exclusion as understood by Ratnakīrti.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, einen bestimmten Punkt in der Entwicklung einer
philosophischen Theorie festzustellen, und einen Überblick darüber zu geben, wie die
Entwicklung bis zu diesem Punkt verlief.
Diese Theorie ist die buddhistische Lehre der Sonderung von anderem (anyāpoha-
vāda). Sie erklärt, wie völlig voneinander verschiedene Einzeldinge als gemeinsame
Merkmale besitzende erkannt werden können.
Die Basis für diese Untersuchung war die Apohasiddhi (“Nachweis der Son-
derung”), ein Text des buddhistischen Mönchs Ratnakīrti (fl. 1000–1050 u. Z.).
Er lebte im Nordosten des heutigen Indien während der letzten indischen Phase der
buddhistischen logisch-epistemologischen Tradition, und somit ca. 500 Jahre nach
Dignāga (480–540 u. Z.), dem Gründer dieser Tradition.
Um das erste Ziel zu erreichen, mußte eine kritische Edition, eine annotierte Über-
setzung und eine gründliche Analyse der Apohasiddhi erstellt werden. Damit ließ sich
mit einiger Sicherheit feststellen, welche Form die Lehre der Sonderung zu Ratnakīrtis
Zeit erhalten hatte. Für die kritische Edition wurden fünf Manuskripte verwendet, von
denen drei bisher noch nicht ediert worden waren.
Eine Antwort zur zweiten Frage wurde gesucht indem die Hauptpunkte der Apo-
hasiddhi in den Texten von Ratnakīrtis buddhistischen Vorgängern verfolgt, und die
Unterschiede bzw. Gemeinsamkeiten in deren Argumenten festgehalten wurden. Dies
wurde durch eine Studie ergänzt, die die Lehre der Sonderung, wie sie Ratnakīrti ver-
stand, nachzuzeichnen versuchte.
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